Editor’s Note: Ali Al-Mawlawi is director of Horizon Advisory, a London-based consultancy specializing in political economy analysis and governance reform. He was previously head of research at the Bayan Center, a Baghdad-based think tank, and an advisor to Iraq’s ambassador in Washington, D.C. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies and Diplomacy from SOAS, University of London. This is his first piece for Stimson.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Fears of regional violence spilling into Iraq – including a possible U.S. and Israeli war against Iran – have reignited debate over the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) nearly 11 years after these armed groups coalesced to help stop an invasion by ISIS.
Against the backdrop of tenuous negotiations between the United States and Iran over the latter’s advancing nuclear program, Iraq’s political leaders face critical decisions. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein has warned that failure by Washington and Tehran to reach an agreement could lead to “catastrophic consequences” for the Middle East. To mitigate the risk of Iraq becoming embroiled in a regional conflict, the PMF must be reformed so that these forces do not become a justification for undermining the country’s hard-fought stability.
The Trump administration has outlined its expectations for Iraq as part of U.S. efforts to prevent the escalation of regional violence. In a press briefing in March, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce emphasized that the Iraqi government “must ensure it has command and control of all security forces within its borders, including the PMF,” adding that “these forces must respond to Iraq’s commander-in-chief and not to Iran.”
The prevailing Western perception that the PMF is merely an arm of Iranian foreign policy is exaggerated, but there is little doubt that the organization is plagued by internal decay and growing public cynicism. While few would dispute the critical role the PMF played along with other actors in the campaign to defeat ISIS and liberate Iraqi territory in 2014-17, the image it and its supporters have sought to cultivate—as a vanguard of national sovereignty—has steadily eroded.
Detractors often reduce this complex organization, which encompasses a broad spectrum of old and newer armed factions and competing political alignments, to a caricature of an Iranian proxy, overlooking its deep social roots in the Shi’ite Muslim heartlands of central and southern Iraq. Moreover, the claim that the PMF operates outside the government’s chain of command does not reflect the full picture. This was evident during the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December. The PMF adhered to the official Iraqi government position and refrained from intervening in support of Assad, despite public calls from some quarters to join the fight.
Conversely, the PMF’s most ardent supporters tend to sanctify the organization and its sacrifices, rejecting legitimate criticism as a foreign ploy aimed at overturning Iraq’s Shi’ite-majority political order. What is urgently needed is a more level-headed and pragmatic discussion that explores how the organization can contribute to Iraq’s security architecture as a stabilizing force.
Calls to disband the PMF risk inflaming sectarian tensions; instead, the conversation should focus on identifying a viable path to institutional renewal. With this aim, the Iraqi government in March submitted a new bill to parliament to replace the 2016 legislation that formalized the PMF but left significant legal and structural questions unresolved. Ambiguities around command hierarchy, budgetary oversight, and integration into the national security framework have since become persistent sources of tension. The new bill seeks to address these gaps by establishing clearer parameters for the PMF’s role within the Iraqi state.
One goal is to articulate the PMF’s strategic purpose. The new bill defines the organization’s mission as contributing to the protection of Iraq’s constitutional and democratic system, as well as supporting national defense, territorial integrity, and counterterrorism efforts. However, the legislation overlooks more entrenched problems. Factions have overrun the organization, siphoning off state resources, exploiting their positions for personal gain, and shielding themselves from accountability under the banner of a patriotic legacy they no longer represent. In practice, rogue elements not only operate outside the formal chain of command but at times actively undermine the authority of the state.
This was starkly illustrated in January 2024, when the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of Iran-backed militias within the PMF, orchestrated a drone attack on Tower 22, a U.S. military outpost near the Iraq-Jordan-Syria border, resulting in the deaths of three American soldiers. Days later, U.S. forces carried out an airstrike in a residential area of Baghdad that killed Abu Baqir Al-Saadi, a senior commander of the Kataib Hezbollah militia who also held an official position within the PMF and was believed by the U.S. to be directly involved in the drone attack. The fact that Al-Saadi occupied a senior role within a state institution was deeply problematic as it seriously undermined the credibility and integrity of Iraq’s national security apparatus.
A repeat scenario remains possible. Israel has previously issued threats against the PMF, and the Trump administration may not wait for another attack before responding if Iraq is not seen to be actively reining in rogue elements within PMF structures. This is especially the case if the U.S. carries out threats to strike Iran in conjunction with Israel if nuclear talks with Tehran fail to reach an agreement soon.
Articulating a long-term strategic vision for the PMF and redefining its role to complement Iraq’s broader security architecture will require time and political consensus. However, immediate steps can be taken to lay the groundwork for deeper reform.
First, the PMF should strongly consider fully severing informal ties to Iran to address persistent perceptions of a PMF political orientation characterized by anti-Western sentiment and a belief that Iraq’s strategic future lies with Iran and the broader East. Like any other security agency, the PMF should refrain from expressing political views on domestic or foreign affairs. PMF personnel should not be mobilized to attend demonstrations that counteract government policy. Nor should PMF leadership, including the commission chairman, travel to Iran or any other foreign country for consultations. Such engagements should be conducted solely by the prime minister in his capacity as commander-in-chief.
Second, the PMF urgently needs a leadership change. Falih Al-Fayyadh, a veteran Iraqi politician, has served as commission chairman since the PMF’s inception, and while debate continues over whether the 69-year-old is subject to mandatory retirement laws, this misses the broader point. The PMF should not be led by individuals with political affiliations or electoral ambitions. If Prime Minister Shia Al-Sudani, with the backing of his governing coalition, were to muster the political will to overhaul the PMF’s senior leadership, it would mark a significant step toward depoliticizing the organization.
Moreover, PMF resources should not be exploited for personal gain—practices that have become increasingly prevalent as the organization’s budget has expanded to nearly $3.5 billion annually, with approximately 80 percent allocated to salaries. This abuse of power was exemplified in 2023 by a widely publicized incident in which individuals believed to be tied to senior PMF figures attempted to confiscate residential land in Jadriya, one of Baghdad’s most affluent and desirable districts. The incident provoked such public outrage that it prompted intervention by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the revered Shi’ite religious figure, who met with the affected family and issued a rare public statement. Sistani condemned the practice as a “violation of both religious and legal principles” and emphasized the government’s duty to safeguard citizens’ property rights against “those who seek to violate them through intimidation and coercion, especially when such individuals hold official titles.”
Third, the PMF should address its chronic transparency deficit. Although the Finance Ministry publishes monthly reports detailing expenditures across state institutions, including the ministries of Defense and Interior, PMF spending remains notably absent. This raises serious concerns about fiscal oversight and the misappropriation of public funds.
The problem extends beyond finances. Ahead of the 2021 national elections, the PMF refused to share personnel data with Iraq’s electoral commission, effectively excluding its members from participating in a special voting process designated for security forces. To this day, contradictory and unverifiable estimates persist regarding how many individuals are on the PMF payroll. The absence of reliable data facilitates misuse of funds, political manipulation, and inflated staffing numbers for budgetary gain.
Iraq’s Shi’ite leadership should make a clear choice about the future of the PMF. Left unchecked, the PMF risks remaining a divisive and politicized force vulnerable to external manipulation. Calls for its dissolution or absorption into other security agencies are unrealistic, given its distinct identity and social base. However, preserving the PMF cannot come at the expense of Iraq’s national interest as determined by the country’s elected representatives. Its original purpose of defending Iraq from the threat of terrorism should be restored, stripping away the factional agendas and profiteering that undermine both the PMF and the integrity of the Iraqi state.
Reforming Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces: From Liability to National Asset
By Ali Al-Mawlawi
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Ali Al-Mawlawi is director of Horizon Advisory, a London-based consultancy specializing in political economy analysis and governance reform. He was previously head of research at the Bayan Center, a Baghdad-based think tank, and an advisor to Iraq’s ambassador in Washington, D.C. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies and Diplomacy from SOAS, University of London. This is his first piece for Stimson.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Fears of regional violence spilling into Iraq – including a possible U.S. and Israeli war against Iran – have reignited debate over the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) nearly 11 years after these armed groups coalesced to help stop an invasion by ISIS.
Against the backdrop of tenuous negotiations between the United States and Iran over the latter’s advancing nuclear program, Iraq’s political leaders face critical decisions. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein has warned that failure by Washington and Tehran to reach an agreement could lead to “catastrophic consequences” for the Middle East. To mitigate the risk of Iraq becoming embroiled in a regional conflict, the PMF must be reformed so that these forces do not become a justification for undermining the country’s hard-fought stability.
The Trump administration has outlined its expectations for Iraq as part of U.S. efforts to prevent the escalation of regional violence. In a press briefing in March, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce emphasized that the Iraqi government “must ensure it has command and control of all security forces within its borders, including the PMF,” adding that “these forces must respond to Iraq’s commander-in-chief and not to Iran.”
The prevailing Western perception that the PMF is merely an arm of Iranian foreign policy is exaggerated, but there is little doubt that the organization is plagued by internal decay and growing public cynicism. While few would dispute the critical role the PMF played along with other actors in the campaign to defeat ISIS and liberate Iraqi territory in 2014-17, the image it and its supporters have sought to cultivate—as a vanguard of national sovereignty—has steadily eroded.
Detractors often reduce this complex organization, which encompasses a broad spectrum of old and newer armed factions and competing political alignments, to a caricature of an Iranian proxy, overlooking its deep social roots in the Shi’ite Muslim heartlands of central and southern Iraq. Moreover, the claim that the PMF operates outside the government’s chain of command does not reflect the full picture. This was evident during the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December. The PMF adhered to the official Iraqi government position and refrained from intervening in support of Assad, despite public calls from some quarters to join the fight.
Conversely, the PMF’s most ardent supporters tend to sanctify the organization and its sacrifices, rejecting legitimate criticism as a foreign ploy aimed at overturning Iraq’s Shi’ite-majority political order. What is urgently needed is a more level-headed and pragmatic discussion that explores how the organization can contribute to Iraq’s security architecture as a stabilizing force.
Calls to disband the PMF risk inflaming sectarian tensions; instead, the conversation should focus on identifying a viable path to institutional renewal. With this aim, the Iraqi government in March submitted a new bill to parliament to replace the 2016 legislation that formalized the PMF but left significant legal and structural questions unresolved. Ambiguities around command hierarchy, budgetary oversight, and integration into the national security framework have since become persistent sources of tension. The new bill seeks to address these gaps by establishing clearer parameters for the PMF’s role within the Iraqi state.
One goal is to articulate the PMF’s strategic purpose. The new bill defines the organization’s mission as contributing to the protection of Iraq’s constitutional and democratic system, as well as supporting national defense, territorial integrity, and counterterrorism efforts. However, the legislation overlooks more entrenched problems. Factions have overrun the organization, siphoning off state resources, exploiting their positions for personal gain, and shielding themselves from accountability under the banner of a patriotic legacy they no longer represent. In practice, rogue elements not only operate outside the formal chain of command but at times actively undermine the authority of the state.
This was starkly illustrated in January 2024, when the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of Iran-backed militias within the PMF, orchestrated a drone attack on Tower 22, a U.S. military outpost near the Iraq-Jordan-Syria border, resulting in the deaths of three American soldiers. Days later, U.S. forces carried out an airstrike in a residential area of Baghdad that killed Abu Baqir Al-Saadi, a senior commander of the Kataib Hezbollah militia who also held an official position within the PMF and was believed by the U.S. to be directly involved in the drone attack. The fact that Al-Saadi occupied a senior role within a state institution was deeply problematic as it seriously undermined the credibility and integrity of Iraq’s national security apparatus.
A repeat scenario remains possible. Israel has previously issued threats against the PMF, and the Trump administration may not wait for another attack before responding if Iraq is not seen to be actively reining in rogue elements within PMF structures. This is especially the case if the U.S. carries out threats to strike Iran in conjunction with Israel if nuclear talks with Tehran fail to reach an agreement soon.
Articulating a long-term strategic vision for the PMF and redefining its role to complement Iraq’s broader security architecture will require time and political consensus. However, immediate steps can be taken to lay the groundwork for deeper reform.
First, the PMF should strongly consider fully severing informal ties to Iran to address persistent perceptions of a PMF political orientation characterized by anti-Western sentiment and a belief that Iraq’s strategic future lies with Iran and the broader East. Like any other security agency, the PMF should refrain from expressing political views on domestic or foreign affairs. PMF personnel should not be mobilized to attend demonstrations that counteract government policy. Nor should PMF leadership, including the commission chairman, travel to Iran or any other foreign country for consultations. Such engagements should be conducted solely by the prime minister in his capacity as commander-in-chief.
Second, the PMF urgently needs a leadership change. Falih Al-Fayyadh, a veteran Iraqi politician, has served as commission chairman since the PMF’s inception, and while debate continues over whether the 69-year-old is subject to mandatory retirement laws, this misses the broader point. The PMF should not be led by individuals with political affiliations or electoral ambitions. If Prime Minister Shia Al-Sudani, with the backing of his governing coalition, were to muster the political will to overhaul the PMF’s senior leadership, it would mark a significant step toward depoliticizing the organization.
Moreover, PMF resources should not be exploited for personal gain—practices that have become increasingly prevalent as the organization’s budget has expanded to nearly $3.5 billion annually, with approximately 80 percent allocated to salaries. This abuse of power was exemplified in 2023 by a widely publicized incident in which individuals believed to be tied to senior PMF figures attempted to confiscate residential land in Jadriya, one of Baghdad’s most affluent and desirable districts. The incident provoked such public outrage that it prompted intervention by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the revered Shi’ite religious figure, who met with the affected family and issued a rare public statement. Sistani condemned the practice as a “violation of both religious and legal principles” and emphasized the government’s duty to safeguard citizens’ property rights against “those who seek to violate them through intimidation and coercion, especially when such individuals hold official titles.”
Third, the PMF should address its chronic transparency deficit. Although the Finance Ministry publishes monthly reports detailing expenditures across state institutions, including the ministries of Defense and Interior, PMF spending remains notably absent. This raises serious concerns about fiscal oversight and the misappropriation of public funds.
The problem extends beyond finances. Ahead of the 2021 national elections, the PMF refused to share personnel data with Iraq’s electoral commission, effectively excluding its members from participating in a special voting process designated for security forces. To this day, contradictory and unverifiable estimates persist regarding how many individuals are on the PMF payroll. The absence of reliable data facilitates misuse of funds, political manipulation, and inflated staffing numbers for budgetary gain.
Iraq’s Shi’ite leadership should make a clear choice about the future of the PMF. Left unchecked, the PMF risks remaining a divisive and politicized force vulnerable to external manipulation. Calls for its dissolution or absorption into other security agencies are unrealistic, given its distinct identity and social base. However, preserving the PMF cannot come at the expense of Iraq’s national interest as determined by the country’s elected representatives. Its original purpose of defending Iraq from the threat of terrorism should be restored, stripping away the factional agendas and profiteering that undermine both the PMF and the integrity of the Iraqi state.
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