Editor’s Note: Stasa Salacanin is a widely published author and analyst focusing on the Middle East and Europe. He produces in-depth analysis of the region’s most pertinent issues for regional and international publications, including the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Middle East Monitor, The New Arab, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Amwaj, Qantara, and other publications.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
As the U.S. claims success in its strikes with Israel against Iran’s nuclear sites, a prior U.S. air campaign against Yemen’s Houthi movement has had decidedly mixed results.
Donald Trump announced a ceasefire in May, asserting that the Yemeni group had “capitulated” after three months of U.S. bombardment. Many analysts who spoke to this author doubt that this was the case.
After Israel attacked Iran on June 13, the Houthis fired several ballistic missiles at the Israeli city of Jaffa, asserting that they were coordinating their attacks with Iran. The fight between the Houthis and Israel has continued, with Israel striking Houthi-controlled ports on July 6 after the rebel group attacked a ship in the Red Sea. The Houthis sank the Liberian-flagged vessel, killed at least two crew members and took others hostage, alleging that the ship was bound for an Israeli port. However, the Houthis have kept their ceasefire with the U.S. even after the Trump administration joined the Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
Most observers believe the earlier U.S. campaign against the Houthis achieved only modest military success and actually strengthened the Houthis’ image and grip on power in the war-torn country.
The U.S. had intensified airstrikes against Yemen in April after the Houthis declared they would attack Israeli ships passing through the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. When President Trump announced an end to the airstrikes on May 6, following a ceasefire brokered by Oman, both sides claimed that the other had “backed down.”
The Houthis did suffer losses, and their military capabilities were slightly impacted, while their missile and drone attacks on Israel were not particularly effective. According to Houthi reports, U.S. and Israeli attacks severely damaged infrastructure in parts of Yemen under Houthi control, including Hodeidah province and its strategically important harbor, with estimates of more than $1 billion in losses. At the same time, the Houthis inflicted at least $1 billion in costs on the U.S. military, including the loss of several U.S. drones and two multimillion-dollar fighter jets, among them an F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet that fell off the back of an aircraft carrier.
Mohamed Aliriani, a research fellow at the Yemen Policy Center, told this analyst that the U.S. campaign was a “partial tactical success but a strategic failure.” The U.S. airstrikes, guided primarily by satellite imagery, limited the Houthis’ ability to launch large-scale drone attacks on shipping lanes by destroying targets such as assembly facilities, he said. According to statistics released by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in May, Houthi ballistic missile attacks decreased by 69 percent and drone attacks by 55 percent as a result of what the Pentagon dubbed Operation Rough Rider.
However, the campaign failed to achieve its core objective of meaningfully degrading the Houthis’ overall military capability. “It lacked the on-the-ground intelligence necessary to locate and destroy critical hidden assets, such as ballistic missile storage facilities,” Aliriani said.
Similarly, Alex Almeida, the head security analyst at the risk advisory firm Horizon Engage, told this author that “the mission was a failure” because “the U.S. sent two carrier groups, most of its deployable B-2 fleet, F-35s, etc., just to return to the status quo ante. Even before the operation began, the Houthis hadn’t attacked U.S. shipping for months.”
The Houthis will be able to rebuild lost capacity if Iran is able to resupply them. Almeida pointed out that since the U.S. began patrolling the Red Sea under the Biden administration following the start of the Israel-Gaza war in 2023, the U.S. has struck Houthi missile and drone sites without seriously addressing the issue of Houthi resupply.
According to Susanne Dahlgren, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a lecturer at Tampere University in Finland, the Trump-Houthi ceasefire deal was motivated in part by U.S. negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. “The Iranians hinted to the Houthis that the nuclear deal is their priority,” she said. She also explained that Trump’s desire to reduce spending was evident in the decision to seek a ceasefire. This angered the Israelis, she said, who wanted the U.S. to continue.
It appears that the Trump administration’s decision to stop fighting also went against the advice of some in the U.S. military. According to reports in the Times of Israel and the New York Times, a longer campaign, lasting at least 8 to 10 months, was envisioned to include the assassination of high-ranking Houthi officials. But Trump preferred a short-term air campaign.
According to Almeida, a “combined air campaign, counter-smuggling effort, and ‘by, with, and through’ effort to build up the Republic of Yemen Government’s (ROYG) forces could probably achieve meaningful results if allowed to develop properly.” However, according to Aliriani, this would have escalated U.S. involvement far beyond its strategic interests. As Vice President J.D. Vance has said, Americans were paying to protect a maritime route used mainly by Europeans.
Dahlgren said that CENTCOM has not identified what strategic objectives the U.S. campaign in Yemen has achieved. “We also don’t know what the Americans promised the Houthis as part of the deal,” she added.
Propaganda Victory for the Houthis
Maritime traffic has not significantly resumed since the ceasefire. Instead, the Houthis appear to have consolidated their power and have celebrated the U.S. withdrawal as a great victory. By portraying themselves as the only force resisting foreign powers — the U.S. and Israel — the Houthis strengthened their internal support, increased recruitment, and reinforced their image as Yemen’s primary defenders, Aliriani said.
The strikes, therefore, paradoxically worked to prolong the conflict by simultaneously entrenching the Houthis and neutralizing their primary domestic opponents.
“Yemeni factions that might have otherwise launched a ground offensive are now paralyzed,” Aliriani said. “Any such attack would be framed by the Houthis as serving U.S./Israeli interests, which would make it politically toxic and cost the highly unpopular Yemeni government any remaining legitimacy.”
Threats of ballistic missile and drone retaliation by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates deter regional backers from supporting a new ground offensive. “This dynamic effectively freezes the frontlines, leaving the Houthis securely in power in their territories and indefinitely prolonging the conflict,” Aliriani added.
Should U.S. or Israeli attacks resume on Iranian nuclear or other targets, the Houthis might seek to block the Bab al-Mandab entrance to the Suez Canal at the same time that Iran chokes off the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Energy experts warn that this could cause a major energy crisis, adding huge costs to the global economy. Mamdouh Salameh, an international oil economist and former professor of energy economics at the ESCP Business School in London, told this author that in that event “global economic growth could easily shrink by two-to-three percent.”
Dahlgren believes that the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States would benefit from a settlement with Houthis and that even if they do not recognize their rule, they may maintain a chilly truce with them. This, she said, “is not a desirable solution to the Yemeni situation, since the majority of the population does not embrace the Houthis but neither the internationally recognized government.”
The Houthis use their military capability to exert influence at local, regional, and international levels. Therefore, attempting to integrate them into a political process without first altering the military reality may be futile.
“Accommodating the Houthis as a decisive factor would mean legitimizing a governance model based on conflict, which would undermine any future state-building efforts from the outset,” Aliriani said. The priority, therefore, should be to support a unified military effort by Yemeni factions, backed by a wide partnership of international stakeholders – not just the U.S. and Israel — to liberate territories under Houthi control. Yet, such an outcome is unlikely, especially with the ongoing crisis between Iran, the U.S,. and Israel.
US Airstrikes on Yemen: Tactical Wins, Strategic Setbacks
By Staša Salacanin
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Stasa Salacanin is a widely published author and analyst focusing on the Middle East and Europe. He produces in-depth analysis of the region’s most pertinent issues for regional and international publications, including the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Middle East Monitor, The New Arab, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Amwaj, Qantara, and other publications.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
As the U.S. claims success in its strikes with Israel against Iran’s nuclear sites, a prior U.S. air campaign against Yemen’s Houthi movement has had decidedly mixed results.
Donald Trump announced a ceasefire in May, asserting that the Yemeni group had “capitulated” after three months of U.S. bombardment. Many analysts who spoke to this author doubt that this was the case.
After Israel attacked Iran on June 13, the Houthis fired several ballistic missiles at the Israeli city of Jaffa, asserting that they were coordinating their attacks with Iran. The fight between the Houthis and Israel has continued, with Israel striking Houthi-controlled ports on July 6 after the rebel group attacked a ship in the Red Sea. The Houthis sank the Liberian-flagged vessel, killed at least two crew members and took others hostage, alleging that the ship was bound for an Israeli port. However, the Houthis have kept their ceasefire with the U.S. even after the Trump administration joined the Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
Most observers believe the earlier U.S. campaign against the Houthis achieved only modest military success and actually strengthened the Houthis’ image and grip on power in the war-torn country.
The U.S. had intensified airstrikes against Yemen in April after the Houthis declared they would attack Israeli ships passing through the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. When President Trump announced an end to the airstrikes on May 6, following a ceasefire brokered by Oman, both sides claimed that the other had “backed down.”
The Houthis did suffer losses, and their military capabilities were slightly impacted, while their missile and drone attacks on Israel were not particularly effective. According to Houthi reports, U.S. and Israeli attacks severely damaged infrastructure in parts of Yemen under Houthi control, including Hodeidah province and its strategically important harbor, with estimates of more than $1 billion in losses. At the same time, the Houthis inflicted at least $1 billion in costs on the U.S. military, including the loss of several U.S. drones and two multimillion-dollar fighter jets, among them an F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet that fell off the back of an aircraft carrier.
Mohamed Aliriani, a research fellow at the Yemen Policy Center, told this analyst that the U.S. campaign was a “partial tactical success but a strategic failure.” The U.S. airstrikes, guided primarily by satellite imagery, limited the Houthis’ ability to launch large-scale drone attacks on shipping lanes by destroying targets such as assembly facilities, he said. According to statistics released by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in May, Houthi ballistic missile attacks decreased by 69 percent and drone attacks by 55 percent as a result of what the Pentagon dubbed Operation Rough Rider.
However, the campaign failed to achieve its core objective of meaningfully degrading the Houthis’ overall military capability. “It lacked the on-the-ground intelligence necessary to locate and destroy critical hidden assets, such as ballistic missile storage facilities,” Aliriani said.
Similarly, Alex Almeida, the head security analyst at the risk advisory firm Horizon Engage, told this author that “the mission was a failure” because “the U.S. sent two carrier groups, most of its deployable B-2 fleet, F-35s, etc., just to return to the status quo ante. Even before the operation began, the Houthis hadn’t attacked U.S. shipping for months.”
The Houthis will be able to rebuild lost capacity if Iran is able to resupply them. Almeida pointed out that since the U.S. began patrolling the Red Sea under the Biden administration following the start of the Israel-Gaza war in 2023, the U.S. has struck Houthi missile and drone sites without seriously addressing the issue of Houthi resupply.
According to Susanne Dahlgren, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a lecturer at Tampere University in Finland, the Trump-Houthi ceasefire deal was motivated in part by U.S. negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. “The Iranians hinted to the Houthis that the nuclear deal is their priority,” she said. She also explained that Trump’s desire to reduce spending was evident in the decision to seek a ceasefire. This angered the Israelis, she said, who wanted the U.S. to continue.
It appears that the Trump administration’s decision to stop fighting also went against the advice of some in the U.S. military. According to reports in the Times of Israel and the New York Times, a longer campaign, lasting at least 8 to 10 months, was envisioned to include the assassination of high-ranking Houthi officials. But Trump preferred a short-term air campaign.
According to Almeida, a “combined air campaign, counter-smuggling effort, and ‘by, with, and through’ effort to build up the Republic of Yemen Government’s (ROYG) forces could probably achieve meaningful results if allowed to develop properly.” However, according to Aliriani, this would have escalated U.S. involvement far beyond its strategic interests. As Vice President J.D. Vance has said, Americans were paying to protect a maritime route used mainly by Europeans.
Dahlgren said that CENTCOM has not identified what strategic objectives the U.S. campaign in Yemen has achieved. “We also don’t know what the Americans promised the Houthis as part of the deal,” she added.
Propaganda Victory for the Houthis
Maritime traffic has not significantly resumed since the ceasefire. Instead, the Houthis appear to have consolidated their power and have celebrated the U.S. withdrawal as a great victory. By portraying themselves as the only force resisting foreign powers — the U.S. and Israel — the Houthis strengthened their internal support, increased recruitment, and reinforced their image as Yemen’s primary defenders, Aliriani said.
The strikes, therefore, paradoxically worked to prolong the conflict by simultaneously entrenching the Houthis and neutralizing their primary domestic opponents.
“Yemeni factions that might have otherwise launched a ground offensive are now paralyzed,” Aliriani said. “Any such attack would be framed by the Houthis as serving U.S./Israeli interests, which would make it politically toxic and cost the highly unpopular Yemeni government any remaining legitimacy.”
Threats of ballistic missile and drone retaliation by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates deter regional backers from supporting a new ground offensive. “This dynamic effectively freezes the frontlines, leaving the Houthis securely in power in their territories and indefinitely prolonging the conflict,” Aliriani added.
Should U.S. or Israeli attacks resume on Iranian nuclear or other targets, the Houthis might seek to block the Bab al-Mandab entrance to the Suez Canal at the same time that Iran chokes off the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Energy experts warn that this could cause a major energy crisis, adding huge costs to the global economy. Mamdouh Salameh, an international oil economist and former professor of energy economics at the ESCP Business School in London, told this author that in that event “global economic growth could easily shrink by two-to-three percent.”
Dahlgren believes that the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States would benefit from a settlement with Houthis and that even if they do not recognize their rule, they may maintain a chilly truce with them. This, she said, “is not a desirable solution to the Yemeni situation, since the majority of the population does not embrace the Houthis but neither the internationally recognized government.”
The Houthis use their military capability to exert influence at local, regional, and international levels. Therefore, attempting to integrate them into a political process without first altering the military reality may be futile.
“Accommodating the Houthis as a decisive factor would mean legitimizing a governance model based on conflict, which would undermine any future state-building efforts from the outset,” Aliriani said. The priority, therefore, should be to support a unified military effort by Yemeni factions, backed by a wide partnership of international stakeholders – not just the U.S. and Israel — to liberate territories under Houthi control. Yet, such an outcome is unlikely, especially with the ongoing crisis between Iran, the U.S,. and Israel.
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