Editor’s note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been speaker of the Iranian parliament since 2020, when extreme vetting by religious authorities disqualified most candidates from Iran’s waning reformist camp. On May 23, 2023, Ghalibaf, a former mayor of Tehran and member of a group that calls itself “neo-fundamentalist” was elected to another one-year term but by a smaller margin than previously.
The 290-seat parliament is dominated by hardliners, who hold about 250 seats. However, the majority is not unified and is split among supporters of Ghalibaf and followers of the so-called Resistance Front, an extreme-right political party that follows the teachings of the late Grand Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. It is filled with current cabinet members as well as top officials in the previous hardline government of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
When Ghalibaf was first elected as speaker, he won 230 votes and nine of his supporters were chosen for an 11-member board that presides over the parliament. In 2021, he retained 230 votes but lost the majority on the board to the Resistance Front, holding on to only five seats. In 2022, his overall support fell to 186 and members of his political group won only four seats on the board. This year, he held the speakership with 210 votes but kept only two seats on the board.
Parliament is not the only scene of a hard-right takeover in Iran. Ebrahim Raisi was elected president in 2021 with the lowest turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic, a result of the elimination of any plausible rivals. Raisi’s interior minister, Ahmad Vahidi has ordered provincial governors to “speed up the cleansing of the mid-level managers and directors remaining” from the previous administration of President Hassan Rouhani. Provincial chapters of the Resistance Front welcomed the move and urgedRaisi to replace incumbents with new, “truly revolutionary” cadre.
The purges come amid an even more important victory for the hard-liners. On May 22, 2023, Ali Shamkhani stepped down as secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security and was replaced by Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who is affiliated with the Resistance Front. Shamkhani is a decorated admiral and former defense minister with a long history of service to the Islamic Republic but spent most of his tenure under reformist and pragmatist presidents.
Changes may not stop with Shamkhani. Reformist media have predicted that Raisi’s cabinet — which has already seen a number of changes due to ministerial incompetence — may see purges of two vice presidents and their replacement by more extreme figures.
All these shifts appear to be preparation for elections scheduled for March 1, 2024 for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, an 88-seat body of clerics that in theory determines who will succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assembly will sit for eight years, meaning that Khamenei, who recently turned 84, would be 93 by the time the body ends its term — assuming he lives that long.
At present there are only two likely candidates for succession, Raisi, who has lost favor because of his poor performance as president, and Khamenei’s second son Mojtaba.
The Resistance Front is a staunch supporter of Mojtaba Khamenei and its latest victories are the outcome of years of careful planning.
The present Assembly of Experts was elected in 2016. Hardliners control 50 seats and more moderate figures hold the remainder. However, Assembly decisions require a two-thirds majority, so the rightists need another nine seats to be assured of power.
Hard-liners are counting on a continuing reduction in voter turnout to boost their control. Iranians had become alienated from the political system long before the outbreak of massive protests following the death in police custody of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in September 2022 for the “crime” of wearing an inadequately conservative head covering. Election turnout dropped from more than 70 percent of registered voters in 2013 presidential elections to less than 48 percent in 2021 with 13 percent of the ballots spoiled or otherwise invalid. The hardliner camp attracts at most 20 percent of eligible voters, but they are well organized and turn out in blocks unlike other Iranians who need stronger incentives and more attractive candidates. However, the smaller the turnout, the better it is for the Resistance Front and Mojtaba Khamenei.
Khamenei and his son have worked hard to prepare the ground for a smooth transition to power to the top job in Iran. They have marginalized moderates and reformists so that these groups have no chance of winning because of low turnout. Khamenei and Mojtaba have also driven out the few remaining moderates like Shamkhani, supporters of former speaker Ali Larijani and even the Ghalibaf camp. Now they are about to complete the purge at the provincial level.
Hypothetically, if Mojtaba succeeds to the top job, he will require a fully supportive and unified hierarchy to guarantee a smooth transition. His best-case scenario is a situation in which there is only one voice coming from all the institutions of the regime, including security entities and the three elected bodies — parliament, the Assembly of Experts, and the executive branch.
Iran Further Narrows Scope for Political Participation as it Prepares for Key Elections in 2024
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Hard-liners are counting on a continuing reduction in voter turnout next year to boost their control. Iranians had become alienated from the political system long before the outbreak of massive protests following the death in police custody of a young woman in September 2022 for the “crime” of wearing an inadequately conservative head covering.
Editor’s note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been speaker of the Iranian parliament since 2020, when extreme vetting by religious authorities disqualified most candidates from Iran’s waning reformist camp. On May 23, 2023, Ghalibaf, a former mayor of Tehran and member of a group that calls itself “neo-fundamentalist” was elected to another one-year term but by a smaller margin than previously.
The 290-seat parliament is dominated by hardliners, who hold about 250 seats. However, the majority is not unified and is split among supporters of Ghalibaf and followers of the so-called Resistance Front, an extreme-right political party that follows the teachings of the late Grand Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. It is filled with current cabinet members as well as top officials in the previous hardline government of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
When Ghalibaf was first elected as speaker, he won 230 votes and nine of his supporters were chosen for an 11-member board that presides over the parliament. In 2021, he retained 230 votes but lost the majority on the board to the Resistance Front, holding on to only five seats. In 2022, his overall support fell to 186 and members of his political group won only four seats on the board. This year, he held the speakership with 210 votes but kept only two seats on the board.
Parliament is not the only scene of a hard-right takeover in Iran. Ebrahim Raisi was elected president in 2021 with the lowest turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic, a result of the elimination of any plausible rivals. Raisi’s interior minister, Ahmad Vahidi has ordered provincial governors to “speed up the cleansing of the mid-level managers and directors remaining” from the previous administration of President Hassan Rouhani. Provincial chapters of the Resistance Front welcomed the move and urgedRaisi to replace incumbents with new, “truly revolutionary” cadre.
The purges come amid an even more important victory for the hard-liners. On May 22, 2023, Ali Shamkhani stepped down as secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security and was replaced by Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who is affiliated with the Resistance Front. Shamkhani is a decorated admiral and former defense minister with a long history of service to the Islamic Republic but spent most of his tenure under reformist and pragmatist presidents.
Changes may not stop with Shamkhani. Reformist media have predicted that Raisi’s cabinet — which has already seen a number of changes due to ministerial incompetence — may see purges of two vice presidents and their replacement by more extreme figures.
All these shifts appear to be preparation for elections scheduled for March 1, 2024 for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, an 88-seat body of clerics that in theory determines who will succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assembly will sit for eight years, meaning that Khamenei, who recently turned 84, would be 93 by the time the body ends its term — assuming he lives that long.
At present there are only two likely candidates for succession, Raisi, who has lost favor because of his poor performance as president, and Khamenei’s second son Mojtaba.
The Resistance Front is a staunch supporter of Mojtaba Khamenei and its latest victories are the outcome of years of careful planning.
The present Assembly of Experts was elected in 2016. Hardliners control 50 seats and more moderate figures hold the remainder. However, Assembly decisions require a two-thirds majority, so the rightists need another nine seats to be assured of power.
Hard-liners are counting on a continuing reduction in voter turnout to boost their control. Iranians had become alienated from the political system long before the outbreak of massive protests following the death in police custody of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in September 2022 for the “crime” of wearing an inadequately conservative head covering. Election turnout dropped from more than 70 percent of registered voters in 2013 presidential elections to less than 48 percent in 2021 with 13 percent of the ballots spoiled or otherwise invalid. The hardliner camp attracts at most 20 percent of eligible voters, but they are well organized and turn out in blocks unlike other Iranians who need stronger incentives and more attractive candidates. However, the smaller the turnout, the better it is for the Resistance Front and Mojtaba Khamenei.
Khamenei and his son have worked hard to prepare the ground for a smooth transition to power to the top job in Iran. They have marginalized moderates and reformists so that these groups have no chance of winning because of low turnout. Khamenei and Mojtaba have also driven out the few remaining moderates like Shamkhani, supporters of former speaker Ali Larijani and even the Ghalibaf camp. Now they are about to complete the purge at the provincial level.
Hypothetically, if Mojtaba succeeds to the top job, he will require a fully supportive and unified hierarchy to guarantee a smooth transition. His best-case scenario is a situation in which there is only one voice coming from all the institutions of the regime, including security entities and the three elected bodies — parliament, the Assembly of Experts, and the executive branch.
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