The demise of the al-Assad dynasty in Syria, a black swan event, is a potential game changer in the Middle East.
All efforts to move from authoritarianism to representative, democratic governance models are complex, but Syria’s transition might be the most fraught in recent history given the speed of Bashar al-Assad’s fall and daunting internal and external challenges.
A lot could go wrong. Despite early efforts by the victorious Sunni Islamist movement Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to reach out to Western countries and regional actors and to embrace ethnic minorities and remnants of the old system, Syria could descend into a new civil war with disastrous implications that go beyond its own borders.
International and regional actors, especially Iraq, should seize this rare opportunity and initiate engagement with the new rulers without consolidating the dominance of HTS. While difficult, this is plausible given the need of HTS for recognition, sanctions relief and reconstruction. External powers, learning from mistakes in similar cases such as Afghanistan, should present clear-cut, time bound and realistic demands for good governance and transitional justice, in exchange for sanctions relief that positively impact the Syrian people and economy.
The role of Syria’s neighbor, Iraq, is particularly crucial. Baghdad’s approach so far has been cautious, but Iraq urgently needs a Syria strategy that goes beyond valid security concerns.
Like the rest of the world, Iraq’s ruling elite was shocked by the quick fall of the Assad regime. Initially, the Iraqi government and pro-Iran groups defended the Syrian government and likened the HTS offensive to the lightning takeover of one third of Iraq in 2014 by ISIS. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani fortified Iraqi’s borders and tried to steer Iraq away from the conflict, refusing calls from some Shi’ite parties in the ruling coalition and pro-Iran militias to intervene militarily in support of Assad. Some militias nonetheless crossed the border into Syria. Two days before the fall of Damascus, the Iraqi foreign minister hosted his Syrian and Iranian counterparts in Baghdad, condemned the attacks by HTS and its allies, and announced plans for further meetings for regional stakeholders impacted by the fast-moving developments in Syria.
Baghdad’s security focus is understandable given the HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s al-Qaeda and ISIS roots, the devastation these groups inflicted on Iraq, the hard-won victory over ISIS and the persistent threat posed by ISIS prisoners held by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria. Gradually and cautiously, however, the policy of the Iraqi government evolved towards engagement with the new Syrian administration. On December 26, 2024, the chief of Iraqi intelligence met with al-Sharaa in Damascus. Reportedly they discussed security matters, protection of Iraqi borders and release of members of Iraqi militia members imprisoned in Syria. According to people familiar with the matter who spoke to this author, there is now regular communication and coordination between Iraqi and Syrian security agencies about the ISIS threat and border protection.
Still, Iraq’s current Syria policy lags far behind the dynamic diplomacy of Arab countries, Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union, which all quickly sent top diplomats to Damascus, provided humanitarian relief and actively engaged with Damascus beyond security concerns. For instance, Saudi Arabia is mobilizing regional and international diplomacy to support the Syrian transition and push for sanctions lifting. Qatar has promised a massive infusion of hard currency to bolster Syrian government salaries.
Despite risks to Iraq’s security, the fall of Assad represents a unique opportunity for Iraq and the wider region to help Syrians build a new state that is representative, inclusive (if not truly democratic) and at peace with itself and its neighbors. For most Iraqis, the end of the Assad dynasty means the end of a regime that destabilized the post-Saddam state through the export of terrorism and Captagon. Some Iraqi leaders, including the influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, former prime minister Haidar al-Abadi and former president Barham Salih welcomed the fall of Assad and called for active Iraqi engagement with New Syria. However, pro-Iran militias and some influential Shi’ite parties opposed the seismic change in Damascus because they lost a strategic route to transfer weapons and money to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Assad’s dictatorship fractured Syrian society, stifled civil society’s natural growth, and eroded political life. However, the uprising that erupted in 2011 resulted in the emergence of an embryonic civil society inside the country and diaspora. Due to their preoccupation with their own internal sectarian and political problems after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and support to the Syrian regime during the 2011 uprising, the Iraqi government and ruling elites have come to know Syria largely through the security threat posed by ISIS, Al-Nusra and other Salafi jihadi groups.
This disconnect has led to a big Iraqi knowledge gap about non-religious, civilian segments of the nascent Syrian civil society that opposed both Assad and Islamist factions, according to interviews by this author with multiple Syrian experts, analysts and activists, as well as Iraqi experts. Only the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has been an exception as it hosted Syrian refugees and provided a space for Syrian civil society and international organizations providing humanitarian relief to northeast Syria.
Syrian and Iraqi interviewees highlighted the urgent need to establish contacts to address the knowledge gap and jointly develop policy for post-Assad relations. Cooperation is needed in areas such as the economy, trade, culture, climate change, academia, and geopolitics. Syrians can learn from Iraq’s post-Saddam transition, both its successes and failures.
The Iraqi government and elites’ deep suspicion of the HTS-led administration has led to doubts about al-Sharaa’s willingness and capacity to control radical elements and foreign fighters within HTS and to build an inclusive state. On these issues, the caretaker Syrian government could reassure Iraqi leaders through concrete policies to fight ISIS and ensure the security of Iraq-Syria borders.
According to an Iraqi expert who spoke to this author on condition of anonymity, the Iraqi government awaits the outcome of an anticipated National Dialogue Conference to decide on next steps for engagement with Damascus. The fragmented nature of Iraq’s political system is a challenge for the development and implementation of a unified foreign policy vision that goes beyond hard security matters. Key issues include disarming armed groups aligned to Iran, the Trump administration policy towards Iran and Iraq, and crucially the impact of the future trajectory of the Iran-Israeli conflict on Iraq.
It will be hard to implement a Syria strategy that will not be influenced by Iran and its allies. According to media reports and people familiar with the visit, recent meetings by al-Sudani with Iranian leaders in Tehran were “disappointing” as Iran objected to disbanding armed groups and merging them with Iraqi security forces. However, the Iraqi government may have some maneuvering room regarding the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. troops, which reflects the weakening of Iran and its allies in light of Israeli advances since Oct. 7, 2023.
It is unlikely that Iraq will be in the driving seat of regional diplomacy towards Syria. Nonetheless Baghdad can be an active member of regional and international diplomatic engagement with Damascus through humanitarian aid and track two diplomacy.
Aiding Syrians in dire need of assistance would send a strong message to the Syrian people that Iraq stands with them. The two countries should also strive to revitalize bilateral economic ties based on mutual interests. In 2010 Iraq was the largest export destination for Syrian pharmaceuticals, food processing and textiles. Jihad Yazigi, editor-in-chief of Syria report and an expert in Syrian economic affairs, told this author, “Even though the geopolitical landscape changed since 2010, today Turkey and Iran are major trade partners of Iraq. Still there is a margin for improvement in bilateral economic relations now that Assad has fallen, and outside powers will be interested to contribute to and benefit from reconstruction efforts.”
“There have been talks for many years about restoring the pipeline that connects Iraqi oil fields to Syrian ports,” Yazigi continued. “If Syria stabilizes, this transit route will provide a good source of revenues for Syria, and a cheap transit route for Iraqi oil exports. A third area of cooperation are joint projects on shared management of the Euphrates River and lessons learned on efficient irrigation of agricultural lands.”
Track two diplomacy between Iraqi and Syrian experts with good access to decisionmakers in Baghdad and Damascus will help Iraq gain insights on the perspectives of the new rulers and other political, confessional, ethnic groups and civil society. Historic social and cultural similarities between the two peoples provide a natural platform for cooperation between Iraqi and Syrian universities, think tanks, intellectuals, artists and civil societies.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq could also play an important role in Iraq’s post-Assad strategy. The ruling Kurdish parties have strong relations with Kurdish counterparts in Syria. The biggest concern for Syrian Kurds is how to secure the autonomy of Kurdish areas within a unified Syria and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Kurdish disunity stands in the way of a unified position towards the new rulers in Damascus but a recent meeting between Kurdish Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi in Erbil provided hope that they might be willing to form a joint delegation. A meeting in Davos between Kurdish Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Assad Hasan al-Shaibani provided a good basis for further engagement. The more immediate security concerns are clashes between the SDF and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army and whether the Trump administration will continue U.S. support for the Kurds.
The seismic shifts in the Middle East have severely weakened the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. As a result, the Iraqi government has a unique opportunity to develop and implement a Syria strategy which goes beyond valid security concerns and defines Syria’s stability and recovery as a top national security priority.
Kawa Hassan is a Nonresident Fellow with Stimson’s Middle East program, a consultant on Middle East affairs, Iraq expert with NATO Communications and Information Agency. He previously served as Executive Director Stimson Europe, Director MENA Program & Senior Fellow, Vice President MENA Program, Director EU Office, EastWest Institute (EWI) where he led Track 2 diplomacy, policy research and advocacy initiatives on mediation and conflict resolution.
How Iraq Can Support Post-Assad Syria
By Kawa Hassan
Middle East & North Africa
The demise of the al-Assad dynasty in Syria, a black swan event, is a potential game changer in the Middle East.
All efforts to move from authoritarianism to representative, democratic governance models are complex, but Syria’s transition might be the most fraught in recent history given the speed of Bashar al-Assad’s fall and daunting internal and external challenges.
A lot could go wrong. Despite early efforts by the victorious Sunni Islamist movement Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to reach out to Western countries and regional actors and to embrace ethnic minorities and remnants of the old system, Syria could descend into a new civil war with disastrous implications that go beyond its own borders.
International and regional actors, especially Iraq, should seize this rare opportunity and initiate engagement with the new rulers without consolidating the dominance of HTS. While difficult, this is plausible given the need of HTS for recognition, sanctions relief and reconstruction. External powers, learning from mistakes in similar cases such as Afghanistan, should present clear-cut, time bound and realistic demands for good governance and transitional justice, in exchange for sanctions relief that positively impact the Syrian people and economy.
The role of Syria’s neighbor, Iraq, is particularly crucial. Baghdad’s approach so far has been cautious, but Iraq urgently needs a Syria strategy that goes beyond valid security concerns.
Like the rest of the world, Iraq’s ruling elite was shocked by the quick fall of the Assad regime. Initially, the Iraqi government and pro-Iran groups defended the Syrian government and likened the HTS offensive to the lightning takeover of one third of Iraq in 2014 by ISIS. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani fortified Iraqi’s borders and tried to steer Iraq away from the conflict, refusing calls from some Shi’ite parties in the ruling coalition and pro-Iran militias to intervene militarily in support of Assad. Some militias nonetheless crossed the border into Syria. Two days before the fall of Damascus, the Iraqi foreign minister hosted his Syrian and Iranian counterparts in Baghdad, condemned the attacks by HTS and its allies, and announced plans for further meetings for regional stakeholders impacted by the fast-moving developments in Syria.
Baghdad’s security focus is understandable given the HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s al-Qaeda and ISIS roots, the devastation these groups inflicted on Iraq, the hard-won victory over ISIS and the persistent threat posed by ISIS prisoners held by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria. Gradually and cautiously, however, the policy of the Iraqi government evolved towards engagement with the new Syrian administration. On December 26, 2024, the chief of Iraqi intelligence met with al-Sharaa in Damascus. Reportedly they discussed security matters, protection of Iraqi borders and release of members of Iraqi militia members imprisoned in Syria. According to people familiar with the matter who spoke to this author, there is now regular communication and coordination between Iraqi and Syrian security agencies about the ISIS threat and border protection.
Still, Iraq’s current Syria policy lags far behind the dynamic diplomacy of Arab countries, Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union, which all quickly sent top diplomats to Damascus, provided humanitarian relief and actively engaged with Damascus beyond security concerns. For instance, Saudi Arabia is mobilizing regional and international diplomacy to support the Syrian transition and push for sanctions lifting. Qatar has promised a massive infusion of hard currency to bolster Syrian government salaries.
Despite risks to Iraq’s security, the fall of Assad represents a unique opportunity for Iraq and the wider region to help Syrians build a new state that is representative, inclusive (if not truly democratic) and at peace with itself and its neighbors. For most Iraqis, the end of the Assad dynasty means the end of a regime that destabilized the post-Saddam state through the export of terrorism and Captagon. Some Iraqi leaders, including the influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, former prime minister Haidar al-Abadi and former president Barham Salih welcomed the fall of Assad and called for active Iraqi engagement with New Syria. However, pro-Iran militias and some influential Shi’ite parties opposed the seismic change in Damascus because they lost a strategic route to transfer weapons and money to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Assad’s dictatorship fractured Syrian society, stifled civil society’s natural growth, and eroded political life. However, the uprising that erupted in 2011 resulted in the emergence of an embryonic civil society inside the country and diaspora. Due to their preoccupation with their own internal sectarian and political problems after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and support to the Syrian regime during the 2011 uprising, the Iraqi government and ruling elites have come to know Syria largely through the security threat posed by ISIS, Al-Nusra and other Salafi jihadi groups.
This disconnect has led to a big Iraqi knowledge gap about non-religious, civilian segments of the nascent Syrian civil society that opposed both Assad and Islamist factions, according to interviews by this author with multiple Syrian experts, analysts and activists, as well as Iraqi experts. Only the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has been an exception as it hosted Syrian refugees and provided a space for Syrian civil society and international organizations providing humanitarian relief to northeast Syria.
Syrian and Iraqi interviewees highlighted the urgent need to establish contacts to address the knowledge gap and jointly develop policy for post-Assad relations. Cooperation is needed in areas such as the economy, trade, culture, climate change, academia, and geopolitics. Syrians can learn from Iraq’s post-Saddam transition, both its successes and failures.
The Iraqi government and elites’ deep suspicion of the HTS-led administration has led to doubts about al-Sharaa’s willingness and capacity to control radical elements and foreign fighters within HTS and to build an inclusive state. On these issues, the caretaker Syrian government could reassure Iraqi leaders through concrete policies to fight ISIS and ensure the security of Iraq-Syria borders.
According to an Iraqi expert who spoke to this author on condition of anonymity, the Iraqi government awaits the outcome of an anticipated National Dialogue Conference to decide on next steps for engagement with Damascus. The fragmented nature of Iraq’s political system is a challenge for the development and implementation of a unified foreign policy vision that goes beyond hard security matters. Key issues include disarming armed groups aligned to Iran, the Trump administration policy towards Iran and Iraq, and crucially the impact of the future trajectory of the Iran-Israeli conflict on Iraq.
It will be hard to implement a Syria strategy that will not be influenced by Iran and its allies. According to media reports and people familiar with the visit, recent meetings by al-Sudani with Iranian leaders in Tehran were “disappointing” as Iran objected to disbanding armed groups and merging them with Iraqi security forces. However, the Iraqi government may have some maneuvering room regarding the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. troops, which reflects the weakening of Iran and its allies in light of Israeli advances since Oct. 7, 2023.
It is unlikely that Iraq will be in the driving seat of regional diplomacy towards Syria. Nonetheless Baghdad can be an active member of regional and international diplomatic engagement with Damascus through humanitarian aid and track two diplomacy.
Aiding Syrians in dire need of assistance would send a strong message to the Syrian people that Iraq stands with them. The two countries should also strive to revitalize bilateral economic ties based on mutual interests. In 2010 Iraq was the largest export destination for Syrian pharmaceuticals, food processing and textiles. Jihad Yazigi, editor-in-chief of Syria report and an expert in Syrian economic affairs, told this author, “Even though the geopolitical landscape changed since 2010, today Turkey and Iran are major trade partners of Iraq. Still there is a margin for improvement in bilateral economic relations now that Assad has fallen, and outside powers will be interested to contribute to and benefit from reconstruction efforts.”
“There have been talks for many years about restoring the pipeline that connects Iraqi oil fields to Syrian ports,” Yazigi continued. “If Syria stabilizes, this transit route will provide a good source of revenues for Syria, and a cheap transit route for Iraqi oil exports. A third area of cooperation are joint projects on shared management of the Euphrates River and lessons learned on efficient irrigation of agricultural lands.”
Track two diplomacy between Iraqi and Syrian experts with good access to decisionmakers in Baghdad and Damascus will help Iraq gain insights on the perspectives of the new rulers and other political, confessional, ethnic groups and civil society. Historic social and cultural similarities between the two peoples provide a natural platform for cooperation between Iraqi and Syrian universities, think tanks, intellectuals, artists and civil societies.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq could also play an important role in Iraq’s post-Assad strategy. The ruling Kurdish parties have strong relations with Kurdish counterparts in Syria. The biggest concern for Syrian Kurds is how to secure the autonomy of Kurdish areas within a unified Syria and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Kurdish disunity stands in the way of a unified position towards the new rulers in Damascus but a recent meeting between Kurdish Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi in Erbil provided hope that they might be willing to form a joint delegation. A meeting in Davos between Kurdish Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Assad Hasan al-Shaibani provided a good basis for further engagement. The more immediate security concerns are clashes between the SDF and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army and whether the Trump administration will continue U.S. support for the Kurds.
The seismic shifts in the Middle East have severely weakened the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. As a result, the Iraqi government has a unique opportunity to develop and implement a Syria strategy which goes beyond valid security concerns and defines Syria’s stability and recovery as a top national security priority.
Kawa Hassan is a Nonresident Fellow with Stimson’s Middle East program, a consultant on Middle East affairs, Iraq expert with NATO Communications and Information Agency. He previously served as Executive Director Stimson Europe, Director MENA Program & Senior Fellow, Vice President MENA Program, Director EU Office, EastWest Institute (EWI) where he led Track 2 diplomacy, policy research and advocacy initiatives on mediation and conflict resolution.
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