Editor’s Note: Stasa Salacanin is a widely published author and analyst focusing on the Middle East and Europe. He produces in-depth analysis of the region’s most pertinent issues for regional and international publications, including the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Middle East Monitor, The New Arab, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Amwaj, Qantara, and other publications.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Despite a fragile ceasefire between Israel, the U.S., and Iran since their 12-day war in June, instability continues to plague the Middle East where a new imbalance of power may be pushing security and lasting peace even farther away.
The current developments call for urgent action by the international community and regional actors to take de-escalation measures and develop new collective diplomatic and security mechanisms. But it is by no means clear that the parties are capable of taking such action.
Israel’s military supremacy in wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran and continuing attacks on Syria represent a shift in the power balance away from Iran and its partners in the Arab world, which had been on the rise since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. But according to Dr. Shehab Makahleh, director of the Geostrategic Media Center, an analytical institute based in Jordan, the current lull in major conflict is only temporary given the failure to address core grievances such as thwarted Palestinian nationalism.
Bernd Kaussler, a professor of political science at James Madison University in Virginia, told the author that the situation in the Middle East since 2003 reminds him of the great conflicts of Europe’s past, such as the First World War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Thirty Years’ War of 1610-1648. These conflicts all ended with new security orders — the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Concert of Europe in 1815, and the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. But Kaussler noted that “a lasting order must be based on a balance of power based on equilibrium,” which the Middle East currently lacks.
The erosion of mutual deterrence in the Middle East marks the emergence of a new phase in regional politics characterized by the direct use of military force among competing powers. Israel’s current posture is consistent with John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, which posits that great powers continuously seek opportunities to enhance their relative power, with regional hegemony as their ultimate objective. This suggests that recent developments serve Israel’s strategic interests, particularly those of its far-right government, which has hegemonic ambitions. Backed by significant military capabilities and U.S. support, Israel has positioned itself as the Middle East’s predominant military actor, capable of preemptive or punitive strikes against perceived existential threats. Nevertheless, it remains doubtful that other regional powers will acquiesce to an Israeli-led order grounded in “peace through strength” as such an arrangement risks intensifying rather than resolving underlying security dilemmas.
Russell Lucas, a professor of international relations and global studies at Michigan State University, contends that Israel’s emergence as the dominant regional power is “a house built on sand with a cracked foundation.” In an interview, he argued that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition is primarily concerned with preserving Netanyahu’s political survival and shielding him from prosecution on corruption charges, in exchange for significant policy freedom. While Israel has achieved tactical victories, Lucas notes that it has also incurred substantial costs, including significant damage from Iranian missile strikes fired in retaliation for Israel’s attacks on Iran. Israel’s military actions in Gaza — characterized by a growing number of observers as genocidal — and its strikes on Iran are seen as violations of international law, fueling increasingly negative global public opinion.
According to Makahleh, Israel’s pursuit of security through regional dominance alienates neighboring states rather than providing reassurance, fostering regional arms buildups and asymmetrical resistance strategies. Makahleh warned that Israeli policymakers underestimate the long-term strategic costs of regional alienation, particularly given that Arab publics remain firmly opposed to normalization in the absence of a just settlement with the Palestinians.
George Bisharat, a professor of Law at Hastings College of the Law, University of California, San Francisco, argues that the doctrine of “peace through strength” is viable only when the dominant state maintains relatively benign intentions toward its neighbors and its interests do not fundamentally conflict with theirs. In his view, this condition does not apply to Israel. Bisharat told this author that he believes Israel’s ultimate strategic objective is to secure and eventually annex the West Bank, a goal that he says will entail extreme violence and ethnic cleansing.
The Role of Arab and Muslim Middle Powers
The increasingly toxic geopolitical environment has placed other regional actors — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman — in a particularly difficult position. While some states, such as Bahrain and the UAE, as well as Egypt and Jordan in earlier periods, have normalized relations with Israel, others have also sought rapprochement with former rival Iran in an effort to curb both Israel’s aggressive actions and Iran’s proxy-driven regional strategy.
One option for these states is to tacitly align with Israel in a “Sunni–Israeli axis” against Iran, trading security guarantees and technological cooperation for muted criticism — or outright silence — on the Palestinian issue. Alternatively, they could seek to establish a bloc advocating multilateralism, sovereignty, and the inclusion of the Palestinian issue, potentially in partnership with Türkiye. According to Makahleh, their dilemma lies in trying to navigate the competing demands of domestic legitimacy, strategic autonomy, and pressures from Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. In his opinion, they need to decide whether to become facilitators of Western-Israeli priorities, or architects of a new regional order.
Professor Lucas argues that it is unlikely that a “Sunni-Israeli” alliance will emerge. He says that the signatories of the Abraham Accords, while not seeking to abrogate those agreements, are gradually distancing themselves from Israel, and that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to join them in the foreseeable future. In Lucas’ view, these states are poised neither to form a bloc aligned with Israel nor to coalesce into a counterbalancing coalition against it. Rather, they are engaged in an “omni-balancing” strategy, seeking the greatest flexibility to navigate evolving uncertainties.
While regional states appear internally stable, Bisharat cautions that this stability could be undermined. Egypt might face significant pressures if large numbers of Palestinians are forced across its borders. Jordan, he notes, is the most vulnerable state in the region, already hosting a substantial Palestinian population and potentially facing an influx of additional refugees from the West Bank.
According to Kaussler, for the protracted conflicts in the region to come to an end, any future Middle Eastern concert must be perceived as legitimate by all regional actors. However, significant barriers persist, including divergent threat perceptions among regional actors, pervasive mistrust among Arab capitals, and resistance from both the United States and Israel to any initiative that might exclude them or dilute their strategic primacy.
Kaussler draws parallels with Europe to illuminate the current dynamics in the Middle East. He notes that the Concert of Europe, established after the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, achieved sustainability in part because Britain maintained its commitment to European security and post-Napoleonic France was not excluded. By analogy, Kaussler argues that any new regional arrangement in the Middle East must include a sovereign Palestinian state to be viable.
Kaussler also acknowledges the important role played by states such as Oman and Qatar, which have demonstrated effectiveness as mediators by maintaining relations across the ideological spectrum. He observes that, “while their leaders may not possess the statesmanship of Klemens von Metternich, the renowned nineteenth-century Austrian diplomat, they command substantial financial resources to assist in the reconstruction of war-torn economies and societies, while sustaining engagement with diverse actors throughout the Middle East and beyond.” In Kaussler’s view, these countries could serve as critical conduits for negotiating a new regional order.
Makahleh identifies both Türkiye and Qatar as capable of serving as bridges between competing blocs, offering alternatives to militarized approaches. He emphasizes that “collective diplomacy must pivot from defensive ententes to proactive architectures, including conflict resolution platforms, de-escalation hotlines, and joint peacekeeping initiatives.” He contends that the coming decade will be defined by which actors shape these rules: unilateral powers, notably Israel with U.S. backing; regional mediators, including Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, and potentially Saudi Arabia; or grassroots resistance movements arising from disenfranchised populations.
Middle East Instability Will Persist Without a New Regional Security Order
By Staša Salacanin
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Stasa Salacanin is a widely published author and analyst focusing on the Middle East and Europe. He produces in-depth analysis of the region’s most pertinent issues for regional and international publications, including the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Middle East Monitor, The New Arab, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Amwaj, Qantara, and other publications.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Despite a fragile ceasefire between Israel, the U.S., and Iran since their 12-day war in June, instability continues to plague the Middle East where a new imbalance of power may be pushing security and lasting peace even farther away.
The current developments call for urgent action by the international community and regional actors to take de-escalation measures and develop new collective diplomatic and security mechanisms. But it is by no means clear that the parties are capable of taking such action.
Israel’s military supremacy in wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran and continuing attacks on Syria represent a shift in the power balance away from Iran and its partners in the Arab world, which had been on the rise since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. But according to Dr. Shehab Makahleh, director of the Geostrategic Media Center, an analytical institute based in Jordan, the current lull in major conflict is only temporary given the failure to address core grievances such as thwarted Palestinian nationalism.
Bernd Kaussler, a professor of political science at James Madison University in Virginia, told the author that the situation in the Middle East since 2003 reminds him of the great conflicts of Europe’s past, such as the First World War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Thirty Years’ War of 1610-1648. These conflicts all ended with new security orders — the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Concert of Europe in 1815, and the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. But Kaussler noted that “a lasting order must be based on a balance of power based on equilibrium,” which the Middle East currently lacks.
The erosion of mutual deterrence in the Middle East marks the emergence of a new phase in regional politics characterized by the direct use of military force among competing powers. Israel’s current posture is consistent with John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, which posits that great powers continuously seek opportunities to enhance their relative power, with regional hegemony as their ultimate objective. This suggests that recent developments serve Israel’s strategic interests, particularly those of its far-right government, which has hegemonic ambitions. Backed by significant military capabilities and U.S. support, Israel has positioned itself as the Middle East’s predominant military actor, capable of preemptive or punitive strikes against perceived existential threats. Nevertheless, it remains doubtful that other regional powers will acquiesce to an Israeli-led order grounded in “peace through strength” as such an arrangement risks intensifying rather than resolving underlying security dilemmas.
Russell Lucas, a professor of international relations and global studies at Michigan State University, contends that Israel’s emergence as the dominant regional power is “a house built on sand with a cracked foundation.” In an interview, he argued that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition is primarily concerned with preserving Netanyahu’s political survival and shielding him from prosecution on corruption charges, in exchange for significant policy freedom. While Israel has achieved tactical victories, Lucas notes that it has also incurred substantial costs, including significant damage from Iranian missile strikes fired in retaliation for Israel’s attacks on Iran. Israel’s military actions in Gaza — characterized by a growing number of observers as genocidal — and its strikes on Iran are seen as violations of international law, fueling increasingly negative global public opinion.
According to Makahleh, Israel’s pursuit of security through regional dominance alienates neighboring states rather than providing reassurance, fostering regional arms buildups and asymmetrical resistance strategies. Makahleh warned that Israeli policymakers underestimate the long-term strategic costs of regional alienation, particularly given that Arab publics remain firmly opposed to normalization in the absence of a just settlement with the Palestinians.
George Bisharat, a professor of Law at Hastings College of the Law, University of California, San Francisco, argues that the doctrine of “peace through strength” is viable only when the dominant state maintains relatively benign intentions toward its neighbors and its interests do not fundamentally conflict with theirs. In his view, this condition does not apply to Israel. Bisharat told this author that he believes Israel’s ultimate strategic objective is to secure and eventually annex the West Bank, a goal that he says will entail extreme violence and ethnic cleansing.
The Role of Arab and Muslim Middle Powers
The increasingly toxic geopolitical environment has placed other regional actors — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman — in a particularly difficult position. While some states, such as Bahrain and the UAE, as well as Egypt and Jordan in earlier periods, have normalized relations with Israel, others have also sought rapprochement with former rival Iran in an effort to curb both Israel’s aggressive actions and Iran’s proxy-driven regional strategy.
One option for these states is to tacitly align with Israel in a “Sunni–Israeli axis” against Iran, trading security guarantees and technological cooperation for muted criticism — or outright silence — on the Palestinian issue. Alternatively, they could seek to establish a bloc advocating multilateralism, sovereignty, and the inclusion of the Palestinian issue, potentially in partnership with Türkiye. According to Makahleh, their dilemma lies in trying to navigate the competing demands of domestic legitimacy, strategic autonomy, and pressures from Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. In his opinion, they need to decide whether to become facilitators of Western-Israeli priorities, or architects of a new regional order.
Professor Lucas argues that it is unlikely that a “Sunni-Israeli” alliance will emerge. He says that the signatories of the Abraham Accords, while not seeking to abrogate those agreements, are gradually distancing themselves from Israel, and that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to join them in the foreseeable future. In Lucas’ view, these states are poised neither to form a bloc aligned with Israel nor to coalesce into a counterbalancing coalition against it. Rather, they are engaged in an “omni-balancing” strategy, seeking the greatest flexibility to navigate evolving uncertainties.
While regional states appear internally stable, Bisharat cautions that this stability could be undermined. Egypt might face significant pressures if large numbers of Palestinians are forced across its borders. Jordan, he notes, is the most vulnerable state in the region, already hosting a substantial Palestinian population and potentially facing an influx of additional refugees from the West Bank.
According to Kaussler, for the protracted conflicts in the region to come to an end, any future Middle Eastern concert must be perceived as legitimate by all regional actors. However, significant barriers persist, including divergent threat perceptions among regional actors, pervasive mistrust among Arab capitals, and resistance from both the United States and Israel to any initiative that might exclude them or dilute their strategic primacy.
Kaussler draws parallels with Europe to illuminate the current dynamics in the Middle East. He notes that the Concert of Europe, established after the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, achieved sustainability in part because Britain maintained its commitment to European security and post-Napoleonic France was not excluded. By analogy, Kaussler argues that any new regional arrangement in the Middle East must include a sovereign Palestinian state to be viable.
Kaussler also acknowledges the important role played by states such as Oman and Qatar, which have demonstrated effectiveness as mediators by maintaining relations across the ideological spectrum. He observes that, “while their leaders may not possess the statesmanship of Klemens von Metternich, the renowned nineteenth-century Austrian diplomat, they command substantial financial resources to assist in the reconstruction of war-torn economies and societies, while sustaining engagement with diverse actors throughout the Middle East and beyond.” In Kaussler’s view, these countries could serve as critical conduits for negotiating a new regional order.
Makahleh identifies both Türkiye and Qatar as capable of serving as bridges between competing blocs, offering alternatives to militarized approaches. He emphasizes that “collective diplomacy must pivot from defensive ententes to proactive architectures, including conflict resolution platforms, de-escalation hotlines, and joint peacekeeping initiatives.” He contends that the coming decade will be defined by which actors shape these rules: unilateral powers, notably Israel with U.S. backing; regional mediators, including Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, and potentially Saudi Arabia; or grassroots resistance movements arising from disenfranchised populations.
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