What is the current situation in Rakhine?
The current situation in Rakhine State is incredibly complex. The Arakan Army (AA) has made rapid military gains against the Myanmar military in the past year, and it now controls more territory and a larger population than any other armed group in Myanmar. The conflict, however, has precipitated a significant deterioration in Rakhine-Rohingya relations and exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis in Rakhine.
By way of background, the AA is seeking to re-establish greater autonomy in Rakhine because of deep historical grievances against Myanmar’s Bamar majority over the political and economic marginalization of Rakhine and its people. Despite dominating the 2015 elections in Rakhine, for example, Rakhine political parties were denied an opportunity to share power, so most Rakhine lost hope in a political pathway for achieving greater autonomy. This provided a boost in support to the AA, which fought an intense conflict with the Myanmar military from late 2018 to November 2020, when an informal ceasefire was agreed. Aside from a brief breakdown from July to November 2022, that ceasefire largely held until its collapse on November 13, 2023.
How has the situation evolved over the past year?
Since the breakdown of the ceasefire last year, the AA had made truly stunning military advances, capturing Paletwa in Chin State and 10 townships in Rakhine, including Mrauk-U, an important symbolic victory over the former capital of the Rakhine Kingdom. The AA is now on the cusp of taking several other townships, including Ann, home to the military’s Western Command, and Maungdaw, which would eliminate the military’s presence in northern Rakhine and give the AA full control of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border.
As it has lost territory, the Myanmar military has turned to classic divide-and-rule tactics to pit Rakhine against Rohingya. It began conscripting Rohingya to fight against the AA in February, often with false promises of citizenship; it instrumentalized Rohingya armed groups, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), in the fight against AA, including by facilitating coercive recruitment of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh; and it forced Rohingya to participate in anti-AA demonstrations.
The AA has seemingly taken the military’s bait, blaming Rohingya for impeding its progress in northern Rakhine, posting inflammatory messages on social media, and reportedly committing serious abuses against Rohingya (which the AA denies). The Rohingya, meanwhile, either willfully ignore the role played by Rohingya armed groups in the conflict or, as is the case for most Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, are afraid they will be targeted if they speak out against ARSA or RSO. These dynamics give Rakhine the false impression that ARSA and the RSO enjoy widespread support among Rohingya (in fact, most Rohingya despise both groups) and provide a pretext for collective punishment, thus contributing to a further spiraling of communal relations.
In addition to stoking communal tensions, the Myanmar military has increasingly turned to its brutal “four cuts” counterinsurgency strategy, which seeks to cut armed groups’ access to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits, with significant collateral impact on civilians. In Rakhine, the military has blocked food, fuel, and medicine shipments, imposed a near-total communication blackout, and scaled up its use of indiscriminate airstrikes. The toll on civilians has been enormous, with hundreds killed and some 600,000 newly displaced. The healthcare system is no longer functioning and the price of basic goods has increased significantly, if they are available at all. The UN predicts that rice production in Rakhine will fall by 65% this year and that two million people — two-thirds of the population — are at risk of starvation.
How is the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine being addressed?
While acknowledging the challenges, I do not think there has been nearly enough urgency to address the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine. The military-imposed blockade has now been in place for most of the past two years, including through Cyclone Mocha, which devastated Rakhine in May 2023. Onerous restrictions on UN and humanitarian agencies have hollowed out their presence and capacity to deliver in Rakhine. Moreover, the Myanmar military re-designated the AA as a terrorist organization in September, so any group or individual providing material support risks arrest, particularly if they operate in areas still controlled by the Myanmar military. Cross-border aid and trade from Bangladesh (and, to a lesser extent, India) remains a relative trickle in relation to the scale of the needs.
It is unlikely that the military blockade on Rakhine will be lifted soon or that the AA will be able to easily create a buffer to enable the import of goods from other parts of Myanmar, so expanding cross-border aid and trade is essential. But a formal humanitarian corridor is unlikely in the near-term because of the differing interests of key stakeholders: Donors and aid organizations worry that aid will not go to those most in need and about the impact that cross-border support will have on their equities in Myanmar; the AA wants a degree of control over assistance that will probably not be acceptable to others; and Bangladesh is increasingly ambivalent towards the AA and also does not want to antagonize the Myanmar military by providing assistance that could be construed as support to the AA (even though many of Myanmar’s neighbors allow support to areas controlled by armed groups while maintaining channels to the military).
It is also important to recognize that, though Rohingya face acute challenges in meeting their basic needs, they are not the only ones impacted. The suffering of Rakhine, Khumi, Mro, and others must be acknowledged; a focus on the Rohingya alone risks feeding into the grievances of other groups and of adding to communal tensions.
How does the situation in Rakhine fit into the broader picture of what’s happening in Myanmar?
Though the situation in Rakhine is often viewed as distinct from other conflict arenas in Myanmar, there are in fact long-standing cross-cutting linkages that are growing. The AA, for example, was founded in Kachin State, has maintained a presence there as well as in Karen State, and shares close ties to two Shan-based groups, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), with whom it formed the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
Two weeks before the ceasefire collapsed in Rakhine, the AA joined the MNDAA and TNLA in the launch of Operation 1027 (so named for its start on October 27) in northern Shan. Like the AA’s own efforts in Rakhine, Operation 1027 has been remarkably successful in winning over territory, including much of the China-Myanmar border. The AA has also provided training and arms to other armed actors in Myanmar, notably a loose grouping of Chin armed groups known as the Chin Brotherhood Alliance and to armed groups operating adjacent to Rakhine in Sagaing and Magwe.
Beyond the linkages between the AA and other armed actors, Rakhine is connected to other ethnic states through grievances against the center, including the mistreatment of ethnic minorities. Overcoming historic discrimination, persecution, and tribalism will be essential to creating a future Myanmar and a future Rakhine that is more inclusive and pluralistic.
What is your sense of how the situation in Rakhine is impacting Cox’s Bazar and Bangladesh as a whole?
Bangladesh has dealt with the spillover from crises in Rakhine before, notably in the 1970s and 1990s, but the scale and persistence of the present crisis dwarfs prior iterations. As a result, there is a lot of frustration among Bangladeshis that progress in addressing, let alone resolving, the Rakhine crisis has proven so elusive.
Bangladeshi frustrations, as I understand them, take a few different forms. Overall, there is the frustration of the disproportionate burden placed on Bangladesh of hosting some one million Rohingya without sufficient political and financial support from the international community to address the proximate and root causes of the crisis. These frustrations have deepened alongside the rise of the AA, which Bangladesh increasingly views as a barrier to rather than a partner in the repatriation of Rohingya to Rakhine.
Communities in Cox’s Bazar echo these frustrations and worry about the relative size (and growth) of the Rohingya population, the environmental impacts of establishing and hosting the Rohingya camps, the economic repercussions of Rohingya laborers undercutting the local workforce, and Rohingyas’ involvement in armed and criminal networks. While the demographic concerns are understandable, particularly in Ukhiya and Teknaf, crime rates within the camps mostly mirror those in the surrounding communities. Moreover, useful steps have been taken to mitigate some concerns — Rohingya have been provided with LPG canisters to reduce the clearing of forests for firewood, for example — but more could and should be done to address Bangladeshis’ increasingly zero-sum view.
At the same time, Bangladeshis must not take their frustration out on the Rohingya. The Rohingya themselves are incredibly frustrated with the predicament they are in; most would like nothing more than to go home, provided they have some assurances they will be safe, and their basic rights respected. Moreover, anyone who has visited the refugee camps knows no one would choose to live there. The camps provide little dignity and foster dependency; they are overcrowded; the shelters are flimsy and susceptible to natural disasters; opportunities for education and earning income are limited; medical care is of low quality; and the Rohingya feel increasingly insecure because of the influence and impunity of Rohingya armed groups.
Can you describe the security situation in the camps? What steps should be taken to address the ongoing security concerns within the camps?
The security situation in the camps has become increasingly fraught, particularly since late 2022. Before then, ARSA dominated the camps. Known as the “night government” among Rohingya, ARSA threatened, intimidated, abducted, and extorted refugees with impunity, culminating in its assassination of a widely respected civil society leader, Mohibullah, in 2021. After a DGFI officer was killed, allegedly by ARSA, in a drug enforcement operation near the Myanmar border in late 2022, Bangladeshi authorities began cracking down on ARSA allowing the RSO, which had been dormant, to reemerge. Contestation between ARSA and RSO over control of the camps led to a significant increase in clashes, particularly during the day, throughout 2023 and 2024; civilians are increasingly caught in the crossfire and, since the beginning of last year, there have been over than 150 murders in the camps and many more injuries.
There was a short lull in fighting in the camps in the first few months of this year as the RSO pushed ARSA out of the camps and both groups sought to establish a presence in Rakhine. But RSO’s reputation was tarnished when it coercively recruited Rohingya from the camps to fight in Rakhine, mostly against the AA. RSO and ARSA fighters were also pushed back into the camps from Rakhine after the AA offensive to take Maungdaw escalated in August. Major clashes have resumed in the camps and are impacting the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide Rohingya with basic services. Insecurity in the camps has also dramatically narrowed the once promising space for Rohingya civil society actors that could serve as a partner to Bangladesh in the pursuit of repatriation and the protection of their rights.
It will not be easy for Bangladesh to tackle insecurity in the camps, but Bangladesh has more agency to address this issue than many others. Moreover, addressing insecurity is essential to both Bangladesh’s security and to prospects for repatriation. So long as Rohingya armed groups fighting against a much more powerful AA operate with relative freedom in Bangladesh it will be very difficult to improve Rakhine-Rohingya relations and lay the foundation for Rohingya returns to Myanmar. Moreover, the presence of Rohingya armed groups in the camps will make it near impossible for Bangladesh to have a constructive relationship with the AA, which will be critical to managing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border for the foreseeable future.
To confront insecurity in the camps, Bangladeshi forces may need to conduct limited operations against Rohingya armed groups, particularly the RSO, to address their perceived impunity. Bangladesh should also work to reduce the corruption among security forces that allows Rohingya armed groups to flourish, including by being more transparent about its efforts to hold corrupt officials to account. Finally, if Bangladesh, with international support, could better demonstrate an ability to provide protection to Rohingya against armed groups, that would yield numerous benefits, not least an increase in Rohingya confidence in Bangladesh’s security services.
What suggestions do you have for how the interim government should tackle the complex dynamics in Rakhine and in Cox’s Bazar? What is the international community’s role?
Beyond addressing insecurity in the camps, which I think should be the top priority, there are a number of things the interim government should consider. First, the interim government should continue its strong start in keeping the Rakhine crisis on the international agenda, ensuring that the crisis is centered in discussions about Myanmar and encouraging further burden-sharing.
Second, the interim government should engage directly with the AA, even if discreetly, to enable a shift away from securitized approaches and to discuss issues of mutual interest, including cross-border aid and trade, border management, the governance of Rakhine, and repatriation.
Third, the interim government could allow more space for creative responses in the camps by facilitating access to formal education, linking skills-building opportunities to gaps in the economy in Rakhine, and, provided it can address insecurity, creating an enabling environment for Rohingya civil society organizations, including by putting Rohingya themselves at the forefront of localization efforts (thus increasing their capacity to sustainably return to Myanmar).
Openness to these innovative approaches may have the additional benefit of rejuvenating flagging donor support. Finally, the interim government should use its moral authority to counter anti-Rohingya sentiment, encourage compassion for Rohingya, and set realistic expectations for repatriation.
The international community is a critical partner for Bangladesh in managing and resolving this crisis. International partners must do more to share the burden with Bangladesh, with continued humanitarian aid serving as a necessary but insufficient foundation of support. While Bangladesh is responsible for security in the camps, the international community could share technical expertise and best practices. International actors should also do more to address the crisis on the Myanmar side of the border. For example, there must be more urgency, financial support, and risk tolerance for dealing with the humanitarian emergency in Rakhine. The international community can also do more to support Bangladesh in finding a resolution to the crisis by conducting its outreach to the AA, supporting trust-building initiatives, and providing Rohingya with the support needed to return to Myanmar, including by improving learning opportunities, fostering the emergence of genuine and legitimate civil society actors, and ensuring Rohingya have a role in shaping the future of both Rakhine and Myanmar.
Should Bangladesh adopt a different approach from the US in addressing the refugee crisis, especially in light of the recent change in administration?
Already a monumental task, these efforts will grow even more challenging next year once Donald Trump takes office. The US, the largest donor to the humanitarian response, will likely turn inward and reduce its financial support, making it even more critical that others step up to fill the gaps in funding and leadership.
‘Addressing insecurity is essential to both Bangladesh’s security and to prospects for repatriation’
Featuring Steve Ross
Asia & Indo-Pacific
Originally published in the Dhaka Tribune
What is the current situation in Rakhine?
The current situation in Rakhine State is incredibly complex. The Arakan Army (AA) has made rapid military gains against the Myanmar military in the past year, and it now controls more territory and a larger population than any other armed group in Myanmar. The conflict, however, has precipitated a significant deterioration in Rakhine-Rohingya relations and exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis in Rakhine.
By way of background, the AA is seeking to re-establish greater autonomy in Rakhine because of deep historical grievances against Myanmar’s Bamar majority over the political and economic marginalization of Rakhine and its people. Despite dominating the 2015 elections in Rakhine, for example, Rakhine political parties were denied an opportunity to share power, so most Rakhine lost hope in a political pathway for achieving greater autonomy. This provided a boost in support to the AA, which fought an intense conflict with the Myanmar military from late 2018 to November 2020, when an informal ceasefire was agreed. Aside from a brief breakdown from July to November 2022, that ceasefire largely held until its collapse on November 13, 2023.
How has the situation evolved over the past year?
Since the breakdown of the ceasefire last year, the AA had made truly stunning military advances, capturing Paletwa in Chin State and 10 townships in Rakhine, including Mrauk-U, an important symbolic victory over the former capital of the Rakhine Kingdom. The AA is now on the cusp of taking several other townships, including Ann, home to the military’s Western Command, and Maungdaw, which would eliminate the military’s presence in northern Rakhine and give the AA full control of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border.
As it has lost territory, the Myanmar military has turned to classic divide-and-rule tactics to pit Rakhine against Rohingya. It began conscripting Rohingya to fight against the AA in February, often with false promises of citizenship; it instrumentalized Rohingya armed groups, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), in the fight against AA, including by facilitating coercive recruitment of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh; and it forced Rohingya to participate in anti-AA demonstrations.
The AA has seemingly taken the military’s bait, blaming Rohingya for impeding its progress in northern Rakhine, posting inflammatory messages on social media, and reportedly committing serious abuses against Rohingya (which the AA denies). The Rohingya, meanwhile, either willfully ignore the role played by Rohingya armed groups in the conflict or, as is the case for most Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, are afraid they will be targeted if they speak out against ARSA or RSO. These dynamics give Rakhine the false impression that ARSA and the RSO enjoy widespread support among Rohingya (in fact, most Rohingya despise both groups) and provide a pretext for collective punishment, thus contributing to a further spiraling of communal relations.
In addition to stoking communal tensions, the Myanmar military has increasingly turned to its brutal “four cuts” counterinsurgency strategy, which seeks to cut armed groups’ access to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits, with significant collateral impact on civilians. In Rakhine, the military has blocked food, fuel, and medicine shipments, imposed a near-total communication blackout, and scaled up its use of indiscriminate airstrikes. The toll on civilians has been enormous, with hundreds killed and some 600,000 newly displaced. The healthcare system is no longer functioning and the price of basic goods has increased significantly, if they are available at all. The UN predicts that rice production in Rakhine will fall by 65% this year and that two million people — two-thirds of the population — are at risk of starvation.
How is the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine being addressed?
While acknowledging the challenges, I do not think there has been nearly enough urgency to address the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine. The military-imposed blockade has now been in place for most of the past two years, including through Cyclone Mocha, which devastated Rakhine in May 2023. Onerous restrictions on UN and humanitarian agencies have hollowed out their presence and capacity to deliver in Rakhine. Moreover, the Myanmar military re-designated the AA as a terrorist organization in September, so any group or individual providing material support risks arrest, particularly if they operate in areas still controlled by the Myanmar military. Cross-border aid and trade from Bangladesh (and, to a lesser extent, India) remains a relative trickle in relation to the scale of the needs.
It is unlikely that the military blockade on Rakhine will be lifted soon or that the AA will be able to easily create a buffer to enable the import of goods from other parts of Myanmar, so expanding cross-border aid and trade is essential. But a formal humanitarian corridor is unlikely in the near-term because of the differing interests of key stakeholders: Donors and aid organizations worry that aid will not go to those most in need and about the impact that cross-border support will have on their equities in Myanmar; the AA wants a degree of control over assistance that will probably not be acceptable to others; and Bangladesh is increasingly ambivalent towards the AA and also does not want to antagonize the Myanmar military by providing assistance that could be construed as support to the AA (even though many of Myanmar’s neighbors allow support to areas controlled by armed groups while maintaining channels to the military).
It is also important to recognize that, though Rohingya face acute challenges in meeting their basic needs, they are not the only ones impacted. The suffering of Rakhine, Khumi, Mro, and others must be acknowledged; a focus on the Rohingya alone risks feeding into the grievances of other groups and of adding to communal tensions.
How does the situation in Rakhine fit into the broader picture of what’s happening in Myanmar?
Though the situation in Rakhine is often viewed as distinct from other conflict arenas in Myanmar, there are in fact long-standing cross-cutting linkages that are growing. The AA, for example, was founded in Kachin State, has maintained a presence there as well as in Karen State, and shares close ties to two Shan-based groups, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), with whom it formed the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
Two weeks before the ceasefire collapsed in Rakhine, the AA joined the MNDAA and TNLA in the launch of Operation 1027 (so named for its start on October 27) in northern Shan. Like the AA’s own efforts in Rakhine, Operation 1027 has been remarkably successful in winning over territory, including much of the China-Myanmar border. The AA has also provided training and arms to other armed actors in Myanmar, notably a loose grouping of Chin armed groups known as the Chin Brotherhood Alliance and to armed groups operating adjacent to Rakhine in Sagaing and Magwe.
Beyond the linkages between the AA and other armed actors, Rakhine is connected to other ethnic states through grievances against the center, including the mistreatment of ethnic minorities. Overcoming historic discrimination, persecution, and tribalism will be essential to creating a future Myanmar and a future Rakhine that is more inclusive and pluralistic.
What is your sense of how the situation in Rakhine is impacting Cox’s Bazar and Bangladesh as a whole?
Bangladesh has dealt with the spillover from crises in Rakhine before, notably in the 1970s and 1990s, but the scale and persistence of the present crisis dwarfs prior iterations. As a result, there is a lot of frustration among Bangladeshis that progress in addressing, let alone resolving, the Rakhine crisis has proven so elusive.
Bangladeshi frustrations, as I understand them, take a few different forms. Overall, there is the frustration of the disproportionate burden placed on Bangladesh of hosting some one million Rohingya without sufficient political and financial support from the international community to address the proximate and root causes of the crisis. These frustrations have deepened alongside the rise of the AA, which Bangladesh increasingly views as a barrier to rather than a partner in the repatriation of Rohingya to Rakhine.
Communities in Cox’s Bazar echo these frustrations and worry about the relative size (and growth) of the Rohingya population, the environmental impacts of establishing and hosting the Rohingya camps, the economic repercussions of Rohingya laborers undercutting the local workforce, and Rohingyas’ involvement in armed and criminal networks. While the demographic concerns are understandable, particularly in Ukhiya and Teknaf, crime rates within the camps mostly mirror those in the surrounding communities. Moreover, useful steps have been taken to mitigate some concerns — Rohingya have been provided with LPG canisters to reduce the clearing of forests for firewood, for example — but more could and should be done to address Bangladeshis’ increasingly zero-sum view.
At the same time, Bangladeshis must not take their frustration out on the Rohingya. The Rohingya themselves are incredibly frustrated with the predicament they are in; most would like nothing more than to go home, provided they have some assurances they will be safe, and their basic rights respected. Moreover, anyone who has visited the refugee camps knows no one would choose to live there. The camps provide little dignity and foster dependency; they are overcrowded; the shelters are flimsy and susceptible to natural disasters; opportunities for education and earning income are limited; medical care is of low quality; and the Rohingya feel increasingly insecure because of the influence and impunity of Rohingya armed groups.
Can you describe the security situation in the camps? What steps should be taken to address the ongoing security concerns within the camps?
The security situation in the camps has become increasingly fraught, particularly since late 2022. Before then, ARSA dominated the camps. Known as the “night government” among Rohingya, ARSA threatened, intimidated, abducted, and extorted refugees with impunity, culminating in its assassination of a widely respected civil society leader, Mohibullah, in 2021. After a DGFI officer was killed, allegedly by ARSA, in a drug enforcement operation near the Myanmar border in late 2022, Bangladeshi authorities began cracking down on ARSA allowing the RSO, which had been dormant, to reemerge. Contestation between ARSA and RSO over control of the camps led to a significant increase in clashes, particularly during the day, throughout 2023 and 2024; civilians are increasingly caught in the crossfire and, since the beginning of last year, there have been over than 150 murders in the camps and many more injuries.
There was a short lull in fighting in the camps in the first few months of this year as the RSO pushed ARSA out of the camps and both groups sought to establish a presence in Rakhine. But RSO’s reputation was tarnished when it coercively recruited Rohingya from the camps to fight in Rakhine, mostly against the AA. RSO and ARSA fighters were also pushed back into the camps from Rakhine after the AA offensive to take Maungdaw escalated in August. Major clashes have resumed in the camps and are impacting the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide Rohingya with basic services. Insecurity in the camps has also dramatically narrowed the once promising space for Rohingya civil society actors that could serve as a partner to Bangladesh in the pursuit of repatriation and the protection of their rights.
It will not be easy for Bangladesh to tackle insecurity in the camps, but Bangladesh has more agency to address this issue than many others. Moreover, addressing insecurity is essential to both Bangladesh’s security and to prospects for repatriation. So long as Rohingya armed groups fighting against a much more powerful AA operate with relative freedom in Bangladesh it will be very difficult to improve Rakhine-Rohingya relations and lay the foundation for Rohingya returns to Myanmar. Moreover, the presence of Rohingya armed groups in the camps will make it near impossible for Bangladesh to have a constructive relationship with the AA, which will be critical to managing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border for the foreseeable future.
To confront insecurity in the camps, Bangladeshi forces may need to conduct limited operations against Rohingya armed groups, particularly the RSO, to address their perceived impunity. Bangladesh should also work to reduce the corruption among security forces that allows Rohingya armed groups to flourish, including by being more transparent about its efforts to hold corrupt officials to account. Finally, if Bangladesh, with international support, could better demonstrate an ability to provide protection to Rohingya against armed groups, that would yield numerous benefits, not least an increase in Rohingya confidence in Bangladesh’s security services.
What suggestions do you have for how the interim government should tackle the complex dynamics in Rakhine and in Cox’s Bazar? What is the international community’s role?
Beyond addressing insecurity in the camps, which I think should be the top priority, there are a number of things the interim government should consider. First, the interim government should continue its strong start in keeping the Rakhine crisis on the international agenda, ensuring that the crisis is centered in discussions about Myanmar and encouraging further burden-sharing.
Second, the interim government should engage directly with the AA, even if discreetly, to enable a shift away from securitized approaches and to discuss issues of mutual interest, including cross-border aid and trade, border management, the governance of Rakhine, and repatriation.
Third, the interim government could allow more space for creative responses in the camps by facilitating access to formal education, linking skills-building opportunities to gaps in the economy in Rakhine, and, provided it can address insecurity, creating an enabling environment for Rohingya civil society organizations, including by putting Rohingya themselves at the forefront of localization efforts (thus increasing their capacity to sustainably return to Myanmar).
Openness to these innovative approaches may have the additional benefit of rejuvenating flagging donor support. Finally, the interim government should use its moral authority to counter anti-Rohingya sentiment, encourage compassion for Rohingya, and set realistic expectations for repatriation.
The international community is a critical partner for Bangladesh in managing and resolving this crisis. International partners must do more to share the burden with Bangladesh, with continued humanitarian aid serving as a necessary but insufficient foundation of support. While Bangladesh is responsible for security in the camps, the international community could share technical expertise and best practices. International actors should also do more to address the crisis on the Myanmar side of the border. For example, there must be more urgency, financial support, and risk tolerance for dealing with the humanitarian emergency in Rakhine. The international community can also do more to support Bangladesh in finding a resolution to the crisis by conducting its outreach to the AA, supporting trust-building initiatives, and providing Rohingya with the support needed to return to Myanmar, including by improving learning opportunities, fostering the emergence of genuine and legitimate civil society actors, and ensuring Rohingya have a role in shaping the future of both Rakhine and Myanmar.
Should Bangladesh adopt a different approach from the US in addressing the refugee crisis, especially in light of the recent change in administration?
Already a monumental task, these efforts will grow even more challenging next year once Donald Trump takes office. The US, the largest donor to the humanitarian response, will likely turn inward and reduce its financial support, making it even more critical that others step up to fill the gaps in funding and leadership.
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