With tensions growing between the United States and other nuclear-armed rivals, it is easy to forget that non-state actors continue to pose a serious nuclear threat. Yet, despite continuing evidence of this threat, in 2021, the headwinds confronting those working to reduce it only got stronger.
Efforts to reduce nuclear terrorism risks have entered a new era. Nuclear operators must defend against threats they have been aware of for decades—like well-funded and sophisticated non-state actors with global reach, malicious insiders, corruption—while learning to be resilient against new threats, such as those posed by adversaries employing new technologies or evolving pathogens that could cripple security forces.
Meanwhile, high-level efforts to prevent nuclear theft and sabotage have lost momentum. Unlike previous decades where preventing nuclear terrorism was an international priority, this new era lacks the same level of attention and focus. Lost are the deep bilateral cooperation between the nuclear-armed states like that which existed between the United States and Russia; the high-level multilateral engagement of the nuclear security summits; and the urgent collective drive to strengthen security at commercial and government nuclear facilities that occurred after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While there were glimmers of hope throughout 2021, there are challenges that need to be addressed if momentum behind strengthening international nuclear security is to be restored.
A Nuclear Security Emergency Continues
Nuclear operators, regulators, and international institutions are now entering the third year in which they must navigate the global crisis caused by COVID-19. Despite a better global understanding of the COVID-19 disease and the growing availability of new tools to fight the disease such as vaccines and antiviral therapies throughout 2021, the effects of the pandemic continued to challenge nuclear security efforts. Just as quickly as institutions have adapted, they have had to face new risks and new challenges, especially in an age where operations are increasingly reliant on digital systems and employees are working remotely.
The socio-economic stressors of COVID-19—combined with contentious government-imposed pandemic policies—have caused some experts to fear the threat of insiders at nuclear facilities is increasing.In the United States, policies like federal vaccine mandates for nuclear operators and regulators have the potential to reinforce physical protection of facilities and mitigate vulnerabilities—such as delayed inspections—relating to staffing shortages resulting from illness or potential exposure to infection.However, personnel at nuclear facilities in countries like the United States have not been immune to vaccine skepticism that has taken hold in some parts of the country, with similar anti-vaccine pushback to be expected in other countries if employer mandates are imposed.These movements could result in increased viral outbreaks that impact nuclear security implementation. Moreover, recent events in the United States have highlighted the insider threat domestic violent extremists might pose to nuclear facilities.
COVID-19 has also impacted efforts to bolster the legal architecture and multilateral cooperation supporting international nuclear security efforts, with the delay of both the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) and the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A) RevCon. There have been other disruptions such as the inability of the Nuclear Security Contact Group to convene, intended to be one of the key mechanisms driving nuclear security efforts forward.
Despite these challenges, there were important successes in strengthening multilateral efforts to reduce risks in 2021. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) broke ground on its Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre, a facility set to become operational in 2023, designed to strengthen countries’ abilities to tackle nuclear terrorism and meet increased demand for nuclear security training from member states.The IAEA also published Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 42-G Computer Security for Nuclear Security to support national implementation of cybersecurity measures at nuclear facilities, leading to a more comprehensive nuclear security regime. This new guidance document is particularly important given growing concerns about cyberattacks, as well as increasing reliance on digital systems at nuclear facilities. The IAEA also resumed its International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, which are the only international mechanism for nuclear security peer review. In 2021, the IAEA conducted six IPPAS missions in Niger, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Turkey, Czech Republic, and Senegal, returning to similar annual numbers of missions undertaken prior to the pandemic.
Countries also took meaningful steps to strengthen their own nuclear security. In the United States, the U.S. military bolstered its protection against insider threats and strengthened its cyber security requirements.Countries tested new systems to protect against emerging technological threats.Numerous countries announced exercises or trainings. Ukraine opened a new center for training guards protecting nuclear facilities.
There was also an important achievement in material minimization, building on decades of work from stakeholders around the world in government, civil society, industry, and elsewhere. The U.S. Department of Energy certified a sufficient worldwide supply of medical isotope molybdenum-99 produced without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), triggering a congressionally mandated ban on exports of HEU for foreign medical isotope production.
There continued to be high level support for nuclear security throughout the year. President Biden voiced support for strengthening nuclear security early on in his presidency, announcing at the Munich Security Conference in February his intent to “lock down fissile and radiological material to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring or using them.”In April, the G7 emphasized material minimization as a priority, stating, “[w]e affirm our commitment to minimise Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stocks globally, and encourage states with civil stocks of HEU to further reduce or eliminate them where economically and technically feasible” and urging universal adherence to and implementation of the CPPNM/A and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
At the IAEA’s 65th General Conference, Director General Rafael Grossi noted the need for more sustainable funding for nuclear security programs at the IAEA, citing the risks posed by the reliance of such critical programs on voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.Director General Grossi also noted preparations for the CPPNM/A RevCon.
Looking Ahead
In 2022, there will be important opportunities for countries to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture and to demonstrate leadership in strengthening global nuclear security. Critical moments in 2022 for nuclear security include the delayed CPPNM/A RevCon and NPT RevCon, scheduled for March and August, respectively (assuming that new variants do not once again require further delay), and the Biden administration’s expected release of its Nuclear Posture Review.
Although nuclear security is not explicitly covered by the NPT, the RevCon itself is an opportunity for states parties to highlight how nuclear security contributes to the overall nuclear nonproliferation regime.Although nuclear security has not been a major element of past RevCons, seven actions in the 2010 NPT Action Plan—actions that state parties agreed to take—are directly related to nuclear security.The Preparatory Committee for the upcoming NPT RevCon received a working paper from the “Vienna Group of Ten” highlighting the importance of physical protection and cybersecurity of nuclear materials and facilities and drawing attention to the evolving risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The paper encourages NPT states parties to strengthen nuclear security at the national level and devote resources to strengthening the international institutions that support these efforts.
The CPPNM/A RevCon presents a critical opportunity for states parties and civil society to engage in a robust nuclear security dialogue on nuclear security and discuss ways to strengthen the implementation of the convention. The CPPNM/A is the only treaty requiring countries to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities and is a foundational international instrument for nuclear security. Despite its importance, the convention only requires one review conference five years after its entry into force—the upcoming RevCon. Future reviews can be requested by a majority of states parties.States parties will need to determine at the 2022 RevCon whether to hold future review conferences. Future review conferences held on a flexible cycle of five to seven years, for instance, will help strengthen and sustain the CPPNM/A regime and provide a forum for regular nuclear security dialogue. States parties can use this regular dialogue to share challenges and lessons learned, including how they continue to adapt to the nuclear security obstacles posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the United States, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review will be a key indicator of what role the United States will play in strengthening global nuclear security for the foreseeable future. While some of the elements of the Nuclear Posture Review can be controversial, the sections on nuclear security have not changed significantly over the past two administrations. They emphasize the need for making nuclear security a national priority and the importance of supporting international engagement and multilateral institutions. If President Biden’s past statements on the topic are a guide, the Nuclear Posture Review’s approach to nuclear security will resemble past administrations.
In addition to these milestone events, nuclear operators will continue to grapple with the challenges created by the COVID-19 epidemic, new technologies, and new adversaries. This year will be an important test of whether nuclear security efforts can regain momentum in the face of future challenges.
Nuclear Security Year in Review, 2021
By Sneha Nair • Nickolas Roth
In Nonproliferation
With tensions growing between the United States and other nuclear-armed rivals, it is easy to forget that non-state actors continue to pose a serious nuclear threat. Yet, despite continuing evidence of this threat, in 2021, the headwinds confronting those working to reduce it only got stronger.
Efforts to reduce nuclear terrorism risks have entered a new era. Nuclear operators must defend against threats they have been aware of for decades—like well-funded and sophisticated non-state actors with global reach, malicious insiders, corruption—while learning to be resilient against new threats, such as those posed by adversaries employing new technologies or evolving pathogens that could cripple security forces.
Meanwhile, high-level efforts to prevent nuclear theft and sabotage have lost momentum. Unlike previous decades where preventing nuclear terrorism was an international priority, this new era lacks the same level of attention and focus. Lost are the deep bilateral cooperation between the nuclear-armed states like that which existed between the United States and Russia; the high-level multilateral engagement of the nuclear security summits; and the urgent collective drive to strengthen security at commercial and government nuclear facilities that occurred after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While there were glimmers of hope throughout 2021, there are challenges that need to be addressed if momentum behind strengthening international nuclear security is to be restored.
A Nuclear Security Emergency Continues
Nuclear operators, regulators, and international institutions are now entering the third year in which they must navigate the global crisis caused by COVID-19. Despite a better global understanding of the COVID-19 disease and the growing availability of new tools to fight the disease such as vaccines and antiviral therapies throughout 2021, the effects of the pandemic continued to challenge nuclear security efforts. Just as quickly as institutions have adapted, they have had to face new risks and new challenges, especially in an age where operations are increasingly reliant on digital systems and employees are working remotely.1Christopher Hobbs, Nickolas Roth, Daniel Salisbury, “Security Under Strain? Protecting Nuclear Materials During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” The RUSI Journal Vol. 166 No. 2, Jne 28, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2021.1937302?src= (accessed January 13, 2022).
The socio-economic stressors of COVID-19—combined with contentious government-imposed pandemic policies—have caused some experts to fear the threat of insiders at nuclear facilities is increasing.2Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Insider Threats and Nuclear Security During a Pandemic,” The Diplomat, April 23, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/insider-threats-and-nuclear-security-during-a-pandemic/ (accessed December 14, 2021)In the United States, policies like federal vaccine mandates for nuclear operators and regulators have the potential to reinforce physical protection of facilities and mitigate vulnerabilities—such as delayed inspections—relating to staffing shortages resulting from illness or potential exposure to infection.3Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Laboratory to require all employees and contractors to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19,” August 23, 2021, https://discover.lanl.gov/news/releases/employees-contractors-to-be-fully-vaccinated-covid-19 (accessed December 13, 2021)President Joseph R. Biden Jr, Executive Order on Requiring Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination for Federal Employees, (Washington D.C.: White House, September 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/09/09/executive-order-on-requiring-coronavirus-disease-2019-vaccination-for-federal-employees/ (accessed December 14, 2021)However, personnel at nuclear facilities in countries like the United States have not been immune to vaccine skepticism that has taken hold in some parts of the country, with similar anti-vaccine pushback to be expected in other countries if employer mandates are imposed.4Susan Montoya Bryan, “Dozens of US Nuclear Lab Workers Sue Over Vaccine Mandate,” Associated Press, October 14, 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2021-10-14/dozens-of-us-nuclear-lab-workers-sue-over-vaccine-mandate (accessed December 14, 2021)Anthony Faiola, “Squeezed by mandates and restrictions, Europe’s anti-vaxxers rebel,” Washington Post, November 22, 2021,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/22/squeezed-by-mandates-restrictions-europes-anti-vaxxers-rebel/ (accessed December 13, 2021)These movements could result in increased viral outbreaks that impact nuclear security implementation. Moreover, recent events in the United States have highlighted the insider threat domestic violent extremists might pose to nuclear facilities.5Rebecca L. Earnhardt, Brendan Hyatt, Nickolas Roth, “A threat to confront: far-right extremists and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 14, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/01/a-threat-to-confront-far-right-extremists-and-nuclear-terrorism/ (accessed January 14, 2022)
COVID-19 has also impacted efforts to bolster the legal architecture and multilateral cooperation supporting international nuclear security efforts, with the delay of both the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) and the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A) RevCon. There have been other disruptions such as the inability of the Nuclear Security Contact Group to convene, intended to be one of the key mechanisms driving nuclear security efforts forward.
Despite these challenges, there were important successes in strengthening multilateral efforts to reduce risks in 2021. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) broke ground on its Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre, a facility set to become operational in 2023, designed to strengthen countries’ abilities to tackle nuclear terrorism and meet increased demand for nuclear security training from member states.6International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA Breaks Ground on Training Centre to Counter Nuclear Terrorism,” July 12, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-breaks-ground-on-training-centre-to-counter-nuclear-terrorism (accessed December 19, 2021)The IAEA also published Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 42-G Computer Security for Nuclear Security to support national implementation of cybersecurity measures at nuclear facilities, leading to a more comprehensive nuclear security regime. This new guidance document is particularly important given growing concerns about cyberattacks, as well as increasing reliance on digital systems at nuclear facilities. The IAEA also resumed its International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, which are the only international mechanism for nuclear security peer review. In 2021, the IAEA conducted six IPPAS missions in Niger, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Turkey, Czech Republic, and Senegal, returning to similar annual numbers of missions undertaken prior to the pandemic.7IAEA, Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar, https://www.iaea.org/services/review-missions/calendar?type=3170&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&location=All&status=All (accessed December 21, 2021)
Countries also took meaningful steps to strengthen their own nuclear security. In the United States, the U.S. military bolstered its protection against insider threats and strengthened its cyber security requirements.8Mariam Baksh, “Energy Department Revising Cybersecurity Requirements for Nuclear Administration Contractors,” Nextgov, June 21, 2021, https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2021/06/energy-department-revising-cybersecurity-requirements-nuclear-administration-contractors/174849/ (accessed January 13, 2022)Brett Tingley, “The Y-12 Nuclear Development Site Has Deployed Its First Anti-Drone System,” The Warzone, June 9, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41002/the-y-12-nuclear-development-site-has-deployed-its-first-anti-drone-system(accessed January 13, 2022)Countries tested new systems to protect against emerging technological threats.9Lim Chang-won, “Anti-drone system being tested at military facilities to neutralize ultra-small drones,” Aju Business Daily, November 1, 2021, https://www.ajudaily.com/view/20210622122438258 (accessed January 13, 2022)Numerous countries announced exercises or trainings. Ukraine opened a new center for training guards protecting nuclear facilities.10Russian Nuclear Security, “Ukraine Opens Training Center for NPPs’ Protective Force With US Funding,” June 25, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210625152434/https://russiannuclearsecurity.com/page20436018.html (accessed January 13, 2022)
There was also an important achievement in material minimization, building on decades of work from stakeholders around the world in government, civil society, industry, and elsewhere. The U.S. Department of Energy certified a sufficient worldwide supply of medical isotope molybdenum-99 produced without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), triggering a congressionally mandated ban on exports of HEU for foreign medical isotope production.11Department of Energy, “U.S. Secretaries of Energy and Health and Human Services Jointly Certify Sufficient Worldwide Supply of Critical Medical Isotope,” December 20, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-secretaries-energy-and-health-and-human-services-jointly-certify-sufficient-worldwide (accessed December 21, 2021)
There continued to be high level support for nuclear security throughout the year. President Biden voiced support for strengthening nuclear security early on in his presidency, announcing at the Munich Security Conference in February his intent to “lock down fissile and radiological material to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring or using them.”12President Joseph R. Biden Jr, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference”, (Washington D.C.: The White House, February 19, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/ (accessed December 16, 2021)In April, the G7 emphasized material minimization as a priority, stating, “[w]e affirm our commitment to minimise Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stocks globally, and encourage states with civil stocks of HEU to further reduce or eliminate them where economically and technically feasible” and urging universal adherence to and implementation of the CPPNM/A and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.13UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group: statement 19 April 2021, April 19, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-19-april-2021/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-19-april-2021 (accessed January 13, 2022)
At the IAEA’s 65th General Conference, Director General Rafael Grossi noted the need for more sustainable funding for nuclear security programs at the IAEA, citing the risks posed by the reliance of such critical programs on voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.14Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, Statement to the Sixty-Fifth Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 20, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-to-the-sixty-fifth-regular-session-of-the-iaea-general-conference (accessed December 20, 2021)Director General Grossi also noted preparations for the CPPNM/A RevCon.15Grossi, Statement to the Sixty-Fifth Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference.
Looking Ahead
In 2022, there will be important opportunities for countries to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture and to demonstrate leadership in strengthening global nuclear security. Critical moments in 2022 for nuclear security include the delayed CPPNM/A RevCon and NPT RevCon, scheduled for March and August, respectively (assuming that new variants do not once again require further delay), and the Biden administration’s expected release of its Nuclear Posture Review.
Although nuclear security is not explicitly covered by the NPT, the RevCon itself is an opportunity for states parties to highlight how nuclear security contributes to the overall nuclear nonproliferation regime.16Jacquelyn S. Porth, “Much of Nuclear Security Rests on NPT Extension, Graham Says,” USIA, December 13, 1994, https://nuke.fas.org/control/npt/news/941213-371179.htm (accessed December 23, 2021)Although nuclear security has not been a major element of past RevCons, seven actions in the 2010 NPT Action Plan—actions that state parties agreed to take—are directly related to nuclear security.17Government of Canada, 2010 NPT Review Conference 64-point action plan, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/action_plan-2010-plan_d_action.aspx?lang=eng (accessed January 14, 2022)The Preparatory Committee for the upcoming NPT RevCon received a working paper from the “Vienna Group of Ten” highlighting the importance of physical protection and cybersecurity of nuclear materials and facilities and drawing attention to the evolving risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The paper encourages NPT states parties to strengthen nuclear security at the national level and devote resources to strengthening the international institutions that support these efforts.18Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Addressing ‘Vienna issues’: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; nuclear security; and discouraging withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten),” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.5, March 15, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.5 (accessed December 17, 2021)
The CPPNM/A RevCon presents a critical opportunity for states parties and civil society to engage in a robust nuclear security dialogue on nuclear security and discuss ways to strengthen the implementation of the convention. The CPPNM/A is the only treaty requiring countries to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities and is a foundational international instrument for nuclear security. Despite its importance, the convention only requires one review conference five years after its entry into force—the upcoming RevCon. Future reviews can be requested by a majority of states parties.19Samantha Neakrase, “Strengthening Nuclear Security With a Sustainable CPPNM Regime,” Arms Control Today, June 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/features/strengthening-nuclear-security-sustainable-cppnm-regime (accessed January 14, 2022)States parties will need to determine at the 2022 RevCon whether to hold future review conferences. Future review conferences held on a flexible cycle of five to seven years, for instance, will help strengthen and sustain the CPPNM/A regime and provide a forum for regular nuclear security dialogue.20Rajagopalan, “Insider Threats and Nuclear Security During a Pandemic” States parties can use this regular dialogue to share challenges and lessons learned, including how they continue to adapt to the nuclear security obstacles posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the United States, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review will be a key indicator of what role the United States will play in strengthening global nuclear security for the foreseeable future. While some of the elements of the Nuclear Posture Review can be controversial, the sections on nuclear security have not changed significantly over the past two administrations. They emphasize the need for making nuclear security a national priority and the importance of supporting international engagement and multilateral institutions. If President Biden’s past statements on the topic are a guide, the Nuclear Posture Review’s approach to nuclear security will resemble past administrations.21Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr, ”Remarks by the Vice President on Nuclear Security, ” (Washington D.C.: White House Archives, January 11, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/12/remarks-vice-president-nuclear-security (accessed December 17, 2021)
In addition to these milestone events, nuclear operators will continue to grapple with the challenges created by the COVID-19 epidemic, new technologies, and new adversaries. This year will be an important test of whether nuclear security efforts can regain momentum in the face of future challenges.
Notes
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