The pending resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated by China, Iraq and Oman, is a welcome signal that diplomacy and dialogue still have a place in the Middle East.
There are prospects for de-escalation on a host of issues, chief among them the war in Yemen. There is to be a revival of previous bilateral agreements, such as the 2001 Security and Cooperation Agreement, which dealt with money laundering and fighting terrorism as well as pledges by Iran and Saudi Arabia to stop interfering in each other’s internal affairs. Iran is seeking to broaden détente by also restoring relations with Bahrain, while Saudi Arabia has promised to restore relations with Iran ally Syria after Ramadan. China may move to consolidate the agreement by hosting a GCC–Iran summit.
The deal has already produced economic benefits. Iran’s currency has strengthened, although there are questions about Saudi promises to invest quickly in Iran. Saudi Arabia is keen to re-establish a semblance of stability in the region to safeguard its investments and rollout of its Vision 2030 to transform its economy from total dependence on oil.
Saudi–Iran normalization may also give a boost to nuclear non-proliferation. Although the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is moribund, Iran may forswear provocative new steps for the time being in order to safeguard its economy and avoid provoking Saudi nuclear hedging.
There is, of course, no guarantee that renewed cooperation will translate into a broader and long-lasting reconciliation. Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, relations between the Sunni and Shiite powers have been marred by sectarian and zero-sum geostrategic calculations. Bilateral relations have been undermined by hajj stampedes, executions, the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016 (which followed the Saudi execution of a prominent Shiite cleric and led to the Kingdom and other allied states cutting diplomatic relations with Iran), as well as aerial attacks and bombings. Further cooperation will therefore be essential to address the full range of concerns and risks that these states continue to face.
One area which could support Saudi–Iran relations going forward is to reach an agreement on judicial measures aimed at limiting sectarian grievances, coupled with a recommitment to diplomatic norms under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Progress could extend to an understanding of regional roles, rights, and responsibilities, forming the pillars for a new regional security architecture.
Like the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), creation of a new regional security forum could develop organically through continued interactions. An expanded process including more states, as well as the inclusion of traditional and nontraditional security challenges which have already been considered in Track II dialogues, could contribute to such a forum and reinforce a stronger sense of regional identity.
One question in the aftermath of the announcement of the Saudi-Iran deal is what impact it will have on the prospect of Saudi normalization with Israel. The Biden administration has been promoting expanding the Abraham Accords, which normalized Israeli relations with several Arab countries under the Trump administration. Saudi Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman is said to have asked the Biden administration for additional security guarantees, help with developing a civilian nuclear program, and fewer restrictions on arms sales in return for opening formal ties with Israel.
His request dovetails with the U.S. desire to conclude a so-called “123 agreement” with the Kingdom establishing a legally binding framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation, including prohibition of enrichment, reprocessing, and the unauthorized transfer of nuclear material. The Saudis would also need to conclude a new safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
However, the U.S. Congress is unlikely to provide the assurances the Saudis seek. Saudi normalization with Israel would also contradict the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, inspired by the Saudi leadership and endorsed shortly after by the Arab League. This links normalization with full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, a “just settlement” of the Palestinian refugee problem, and East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state.
Indeed, Prince Turki al-Faisal, formerly Saudi ambassador to the US, stated on March 14, 2023 that the Kingdom would continue to adhere to this strategy, suggesting a continuing Saudi reluctance to normalize ties with Israel, particularly under the current right-wing Israeli government. The Kingdom might also fear that it could be targeted by Iran should Israel—with or without the United States—attack Iranian nuclear facilities.
Despite Saudi efforts to hedge its foreign policy by reaching out to China and working with Russia primarily to curb oil production, the Kingdom remains dependent on the U.S. for security. Fundamentally, Saudi–Iran ties will be hampered by U.S.–Iran tensions at a time when there is little forward momentum on the nuclear front and Iran faces pressure for its growing military ties to Russia and its repression of internal dissent.
Iranian leadership remains divided and under internal and external duress, raising the likelihood that Tehran will continue its hostility toward the U.S. and U.S. partners. This includes support for attacks by proxies and other non-state actors, as shown by a recent flareup in Syria that killed an American contractor. More instability is hard to avoid. The task is to build on past agreements with new stopgaps to limit cycles of conflict and address emerging areas of risk.
Dr. Robert Mason is author of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign Policy and Strategic Alliances in an Uncertain World. He tweets @Dr_Robert_Mason.
How to Build on the Saudi-Iran Reset
By Robert Mason
In Middle East & North Africa
The pending resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated by China, Iraq and Oman, is a welcome signal that diplomacy and dialogue still have a place in the Middle East.
There are prospects for de-escalation on a host of issues, chief among them the war in Yemen. There is to be a revival of previous bilateral agreements, such as the 2001 Security and Cooperation Agreement, which dealt with money laundering and fighting terrorism as well as pledges by Iran and Saudi Arabia to stop interfering in each other’s internal affairs. Iran is seeking to broaden détente by also restoring relations with Bahrain, while Saudi Arabia has promised to restore relations with Iran ally Syria after Ramadan. China may move to consolidate the agreement by hosting a GCC–Iran summit.
The deal has already produced economic benefits. Iran’s currency has strengthened, although there are questions about Saudi promises to invest quickly in Iran. Saudi Arabia is keen to re-establish a semblance of stability in the region to safeguard its investments and rollout of its Vision 2030 to transform its economy from total dependence on oil.
Saudi–Iran normalization may also give a boost to nuclear non-proliferation. Although the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is moribund, Iran may forswear provocative new steps for the time being in order to safeguard its economy and avoid provoking Saudi nuclear hedging.
There is, of course, no guarantee that renewed cooperation will translate into a broader and long-lasting reconciliation. Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, relations between the Sunni and Shiite powers have been marred by sectarian and zero-sum geostrategic calculations. Bilateral relations have been undermined by hajj stampedes, executions, the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016 (which followed the Saudi execution of a prominent Shiite cleric and led to the Kingdom and other allied states cutting diplomatic relations with Iran), as well as aerial attacks and bombings. Further cooperation will therefore be essential to address the full range of concerns and risks that these states continue to face.
One area which could support Saudi–Iran relations going forward is to reach an agreement on judicial measures aimed at limiting sectarian grievances, coupled with a recommitment to diplomatic norms under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Progress could extend to an understanding of regional roles, rights, and responsibilities, forming the pillars for a new regional security architecture.
Like the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), creation of a new regional security forum could develop organically through continued interactions. An expanded process including more states, as well as the inclusion of traditional and nontraditional security challenges which have already been considered in Track II dialogues, could contribute to such a forum and reinforce a stronger sense of regional identity.
One question in the aftermath of the announcement of the Saudi-Iran deal is what impact it will have on the prospect of Saudi normalization with Israel. The Biden administration has been promoting expanding the Abraham Accords, which normalized Israeli relations with several Arab countries under the Trump administration. Saudi Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman is said to have asked the Biden administration for additional security guarantees, help with developing a civilian nuclear program, and fewer restrictions on arms sales in return for opening formal ties with Israel.
His request dovetails with the U.S. desire to conclude a so-called “123 agreement” with the Kingdom establishing a legally binding framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation, including prohibition of enrichment, reprocessing, and the unauthorized transfer of nuclear material. The Saudis would also need to conclude a new safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
However, the U.S. Congress is unlikely to provide the assurances the Saudis seek. Saudi normalization with Israel would also contradict the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, inspired by the Saudi leadership and endorsed shortly after by the Arab League. This links normalization with full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, a “just settlement” of the Palestinian refugee problem, and East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state.
Indeed, Prince Turki al-Faisal, formerly Saudi ambassador to the US, stated on March 14, 2023 that the Kingdom would continue to adhere to this strategy, suggesting a continuing Saudi reluctance to normalize ties with Israel, particularly under the current right-wing Israeli government. The Kingdom might also fear that it could be targeted by Iran should Israel—with or without the United States—attack Iranian nuclear facilities.
Despite Saudi efforts to hedge its foreign policy by reaching out to China and working with Russia primarily to curb oil production, the Kingdom remains dependent on the U.S. for security. Fundamentally, Saudi–Iran ties will be hampered by U.S.–Iran tensions at a time when there is little forward momentum on the nuclear front and Iran faces pressure for its growing military ties to Russia and its repression of internal dissent.
Iranian leadership remains divided and under internal and external duress, raising the likelihood that Tehran will continue its hostility toward the U.S. and U.S. partners. This includes support for attacks by proxies and other non-state actors, as shown by a recent flareup in Syria that killed an American contractor. More instability is hard to avoid. The task is to build on past agreements with new stopgaps to limit cycles of conflict and address emerging areas of risk.
Dr. Robert Mason is author of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign Policy and Strategic Alliances in an Uncertain World. He tweets @Dr_Robert_Mason.
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