South Asia

The Stimson Center's South Asia programming has several key elements: reducing nuclear dangers and increasing deterrence stability on the subcontinent; analyzing crisis management in the United States, India and Pakistan; promoting confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction measures; and nurturing talent in a rising generation of strategic analysts by means of visiting fellowships and workshops.

India and Pakistan are building up their nuclear weapon capabilities with newer versions of land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.  Both appear to be moving toward triads of land- and, sea-based, as well as aircraft-delivered weapons. While there are signs of diplomatic rapprochement, progress has been slow, and spoilers will try to stymie any thaw. Moreover, it is hard to improve bilateral relations when one or both countries have weak governments.  Pakistan's domestic challenges are particularly great.  Under these circumstances, all of Stimson's programming initiatives have significant relevance.

Stimson has long been a thought leader and promoter of nuclear risk-reduction and confidence-building measures in South Asia. We view our role as helping to develop creative thinking and worthwhile proposals within the region to reduce nuclear dangers. Much useful analytical work can be done to determine what measures might be considered to reduce nuclear dangers on the subcontinent. We also encourage the cross-fertilization of ideas. The "tool box" of risk reduction measures developed outside the region is quite full. Our focus has been on how such measures might best be adapted to the unique circumstances that obtain in South Asia. Stimson Center Stimson has advanced proposals through workshops with knowledgeable and well-connected Indian, Pakistani, and US participants; private meetings with key officials in all three countries; research and publications; and public forums in the region.  All of the CBMs and NRRMs agreed to by the Governments of Pakistan and India have previously been identified and promoted in Stimson programming.

Stimson is also very proud of our visiting fellowship program, which began in 1993 with private foundation support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation.  At the outset of this program, we focused on rising Indian and Pakistani talent engaged in teaching at the university level; print journalists covering bilateral relations and nuclear issues; and individuals oriented toward what were then fledgling nongovernmental organizations. Over seventy Visiting Fellows from Pakistan, India and China have enriched the Stimson Center with their presence.

Stimson currently receives support for Visiting Fellowships from the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. These fellowships are designated for Pakistani military officers from the Strategic Plans Division at Joint Staff Headquarters and for civilians assigned to the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority.    

Crisis management has been a more recent focus of Stimson's South Asia program. A succession of unsettling crises in 1986-7, 1990, 1999, 2001-2, and 2008 has raised concerns about war and escalation control on the subcontinent.  These crises have occurred during large-scale military exercises, in conjunction with the Kashmir dispute, or after mass-casualty attacks by Pakistani extremists on iconic Indian targets.  Stimson has produced a series of important publications on escalation control and crisis management, including a monograph, Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, and two extensive case studies on US crisis management after the 2001-2 "Twin Peaks" crisis and 2008 Mumbai crisis.

Deterrence stability doesn't evolve naturally and cannot be taken for granted. The most dangerous time for deterrence stability and escalation control usually comes in the years immediately after countries acquire nuclear capabilities. During this awkward period, "red lines" - thresholds that, if crossed, could provoke intense retaliation - and the nuclear balance are unclear, and substantial risk-reduction arrangements have not been implemented. The early stages of the US-Soviet nuclear competition were most harrowing, including a series of crises over Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis. Similarly, India and Pakistan have lurched from one crisis to the next during the first two decades after acquiring nuclear weapons.