Editor’s Note: With expertise on developments in the Caucasus and the Middle East, Ilya Roubanis interviewed sources in Iran, Turkey, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Europe to analyze the role of outside powers in shaping the future of Syria after the Assad regime. His previous work includes project management for the European Commission on education and migration and a project on security reform for the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. This is his first piece for Stimson.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
At a time when many multilateral security frameworks are in crisis, it is worth examining the role of the “Astana Process” that brought together Russia, Turkey, and Iran in 2017 to coordinate positions over Syria and later expanded to the Caucasus. With the collapse of the Assad regime, two important questions arise: Was the Astana process effective in managing the Syrian conflict? And does it still play a role today? To explore these questions, I consulted sources from Iran, Turkey, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Europe. Their consensus is that the power dynamic between the Astana partners has changed since the framework was established but remains relevant. Turkey, situated in the middle of a geopolitical space catalyzed by conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Nagorno-Karabakh, has clearly been empowered. With Russia and Iran reducing their hard security capabilities, Ankara has taken a more active role in shaping regional security dynamics. This is further influenced by the shift toward a more selective U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East return under the second Trump administration. However, the Astana Process is still probably more significant in managing the emerging status quo, especially as ties between Europe and the United States appear to fray
Three Power Vacuums, Two Security Zones, and an Army in Flux
The last meeting of the Astana framework was in Doha on December 7, 2024, a day before Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow as his military crumbled. The three powers convened with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pederson, to discuss the future of Syria. The convening states did not reach a consensus, and the rapid offensive of the Sunni Muslim Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) force from Idlib to Damascus created a fait accompli. However, the consultation between Iran, Turkey, and Russia helped prevent an escalation of the conflict to a Hobbesian nightmare of war of all against all.
The collapse of the Assad regime was driven by multiple power vacuums. The first was Russia’s withdrawal. Reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Ukrainian intelligence indicate that in mid-2024, Russia began a large-scale withdrawal of troops, personnel, and equipment from Syria’s Khmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus. This shift reflected Russia’s renewed focus on the war in Ukraine.
Secondly, there was a U.S. vacuum. The election of Donald Trump raised new questions about whether the U.S. would maintain troops in Syria and encouraged Turkey to believe it could end de facto autonomy by Kurdish forces in northwest Syria.
The Russian and American vacuums were compounded by an Iranian vacuum triggered by the weakening of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance against Israel since the Hamas attacks of 2023. Iranian diplomatic and security sources suggest that the term “corruption” does not adequately capture the state of play in the Syrian military in the final days of the Assad regime, as inflation eroded officers’ salaries to the point of them going hungry. With Hezbollah pounded by Israel in Lebanon, Tehran lost the ability to support Assad – as Iran and Russia had done during the middle stages of the Syrian civil war — and withdrew remaining military advisors from Syria. An Iranian counter-intelligence source told this author that Russia also advised pro-Assad forces to stand down. Atlantic Council Syria expert Ömer Özkizilcik suggested to the author that Turkey facilitated the retreat of Iranian-backed militias via Iraq. Pressure is now mounting on Shi’ite militias in Iraq, as Baghdad fears secondary sanctions from the U.S.
Both Turkey and Israel perceive a need to ensure that no hostile militia can use Syria as a sanctuary and have established buffer zones in Syrian territory. For Turkey, this means preventing Kurdish autonomy in northwest Syria; for Israel, ensuring that neither Iran-backed militias nor Sunni fundamentalists can use the south as a launchpad for attacks on northern Israel or as a logistics conduit to Lebanon. The fact that Syrian sovereignty is dependent on the security of its neighbors stands in the way of the new regime in Damascus consolidating a monopoly of force with sovereign control across all Syrian territory.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made explicit that Israel will not permit Syrian forces to operate south of Damascus. In a speech in February, he demanded “complete demilitarization” of the southern Syrian provinces of Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda. Accompanying words with deeds, Israel has conducted airstrikes against military sites around Damascus and in Deraa province. Israel has also sought to leverage its relationships with the Druze community and Kurds to advocate for Druze-Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
This Israeli position is at odds with Turkish interests. Turkey has long fought the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Ankara regards as an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK. At the Munich Security Conference in February, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey would reconsider its military presence in Syria only if PKK affiliates disbanded. Turkey has offered to lead the organization of a new Syrian military of 300,000 troops incorporating members of HTS, the Kurdish militia, and elements of the old Assad army.
Turkey has avoided making territorial claims but remains firmly opposed to Kurdish autonomy. This is a challenging situation for negotiators in Damascus, who are trying to incorporate Kurdish-led forces into a new Syrian army.
Geopolitical limitations often dictate security policy choices. Despite the political and ideological differences between the Assad regime and the transitional government in Damascus, the latter is also finding it difficult to establish a monopoly of force and that the only viable option is a balance of power. Syrian political analyst Rasha al Joundy of the Dubai Policy Research Center told this author that the transitional government prioritizes stability and inclusiveness, necessitating a multi-vector engagement policy with external stakeholders. In this context, the Astana framework retains its relevance even as the status quo evolves.
Russia does not appear to be leaving Syria despite initial signs that Damascus prioritized alleviating sanctions and reaching out to the West. The most emblematic move in that respect was in January, when Syria rejected Russian grain and instead received Ukrainian grain, followed by flour and sunflower oil shipments. Still, there is evidence to suggest not only that Damascus wants to keep its options open but that Israel is lobbying Washington to maintain a Russian military presence in Syria as a deconflicting factor with Turkey. While the Syrian government ended its lease of Russia’s Tartus naval base in January, this position is being reviewed, as Russia is seen as a potential ally in the fight against ISIS, especially if Washington withdraws its forces from Syria. In addition, the Kremlin has softer but relevant levers over Damascus, such as a monopoly over printing Syrian currency.
While Turkey has been empowered by its influence over the Sunni Muslim forces that removed Assad, it is not uncontested in Syria. Even the historic call by jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for Kurdish forces to disband does not ensure that the SDF will give up its arms and no longer remain organizationally distinct.
Like HTS, Kurdish forces have been courting external powers to tilt the balance of negotiations with Damascus. Paradoxically, arch-enemies Iran and Israel both seem willing to step up. Regional security analyst Shahriar Sabet flagged that in trying to exclude Iran as a stakeholder in Syria, Turkey only stoked Tehran’s eagerness to supply the SDF with drone and counter-drone systems. The Stimson Center’s Kawa Hassan noted that the reliable supply of Iranian systems is impracticable as Tehran is no longer able to transfer arms and money to its proxies in Syria. However, Israel is keen to maintain a longstanding partnership with the Kurdish forces, backed by Washington, to re-position Tel Aviv as the sole ally of the SDF in Syria.
Whoever supports Kurdish autonomy in Syria is on a collision course with Turkey. The SDF, a disciplined, American trained and equipped Kurdish force, has agreed to integrate into a new Syrian army, prioritizing security over sovereignty. Burcu Ozcelik, an analyst for the London-based Royal United Services Institute, noted to this author that the integration of SDF is construed in Ankara as a victory over Iran. However, it is far from the vision of a single military force trained and equipped by Turkey. Tension is mounting and Russian mediation among Israeli, Kurdish, and Turkish forces may be necessary.
The Astana Framework Beyond Syria
All the former Astana stakeholders still need to coordinate their security policy, but there is undoubtedly a major fracture between Ankara and Tehran. Ali Mousavi Khalkhali, the editor-in-chief of the Tehran publication “Iranian Diplomacy,” told this author that Ankara has notified Tehran that it has been evicted from the Astana process and has been replaced by Iraq and Jordan. Several sources speaking on condition of anonymity indicated that Iraq is no longer assisting Tehran in projecting military power. Turkey now claims the role of the regional security provider in the Caucasus and the Levant, but it can’t exclude Iran without Russian consent. Moscow’s mediation may soon be needed should the two other parties become more assertive.
Iran continues to commit substantial resources to militias entrusted with deterrence and power projection without direct intrastate confrontation. The “three plus three” (Iran, Turkey, Russia plus Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia) incarnation of the Astana framework could remain relevant in the Caucasus, even if it is not in the Levant in the short-to-medium run, except perhaps in western regions. For Israeli analysts, Iran’s ambition to re-establish logistical support for Hezbollah remains a persistent threat, which once again positions the Kremlin as a possible mediator between Tel Aviv and Ankara.
Russia, meanwhile, is evolving from a major security provider, primarily of air power, to a diplomatic facilitator in the broader Middle East. Moscow and Tehran affirmed a strategic alliance in January 2025, focusing on technical-military cooperation and investment in oil exploration, nuclear energy, and logistics. The framework agreement includes diplomatic and security collaboration in regional affairs, encompassing Syria and the Caucasus. Investing in its partnership with Tehran, Russia is well-placed to mediate between Turkey and Iran or play one against the other.
Improved relations between Russia and the United States could also assist progress on the Iranian nuclear file, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov already conveying messages to Tehran on behalf of the Trump administration.
Overall, the transformation of Russian and Turkish power in the Levant means that their role within the Astana framework is evolving. Russia is discovering new “soft power” elements, including grain supply, banknote issues, market access, and investment in infrastructure. Turkey is building military procurement networks and becoming a security provider in the classical sense of the term. Iran’s political, military, and economic crises dictate a reliance on existing alliances. Should Damascus fail to balance power between stakeholders, sovereignty may be more curtailed than it was under the Assad regime, disintegrating into a proxy war comparable to Lebanon in the 1980s, when every power positioned itself behind a preferred militia. In sum, the Astana framework remains relevant because its substance is crisis management rather than collective defense.
Ilya Roubanis is an area studies expert specializing in Southeast Europe and the Levant. He is a non-resident fellow of the Institute of International Relations in Athens, and a member of the Caucasus Watch editorial team.
The Relevance of the Astana Process in Post-Assad Syria
By Ilya Roubanis
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: With expertise on developments in the Caucasus and the Middle East, Ilya Roubanis interviewed sources in Iran, Turkey, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Europe to analyze the role of outside powers in shaping the future of Syria after the Assad regime. His previous work includes project management for the European Commission on education and migration and a project on security reform for the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. This is his first piece for Stimson.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
At a time when many multilateral security frameworks are in crisis, it is worth examining the role of the “Astana Process” that brought together Russia, Turkey, and Iran in 2017 to coordinate positions over Syria and later expanded to the Caucasus. With the collapse of the Assad regime, two important questions arise: Was the Astana process effective in managing the Syrian conflict? And does it still play a role today? To explore these questions, I consulted sources from Iran, Turkey, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Europe. Their consensus is that the power dynamic between the Astana partners has changed since the framework was established but remains relevant. Turkey, situated in the middle of a geopolitical space catalyzed by conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Nagorno-Karabakh, has clearly been empowered. With Russia and Iran reducing their hard security capabilities, Ankara has taken a more active role in shaping regional security dynamics. This is further influenced by the shift toward a more selective U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East return under the second Trump administration. However, the Astana Process is still probably more significant in managing the emerging status quo, especially as ties between Europe and the United States appear to fray
Three Power Vacuums, Two Security Zones, and an Army in Flux
The last meeting of the Astana framework was in Doha on December 7, 2024, a day before Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow as his military crumbled. The three powers convened with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pederson, to discuss the future of Syria. The convening states did not reach a consensus, and the rapid offensive of the Sunni Muslim Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) force from Idlib to Damascus created a fait accompli. However, the consultation between Iran, Turkey, and Russia helped prevent an escalation of the conflict to a Hobbesian nightmare of war of all against all.
The collapse of the Assad regime was driven by multiple power vacuums. The first was Russia’s withdrawal. Reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Ukrainian intelligence indicate that in mid-2024, Russia began a large-scale withdrawal of troops, personnel, and equipment from Syria’s Khmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus. This shift reflected Russia’s renewed focus on the war in Ukraine.
Secondly, there was a U.S. vacuum. The election of Donald Trump raised new questions about whether the U.S. would maintain troops in Syria and encouraged Turkey to believe it could end de facto autonomy by Kurdish forces in northwest Syria.
The Russian and American vacuums were compounded by an Iranian vacuum triggered by the weakening of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance against Israel since the Hamas attacks of 2023. Iranian diplomatic and security sources suggest that the term “corruption” does not adequately capture the state of play in the Syrian military in the final days of the Assad regime, as inflation eroded officers’ salaries to the point of them going hungry. With Hezbollah pounded by Israel in Lebanon, Tehran lost the ability to support Assad – as Iran and Russia had done during the middle stages of the Syrian civil war — and withdrew remaining military advisors from Syria. An Iranian counter-intelligence source told this author that Russia also advised pro-Assad forces to stand down. Atlantic Council Syria expert Ömer Özkizilcik suggested to the author that Turkey facilitated the retreat of Iranian-backed militias via Iraq. Pressure is now mounting on Shi’ite militias in Iraq, as Baghdad fears secondary sanctions from the U.S.
Both Turkey and Israel perceive a need to ensure that no hostile militia can use Syria as a sanctuary and have established buffer zones in Syrian territory. For Turkey, this means preventing Kurdish autonomy in northwest Syria; for Israel, ensuring that neither Iran-backed militias nor Sunni fundamentalists can use the south as a launchpad for attacks on northern Israel or as a logistics conduit to Lebanon. The fact that Syrian sovereignty is dependent on the security of its neighbors stands in the way of the new regime in Damascus consolidating a monopoly of force with sovereign control across all Syrian territory.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made explicit that Israel will not permit Syrian forces to operate south of Damascus. In a speech in February, he demanded “complete demilitarization” of the southern Syrian provinces of Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda. Accompanying words with deeds, Israel has conducted airstrikes against military sites around Damascus and in Deraa province. Israel has also sought to leverage its relationships with the Druze community and Kurds to advocate for Druze-Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
This Israeli position is at odds with Turkish interests. Turkey has long fought the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Ankara regards as an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK. At the Munich Security Conference in February, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey would reconsider its military presence in Syria only if PKK affiliates disbanded. Turkey has offered to lead the organization of a new Syrian military of 300,000 troops incorporating members of HTS, the Kurdish militia, and elements of the old Assad army.
Turkey has avoided making territorial claims but remains firmly opposed to Kurdish autonomy. This is a challenging situation for negotiators in Damascus, who are trying to incorporate Kurdish-led forces into a new Syrian army.
Geopolitical limitations often dictate security policy choices. Despite the political and ideological differences between the Assad regime and the transitional government in Damascus, the latter is also finding it difficult to establish a monopoly of force and that the only viable option is a balance of power. Syrian political analyst Rasha al Joundy of the Dubai Policy Research Center told this author that the transitional government prioritizes stability and inclusiveness, necessitating a multi-vector engagement policy with external stakeholders. In this context, the Astana framework retains its relevance even as the status quo evolves.
Russia does not appear to be leaving Syria despite initial signs that Damascus prioritized alleviating sanctions and reaching out to the West. The most emblematic move in that respect was in January, when Syria rejected Russian grain and instead received Ukrainian grain, followed by flour and sunflower oil shipments. Still, there is evidence to suggest not only that Damascus wants to keep its options open but that Israel is lobbying Washington to maintain a Russian military presence in Syria as a deconflicting factor with Turkey. While the Syrian government ended its lease of Russia’s Tartus naval base in January, this position is being reviewed, as Russia is seen as a potential ally in the fight against ISIS, especially if Washington withdraws its forces from Syria. In addition, the Kremlin has softer but relevant levers over Damascus, such as a monopoly over printing Syrian currency.
While Turkey has been empowered by its influence over the Sunni Muslim forces that removed Assad, it is not uncontested in Syria. Even the historic call by jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for Kurdish forces to disband does not ensure that the SDF will give up its arms and no longer remain organizationally distinct.
Like HTS, Kurdish forces have been courting external powers to tilt the balance of negotiations with Damascus. Paradoxically, arch-enemies Iran and Israel both seem willing to step up. Regional security analyst Shahriar Sabet flagged that in trying to exclude Iran as a stakeholder in Syria, Turkey only stoked Tehran’s eagerness to supply the SDF with drone and counter-drone systems. The Stimson Center’s Kawa Hassan noted that the reliable supply of Iranian systems is impracticable as Tehran is no longer able to transfer arms and money to its proxies in Syria. However, Israel is keen to maintain a longstanding partnership with the Kurdish forces, backed by Washington, to re-position Tel Aviv as the sole ally of the SDF in Syria.
Whoever supports Kurdish autonomy in Syria is on a collision course with Turkey. The SDF, a disciplined, American trained and equipped Kurdish force, has agreed to integrate into a new Syrian army, prioritizing security over sovereignty. Burcu Ozcelik, an analyst for the London-based Royal United Services Institute, noted to this author that the integration of SDF is construed in Ankara as a victory over Iran. However, it is far from the vision of a single military force trained and equipped by Turkey. Tension is mounting and Russian mediation among Israeli, Kurdish, and Turkish forces may be necessary.
The Astana Framework Beyond Syria
All the former Astana stakeholders still need to coordinate their security policy, but there is undoubtedly a major fracture between Ankara and Tehran. Ali Mousavi Khalkhali, the editor-in-chief of the Tehran publication “Iranian Diplomacy,” told this author that Ankara has notified Tehran that it has been evicted from the Astana process and has been replaced by Iraq and Jordan. Several sources speaking on condition of anonymity indicated that Iraq is no longer assisting Tehran in projecting military power. Turkey now claims the role of the regional security provider in the Caucasus and the Levant, but it can’t exclude Iran without Russian consent. Moscow’s mediation may soon be needed should the two other parties become more assertive.
Iran continues to commit substantial resources to militias entrusted with deterrence and power projection without direct intrastate confrontation. The “three plus three” (Iran, Turkey, Russia plus Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia) incarnation of the Astana framework could remain relevant in the Caucasus, even if it is not in the Levant in the short-to-medium run, except perhaps in western regions. For Israeli analysts, Iran’s ambition to re-establish logistical support for Hezbollah remains a persistent threat, which once again positions the Kremlin as a possible mediator between Tel Aviv and Ankara.
Russia, meanwhile, is evolving from a major security provider, primarily of air power, to a diplomatic facilitator in the broader Middle East. Moscow and Tehran affirmed a strategic alliance in January 2025, focusing on technical-military cooperation and investment in oil exploration, nuclear energy, and logistics. The framework agreement includes diplomatic and security collaboration in regional affairs, encompassing Syria and the Caucasus. Investing in its partnership with Tehran, Russia is well-placed to mediate between Turkey and Iran or play one against the other.
Improved relations between Russia and the United States could also assist progress on the Iranian nuclear file, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov already conveying messages to Tehran on behalf of the Trump administration.
Overall, the transformation of Russian and Turkish power in the Levant means that their role within the Astana framework is evolving. Russia is discovering new “soft power” elements, including grain supply, banknote issues, market access, and investment in infrastructure. Turkey is building military procurement networks and becoming a security provider in the classical sense of the term. Iran’s political, military, and economic crises dictate a reliance on existing alliances. Should Damascus fail to balance power between stakeholders, sovereignty may be more curtailed than it was under the Assad regime, disintegrating into a proxy war comparable to Lebanon in the 1980s, when every power positioned itself behind a preferred militia. In sum, the Astana framework remains relevant because its substance is crisis management rather than collective defense.
Ilya Roubanis is an area studies expert specializing in Southeast Europe and the Levant. He is a non-resident fellow of the Institute of International Relations in Athens, and a member of the Caucasus Watch editorial team.
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