Editor’s Note: Nour Eid is a Senior Consultant in Forensics and Integrity in Paris and a Nuclear Researcher for the Energy for Growth Hub based in Washington D.C. Her research focuses on the nexus between nuclear energy and security in the Gulf region. She graduated with a master’s degree in international security from Sciences Po Paris and wrote her master thesis on the Saudi Nuclear Program. Prior to that, she worked at the International Atomic Energy Agency. She also holds a bachelor’s degree from the American University of Beirut in Political Science and International Law.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
For over a decade, policymakers and analysts have warned of a nuclear domino in the Middle East: Tehran crosses the threshold, and Riyadh races to match it.
This perception has been reinforced not only by Western and Israeli commentary but also by statements from senior Saudi figures. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reiterated on multiple occasions — including in 2018 and 2023 — that Saudi Arabia would develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did, a position that echoed earlier statements by former intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal in 2011. Yet “reactive proliferation” has been rare in the nuclear age. Far more common has been restraint, hedging, and the search for alternative forms of deterrence short of weaponization. Public rhetoric, especially in highly securitized regional environments, often serves signaling purposes rather than imminent policy decisions.
Saudi Arabia’s evolving nuclear calculus reflects a broader reassessment of Gulf threat perceptions. It is shaped not only by Iran’s program but also by eroding U.S. security guarantees, Israel’s growing assertiveness, the risk of a hardliner in Tehran pursuing a North Korea-style dash to the bomb, and Riyadh’s own ambitions for strategic autonomy. Yet contrary to alarmist narratives, these developments are unlikely to trigger precipitous nuclearization. Historical experience shows that states rarely pursue costly weapons programs solely in response to rivals, doing so only when regime survival is acutely threatened and credible security guarantees are absent. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge lies less in an imminent Iranian bomb than in the gradual weakening of the external security framework it has long relied upon.
An Evolving Threat Perception
For decades, Iran has occupied a central place in Saudi and Gulf security thinking, with the 1979 revolution and subsequent regional unrest crystallizing fears of ideological subversion, sectarian mobilization, and destabilization that directly shaped the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a collective security response to perceived threats from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Baathist Iraq. Between 2003 and 2023, these anxieties deepened as Tehran developed its ballistic missile program and expanded its influence in Iraq after the U.S. invasion, reinforced its alliance with Damascus during the Syrian civil war, empowered Hezbollah in Lebanon, and backed the Houthis in Yemen — an arc of state and non‑state actors labeled the “Axis of Resistance” that appeared to encircle the Gulf monarchies. The erosion of this axis began in the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, culminating in the Israeli killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28. Despite Iran’s targeting of GCC states during the current war, there is a growing perception in Gulf capitals that, while still consequential, Iran is no longer the unassailable regional hegemon once feared.
Yet Iran’s nuclear file remains a source of structural uncertainty. The passing of the Supreme Leader could shift internal dynamics toward less restraint on the nuclear file. Iranian leaders have not forgotten the fate of the Gaddafi regime in Libya after it relinquished its nuclear ambitions. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran retains over 400kg of highly enriched uranium, far beyond civilian energy needs. Although Israeli and U.S. strikes in June 2025 degraded core elements of the program, they did not eliminate the enriched uranium stockpile or the accumulated know-how that would allow reconstitution of the program over time. With the survival of the regime now at stake, Iranian leaders might determine that a rapid move toward weaponization offers the ultimate insurance policy. While that option seems difficult to carry out in practice, it cannot be ruled out.
At the same time, Israel’s behavior has generated new anxieties. The September 2025 strike on Doha targeting a Hamas negotiator signaled a willingness to test long-standing understandings about regional red lines and U.S. security guarantees. In several Gulf capitals, Israel is increasingly viewed not as a stabilizing partner but as an actor whose escalatory tendencies keep on drawing the region into broader conflicts, pushing away the environment conducive to economic transformation envisioned by Saudi Arabia under Vision 2030. This divergence may push Riyadh to seek greater leverage and autonomy.
The Erosion of U.S. Security Guarantees
For decades, the US-Saudi relationship rested on an implicit bargain — energy stability in exchange for security protection. American arms sales, training programs, and deployments underpinned this arrangement. Yet the muted U.S. response to the 2019 attacks on the Abqaiq oil facilities and the 2022 attacks on Abu Dhabi airport shook Riyadh’s confidence in U.S. security assurances. Gulf policymakers have also taken note of Washington’s increasingly fraught dealings with its NATO and European allies, reinforcing concerns about the reliability of American commitments. The cumulative and sobering message was that U.S. guarantees might not automatically translate into decisive retaliation, even when core Gulf infrastructure is targeted. This anxiety has deepened as the ongoing war against Iran unfolds. Gulf states actively sought to prevent the war through diplomacy only to find themselves exposed to retaliation. Iran decided to target civilian infrastructure undermining “safe hub branding” and investor confidence, rather than stick to U.S. military bases in these countries. For many in the GCC, the war reinforced the perception that Washington prioritizes Israel’s security over that of its Gulf partners.
Saudi Arabia’s response to its evolving threat environment is not a rush for the bomb but a multidirectional hedging strategy, which has thus far not been as effective as hoped. The September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan has proven largely symbolic, as Islamabad offered no tangible military support when Saudi civilian infrastructure was targeted by Iran. This diversification is embedded in the broader logic of Saudi Vision 2030, which emphasizes domestic industrial and defense capacity to reduce dependence on external suppliers, enhance strategic flexibility, and increase bargaining power. Riyadh’s diversification strategy extends across sectors, engaging Turkey on co-production and technology transfer for its next-generation Kaan fighter program while continuing negotiations with the U.S. A comparable approach is evident in the nuclear sphere, where reported cooperation with China on uranium exploration and elements of the fuel cycle underscores Saudi readiness to diversify partnerships if Washington’s terms are unsatisfactory.
Riyadh’s negotiation tactics with Washington appear to be bearing fruit, as the United States has signaled willingness to allow for Saudi enrichment without demanding acceptance of the Additional Protocol (AP) of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a voluntary IAEA safeguard that is usually part of the obligatory Section 123 agreement submitted to Congress. For the first time, the Trump administration has used a waiver provision in the annual National Defense Authorization Act to bypass the AP requirement, submitting a report in November 2025 “describing the manner in which such agreement would advance the national security and defense interests of the United States and not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” The Trump administration sees cooperation with Riyadh as a way to reestablish the United States as a competitive nuclear supplier in the Middle East, where Russia is advancing projects in Egypt and Turkey, South Korea provided key elements of the UAE’s program, and China seems well positioned to secure a contract for Turkey’s second plant.
The proposed framework relies on a bilateral safeguards agreement under which only facilities declared under the agreement would be subject to IAEA oversight. The AP provides broader access, including to non-nuclear facilities. In general, Arab states have been expected to accept strict safeguards and forgo enrichment rights, while Israel maintained a nuclear arsenal outside the NPT, deepening a long-standing perception of regional double standards. This feeling was reinforced by IAEA inspections in Iraq during the 1990s, conducted under the so-called “anyplace, anytime” mandate, which many Arab states — Saudi Arabia and Egypt most vocally — viewed as overly intrusive and thought would be replicated under the AP.
Among the possible paths going forward is a model similar to South Korea, where a moratorium on domestic enrichment was combined with the creation of a bilateral commission to assess whether in-house fissile material production was strategically and economically viable in the future. In South Korea’s case, enrichment seems cost-effective because the country operates over 25 reactors, making the economics of domestic fuel cycle development a key consideration. While the specifics of the Saudi 123 agreement remain unclear, the fact that Washington is considering allowing both Saudi Arabia and South Korea to develop domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities despite having threatened to develop nuclear weapons in the past signals growing U.S. tolerance for “friendly proliferation,” a concept with evident risks since today’s partner could become tomorrow’s adversary, as seen with Iran. Proponents argue that selectively backing allies’ sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities can be strategically managed and even serve U.S. interests, yet such reasoning normalizes weapons-adjacent development and reinforces the belief that alignment with a major power can shield aspirants from the full consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold.
Beyond strategic hedging, Riyadh views nuclear energy as a way to diversify its power mix and meet the rising electricity demands of Vision 2030 projects, which require stable energy that intermittent renewables cannot as reliably provide.
A Potential Path Forward
Iran’s experience with nuclear latency offers a central lesson that what once functioned as protection and bargaining power can turn into strategic exposure. For years, Tehran leveraged its threshold status to extract concessions and signal deterrent potential. Yet after October 7, 2023, Israel appeared even less willing to tolerate a regional adversary hovering near nuclear capability. Iran’s reliance on latency misfired as technical progress alone cannot shield a state from attack or guarantee diplomatic gains. Going forward, states considering nuclear paths will weigh how their programs might be perceived, and whether geopolitical conditions favor or undermine a hedging approach, in which case swift weaponization might end up being the safer bet.
For Riyadh, Iran’s trajectory provides both warning and incentive. Although Iranian advances prompted Saudi officials to signal interest in comparable capabilities, the kingdom’s nuclear calculus extends beyond Tehran’s enrichment levels. Even if Iran were constrained, Riyadh appears intent on mastering the fuel cycle with Washington’s help despite China’s readiness to engage. The objective seems less about rapid weaponization and more about preserving long-term options by anchoring technical autonomy while remaining formally within NPT commitments. In a region shaped by deep-seated mistrust, Israel’s undeclared arsenal outside the treaty, earlier proliferation efforts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran, and recurrent strikes on nuclear infrastructure, aspirations for sensitive capabilities are unlikely to dissipate regardless of how the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran ends and whether Tehran ultimately builds a nuclear weapon.
Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Path Will Not Depend on Iran or the War’s Outcome
By Nour Eid
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Nour Eid is a Senior Consultant in Forensics and Integrity in Paris and a Nuclear Researcher for the Energy for Growth Hub based in Washington D.C. Her research focuses on the nexus between nuclear energy and security in the Gulf region. She graduated with a master’s degree in international security from Sciences Po Paris and wrote her master thesis on the Saudi Nuclear Program. Prior to that, she worked at the International Atomic Energy Agency. She also holds a bachelor’s degree from the American University of Beirut in Political Science and International Law.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
For over a decade, policymakers and analysts have warned of a nuclear domino in the Middle East: Tehran crosses the threshold, and Riyadh races to match it.
This perception has been reinforced not only by Western and Israeli commentary but also by statements from senior Saudi figures. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reiterated on multiple occasions — including in 2018 and 2023 — that Saudi Arabia would develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did, a position that echoed earlier statements by former intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal in 2011. Yet “reactive proliferation” has been rare in the nuclear age. Far more common has been restraint, hedging, and the search for alternative forms of deterrence short of weaponization. Public rhetoric, especially in highly securitized regional environments, often serves signaling purposes rather than imminent policy decisions.
Saudi Arabia’s evolving nuclear calculus reflects a broader reassessment of Gulf threat perceptions. It is shaped not only by Iran’s program but also by eroding U.S. security guarantees, Israel’s growing assertiveness, the risk of a hardliner in Tehran pursuing a North Korea-style dash to the bomb, and Riyadh’s own ambitions for strategic autonomy. Yet contrary to alarmist narratives, these developments are unlikely to trigger precipitous nuclearization. Historical experience shows that states rarely pursue costly weapons programs solely in response to rivals, doing so only when regime survival is acutely threatened and credible security guarantees are absent. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge lies less in an imminent Iranian bomb than in the gradual weakening of the external security framework it has long relied upon.
An Evolving Threat Perception
For decades, Iran has occupied a central place in Saudi and Gulf security thinking, with the 1979 revolution and subsequent regional unrest crystallizing fears of ideological subversion, sectarian mobilization, and destabilization that directly shaped the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a collective security response to perceived threats from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Baathist Iraq. Between 2003 and 2023, these anxieties deepened as Tehran developed its ballistic missile program and expanded its influence in Iraq after the U.S. invasion, reinforced its alliance with Damascus during the Syrian civil war, empowered Hezbollah in Lebanon, and backed the Houthis in Yemen — an arc of state and non‑state actors labeled the “Axis of Resistance” that appeared to encircle the Gulf monarchies. The erosion of this axis began in the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, culminating in the Israeli killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28. Despite Iran’s targeting of GCC states during the current war, there is a growing perception in Gulf capitals that, while still consequential, Iran is no longer the unassailable regional hegemon once feared.
Yet Iran’s nuclear file remains a source of structural uncertainty. The passing of the Supreme Leader could shift internal dynamics toward less restraint on the nuclear file. Iranian leaders have not forgotten the fate of the Gaddafi regime in Libya after it relinquished its nuclear ambitions. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran retains over 400kg of highly enriched uranium, far beyond civilian energy needs. Although Israeli and U.S. strikes in June 2025 degraded core elements of the program, they did not eliminate the enriched uranium stockpile or the accumulated know-how that would allow reconstitution of the program over time. With the survival of the regime now at stake, Iranian leaders might determine that a rapid move toward weaponization offers the ultimate insurance policy. While that option seems difficult to carry out in practice, it cannot be ruled out.
At the same time, Israel’s behavior has generated new anxieties. The September 2025 strike on Doha targeting a Hamas negotiator signaled a willingness to test long-standing understandings about regional red lines and U.S. security guarantees. In several Gulf capitals, Israel is increasingly viewed not as a stabilizing partner but as an actor whose escalatory tendencies keep on drawing the region into broader conflicts, pushing away the environment conducive to economic transformation envisioned by Saudi Arabia under Vision 2030. This divergence may push Riyadh to seek greater leverage and autonomy.
The Erosion of U.S. Security Guarantees
For decades, the US-Saudi relationship rested on an implicit bargain — energy stability in exchange for security protection. American arms sales, training programs, and deployments underpinned this arrangement. Yet the muted U.S. response to the 2019 attacks on the Abqaiq oil facilities and the 2022 attacks on Abu Dhabi airport shook Riyadh’s confidence in U.S. security assurances. Gulf policymakers have also taken note of Washington’s increasingly fraught dealings with its NATO and European allies, reinforcing concerns about the reliability of American commitments. The cumulative and sobering message was that U.S. guarantees might not automatically translate into decisive retaliation, even when core Gulf infrastructure is targeted. This anxiety has deepened as the ongoing war against Iran unfolds. Gulf states actively sought to prevent the war through diplomacy only to find themselves exposed to retaliation. Iran decided to target civilian infrastructure undermining “safe hub branding” and investor confidence, rather than stick to U.S. military bases in these countries. For many in the GCC, the war reinforced the perception that Washington prioritizes Israel’s security over that of its Gulf partners.
Saudi Arabia’s response to its evolving threat environment is not a rush for the bomb but a multidirectional hedging strategy, which has thus far not been as effective as hoped. The September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan has proven largely symbolic, as Islamabad offered no tangible military support when Saudi civilian infrastructure was targeted by Iran. This diversification is embedded in the broader logic of Saudi Vision 2030, which emphasizes domestic industrial and defense capacity to reduce dependence on external suppliers, enhance strategic flexibility, and increase bargaining power. Riyadh’s diversification strategy extends across sectors, engaging Turkey on co-production and technology transfer for its next-generation Kaan fighter program while continuing negotiations with the U.S. A comparable approach is evident in the nuclear sphere, where reported cooperation with China on uranium exploration and elements of the fuel cycle underscores Saudi readiness to diversify partnerships if Washington’s terms are unsatisfactory.
Riyadh’s negotiation tactics with Washington appear to be bearing fruit, as the United States has signaled willingness to allow for Saudi enrichment without demanding acceptance of the Additional Protocol (AP) of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a voluntary IAEA safeguard that is usually part of the obligatory Section 123 agreement submitted to Congress. For the first time, the Trump administration has used a waiver provision in the annual National Defense Authorization Act to bypass the AP requirement, submitting a report in November 2025 “describing the manner in which such agreement would advance the national security and defense interests of the United States and not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” The Trump administration sees cooperation with Riyadh as a way to reestablish the United States as a competitive nuclear supplier in the Middle East, where Russia is advancing projects in Egypt and Turkey, South Korea provided key elements of the UAE’s program, and China seems well positioned to secure a contract for Turkey’s second plant.
The proposed framework relies on a bilateral safeguards agreement under which only facilities declared under the agreement would be subject to IAEA oversight. The AP provides broader access, including to non-nuclear facilities. In general, Arab states have been expected to accept strict safeguards and forgo enrichment rights, while Israel maintained a nuclear arsenal outside the NPT, deepening a long-standing perception of regional double standards. This feeling was reinforced by IAEA inspections in Iraq during the 1990s, conducted under the so-called “anyplace, anytime” mandate, which many Arab states — Saudi Arabia and Egypt most vocally — viewed as overly intrusive and thought would be replicated under the AP.
Among the possible paths going forward is a model similar to South Korea, where a moratorium on domestic enrichment was combined with the creation of a bilateral commission to assess whether in-house fissile material production was strategically and economically viable in the future. In South Korea’s case, enrichment seems cost-effective because the country operates over 25 reactors, making the economics of domestic fuel cycle development a key consideration. While the specifics of the Saudi 123 agreement remain unclear, the fact that Washington is considering allowing both Saudi Arabia and South Korea to develop domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities despite having threatened to develop nuclear weapons in the past signals growing U.S. tolerance for “friendly proliferation,” a concept with evident risks since today’s partner could become tomorrow’s adversary, as seen with Iran. Proponents argue that selectively backing allies’ sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities can be strategically managed and even serve U.S. interests, yet such reasoning normalizes weapons-adjacent development and reinforces the belief that alignment with a major power can shield aspirants from the full consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold.
Beyond strategic hedging, Riyadh views nuclear energy as a way to diversify its power mix and meet the rising electricity demands of Vision 2030 projects, which require stable energy that intermittent renewables cannot as reliably provide.
A Potential Path Forward
Iran’s experience with nuclear latency offers a central lesson that what once functioned as protection and bargaining power can turn into strategic exposure. For years, Tehran leveraged its threshold status to extract concessions and signal deterrent potential. Yet after October 7, 2023, Israel appeared even less willing to tolerate a regional adversary hovering near nuclear capability. Iran’s reliance on latency misfired as technical progress alone cannot shield a state from attack or guarantee diplomatic gains. Going forward, states considering nuclear paths will weigh how their programs might be perceived, and whether geopolitical conditions favor or undermine a hedging approach, in which case swift weaponization might end up being the safer bet.
For Riyadh, Iran’s trajectory provides both warning and incentive. Although Iranian advances prompted Saudi officials to signal interest in comparable capabilities, the kingdom’s nuclear calculus extends beyond Tehran’s enrichment levels. Even if Iran were constrained, Riyadh appears intent on mastering the fuel cycle with Washington’s help despite China’s readiness to engage. The objective seems less about rapid weaponization and more about preserving long-term options by anchoring technical autonomy while remaining formally within NPT commitments. In a region shaped by deep-seated mistrust, Israel’s undeclared arsenal outside the treaty, earlier proliferation efforts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran, and recurrent strikes on nuclear infrastructure, aspirations for sensitive capabilities are unlikely to dissipate regardless of how the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran ends and whether Tehran ultimately builds a nuclear weapon.
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