Editor’s Note: Dr. Mohanned M. Al-Arabiat is a political analyst and writer specializing in strategy, strategic communications and crisis management. His work explores the narratives shaping political and social dynamics, with a focus on governance, identity politics and preventing violent extremism. Using context analysis and participatory research, he examines how communication strategies influence policy and public perception. He holds a doctorate in information sciences from DePaul University and a master’s in social justice from Loyola University.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Jordan’s April 23 decision to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood, following the uncovering of an alleged plot tied to the group, reflects more than a security measure—it signals an effort to renegotiate the kingdom’s internal and regional legitimacy.
In a Middle East still reeling from the Gaza war triggered by Hamas’ attack on Israel, violence has become normalized, alliances are shifting, and governments are increasingly asserting sovereignty to reaffirm legitimacy.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological, historical, and alleged financial and operational ties to Hamas – itself an offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood – have reinforced perceptions of the group as a national security threat, heightening domestic pressures on Jordan, whose 11 million people include more than 50 percent of Palestinian origin and many refugees from past regional conflicts. The broader “Axis of Resistance” comprising Iran and Iran-backed militant groups, has been adapting to strategic setbacks in Gaza, Syria, and southern Lebanon by seeking new pressure points on Israel’s periphery. Jordan, which borders Israel and signed a peace agreement with it in 1994, especially risks being used as a lever of destabilization to impose costs on Israel.
As Hamas absorbs major losses in Gaza, it has shifted to exporting a narrative of moral resistance— one that directly affects Jordan’s internal stability and control over its political narrative. At the same time, Israeli militancy in the occupied West Bank, including a dramatic increase in settler attacks on Palestinians, and the second Trump term, seemingly committed to transactional regional politics, have further constrained Jordan’s room for maneuver.
In the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023, the Jordanian state tried to reassert its traditional posture on Palestine. Queen Rania, herself of Palestinian descent, adopted a humanitarian tone, drawing attention to the suffering of families in Gaza, while Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi led a kind of resistance diplomacy — publicly and forcefully condemning Israeli policies, advocating for Palestinian rights, and voicing broader regional frustrations. This stance allowed the state to claim the mantle of resistance in a way that reinforced the monarchy’s role as a protector of national identity and a supporter of a diplomatic resolution to the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
But this posture has grown increasingly difficult to sustain. As regional diplomacy becomes more transactional — particularly amid Washington’s deepening alignment with the policies of the Netanyahu government — the space Jordan long occupied has begun to shrink. For Amman, the relationship with the United States, which includes more than $1.4 billion annually in military and economic aid, remains a cornerstone of its strategic posture. Yet that relationship now operates in a more constrained climate — a shift from the Biden administration, which afforded Jordan greater space to articulate its positions on regional issues. According to diplomatic sources, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly declined to meet with Foreign Minister Safadi during Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan’s recent visit to Washington. King Abdullah’s Feb. 11 meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office — just after Trump called for removing Gaza’s 2 million Palestinians to construct a “riviera” in the enclave – was also tense, with the King announcing at Trump’s prompting an agreement to accept 2,000 Palestinian children for medical care. On May 4, King Abdullah returned to Washington, only to face criticism from the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who noted that Jordan had accepted just 44 Palestinian children. Jordan is reportedly reluctant to receive more without assurances they will eventually be able to return to Gaza — a prospect that appears increasingly unlikely as Israel threatens a broader invasion and potential re-occupation of the territory.
Jordanian political circles believe that the assertive diplomatic rhetoric once used to condemn Israeli actions may no longer be acceptable under the current U.S. administration. What had once been a carefully managed balance between domestic sentiment and international engagement is now under pressure, leaving the state more vulnerable to non-state actors capable of mobilizing public emotion in ways the state cannot easily contain.
In April, Jordanian security services announced the arrest of 16 people in a plot against the government that included weapons, explosives, and plans to make drones. Hamas’s statement defending the detainees framed them as symbols of resistance, part of a broader strategy to project influence into neighboring states. Hamas cast Palestinians imprisoned by Israel and by Jordan as victims of a shared system of repression and, by extension, as unified symbols of resistance and directly challenged the Jordanian state’s claim to moral agency. In a region where legitimacy is increasingly shaped by emotional resonance and symbolism, such narrative power is perceived as a direct threat to the state’s monopoly of force.
The government’s response should therefore be read as an attempt to reassert control of the narrative by ending a long-standing accommodation of alternative claims to legitimacy within Jordanian public space.
Jordan’s approach to managing Islamist opposition has previously stood apart from regional norms. Unlike other regimes in the Middle East that relied on prisons, surveillance, and political erasure to contain Islamist movements, Jordan tolerated — and at times cooperated with — the Muslim Brotherhood’s extensive network of charities, unions, mosques, and professional associations. The government’s view was that these structures helped absorb dissent, moderate radical impulses, and embed a version of political Islam within a framework the state could monitor and, when needed, negotiate with.
The recent decision, however, marks a clear departure from that model. By dismantling long-standing structures without simultaneously opening new avenues for political and social participation, the state risks severing one of its most effective buffers against radicalization. But the shift reflects a deeper message that the old rules no longer apply. Jordanian authorities have signaled that any future engagement must be channeled through formal party structures and anchored in a Jordanian national identity. In that context, the fate of the Islamic Action Front — the Brotherhood’s political arm, which holds 31 of 138 seats in Parliament — remains uncertain. Much will depend on the outcomes of ongoing investigations and on how the party positions itself in response to the current crisis. Whether it can adapt or becomes further marginalized will likely become clearer in the coming weeks.
The war in Gaza has sharpened popular anger, amplified feelings of disenfranchisement, and created fertile ground for grievance-based mobilization. Banning the Brotherhood leaves thousands of Jordanians — many of them deeply embedded in social and religious networks — politically adrift. At a time when Hamas is seeking to export a model of legitimacy grounded in resistance and sacrifice, cutting off structured domestic pathways for political expression may not dampen dissent but simply make it harder to channel.
Jordan stands at an inflection point. A lasting strategy for national resilience must go beyond repression or restriction. It must be anchored in political reform: the construction of new civic spaces, representative mechanisms, and accountable institutions capable of giving citizens a meaningful stake in public life.
U.S. policymakers should view Jordan’s internal recalibrations as critical signals from a frontline partner. For the United States, engaging with Jordan in a way that reinforces — rather than undermines — its legitimacy and sovereignty is a matter of strategic interest.
Jordan has long carried an asymmetric share of regional risk. It has absorbed shocks generated by conflicts it does not control while navigating public sentiment and maintaining strategic alignments. Yet despite these pressures, it has preserved a political model that has contained dissent and converted it, at times, into dialogue. The model is not without flaws, but remains one of the few viable paths in a deeply unstable region. Few U.S. allies carry more weight with less margin for error.
Is This the End of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan?
By Mohanned M. Al-Arabiat
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Dr. Mohanned M. Al-Arabiat is a political analyst and writer specializing in strategy, strategic communications and crisis management. His work explores the narratives shaping political and social dynamics, with a focus on governance, identity politics and preventing violent extremism. Using context analysis and participatory research, he examines how communication strategies influence policy and public perception. He holds a doctorate in information sciences from DePaul University and a master’s in social justice from Loyola University.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Jordan’s April 23 decision to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood, following the uncovering of an alleged plot tied to the group, reflects more than a security measure—it signals an effort to renegotiate the kingdom’s internal and regional legitimacy.
In a Middle East still reeling from the Gaza war triggered by Hamas’ attack on Israel, violence has become normalized, alliances are shifting, and governments are increasingly asserting sovereignty to reaffirm legitimacy.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological, historical, and alleged financial and operational ties to Hamas – itself an offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood – have reinforced perceptions of the group as a national security threat, heightening domestic pressures on Jordan, whose 11 million people include more than 50 percent of Palestinian origin and many refugees from past regional conflicts. The broader “Axis of Resistance” comprising Iran and Iran-backed militant groups, has been adapting to strategic setbacks in Gaza, Syria, and southern Lebanon by seeking new pressure points on Israel’s periphery. Jordan, which borders Israel and signed a peace agreement with it in 1994, especially risks being used as a lever of destabilization to impose costs on Israel.
As Hamas absorbs major losses in Gaza, it has shifted to exporting a narrative of moral resistance— one that directly affects Jordan’s internal stability and control over its political narrative. At the same time, Israeli militancy in the occupied West Bank, including a dramatic increase in settler attacks on Palestinians, and the second Trump term, seemingly committed to transactional regional politics, have further constrained Jordan’s room for maneuver.
In the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023, the Jordanian state tried to reassert its traditional posture on Palestine. Queen Rania, herself of Palestinian descent, adopted a humanitarian tone, drawing attention to the suffering of families in Gaza, while Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi led a kind of resistance diplomacy — publicly and forcefully condemning Israeli policies, advocating for Palestinian rights, and voicing broader regional frustrations. This stance allowed the state to claim the mantle of resistance in a way that reinforced the monarchy’s role as a protector of national identity and a supporter of a diplomatic resolution to the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
But this posture has grown increasingly difficult to sustain. As regional diplomacy becomes more transactional — particularly amid Washington’s deepening alignment with the policies of the Netanyahu government — the space Jordan long occupied has begun to shrink. For Amman, the relationship with the United States, which includes more than $1.4 billion annually in military and economic aid, remains a cornerstone of its strategic posture. Yet that relationship now operates in a more constrained climate — a shift from the Biden administration, which afforded Jordan greater space to articulate its positions on regional issues. According to diplomatic sources, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly declined to meet with Foreign Minister Safadi during Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan’s recent visit to Washington. King Abdullah’s Feb. 11 meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office — just after Trump called for removing Gaza’s 2 million Palestinians to construct a “riviera” in the enclave – was also tense, with the King announcing at Trump’s prompting an agreement to accept 2,000 Palestinian children for medical care. On May 4, King Abdullah returned to Washington, only to face criticism from the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who noted that Jordan had accepted just 44 Palestinian children. Jordan is reportedly reluctant to receive more without assurances they will eventually be able to return to Gaza — a prospect that appears increasingly unlikely as Israel threatens a broader invasion and potential re-occupation of the territory.
Jordanian political circles believe that the assertive diplomatic rhetoric once used to condemn Israeli actions may no longer be acceptable under the current U.S. administration. What had once been a carefully managed balance between domestic sentiment and international engagement is now under pressure, leaving the state more vulnerable to non-state actors capable of mobilizing public emotion in ways the state cannot easily contain.
In April, Jordanian security services announced the arrest of 16 people in a plot against the government that included weapons, explosives, and plans to make drones. Hamas’s statement defending the detainees framed them as symbols of resistance, part of a broader strategy to project influence into neighboring states. Hamas cast Palestinians imprisoned by Israel and by Jordan as victims of a shared system of repression and, by extension, as unified symbols of resistance and directly challenged the Jordanian state’s claim to moral agency. In a region where legitimacy is increasingly shaped by emotional resonance and symbolism, such narrative power is perceived as a direct threat to the state’s monopoly of force.
The government’s response should therefore be read as an attempt to reassert control of the narrative by ending a long-standing accommodation of alternative claims to legitimacy within Jordanian public space.
Jordan’s approach to managing Islamist opposition has previously stood apart from regional norms. Unlike other regimes in the Middle East that relied on prisons, surveillance, and political erasure to contain Islamist movements, Jordan tolerated — and at times cooperated with — the Muslim Brotherhood’s extensive network of charities, unions, mosques, and professional associations. The government’s view was that these structures helped absorb dissent, moderate radical impulses, and embed a version of political Islam within a framework the state could monitor and, when needed, negotiate with.
The recent decision, however, marks a clear departure from that model. By dismantling long-standing structures without simultaneously opening new avenues for political and social participation, the state risks severing one of its most effective buffers against radicalization. But the shift reflects a deeper message that the old rules no longer apply. Jordanian authorities have signaled that any future engagement must be channeled through formal party structures and anchored in a Jordanian national identity. In that context, the fate of the Islamic Action Front — the Brotherhood’s political arm, which holds 31 of 138 seats in Parliament — remains uncertain. Much will depend on the outcomes of ongoing investigations and on how the party positions itself in response to the current crisis. Whether it can adapt or becomes further marginalized will likely become clearer in the coming weeks.
The war in Gaza has sharpened popular anger, amplified feelings of disenfranchisement, and created fertile ground for grievance-based mobilization. Banning the Brotherhood leaves thousands of Jordanians — many of them deeply embedded in social and religious networks — politically adrift. At a time when Hamas is seeking to export a model of legitimacy grounded in resistance and sacrifice, cutting off structured domestic pathways for political expression may not dampen dissent but simply make it harder to channel.
Jordan stands at an inflection point. A lasting strategy for national resilience must go beyond repression or restriction. It must be anchored in political reform: the construction of new civic spaces, representative mechanisms, and accountable institutions capable of giving citizens a meaningful stake in public life.
U.S. policymakers should view Jordan’s internal recalibrations as critical signals from a frontline partner. For the United States, engaging with Jordan in a way that reinforces — rather than undermines — its legitimacy and sovereignty is a matter of strategic interest.
Jordan has long carried an asymmetric share of regional risk. It has absorbed shocks generated by conflicts it does not control while navigating public sentiment and maintaining strategic alignments. Yet despite these pressures, it has preserved a political model that has contained dissent and converted it, at times, into dialogue. The model is not without flaws, but remains one of the few viable paths in a deeply unstable region. Few U.S. allies carry more weight with less margin for error.
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