Haiti, less than 200 miles from the Florida coast, has been of strategic interest to the United States for more than a century, given its territorial proximity and people-to-people connections. Historically, the country has gone through cycles of violence that have prompted the deployment of forces led by the United States, regional partners, and the United Nations (UN). Since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moise, Haiti has once again been overtaken by political instability and a humanitarian crisis, and the latest coalition of forces — the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti, led by Kenyan police — has tried to quell a devastating upsurge in gang violence. However, the MSS has struggled due to a lack of adequate resourcing, even though it has been backstopped by the U.S. government financially. With American funding expected to run out at the end of September, it is in the U.S. interest to work with Haitian partners and the international community to identify a way forward that will address the insecurity and its devastating impact on the civilian population.
The UN Security Council authorized the MSS to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in October 2023. This step followed a request in 2022 from the transitional Prime Minister Ariel Henry to support the Haitian National Police (HNP). The United States responded by standing up the MSS mission to provide stability and security and facilitate immediate humanitarian assistance. The U.S. persuaded Kenya to lead the force in 2023 by pledging $300 million in support and signing a defense cooperation agreement with Kenya. Other countries provided voluntary contributions to support the MSS, but the mission was not authorized to draw on UN-assessed funding. Furthermore, even though the Organization of American States (OAS) has put together a $2 billion rescue plan for Haiti, it does not include funding for the MSS. As such, the MSS is overly reliant on U.S. funding, which is detrimental as the U.S. shifts policies and priorities.
The MSS is currently mandated to provide support, training, and capacity-building to the HNP, with the expectation that it will enable the HNP to provide security to critical infrastructure, counter gangs, and restore law and order. Despite delays to its initial deployment, the MSS mission has experienced some limited successes over the last 12 months. These have included regaining control of the airport, which was once controlled by gangs, undertaking joint patrols with the HNP in Port-au-Prince and in the West Department, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
However, the effectiveness of the MSS has been limited by a lack of resources and an underestimation of the sophistication of armed groups. The Security Council authorized a ceiling of 2,500 personnel for the MSS, yet it has never even reached this threshold, with approximately 1,000 personnel currently deployed. (Kenya has supplied 800 while the rest of the force is comprised of troops from Belize, Jamaica, Guatemala, and El Salvador.) This has left the MSS incapable of conducting kinetic operations and retaining neighborhoods cleared of gangs. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated this point in remarks during his visit to the Dominican Republic in February this year, saying “The mission needs to be broadened for it to be able to eliminate these gangs.” The ineffectiveness of the MSS has also led the Haitian authorities to turn to private security contractors, including Vectus Global, a private military corporation run by Erik Prince, to support the HNP. Vectus’ mandate remains unclear, but it adds to the complexity of the security situation on the ground and reinforces a lack of accountability.
Even with the MSS’s presence in Haiti, the impact of violence on the civilian population has been devastating. More than 5,600 people were killed in 2024, and 1,600 civilians were killed between January and March of this year alone. The violence has left 1.3 million people displaced and 5.7 million people food insecure, including one million children. Health care providers are reporting 40 cases of rape a day, and the UN has documented that sexual violence against children increased by 1,000% in 2024. Women and girls are at increased risk of gender-based violence.
As of July 2025, an estimated 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince, was controlled by criminal armed groups. The gangs have infiltrated the HNP and are associated with the political elites, who provide a level of immunity. Furthermore, since the turmoil began in 2021, gangs have been able to grab swaths of land and operate illicit narcotic and drug smuggling operations, creating a criminal state.
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, most firearms that are fueling the current violence in Haiti are “sourced in the U.S. and make their way to gang members,” and most drugs from Haiti are “shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe, and primarily, the U.S.” Haitian criminality, if left unchecked, could create more opportunities for illicit flows of narcotics and arms trafficking between the U.S. and Haiti. Currently, one-fifth of cocaine that enters the U.S. from Colombia is shipped through Haiti.
It is unclear if the Trump administration will continue to support Haiti. Despite the pause to all foreign assistance, Secretary Rubio waived the pause and allocated $40 million in funding in February for the MSS. He also recently deployed Ambassador Henry Wooster, a long-time diplomat with an extensive background in the Middle East, as Chargé d’Affaires, to drive policy on Haiti. However, without more resources and boots on the ground, the security situation is unlikely to improve. There is less than a month left before the expiration of the MSS’s mandate on October 2, 2025, and funding from the U.S. government for the MSS is scheduled to run out on September 30. Human Rights Watch and the humanitarian community report that the MSS needs increased support in addition to sustained funding to make a difference in Haiti.
The U.S. has sought alternatives to the MSS previously. In 2024, under the Biden Administration, the U.S. advocated for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, responding to a formal request from the Haitian authorities. However, those efforts were opposed by Russia and China, which remain reluctant to support a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, in part due to their belief that Haiti is in America’s region and sphere of influence. China’s hesitancy also stems from Haiti’s recognition of Taiwan, as well as the strengthened relationship between China and Kenya. In addition, previous UN Peacekeeping forces deployed in Haiti received criticism for failing to create sustainable peace.
The UN Secretary-General requested an assessment of UN options for Haiti after the deployment of the MSS. This UN report from February 2025 further stymied any consideration of a UN peacekeeping mission because of the difficult conditions on the ground. In a letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a UN support office. This office would provide logistical support to the MSS and operate alongside the UN political mission in Haiti (BINUH) as well as the 19 UN agencies that still operate in a limited capacity.
Negotiations on potential options to either renew or recalibrate the MSS and UN presence in Haiti will take place throughout September. There is an opportunity for the U.S. and regional states in the Caribbean and Latin America to negotiate improved support for the MSS and work to address the corruption that plagues Haiti. If the support office model is selected, it should reflect some of the best practices from Somalia, where the UN has maintained a logistical support mission to support the AU-led peace support operation. For example, the MSS will need to be accountable to the larger political process. Yet, it won’t be enough to simply deploy a logistical support office without substantially bolstering the UN-mandated MSS. American political and financial support will be critical for Kenyan forces to stay on the ground in Haiti and secure the country.
In the longer term, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission could bring together both civilian and military components to address the humanitarian crisis, counter corruption and narcotics trafficking, and rebuild the security sector to provide stability in the country. Lessons learned from decades of UN interventions indicate that this is an opportunity for the UN and the U.S. to draw on their experience in Haiti to develop a UN Peacekeeping mission that targets the root causes of the conflict, including corruption, porous borders, and a lack of trust in the government to deliver basic services in support of sustainable peace. A new peacekeeping mission could build trust within the community for an integrated approach that encompasses the work of the existing political mission and the security components that support a transparent and accountable government. It is unlikely that political support will exist in the Security Council for such a deployment in the month ahead, but the idea warrants consideration as a follow-on force as geopolitical dynamics, including the priorities of the U.S. administration, shift. An independent report commissioned by the UN has provided future models to draw upon to ensure more flexible, nimble, and effective peacekeeping reform initiatives that will be well-suited to the Haitian context.
As the Trump administration assesses the value of the UN, this is an opportunity for the U.S. to prompt the UN and the international community to share the burden of addressing the regional security concerns of the United States, while pushing for reforms and enhanced accountability. Continuing to support the MSS to address insecurity and build peace in Haiti — through burden-sharing with the United Nations — will directly serve U.S. interests in the region by making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
Sharing the Burden of Securing Haiti
By Chandrima Das
Peacekeeping
The mandate of the Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti is set to expire in early October 2025, even while the country remains caught in a deadly cycle of gang violence, insecurity, and suffering among the civilian population. While the United States has provided support for international efforts — even circumventing its own pause on foreign aid — it must continue to work with the United Nations and the broader international community to address violence and encourage stability.
Haiti, less than 200 miles from the Florida coast, has been of strategic interest to the United States for more than a century, given its territorial proximity and people-to-people connections. Historically, the country has gone through cycles of violence that have prompted the deployment of forces led by the United States, regional partners, and the United Nations (UN). Since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moise, Haiti has once again been overtaken by political instability and a humanitarian crisis, and the latest coalition of forces — the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti, led by Kenyan police — has tried to quell a devastating upsurge in gang violence. However, the MSS has struggled due to a lack of adequate resourcing, even though it has been backstopped by the U.S. government financially. With American funding expected to run out at the end of September, it is in the U.S. interest to work with Haitian partners and the international community to identify a way forward that will address the insecurity and its devastating impact on the civilian population.
The UN Security Council authorized the MSS to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in October 2023. This step followed a request in 2022 from the transitional Prime Minister Ariel Henry to support the Haitian National Police (HNP). The United States responded by standing up the MSS mission to provide stability and security and facilitate immediate humanitarian assistance. The U.S. persuaded Kenya to lead the force in 2023 by pledging $300 million in support and signing a defense cooperation agreement with Kenya. Other countries provided voluntary contributions to support the MSS, but the mission was not authorized to draw on UN-assessed funding. Furthermore, even though the Organization of American States (OAS) has put together a $2 billion rescue plan for Haiti, it does not include funding for the MSS. As such, the MSS is overly reliant on U.S. funding, which is detrimental as the U.S. shifts policies and priorities.
The MSS is currently mandated to provide support, training, and capacity-building to the HNP, with the expectation that it will enable the HNP to provide security to critical infrastructure, counter gangs, and restore law and order. Despite delays to its initial deployment, the MSS mission has experienced some limited successes over the last 12 months. These have included regaining control of the airport, which was once controlled by gangs, undertaking joint patrols with the HNP in Port-au-Prince and in the West Department, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
However, the effectiveness of the MSS has been limited by a lack of resources and an underestimation of the sophistication of armed groups. The Security Council authorized a ceiling of 2,500 personnel for the MSS, yet it has never even reached this threshold, with approximately 1,000 personnel currently deployed. (Kenya has supplied 800 while the rest of the force is comprised of troops from Belize, Jamaica, Guatemala, and El Salvador.) This has left the MSS incapable of conducting kinetic operations and retaining neighborhoods cleared of gangs. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated this point in remarks during his visit to the Dominican Republic in February this year, saying “The mission needs to be broadened for it to be able to eliminate these gangs.” The ineffectiveness of the MSS has also led the Haitian authorities to turn to private security contractors, including Vectus Global, a private military corporation run by Erik Prince, to support the HNP. Vectus’ mandate remains unclear, but it adds to the complexity of the security situation on the ground and reinforces a lack of accountability.
Even with the MSS’s presence in Haiti, the impact of violence on the civilian population has been devastating. More than 5,600 people were killed in 2024, and 1,600 civilians were killed between January and March of this year alone. The violence has left 1.3 million people displaced and 5.7 million people food insecure, including one million children. Health care providers are reporting 40 cases of rape a day, and the UN has documented that sexual violence against children increased by 1,000% in 2024. Women and girls are at increased risk of gender-based violence.
As of July 2025, an estimated 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince, was controlled by criminal armed groups. The gangs have infiltrated the HNP and are associated with the political elites, who provide a level of immunity. Furthermore, since the turmoil began in 2021, gangs have been able to grab swaths of land and operate illicit narcotic and drug smuggling operations, creating a criminal state.1Felbab-Brown, V. (2024, December). Slipping the Leash, A Net Assessment of Haitian Gangs, Local Armed Actors, and the Multinational Security Support Mission. Retrieved on August 7, 2025.
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, most firearms that are fueling the current violence in Haiti are “sourced in the U.S. and make their way to gang members,” and most drugs from Haiti are “shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe, and primarily, the U.S.” Haitian criminality, if left unchecked, could create more opportunities for illicit flows of narcotics and arms trafficking between the U.S. and Haiti. Currently, one-fifth of cocaine that enters the U.S. from Colombia is shipped through Haiti.
It is unclear if the Trump administration will continue to support Haiti. Despite the pause to all foreign assistance, Secretary Rubio waived the pause and allocated $40 million in funding in February for the MSS. He also recently deployed Ambassador Henry Wooster, a long-time diplomat with an extensive background in the Middle East, as Chargé d’Affaires, to drive policy on Haiti. However, without more resources and boots on the ground, the security situation is unlikely to improve. There is less than a month left before the expiration of the MSS’s mandate on October 2, 2025, and funding from the U.S. government for the MSS is scheduled to run out on September 30. Human Rights Watch and the humanitarian community report that the MSS needs increased support in addition to sustained funding to make a difference in Haiti.
The U.S. has sought alternatives to the MSS previously. In 2024, under the Biden Administration, the U.S. advocated for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, responding to a formal request from the Haitian authorities. However, those efforts were opposed by Russia and China, which remain reluctant to support a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, in part due to their belief that Haiti is in America’s region and sphere of influence. China’s hesitancy also stems from Haiti’s recognition of Taiwan, as well as the strengthened relationship between China and Kenya. In addition, previous UN Peacekeeping forces deployed in Haiti received criticism for failing to create sustainable peace.
The UN Secretary-General requested an assessment of UN options for Haiti after the deployment of the MSS. This UN report from February 2025 further stymied any consideration of a UN peacekeeping mission because of the difficult conditions on the ground. In a letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a UN support office. This office would provide logistical support to the MSS and operate alongside the UN political mission in Haiti (BINUH) as well as the 19 UN agencies that still operate in a limited capacity.
Negotiations on potential options to either renew or recalibrate the MSS and UN presence in Haiti will take place throughout September. There is an opportunity for the U.S. and regional states in the Caribbean and Latin America to negotiate improved support for the MSS and work to address the corruption that plagues Haiti. If the support office model is selected, it should reflect some of the best practices from Somalia, where the UN has maintained a logistical support mission to support the AU-led peace support operation. For example, the MSS will need to be accountable to the larger political process. Yet, it won’t be enough to simply deploy a logistical support office without substantially bolstering the UN-mandated MSS. American political and financial support will be critical for Kenyan forces to stay on the ground in Haiti and secure the country.
In the longer term, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission could bring together both civilian and military components to address the humanitarian crisis, counter corruption and narcotics trafficking, and rebuild the security sector to provide stability in the country. Lessons learned from decades of UN interventions indicate that this is an opportunity for the UN and the U.S. to draw on their experience in Haiti to develop a UN Peacekeeping mission that targets the root causes of the conflict, including corruption, porous borders, and a lack of trust in the government to deliver basic services in support of sustainable peace. A new peacekeeping mission could build trust within the community for an integrated approach that encompasses the work of the existing political mission and the security components that support a transparent and accountable government. It is unlikely that political support will exist in the Security Council for such a deployment in the month ahead, but the idea warrants consideration as a follow-on force as geopolitical dynamics, including the priorities of the U.S. administration, shift. An independent report commissioned by the UN has provided future models to draw upon to ensure more flexible, nimble, and effective peacekeeping reform initiatives that will be well-suited to the Haitian context.
As the Trump administration assesses the value of the UN, this is an opportunity for the U.S. to prompt the UN and the international community to share the burden of addressing the regional security concerns of the United States, while pushing for reforms and enhanced accountability. Continuing to support the MSS to address insecurity and build peace in Haiti — through burden-sharing with the United Nations — will directly serve U.S. interests in the region by making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
Notes
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