Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iran’s decision to expel inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) represents both a defense against external aggression and an offensive strategy following a 12-day war with Israel and the U.S. and years of attacks against Iranian scientists and infrastructure.
Iranian legislation suspending all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA represents a rupture in nonproliferation governance as well as a calculated gambit to recalibrate the terms of engagement with the agency. The legislation freezes surveillance of equipment installation, inspector access to declared nuclear sites, and data sharing until verifiable security guarantees and sovereign rights assurances can be secured. IAEA cameras have also been removed.
The strategy carries significant risks. By codifying suspension into law, Tehran reduces its negotiating flexibility, as any future concession will require parliamentary approval. While strengthening domestic consensus, this approach also complicates third-party mediation efforts. IAEA inspectors expelled after years of on-site work face bureaucratic limbo with painstakingly built institutional knowledge rendered largely obsolete. Civil society groups monitoring regional proliferation warn of cascading consequences, from rising military budgets to the humanitarian impact of continued economic sanctions on Iran.
The crisis crystallizes years of escalating tensions between Tehran and the IAEA under Director General Rafael Grossi. Concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, which Iran frames as a sovereign right under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), intensified following the 2018 unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 2015 deal that was intended to constrain Iran’s uranium enrichment until 2030. Iran began advancing its program in 2019 in response to the U.S. action as well as Israeli attacks on scientists and facilities. It reduced cooperation with the IAEA but continued to allow basic monitoring and inspections of uranium stockpiles. The IAEA’s failure to condemn the recent Israeli and U.S. strikes – which began a day after the IAEA Board of Governors had censured Iran for failing to resolve questions about old traces of uranium found at undeclared locations – was the final straw for Iran. The IAEA’s subsequent confirmation that no radioactive leaks occurred from facilities damaged in the U.S. and Israeli attacks did little to assuage Tehran’s grievances.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused Grossi of suppressing a 2015 acknowledgment that questions about past nuclear activities had been resolved. Iran rejected demands for intrusive inspections of bomb-damaged facilities and expelled inspectors on July 4. For many in Tehran, IAEA actions prior to and after the Israeli and U.S. attacks have confirmed the agency’s transformation from technical arbiter to geopolitical instrument.
Iran’s legislative response attempts to reset diplomatic parameters. The law’s three bans — no new surveillance cameras, no inspector access, no reporting — dismantle transparency mechanisms that were built over decades. Crucially, the legislation delegates authority to Iran’s highest decision-making entity, the Supreme National Security Council, to assess future engagement with the IAEA, tying resumed cooperation to physical security for nuclear sites, respect for what Iran views as its enrichment rights under the NPT, and cessation of what Iran regards as politically motivated resolutions.
Domestically, the suspension shores up nationalist sentiment amid economic hardship, framing resistance to foreign coercion as a constitutional duty. Internationally, it signals Tehran’s willingness to escalate and leverage its nuclear capabilities as both a deterrent and a bargaining chip. Iran is also believed to retain nearly 900 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent — sufficient for multiple weapons if further processed.
In Iran’s view, the NPT’s foundational bargain has been shaken by the IAEA’s failure to condemn the resort to military action by the U.S. and Israel, validating the narrative that compliance invites vulnerability rather than protection. For Iran’s Middle Eastern rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, reduced IAEA oversight of Iran’s program heightens proliferation anxieties and encourages a regional arms race.
Diplomatic off-ramps remain theoretically viable but politically fraught. Araghchi has insisted that any future agreement must entail a binding UN Security Council condemning attacks on nuclear facilities, full JCPOA-era sanctions relief, and IAEA governance reforms. At a minimum, Iran has said it requires guarantees of no future military strikes as a precondition for new talks with the U.S.
Iranian negotiators, including Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi, reportedly plan to condition any reduction in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to both verifiable sanctions removal and security guarantees, rejecting U.S. calls for complete cessation of enrichment. This stance reflects lessons from the original JCPOA, which Tehran believes yielded insufficient economic relief.
For the IAEA, the crisis could be existential. Grossi’s admission that the agency now lacks visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities and may never be able to restore continuity of knowledge about the program underscores the operational costs of eroded trust. Critics argue that the IAEA’s alignment with Western narratives under Grossi compromised its technical mandate, with a February 2025 report about unexplained uranium traces exemplifying what Iran and its supporters view as bias but Iran critics say are legitimate concerns about past weapons research. Tehran has dismissed these allegations as recycled claims from discredited sources and protested their re-emergence as a political decision timed just before the Israeli strikes.
Iran’s calibrated suspension seeks to reform rather than reject the current nonproliferation regime and it is notable that it has not yet withdrawn from the NPT as North Korea did in 2003 in response to another failed diplomatic effort to curb nuclear proliferation. The current approach seeks to demonstrate nuclear latency sufficient to deter more attacks while avoiding overt weaponization that would unite global opposition.
Technological developments could further complicate the situation. Iran’s deployment of advanced centrifuges at the deeply underground site at Fordow, coupled with reported breakthroughsin laser enrichment, could reduce breakout timelines even more. Conversely, Israeli drone swarms and U.S. bombing showcase capabilities to penetrate hardened sites, undermining traditional deterrence models. In this environment, the IAEA’s traditional tools — cameras, seals, and inspector access — appear increasingly insufficient.
Still, some analysts argue that suspending cooperation with the IAEA has more disadvantages than advantages. While Iran invokes the NPT’s “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear technology, voluntary safeguards adherence cannot be unilaterally revoked.
Cultural factors also permeate the standoff. For Iran’s leadership, nuclear sovereignty symbolizes resistance to post-colonial domination, a narrative that resonates across the Global South. The IAEA’s governance structure feeds perceptions of institutionalized bias and hypocrisy, particularly when contrasted with the agency’s muted responses to India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests and complete silence about Israel’s large undeclared nuclear arsenal.
In Iran’s view, technical solutions exist: phased reinspection tied to sanctions removal, third-country uranium custodianship, and regional security dialogues. Conversely, renewed strikes or coercive measures – such as snapback of U.N. sanctions threatened by Britain and France before October — could push Tehran toward NPT withdrawal and overt weaponization.
Many in Iran’s leadership fear that unless the IAEA evolves into a genuinely neutral forum addressing all members’ security concerns, it will devolve into yet another arena for great power rivalry. The coming days will be a high-stakes test of whether multilateral institutions can adapt to 21st-century realities or whether the nuclear order will fracture into competing spheres of influence.
The ultimate lesson of this showdown may be that nuclear diplomacy cannot survive where trust dies — and trust cannot exist where double standards reign. For Iran, the path forward demands not just technical fixes but moral consistency: recognizing that security built on others’ insecurity is no security at all.
Iran Escalates Nuclear Standoff by Suspending Cooperation with IAEA
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iran’s decision to expel inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) represents both a defense against external aggression and an offensive strategy following a 12-day war with Israel and the U.S. and years of attacks against Iranian scientists and infrastructure.
Iranian legislation suspending all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA represents a rupture in nonproliferation governance as well as a calculated gambit to recalibrate the terms of engagement with the agency. The legislation freezes surveillance of equipment installation, inspector access to declared nuclear sites, and data sharing until verifiable security guarantees and sovereign rights assurances can be secured. IAEA cameras have also been removed.
The strategy carries significant risks. By codifying suspension into law, Tehran reduces its negotiating flexibility, as any future concession will require parliamentary approval. While strengthening domestic consensus, this approach also complicates third-party mediation efforts. IAEA inspectors expelled after years of on-site work face bureaucratic limbo with painstakingly built institutional knowledge rendered largely obsolete. Civil society groups monitoring regional proliferation warn of cascading consequences, from rising military budgets to the humanitarian impact of continued economic sanctions on Iran.
The crisis crystallizes years of escalating tensions between Tehran and the IAEA under Director General Rafael Grossi. Concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, which Iran frames as a sovereign right under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), intensified following the 2018 unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 2015 deal that was intended to constrain Iran’s uranium enrichment until 2030. Iran began advancing its program in 2019 in response to the U.S. action as well as Israeli attacks on scientists and facilities. It reduced cooperation with the IAEA but continued to allow basic monitoring and inspections of uranium stockpiles. The IAEA’s failure to condemn the recent Israeli and U.S. strikes – which began a day after the IAEA Board of Governors had censured Iran for failing to resolve questions about old traces of uranium found at undeclared locations – was the final straw for Iran. The IAEA’s subsequent confirmation that no radioactive leaks occurred from facilities damaged in the U.S. and Israeli attacks did little to assuage Tehran’s grievances.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused Grossi of suppressing a 2015 acknowledgment that questions about past nuclear activities had been resolved. Iran rejected demands for intrusive inspections of bomb-damaged facilities and expelled inspectors on July 4. For many in Tehran, IAEA actions prior to and after the Israeli and U.S. attacks have confirmed the agency’s transformation from technical arbiter to geopolitical instrument.
Iran’s legislative response attempts to reset diplomatic parameters. The law’s three bans — no new surveillance cameras, no inspector access, no reporting — dismantle transparency mechanisms that were built over decades. Crucially, the legislation delegates authority to Iran’s highest decision-making entity, the Supreme National Security Council, to assess future engagement with the IAEA, tying resumed cooperation to physical security for nuclear sites, respect for what Iran views as its enrichment rights under the NPT, and cessation of what Iran regards as politically motivated resolutions.
Domestically, the suspension shores up nationalist sentiment amid economic hardship, framing resistance to foreign coercion as a constitutional duty. Internationally, it signals Tehran’s willingness to escalate and leverage its nuclear capabilities as both a deterrent and a bargaining chip. Iran is also believed to retain nearly 900 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent — sufficient for multiple weapons if further processed.
In Iran’s view, the NPT’s foundational bargain has been shaken by the IAEA’s failure to condemn the resort to military action by the U.S. and Israel, validating the narrative that compliance invites vulnerability rather than protection. For Iran’s Middle Eastern rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, reduced IAEA oversight of Iran’s program heightens proliferation anxieties and encourages a regional arms race.
Diplomatic off-ramps remain theoretically viable but politically fraught. Araghchi has insisted that any future agreement must entail a binding UN Security Council condemning attacks on nuclear facilities, full JCPOA-era sanctions relief, and IAEA governance reforms. At a minimum, Iran has said it requires guarantees of no future military strikes as a precondition for new talks with the U.S.
Iranian negotiators, including Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi, reportedly plan to condition any reduction in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to both verifiable sanctions removal and security guarantees, rejecting U.S. calls for complete cessation of enrichment. This stance reflects lessons from the original JCPOA, which Tehran believes yielded insufficient economic relief.
For the IAEA, the crisis could be existential. Grossi’s admission that the agency now lacks visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities and may never be able to restore continuity of knowledge about the program underscores the operational costs of eroded trust. Critics argue that the IAEA’s alignment with Western narratives under Grossi compromised its technical mandate, with a February 2025 report about unexplained uranium traces exemplifying what Iran and its supporters view as bias but Iran critics say are legitimate concerns about past weapons research. Tehran has dismissed these allegations as recycled claims from discredited sources and protested their re-emergence as a political decision timed just before the Israeli strikes.
Iran’s calibrated suspension seeks to reform rather than reject the current nonproliferation regime and it is notable that it has not yet withdrawn from the NPT as North Korea did in 2003 in response to another failed diplomatic effort to curb nuclear proliferation. The current approach seeks to demonstrate nuclear latency sufficient to deter more attacks while avoiding overt weaponization that would unite global opposition.
Technological developments could further complicate the situation. Iran’s deployment of advanced centrifuges at the deeply underground site at Fordow, coupled with reported breakthroughsin laser enrichment, could reduce breakout timelines even more. Conversely, Israeli drone swarms and U.S. bombing showcase capabilities to penetrate hardened sites, undermining traditional deterrence models. In this environment, the IAEA’s traditional tools — cameras, seals, and inspector access — appear increasingly insufficient.
Still, some analysts argue that suspending cooperation with the IAEA has more disadvantages than advantages. While Iran invokes the NPT’s “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear technology, voluntary safeguards adherence cannot be unilaterally revoked.
Cultural factors also permeate the standoff. For Iran’s leadership, nuclear sovereignty symbolizes resistance to post-colonial domination, a narrative that resonates across the Global South. The IAEA’s governance structure feeds perceptions of institutionalized bias and hypocrisy, particularly when contrasted with the agency’s muted responses to India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests and complete silence about Israel’s large undeclared nuclear arsenal.
In Iran’s view, technical solutions exist: phased reinspection tied to sanctions removal, third-country uranium custodianship, and regional security dialogues. Conversely, renewed strikes or coercive measures – such as snapback of U.N. sanctions threatened by Britain and France before October — could push Tehran toward NPT withdrawal and overt weaponization.
Many in Iran’s leadership fear that unless the IAEA evolves into a genuinely neutral forum addressing all members’ security concerns, it will devolve into yet another arena for great power rivalry. The coming days will be a high-stakes test of whether multilateral institutions can adapt to 21st-century realities or whether the nuclear order will fracture into competing spheres of influence.
The ultimate lesson of this showdown may be that nuclear diplomacy cannot survive where trust dies — and trust cannot exist where double standards reign. For Iran, the path forward demands not just technical fixes but moral consistency: recognizing that security built on others’ insecurity is no security at all.
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