Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Since he was chosen to replace the Islamic Republic’s founding Supreme Leader in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has embodied the pinnacle of authority under the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which grants him unparalleled control over every facet of Iran’s governance, military, economy, and society. Yet, this meticulously constructed edifice has begun to crumble under the weight of the 86-year-old Khamenei’s own mortality and other vulnerabilities, leading to his prolonged absence from the political scene and plunging Iran into unprecedented factional fighting and decision-making paralysis just when it needs to be most nimble to deal with multiplying threats.
The leader’s health crises have escalated dramatically since his 2014 prostate cancer surgery with reports of advanced cognitive impairment and even coma-like episodes. Add to this his growing seclusion due to Israeli attempts to assassinate him during the 12-day war in June, which have isolated him from the apparatus he once micromanaged.
After Israeli strikes killed the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hossein Salami, chief of general staff Mohammad Bagheri, and dozens of nuclear scientists, Khamenei retreated to a hardened Tehran bunker, relaying orders through a single aide, Ali Asghar Hejazi, for nine critical days. No one, including President Masoud Pezeshkian or the Supreme National Security Council, a body charged with key decisions on foreign policy and defense, could reach him directly; Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf unilaterally assumed emergency military authority for several days without constitutional basis, while IRGC regional commanders launched uncoordinated missile salvos, depleting arsenals until Khamenei approved a US-proposed ceasefire via a 45-second pre-recorded video on June 26.
Post-war, his absences multiplied: a silent wave at the July 5 Ashura commemoration, normally the high point of the Shi’ite Islamic calendar, and skipping other annual rituals like Quds Day, Eid al-Ghadir, and Police Week. His first post-war public sighting was on October 20 and he did appear on November 4 to commemorate the taking of U.S. diplomat hostages in 1979.Otherwise, state media has resorted to archival footage, pre-recorded clips, and inconsistently timestamped photos to mask the void.
This eclipse has left Iran without a functioning helm and caused stasis across all sectors even as Iran faces unprecedented domestic and foreign challenges, including severe Israeli damage to Iran-backed regional militant groups and the fall in 2024 of Bashar al-Assad, a long-time Iranian ally, in Syria. Underlining this strategic setback, Syria’s new president, Ahmed al Sharaa, visited the White House on Monday, the first Syrian leader ever to do so.
Nuclear talks have stalled under renewed U.S. and UN maximum pressure while proposals for subsidy reform, stabilization of the rial, and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force, a global monitor of terrorism financing and money laundering, languish unsigned in Khamenei’s office. Meanwhile inflation soared to 49% in September 2025, the rial plummeted below 1,000,000 to the dollar, and water shortages led to rotational cutoffs in Tehran over the summer and warnings of rationing this fall if a prolonged drought persists. At the same time, the National Development Fund saw $35 billion diverted to IRGC projects without apparent oversight.
According to the IMF’s latest projections, GDP growth is expected to contract by 1.7% in 2025 and 2.8% in 2026, while per capita GDP declines by 2.5% in 2025 and 3.6% in 2026, translating to diminished living standards for the average Iranian. Only 38% of working-age men are employed according to official statistics, while female labor force participation is alarmingly low at 12%. The Purchasing Managers’ Index for September 2025 registered at 45.5, signaling contraction, and sub-indices for new orders, production, and inventory were all below the 50-point mark, indicating widespread pessimism among businesses.
Although Iranian women increasingly are defying the law and going without hijab in public, executions and arrests of dissidents continue and media bans persist. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace hasn’t met since May 2025, and a partial unblocking of WhatsApp and Google Play in December 2024 were technocratic patches, not strategic shifts, leaving Instagram, Telegram, X, and YouTube still officially banned.
The vacuum created by Khamenei’s absence has not only frozen decision-making but unleashed intensification of Iran’s chronic factional infighting, transforming what was once a controlled rivalry orchestrated by the Supreme Leader into raw, unchecked partisan warfare.
In the past, Khamenei deployed opposing ideological blocs to check presidents who pushed their agendas too far and to retain ultimate authority. But without his intervening hand, factions are combating each other without restraint. Over the past year, hardliners have impeached moderate ministers such as Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemati, the IRGC has accused reformists of treason, and the parliament has become a den of mutual denunciations.
Post-12-day war recriminations have multiplied with conservatives accusing the government of weakness in accepting a ceasefire, while pragmatists blame hardline provocations for inviting attack. Moderates such as former president Hassan Rouhani have urged restraint to avert economic collapse amid sanctions, but hardliners demand escalation, echoing Khamenei’s past calls for “severe punishment” of Iran’s many enemies.
Given Khamenei’s deteriorating health and age, if he dies in the near future, there is no obvious kingmaker to orchestrate his succession as there was in 1989 when Iran’s founding leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died, and Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his long-time colleague, choreographed Khamenei’s rise. The ability to replicate the 1989 succession, which involved stretching the constitution to allow a non-ayatollah to become supreme leader, died with its architect in 2017. Today’s Iran is a nest of rival fiefdoms including IRGC economic cartels, intelligence barons, clerical mafias, and bureaucratic warlords. Every faction still claims allegiance to Velayat-e Faqih — the rule of a supreme clerical jurisprudent — yet sharpens knives for the moment Khamenei’s pulse stops, knowing that the next Leader will redistribute billions in confiscated wealth, sanctions-busting networks, and the machinery of repression.
The IRGC, to which Khamenei gave increasing power after his rise in part to increase his power vis-à-vis Rafsanjani, is likely to dominate the succession process.
In one scenario, IRGC top leaders could mobilize and pressure the Assembly of Experts to anoint their choice, locking in repression and the IRGC’s economic empires.
If factional splits or Assembly defiance stall such an imposition, there could be a temporary collective leadership including the president, the head of the Expediency Council, which is supposed to resolve differences among government bodies, and a cleric from the Council of Guardians, another entity that vets legislation and candidates for elected office for their loyalty to the system. This outcome is likely to cause deadlock over key decisions, with the IRGC acting as the ultimate arbiter.
In the most optimistic scenario, civil society and reformists may stage peaceful protests and pressure bickering hardliners toward negotiated concessions. A united populace would have the best opportunity to campaign for a constitutional referendum that dismantles the theocracy without bloodshed. But at this moment, it is hard to see a way to freedom.
Khamenei’s Eclipse: Absolute Rule Crumbles into Paralysis and Infighting in Iran
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Since he was chosen to replace the Islamic Republic’s founding Supreme Leader in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has embodied the pinnacle of authority under the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which grants him unparalleled control over every facet of Iran’s governance, military, economy, and society. Yet, this meticulously constructed edifice has begun to crumble under the weight of the 86-year-old Khamenei’s own mortality and other vulnerabilities, leading to his prolonged absence from the political scene and plunging Iran into unprecedented factional fighting and decision-making paralysis just when it needs to be most nimble to deal with multiplying threats.
The leader’s health crises have escalated dramatically since his 2014 prostate cancer surgery with reports of advanced cognitive impairment and even coma-like episodes. Add to this his growing seclusion due to Israeli attempts to assassinate him during the 12-day war in June, which have isolated him from the apparatus he once micromanaged.
After Israeli strikes killed the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hossein Salami, chief of general staff Mohammad Bagheri, and dozens of nuclear scientists, Khamenei retreated to a hardened Tehran bunker, relaying orders through a single aide, Ali Asghar Hejazi, for nine critical days. No one, including President Masoud Pezeshkian or the Supreme National Security Council, a body charged with key decisions on foreign policy and defense, could reach him directly; Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf unilaterally assumed emergency military authority for several days without constitutional basis, while IRGC regional commanders launched uncoordinated missile salvos, depleting arsenals until Khamenei approved a US-proposed ceasefire via a 45-second pre-recorded video on June 26.
Post-war, his absences multiplied: a silent wave at the July 5 Ashura commemoration, normally the high point of the Shi’ite Islamic calendar, and skipping other annual rituals like Quds Day, Eid al-Ghadir, and Police Week. His first post-war public sighting was on October 20 and he did appear on November 4 to commemorate the taking of U.S. diplomat hostages in 1979.Otherwise, state media has resorted to archival footage, pre-recorded clips, and inconsistently timestamped photos to mask the void.
This eclipse has left Iran without a functioning helm and caused stasis across all sectors even as Iran faces unprecedented domestic and foreign challenges, including severe Israeli damage to Iran-backed regional militant groups and the fall in 2024 of Bashar al-Assad, a long-time Iranian ally, in Syria. Underlining this strategic setback, Syria’s new president, Ahmed al Sharaa, visited the White House on Monday, the first Syrian leader ever to do so.
Nuclear talks have stalled under renewed U.S. and UN maximum pressure while proposals for subsidy reform, stabilization of the rial, and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force, a global monitor of terrorism financing and money laundering, languish unsigned in Khamenei’s office. Meanwhile inflation soared to 49% in September 2025, the rial plummeted below 1,000,000 to the dollar, and water shortages led to rotational cutoffs in Tehran over the summer and warnings of rationing this fall if a prolonged drought persists. At the same time, the National Development Fund saw $35 billion diverted to IRGC projects without apparent oversight.
According to the IMF’s latest projections, GDP growth is expected to contract by 1.7% in 2025 and 2.8% in 2026, while per capita GDP declines by 2.5% in 2025 and 3.6% in 2026, translating to diminished living standards for the average Iranian. Only 38% of working-age men are employed according to official statistics, while female labor force participation is alarmingly low at 12%. The Purchasing Managers’ Index for September 2025 registered at 45.5, signaling contraction, and sub-indices for new orders, production, and inventory were all below the 50-point mark, indicating widespread pessimism among businesses.
Although Iranian women increasingly are defying the law and going without hijab in public, executions and arrests of dissidents continue and media bans persist. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace hasn’t met since May 2025, and a partial unblocking of WhatsApp and Google Play in December 2024 were technocratic patches, not strategic shifts, leaving Instagram, Telegram, X, and YouTube still officially banned.
The vacuum created by Khamenei’s absence has not only frozen decision-making but unleashed intensification of Iran’s chronic factional infighting, transforming what was once a controlled rivalry orchestrated by the Supreme Leader into raw, unchecked partisan warfare.
In the past, Khamenei deployed opposing ideological blocs to check presidents who pushed their agendas too far and to retain ultimate authority. But without his intervening hand, factions are combating each other without restraint. Over the past year, hardliners have impeached moderate ministers such as Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemati, the IRGC has accused reformists of treason, and the parliament has become a den of mutual denunciations.
Post-12-day war recriminations have multiplied with conservatives accusing the government of weakness in accepting a ceasefire, while pragmatists blame hardline provocations for inviting attack. Moderates such as former president Hassan Rouhani have urged restraint to avert economic collapse amid sanctions, but hardliners demand escalation, echoing Khamenei’s past calls for “severe punishment” of Iran’s many enemies.
Given Khamenei’s deteriorating health and age, if he dies in the near future, there is no obvious kingmaker to orchestrate his succession as there was in 1989 when Iran’s founding leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died, and Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his long-time colleague, choreographed Khamenei’s rise. The ability to replicate the 1989 succession, which involved stretching the constitution to allow a non-ayatollah to become supreme leader, died with its architect in 2017. Today’s Iran is a nest of rival fiefdoms including IRGC economic cartels, intelligence barons, clerical mafias, and bureaucratic warlords. Every faction still claims allegiance to Velayat-e Faqih — the rule of a supreme clerical jurisprudent — yet sharpens knives for the moment Khamenei’s pulse stops, knowing that the next Leader will redistribute billions in confiscated wealth, sanctions-busting networks, and the machinery of repression.
The IRGC, to which Khamenei gave increasing power after his rise in part to increase his power vis-à-vis Rafsanjani, is likely to dominate the succession process.
In one scenario, IRGC top leaders could mobilize and pressure the Assembly of Experts to anoint their choice, locking in repression and the IRGC’s economic empires.
If factional splits or Assembly defiance stall such an imposition, there could be a temporary collective leadership including the president, the head of the Expediency Council, which is supposed to resolve differences among government bodies, and a cleric from the Council of Guardians, another entity that vets legislation and candidates for elected office for their loyalty to the system. This outcome is likely to cause deadlock over key decisions, with the IRGC acting as the ultimate arbiter.
In the most optimistic scenario, civil society and reformists may stage peaceful protests and pressure bickering hardliners toward negotiated concessions. A united populace would have the best opportunity to campaign for a constitutional referendum that dismantles the theocracy without bloodshed. But at this moment, it is hard to see a way to freedom.
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