Another Nuclear Security Crisis
When the Soviet Union ended, a forward-looking group of U.S. lawmakers and statesmen had been planning for months how to ensure that Soviet nuclear weapons were safe and secure amid any ensuing political turmoil. Saturday’s attack on Iran appears to have been planned for months with the explicit goal of encouraging the overthrow of the government. It is less clear, however, that there has been any associated forethought given to securing the stockpiles not only of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and nuclear centrifuges, but of other dangerous nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and expertise that successive U.S. administrations have raised concerns about or declared that the Islamic Republic is harboring.
CBRN Risks
Iran is known to have stockpiled more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level that has no peaceful justification and can be quickly raised to the 90 percent level needed for a nuclear bomb. Indeed, this was one of President Trump’s main justifications for the strikes. Despite devastating strikes on Iran nuclear program sites by Israel and the United States last June, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi warned of the nuclear proliferation threat earlier this month, saying that “most of the material” Iran had enriched was still present “in large quantities.” Experts are doubtful whether the Ayatollah’s regime, though weakened, would actually fall without a full-scale ground invasion of the kind President Trump says he is against. Yet even political disruption, let alone regime change, could provide enough of an opening for theft or disappearance of the material.
Iran’s collection of nuclear enrichment centrifuges would also be at risk of diversion by non-state actor groups it has supported and that are active in the region, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS. The International Atomic Energy Agency has previously flagged that the Bushehr nuclear power plant and Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor would both present an immediate danger to surrounding populations if hit by strikes, and the facilities and their spent nuclear fuel also present inviting security and proliferation targets.
Dual-use chemical and biological materials and capabilities also present concerns. U.S. law requires the U.S. Department of State to report on U.S. and foreign country compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament conventions and treaties. Iran’s program has been a consistent focus of these reports, due to concerns not just about the purpose of its nuclear program but also to problematic declarations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In 2018, the first Trump administration certified that Iran, reported to have transferred chemical weapons to Libya, was not in compliance with the CWC due to its failure to declare those transfers as well as complete holdings of riot control agents and to submit a complete declaration of chemical weapons production facilities. “Further, the United States has serious concerns that Iran is pursuing pharmaceutical-based agents for offensive purposes,” the report stated. Subsequent annual reports have upheld this finding, along with persistent concerns about the nature of Iran’s bioweapons-relevant research.
Boots on the Ground?
The launch of Operation Epic Fury raises less the memory of the deliberate U.S. statesmanship that produced the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program than the rush to war in Iraq in 2003 over false allegations of weapons of mass destruction programs. While the stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium was verified by the IAEA as of June 2025, and raises real and grave proliferation concerns, Iran maintains it does not have – and analysts have found no evidence of – an active weapons program. There is also no evidence that Iran has tried to recover the canisters of highly enriched uranium, which were buried under rubble after U.S. and Israeli strikes last June. To truly effect both regime change and secure the vulnerable WMD-relevant material in Iran, the United States may yet have to put “boots on the ground.” Verifying compliance with dismantling its nuclear enrichment, missile, and drone programs, and investigating potential biological and chemical weapons programs and, if confirmed, dismantling them, will certainly take large numbers of investigators and inspectors at the very least. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and partners in the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction have decades of experience in securing and eliminating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, delivery systems, and dual use material around the world. Collaborative planning efforts must begin.
Start Planning Now to Secure CBRN Materials in Iran
By Richard Cupitt • Christina McAllister • Barbara Slavin
Nonproliferation
The potential of chemical and biological weapons dual use material and expertise in Iran has received less attention than the country’s known stockpile of highly enriched uranium, but materials in the event of political upheaval will require experts on the ground to identify, verify, secure, and eliminate them.
Another Nuclear Security Crisis
When the Soviet Union ended, a forward-looking group of U.S. lawmakers and statesmen had been planning for months how to ensure that Soviet nuclear weapons were safe and secure amid any ensuing political turmoil. Saturday’s attack on Iran appears to have been planned for months with the explicit goal of encouraging the overthrow of the government. It is less clear, however, that there has been any associated forethought given to securing the stockpiles not only of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and nuclear centrifuges, but of other dangerous nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and expertise that successive U.S. administrations have raised concerns about or declared that the Islamic Republic is harboring.
CBRN Risks
Iran is known to have stockpiled more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level that has no peaceful justification and can be quickly raised to the 90 percent level needed for a nuclear bomb. Indeed, this was one of President Trump’s main justifications for the strikes. Despite devastating strikes on Iran nuclear program sites by Israel and the United States last June, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi warned of the nuclear proliferation threat earlier this month, saying that “most of the material” Iran had enriched was still present “in large quantities.” Experts are doubtful whether the Ayatollah’s regime, though weakened, would actually fall without a full-scale ground invasion of the kind President Trump says he is against. Yet even political disruption, let alone regime change, could provide enough of an opening for theft or disappearance of the material.
Iran’s collection of nuclear enrichment centrifuges would also be at risk of diversion by non-state actor groups it has supported and that are active in the region, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS. The International Atomic Energy Agency has previously flagged that the Bushehr nuclear power plant and Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor would both present an immediate danger to surrounding populations if hit by strikes, and the facilities and their spent nuclear fuel also present inviting security and proliferation targets.
Dual-use chemical and biological materials and capabilities also present concerns. U.S. law requires the U.S. Department of State to report on U.S. and foreign country compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament conventions and treaties. Iran’s program has been a consistent focus of these reports, due to concerns not just about the purpose of its nuclear program but also to problematic declarations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In 2018, the first Trump administration certified that Iran, reported to have transferred chemical weapons to Libya, was not in compliance with the CWC due to its failure to declare those transfers as well as complete holdings of riot control agents and to submit a complete declaration of chemical weapons production facilities. “Further, the United States has serious concerns that Iran is pursuing pharmaceutical-based agents for offensive purposes,” the report stated. Subsequent annual reports have upheld this finding, along with persistent concerns about the nature of Iran’s bioweapons-relevant research.
Boots on the Ground?
The launch of Operation Epic Fury raises less the memory of the deliberate U.S. statesmanship that produced the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program than the rush to war in Iraq in 2003 over false allegations of weapons of mass destruction programs. While the stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium was verified by the IAEA as of June 2025, and raises real and grave proliferation concerns, Iran maintains it does not have – and analysts have found no evidence of – an active weapons program. There is also no evidence that Iran has tried to recover the canisters of highly enriched uranium, which were buried under rubble after U.S. and Israeli strikes last June. To truly effect both regime change and secure the vulnerable WMD-relevant material in Iran, the United States may yet have to put “boots on the ground.” Verifying compliance with dismantling its nuclear enrichment, missile, and drone programs, and investigating potential biological and chemical weapons programs and, if confirmed, dismantling them, will certainly take large numbers of investigators and inspectors at the very least. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and partners in the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction have decades of experience in securing and eliminating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, delivery systems, and dual use material around the world. Collaborative planning efforts must begin.
Recent & Related