Mediation versus Facilitation
In the Chinese foreign policy lexicon, Beijing’s policy toward regional conflicts is summarized as “persuading for peace and promoting dialogues” (劝和促谈). People have seen this in the case of China’s involvement in Myanmar’s ethnic reconciliation process, the Afghan peace process under the previous Ghani government, the Syrian civil war, as well as the conflict in South Sudan, to name a few. China has a track record of inviting opposition groups in these conflicts to China for policy consultation and dialogues. For example, it hosted peace talks in China’s Yunnan province between Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups and the Burmese military, and in Urumqi between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul-based government officials. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Foreign Minister has expressed on multiple occasions that China’s basic attitude toward the conflict is to persuade for peace and to promote dialogue.
Although China would like to claim the role of a mediator in these cases, its actual role has been limited to dialogue facilitation. On Afghanistan, Myanmar, and North Korea, China has played the role of convener and host of the dialogue, such as the cases above and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. In the cases of Myanmar and North Korea, there are even examples of China using its influence to ensure the attendance of parties to the conflict. However, beyond that, China’s role remains largely faciliatory in terms of ensuring dialogue occurs.
The most important distinction between mediation and facilitation lies in substantive contributions to and stakes in the solution of the conflict. Being a mediator implies being a broker. It includes making substantive and practical proposals that the parties to the conflict could accept or negotiate from. It also includes providing incentives when such proposals hit roadblocks, and providing implicit or explicit endorsement of the settlement, thereby acting as a designated or de facto guarantor of the agreement reached. It substantively ties the mediator close to the reconciliation process and the eventual peace deal.
But China almost never gets involved in the substantive resolution of conflicts as a broker, instead approaching the peace process as at most facilitator. China’s record of mediation in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and North Korea demonstrates a strong and almost exclusive preference for dialogue as a process while offering scant substantive contribution to the resolution of the conflict. China has consistently refrained from making concrete proposals on the content of peace deals, especially when concessions are needed to reach a settlement. It refrains from providing incentives to induce such concessions, and most importantly refrains from applying pressure when negotiations run into stalemate. In the case of the Myanmar Nationwide Ceasefire Accord, the Chinese special envoy attended the signing ceremony as a witness. While people assumed it would equate to a de factor guarantee of the deal, China did not get involved when the deal was later violated. In other words, China facilitates dialogues, but is detached from the negotiation and the result.
The reason for China’s faciliatory rather than mediatory involvement in conflict resolution, despite its high-profile claims, is also simple. China wants the credit and glory associated with ending conflict but not the responsibility or blame if the process fails to reach settlement or the settlement fails to bring peace. Substantive proposals and their imposition risks Beijing violating the its own non-interference principle. Likewise, the potential failure of a peace deal, which is common in conflict issues, exposes China to criticism and skepticism over its credibility and leadership.
Preconditions for China to Mediate in Ukraine
Having clarified the differences between mediation and facilitation, one can assert with reasonable confidence that China’s “mediation” role in the Ukraine crisis will be different from what the West thought it would be. Observers had had high hopes for China to mediate and bring the conflict to a speedy resolution. Because China has significant leverage over Russia, especially through trade, the assumption is that China is the party with the most practical capacity to persuade Russia.
However, China very rarely uses its military or economic power to coerce a party to a conflict to make substantive compromise and adopt a certain position—that would damage China’s relationship with either or both parties to the conflict. More importantly, China believes that peace must happen organically; an “imposed” solution will not create peace. Therefore, even if dialogue facilitation is important when dialogues are scarce, we should have realistic expectations for what China will deliver. The “mediation” envisioned by China most likely implies the hosting of dialogues and/or facilitation of communications when the dialogue fails to occur. It does not suggest that China will propose a peace deal, let alone apply pressure on Russia to incentivize concessions.
That brings the question of when and how China will play a mediation/facilitation role. On the most basic level, China will need Russia to extend an invitation or at least express its willingness for China to facilitate a dialogue. So far, Ukraine has asked China to play that role, but Russia has not. Following the principle of host-country consent, without Russia’s agreement and invitation for China to mediate, China is not likely to make an offer Russia may not accept.
Secondly, due to the concern about its image, credibility, and potential liability, the Chinese will want to have a reasonable chance of success before they plunge into the effort, which means an understanding of both parties’ bottom lines coming into negotiations. However, Russia has held its cards so close to its chest that Beijing does not yet have a clear picture of Russia’s endgame. Once again, this demonstrates the limitation of China and Russia’s so-called strategic alignment.
Conclusion
Despite the limited potential for China to play a real mediation role, Beijing still has ample venues to express its positions and concerns with Russia bilaterally and privately, especially when the perceived costs of the continued war significantly outweigh its benefits for both China and Russia. China’s mediation is unlikely to render the result desired by the rest of the world. Cost imposition on both China and Russia to change their calculus will be the more practical way forward.
The War in Ukraine: China as the Mediator?
By Yun Sun
In China
The war in Ukraine has been ongoing for more than 50 days now. While China made its offer to mediate as early as March, the offer has not resulted in anything that amounts to a real mediation. Questions are rampant as to what role China will play to mediate and when. To answer these questions, it is important to understand the distinction between mediation and facilitation and how China’s role in conflict mediation has mostly been faciliatory. Furthermore, it is also important to understand the external preconditions, especially Russia’s attitude, for China to be involved either as a mediator or facilitator.
Mediation versus Facilitation
In the Chinese foreign policy lexicon, Beijing’s policy toward regional conflicts is summarized as “persuading for peace and promoting dialogues” (劝和促谈). People have seen this in the case of China’s involvement in Myanmar’s ethnic reconciliation process, the Afghan peace process under the previous Ghani government, the Syrian civil war, as well as the conflict in South Sudan, to name a few. China has a track record of inviting opposition groups in these conflicts to China for policy consultation and dialogues. For example, it hosted peace talks in China’s Yunnan province between Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups and the Burmese military, and in Urumqi between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul-based government officials. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese Foreign Minister has expressed on multiple occasions that China’s basic attitude toward the conflict is to persuade for peace and to promote dialogue.
Although China would like to claim the role of a mediator in these cases, its actual role has been limited to dialogue facilitation. On Afghanistan, Myanmar, and North Korea, China has played the role of convener and host of the dialogue, such as the cases above and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. In the cases of Myanmar and North Korea, there are even examples of China using its influence to ensure the attendance of parties to the conflict. However, beyond that, China’s role remains largely faciliatory in terms of ensuring dialogue occurs.
The most important distinction between mediation and facilitation lies in substantive contributions to and stakes in the solution of the conflict. Being a mediator implies being a broker. It includes making substantive and practical proposals that the parties to the conflict could accept or negotiate from. It also includes providing incentives when such proposals hit roadblocks, and providing implicit or explicit endorsement of the settlement, thereby acting as a designated or de facto guarantor of the agreement reached. It substantively ties the mediator close to the reconciliation process and the eventual peace deal.
But China almost never gets involved in the substantive resolution of conflicts as a broker, instead approaching the peace process as at most facilitator. China’s record of mediation in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and North Korea demonstrates a strong and almost exclusive preference for dialogue as a process while offering scant substantive contribution to the resolution of the conflict. China has consistently refrained from making concrete proposals on the content of peace deals, especially when concessions are needed to reach a settlement. It refrains from providing incentives to induce such concessions, and most importantly refrains from applying pressure when negotiations run into stalemate. In the case of the Myanmar Nationwide Ceasefire Accord, the Chinese special envoy attended the signing ceremony as a witness. While people assumed it would equate to a de factor guarantee of the deal, China did not get involved when the deal was later violated. In other words, China facilitates dialogues, but is detached from the negotiation and the result.
The reason for China’s faciliatory rather than mediatory involvement in conflict resolution, despite its high-profile claims, is also simple. China wants the credit and glory associated with ending conflict but not the responsibility or blame if the process fails to reach settlement or the settlement fails to bring peace. Substantive proposals and their imposition risks Beijing violating the its own non-interference principle. Likewise, the potential failure of a peace deal, which is common in conflict issues, exposes China to criticism and skepticism over its credibility and leadership.
Preconditions for China to Mediate in Ukraine
Having clarified the differences between mediation and facilitation, one can assert with reasonable confidence that China’s “mediation” role in the Ukraine crisis will be different from what the West thought it would be. Observers had had high hopes for China to mediate and bring the conflict to a speedy resolution. Because China has significant leverage over Russia, especially through trade, the assumption is that China is the party with the most practical capacity to persuade Russia.
However, China very rarely uses its military or economic power to coerce a party to a conflict to make substantive compromise and adopt a certain position—that would damage China’s relationship with either or both parties to the conflict. More importantly, China believes that peace must happen organically; an “imposed” solution will not create peace. Therefore, even if dialogue facilitation is important when dialogues are scarce, we should have realistic expectations for what China will deliver. The “mediation” envisioned by China most likely implies the hosting of dialogues and/or facilitation of communications when the dialogue fails to occur. It does not suggest that China will propose a peace deal, let alone apply pressure on Russia to incentivize concessions.
That brings the question of when and how China will play a mediation/facilitation role. On the most basic level, China will need Russia to extend an invitation or at least express its willingness for China to facilitate a dialogue. So far, Ukraine has asked China to play that role, but Russia has not. Following the principle of host-country consent, without Russia’s agreement and invitation for China to mediate, China is not likely to make an offer Russia may not accept.
Secondly, due to the concern about its image, credibility, and potential liability, the Chinese will want to have a reasonable chance of success before they plunge into the effort, which means an understanding of both parties’ bottom lines coming into negotiations. However, Russia has held its cards so close to its chest that Beijing does not yet have a clear picture of Russia’s endgame. Once again, this demonstrates the limitation of China and Russia’s so-called strategic alignment.
Conclusion
Despite the limited potential for China to play a real mediation role, Beijing still has ample venues to express its positions and concerns with Russia bilaterally and privately, especially when the perceived costs of the continued war significantly outweigh its benefits for both China and Russia. China’s mediation is unlikely to render the result desired by the rest of the world. Cost imposition on both China and Russia to change their calculus will be the more practical way forward.
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