Editor’s Note: Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz is a Senior Researcher in the Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, a prominent Israeli think tank. Citrinowicz served for 25 years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) and as the division’s representative in the United States.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
For decades, Iran has occupied a singular place in Israel’s threat perception. Across governments of the left, center, and right, Tehran has been viewed as the most consequential long-term strategic challenge to Israeli security.
That consensus has only hardened in recent years. Yet, the strength of that agreement may now be obscuring important questions about the limits of military power and the risks of escalation.
Six months after Israel declared that its latest confrontation with Iran had significantly degraded the Iranian threat, Tehran is rebuilding its nuclear and missile programs. Deterrence, as in previous cycles, appears temporary rather than transformative.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long argued that only sustained pressure — ideally culminating in decisive U.S. action — can fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic trajectory. From his perspective, further degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure would represent a historic achievement, even if it does not immediately resolve the broader regional competition. The underlying assumption is that the accumulation of military setbacks will eventually force Tehran to recalculate.
Yet, the historical record suggests caution. Iran’s leadership has consistently treated its nuclear program and missile capabilities as core elements of regime security and national deterrence. External military pressure has often reinforced, rather than weakened, hardline elements within the system. Even significant tactical damage has not altered the regime’s long-term strategic orientation.
Inside Israel, however, there is limited sustained debate over whether repeated military campaigns can produce durable outcomes. Iran is widely understood as an existential or near-existential threat. That framing narrows the range of politically viable alternatives. While tactical successes are acknowledged, less attention is paid to the structural question: Can military force permanently resolve a problem rooted in ideology, deterrence logic, and regime survival?
Above all, policymakers in Israel must confront a more difficult question: Is the cumulative cost of repeated rounds of confrontation with Iran proportional to the strategic gains achieved? Even during last June’s 12-day confrontation — despite an impressive opening operational picture — Iran continued launching missiles toward Israel. Tactical surprise and initial success did not translate into immediate coercive effect. If Iran retains the capacity and willingness to absorb blows while sustaining retaliatory fire, then each cycle risks becoming an exercise in damage management rather than strategic resolution.
The issue is not whether Israel can impose costs, but whether those costs meaningfully alter Tehran’s long-term calculus, or merely reset the clock until the next round.
This matters not only for Israel but also for the United States.
Iran is not solely an Israeli challenge; it is a regional and global one. But when Israeli domestic politics offer little opposition to escalation, Washington may find itself increasingly central to decisions whose consequences extend far beyond the immediate battlefield. Any large-scale military action against Iran would carry significant risks: regional spillover, global energy disruption, the activation of Iranian partners such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, and the possibility of protracted confrontation without a clearly defined end state.
The feasibility question is equally pressing. Airpower can delay nuclear development and destroy physical infrastructure. It cannot eliminate scientific knowledge. Reconstruction is possible. The strategic dilemma, therefore, is whether policymakers are prepared for a recurring cycle in which Iran rebuilds and military action becomes a periodic instrument of management rather than resolution.
None of this minimizes the seriousness of Iran’s nuclear advances. The trajectory is deeply concerning, and deterrence must remain credible. But credibility should not substitute for strategic clarity.
Israel’s broad political consensus on Iran reflects legitimate security fears. Yet consensus can also constrain reassessment. The limited depth of public debate in Israel regarding the nature of the Iranian threat — combined with a striking degree of cross-political consensus — has also constrained the development of alternative strategic thinking. When the threat is framed in near-existential terms and policy responses are treated as self-evident, space narrows for exploring approaches that extend beyond the use of force. This does not imply naïveté about Iranian intentions; rather, it raises the question of whether a more diversified strategy — integrating diplomacy, regional balancing, deterrence, and calibrated pressure — might ultimately yield more durable gains than reliance on military action alone. For now, however, such reassessment appears unlikely no matter how the current crisis unfolds. The prevailing consensus reduces incentives for strategic innovation, even as the cycle of confrontation persists.
It is important to recognize that Israel’s policy trajectory toward Iran is unlikely to shift significantly after elections — regardless of who becomes prime minister. The strategic focus on Iran offers so many political and security advantages within Israel’s system that no major leader is likely to abandon it or substantially downgrade investment in countering the Iranian threat.
Iran functions as a unifying organizing principle in Israeli national security policy. It generates broad political consensus, justifies sustained defense spending, and aligns with the post–October 7, 2023, security doctrine that prioritizes preemption and risk minimization. In that sense, the Iran file is not tied to one political figure; it is embedded in the strategic culture.
If the Iranian regime remains stable and continues advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities, Israel is likely to operate according to a principle that has hardened since October 7: Threats will be assessed not by declared intentions but by demonstrated capabilities. The trauma of strategic surprise has deeply reinforced a capabilities-based doctrine.
Under these conditions, it is difficult to envision a meaningful internal Israeli challenge to a more proactive — or even preventive — approach toward Iran. That consensus will shape Israel’s risk tolerance and escalation thresholds in the years ahead.
Israel’s Strategic Consensus on Iran — and Its Risks
By Danny Citrinowicz
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz is a Senior Researcher in the Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, a prominent Israeli think tank. Citrinowicz served for 25 years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) and as the division’s representative in the United States.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
For decades, Iran has occupied a singular place in Israel’s threat perception. Across governments of the left, center, and right, Tehran has been viewed as the most consequential long-term strategic challenge to Israeli security.
That consensus has only hardened in recent years. Yet, the strength of that agreement may now be obscuring important questions about the limits of military power and the risks of escalation.
Six months after Israel declared that its latest confrontation with Iran had significantly degraded the Iranian threat, Tehran is rebuilding its nuclear and missile programs. Deterrence, as in previous cycles, appears temporary rather than transformative.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long argued that only sustained pressure — ideally culminating in decisive U.S. action — can fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic trajectory. From his perspective, further degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure would represent a historic achievement, even if it does not immediately resolve the broader regional competition. The underlying assumption is that the accumulation of military setbacks will eventually force Tehran to recalculate.
Yet, the historical record suggests caution. Iran’s leadership has consistently treated its nuclear program and missile capabilities as core elements of regime security and national deterrence. External military pressure has often reinforced, rather than weakened, hardline elements within the system. Even significant tactical damage has not altered the regime’s long-term strategic orientation.
Inside Israel, however, there is limited sustained debate over whether repeated military campaigns can produce durable outcomes. Iran is widely understood as an existential or near-existential threat. That framing narrows the range of politically viable alternatives. While tactical successes are acknowledged, less attention is paid to the structural question: Can military force permanently resolve a problem rooted in ideology, deterrence logic, and regime survival?
Above all, policymakers in Israel must confront a more difficult question: Is the cumulative cost of repeated rounds of confrontation with Iran proportional to the strategic gains achieved? Even during last June’s 12-day confrontation — despite an impressive opening operational picture — Iran continued launching missiles toward Israel. Tactical surprise and initial success did not translate into immediate coercive effect. If Iran retains the capacity and willingness to absorb blows while sustaining retaliatory fire, then each cycle risks becoming an exercise in damage management rather than strategic resolution.
The issue is not whether Israel can impose costs, but whether those costs meaningfully alter Tehran’s long-term calculus, or merely reset the clock until the next round.
This matters not only for Israel but also for the United States.
Iran is not solely an Israeli challenge; it is a regional and global one. But when Israeli domestic politics offer little opposition to escalation, Washington may find itself increasingly central to decisions whose consequences extend far beyond the immediate battlefield. Any large-scale military action against Iran would carry significant risks: regional spillover, global energy disruption, the activation of Iranian partners such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, and the possibility of protracted confrontation without a clearly defined end state.
The feasibility question is equally pressing. Airpower can delay nuclear development and destroy physical infrastructure. It cannot eliminate scientific knowledge. Reconstruction is possible. The strategic dilemma, therefore, is whether policymakers are prepared for a recurring cycle in which Iran rebuilds and military action becomes a periodic instrument of management rather than resolution.
None of this minimizes the seriousness of Iran’s nuclear advances. The trajectory is deeply concerning, and deterrence must remain credible. But credibility should not substitute for strategic clarity.
Israel’s broad political consensus on Iran reflects legitimate security fears. Yet consensus can also constrain reassessment. The limited depth of public debate in Israel regarding the nature of the Iranian threat — combined with a striking degree of cross-political consensus — has also constrained the development of alternative strategic thinking. When the threat is framed in near-existential terms and policy responses are treated as self-evident, space narrows for exploring approaches that extend beyond the use of force. This does not imply naïveté about Iranian intentions; rather, it raises the question of whether a more diversified strategy — integrating diplomacy, regional balancing, deterrence, and calibrated pressure — might ultimately yield more durable gains than reliance on military action alone. For now, however, such reassessment appears unlikely no matter how the current crisis unfolds. The prevailing consensus reduces incentives for strategic innovation, even as the cycle of confrontation persists.
It is important to recognize that Israel’s policy trajectory toward Iran is unlikely to shift significantly after elections — regardless of who becomes prime minister. The strategic focus on Iran offers so many political and security advantages within Israel’s system that no major leader is likely to abandon it or substantially downgrade investment in countering the Iranian threat.
Iran functions as a unifying organizing principle in Israeli national security policy. It generates broad political consensus, justifies sustained defense spending, and aligns with the post–October 7, 2023, security doctrine that prioritizes preemption and risk minimization. In that sense, the Iran file is not tied to one political figure; it is embedded in the strategic culture.
If the Iranian regime remains stable and continues advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities, Israel is likely to operate according to a principle that has hardened since October 7: Threats will be assessed not by declared intentions but by demonstrated capabilities. The trauma of strategic surprise has deeply reinforced a capabilities-based doctrine.
Under these conditions, it is difficult to envision a meaningful internal Israeli challenge to a more proactive — or even preventive — approach toward Iran. That consensus will shape Israel’s risk tolerance and escalation thresholds in the years ahead.
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