Editor’s Note: Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst covering Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Turkey and Israel hold fundamentally opposing visions for post-Assad Syria. Ankara views the regime’s fall as an opportunity to foster stability through a strong, centralized Syrian state. Israel, by contrast, perceives the new government as a strategic threat and seeks to ensure that Syria remains weak and fragmented.
This divergence lies at the heart of the Turkish-Israeli conflict in Syria. How does Turkey interpret Israeli actions on the ground? What are Ankara’s red lines, and how does it propose to manage this challenge?
Israel as the Primary Obstacle
From Ankara’s perspective, three actors — each beginning with the letter “I” — actively undermine Syria’s new government: ISIS, Iran, and Israel. Of these, according to Turkey, Israel poses the gravest threat to Syrian stability.
Israel has become the principal external destabilizing military actor in Syria. In the first seven months following Assad’s fall, Israel conducted 988 air and artillery strikes — nearly triple the 334 airstrikes carried out over the previous seven years, when Israel’s primary target in Syria was Iran. Simultaneously, Israel has expanded its territorial occupation in southern Syria and provided direct support to Druze militias openly advocating autonomy or independence. From Turkey’s perspective, sustained Israeli military pressure erodes Damascus’ governing capacity, reinforces fragmentation, and risks reopening space for extremist actors — including ISIS — to regroup.
Beyond military actions, Israel-affiliated media consistently promote narratives hostile to the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, directly conflicting with efforts to reintegrate Syria into regional and international diplomatic frameworks. (Privately, Israeli officials continue to refer to the Syrian leader as al-Jolani, his nom de guerre as an Islamist fighter, and a reference to the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights.)
Israel attempted, but ultimately failed, to block international recognition of al-Sharaa and prevent sanctions relief. Countering Israeli opposition required Turkey and Saudi Arabia to expend considerable diplomatic capital in persuading the Trump administration.
Turkish-Israeli Military Deconfliction
Initially, Turkey planned to establish three military bases in central Syria. After Israel struck the designated sites, Ankara halted deployment plans. Through Azerbaijani mediation, Turkey and Israel agreed on a military deconfliction mechanism that has effectively prevented miscalculations.
For Ankara, this mechanism is strictly technical — a limited precaution against accidents and unintended clashes. It signals neither normalization nor broader alignment on Syria policy. Turkish officials maintain that normalization with Israel remains contingent on the implementation of a permanent ceasefire in Gaza.
Another major concern for Ankara is that Israeli policies sustain separatist aspirations within Syria. Israel is increasingly perceived as a potential patron by Druze separatists, Assad regime remnants, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian offshoot of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Leaked communications also reveal that Assad-era war criminals have expressed willingness to cooperate with Israel.
The YPG remains Ankara’s foremost security concern in Syria. Turkey expected the SDF to implement a March 10, 2025 agreement to merge its forces with the new Syrian army; instead, the process has stalled. Turkish officials believe Israeli strikes on the Presidential Palace and the Ministry of Defense in Damascus last year decisively shaped the SDF’s reluctance to proceed. Ankara’s own process with the PKK, whose long-jailed leader has called for the group to disarm, is entwined with the fate of the March 10 deal in Syria.
Indirect Threats to Turkey
Israeli policies in Syria pose other serious if indirect risks to Turkey’s national security and domestic stability. The most immediate concerns are refugee returns; without sustained stability in Syria, voluntary repatriation of the more than two million Syrians still in Turkey will stall.
A deeper threat involves the PKK. Failure to resolve the SDF issue in Syria could jeopardize talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has called for the organization to disarm and dissolve. If successful, this process could fundamentally reshape Turkish domestic politics and reposition the state as a protector of Kurdish rights, securing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long-term legacy.
However, as long as the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state remains frozen, the domestic track cannot advance. Ankara attributes this stagnation largely to Israeli actions, viewing Israeli policy in Syria as direct interference in Turkish internal affairs.
Should integration in Syria fail, Turkey threatens direct military intervention against the SDF. In that scenario, Israeli obstruction would constitute a clear red line for Ankara. Although Turkish officials consider this scenario unlikely given IDF operational constraints, two additional red lines exist: large-scale Israeli occupation of southern Syria, and any action directly threatening the al-Sharaa government’s survival.
Ankara’s Way Forward
Turkey has adopted a three-layered strategy to address growing tensions with Israel over Syria.
First, Ankara has encouraged Damascus to establish a security mechanism with Israel, believing such an arrangement could incentivize more pragmatic Israeli behavior. To facilitate this, Turkey supports active U.S. mediation and has encouraged Syria to request the deployment of Russian military observers in southern Syria. Military arrangements south of Damascus hold limited strategic importance for Ankara.
Second, Turkey has shifted toward gradualism. Rather than rapidly establishing military bases and restructuring the Syrian armed forces, Ankara is proceeding incrementally while laying the groundwork to establish rapid military dominance in Syria should Israeli actions compel it to do so.
Third, Ankara anticipates change in Israel itself. Turkish officials believe engagement may become possible under a future Israeli cabinet. Additionally, Ankara assesses that stabilization in Gaza — potentially under the Trump plan — could reduce Israeli intervention in Syria.
Turkey-Israel Rivalry in the New Syria
By Ömer Özkizilcik
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst covering Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Turkey and Israel hold fundamentally opposing visions for post-Assad Syria. Ankara views the regime’s fall as an opportunity to foster stability through a strong, centralized Syrian state. Israel, by contrast, perceives the new government as a strategic threat and seeks to ensure that Syria remains weak and fragmented.
This divergence lies at the heart of the Turkish-Israeli conflict in Syria. How does Turkey interpret Israeli actions on the ground? What are Ankara’s red lines, and how does it propose to manage this challenge?
Israel as the Primary Obstacle
From Ankara’s perspective, three actors — each beginning with the letter “I” — actively undermine Syria’s new government: ISIS, Iran, and Israel. Of these, according to Turkey, Israel poses the gravest threat to Syrian stability.
Israel has become the principal external destabilizing military actor in Syria. In the first seven months following Assad’s fall, Israel conducted 988 air and artillery strikes — nearly triple the 334 airstrikes carried out over the previous seven years, when Israel’s primary target in Syria was Iran. Simultaneously, Israel has expanded its territorial occupation in southern Syria and provided direct support to Druze militias openly advocating autonomy or independence. From Turkey’s perspective, sustained Israeli military pressure erodes Damascus’ governing capacity, reinforces fragmentation, and risks reopening space for extremist actors — including ISIS — to regroup.
Beyond military actions, Israel-affiliated media consistently promote narratives hostile to the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, directly conflicting with efforts to reintegrate Syria into regional and international diplomatic frameworks. (Privately, Israeli officials continue to refer to the Syrian leader as al-Jolani, his nom de guerre as an Islamist fighter, and a reference to the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights.)
Israel attempted, but ultimately failed, to block international recognition of al-Sharaa and prevent sanctions relief. Countering Israeli opposition required Turkey and Saudi Arabia to expend considerable diplomatic capital in persuading the Trump administration.
Turkish-Israeli Military Deconfliction
Initially, Turkey planned to establish three military bases in central Syria. After Israel struck the designated sites, Ankara halted deployment plans. Through Azerbaijani mediation, Turkey and Israel agreed on a military deconfliction mechanism that has effectively prevented miscalculations.
For Ankara, this mechanism is strictly technical — a limited precaution against accidents and unintended clashes. It signals neither normalization nor broader alignment on Syria policy. Turkish officials maintain that normalization with Israel remains contingent on the implementation of a permanent ceasefire in Gaza.
Another major concern for Ankara is that Israeli policies sustain separatist aspirations within Syria. Israel is increasingly perceived as a potential patron by Druze separatists, Assad regime remnants, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian offshoot of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Leaked communications also reveal that Assad-era war criminals have expressed willingness to cooperate with Israel.
The YPG remains Ankara’s foremost security concern in Syria. Turkey expected the SDF to implement a March 10, 2025 agreement to merge its forces with the new Syrian army; instead, the process has stalled. Turkish officials believe Israeli strikes on the Presidential Palace and the Ministry of Defense in Damascus last year decisively shaped the SDF’s reluctance to proceed. Ankara’s own process with the PKK, whose long-jailed leader has called for the group to disarm, is entwined with the fate of the March 10 deal in Syria.
Indirect Threats to Turkey
Israeli policies in Syria pose other serious if indirect risks to Turkey’s national security and domestic stability. The most immediate concerns are refugee returns; without sustained stability in Syria, voluntary repatriation of the more than two million Syrians still in Turkey will stall.
A deeper threat involves the PKK. Failure to resolve the SDF issue in Syria could jeopardize talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has called for the organization to disarm and dissolve. If successful, this process could fundamentally reshape Turkish domestic politics and reposition the state as a protector of Kurdish rights, securing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long-term legacy.
However, as long as the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state remains frozen, the domestic track cannot advance. Ankara attributes this stagnation largely to Israeli actions, viewing Israeli policy in Syria as direct interference in Turkish internal affairs.
Should integration in Syria fail, Turkey threatens direct military intervention against the SDF. In that scenario, Israeli obstruction would constitute a clear red line for Ankara. Although Turkish officials consider this scenario unlikely given IDF operational constraints, two additional red lines exist: large-scale Israeli occupation of southern Syria, and any action directly threatening the al-Sharaa government’s survival.
Ankara’s Way Forward
Turkey has adopted a three-layered strategy to address growing tensions with Israel over Syria.
First, Ankara has encouraged Damascus to establish a security mechanism with Israel, believing such an arrangement could incentivize more pragmatic Israeli behavior. To facilitate this, Turkey supports active U.S. mediation and has encouraged Syria to request the deployment of Russian military observers in southern Syria. Military arrangements south of Damascus hold limited strategic importance for Ankara.
Second, Turkey has shifted toward gradualism. Rather than rapidly establishing military bases and restructuring the Syrian armed forces, Ankara is proceeding incrementally while laying the groundwork to establish rapid military dominance in Syria should Israeli actions compel it to do so.
Third, Ankara anticipates change in Israel itself. Turkish officials believe engagement may become possible under a future Israeli cabinet. Additionally, Ankara assesses that stabilization in Gaza — potentially under the Trump plan — could reduce Israeli intervention in Syria.
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