The Stimson Center Korea Program invited Professor Ahn Byong-jin of the Global Academy of Future Civilizations at Kyung Hee University on September 18, 2025 to share his assessment of the first 100 days of the Lee Jae Myung administration at a closed-door meeting. Professor Ahn offered a unique insider perspective, having recently served on the Planning Subcommittee of the State Affairs Planning Committee. Below is the content of an interview that the Stimson Center Korea Program conducted with Professor Ahn after the event
Professor Ahn’s distinguished academic career spans positions at Kyung He-e University, Changwon National University, and the City University of New York. Dr. Ahn holds a PhD in American Politics from the New School for Social Research, where he was awarded the prestigious Hannah Arendt Award for his dissertation. He will join Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as a visiting scholar in Fall 2025.
Professor Ahn, thank you for agreeing to join us at the Stimson Center to talk about the new administration, which recently hit its first 100 days as of September 11th. So, what is your assessment of the first 100 days of the Lee Jae Myung administration?
First, we need to consider the voters’ mandate for the Lee Jae Myung administration. Historically, many Korean administrations have tended to neglect this and instead pursue the agendas they want. In my view, the majority voters’ mandate was to restore a competent administration that reflects the people’s will and takes responsibility – this was especially so after what happened with the previous administration and the attempted autocoup. In this respect, Lee Jae Myung’s first 100 days can be rated highly for faithfully upholding the people’s mandate. Indeed, approval ratings in polls were about 10% higher than the historical average (63%).
“…the majority voters’ mandate was to restore a competent administration that reflects the people’s will and takes responsibility…”
When it comes to presidential evaluations, citizens value not so much the policy agenda emphasized by intellectuals, but performance. And in performance, “defining moments” matter. I believe there were two such moments during the early part of the Lee administration.
The first was the image of President Lee eating gimbap while chairing a Cabinet meeting. The image for the broader Korean public in these meetings and town halls was his sense of responsibility and his “I feel your pain” attitude. Many of these meetings were also televised and reported on, and the public was astonished by his detailed understanding of policy. This also left a strong impression, especially when contrasted with the previous leader, who was less outward facing.
The second was his handling of the summit with President Trump, where he conveyed messages with ease and produced good results in the tariff negotiations. These two defining moments will likely be the basis for his performance evaluation for many months to come.
Now that 100 days have passed, however, difficult challenges lie ahead – economic hardship, international uncertainty, opposition party challenges, and media scrutiny. In a book titled Year Zero, author Christopher Liddell posits that a president’s first question during the campaign should be: “What legacy do I want to leave at the end of my term?” The Lee administration should keep asking itself this question over the next five years. From here on out, it must focus with laser precision on creating a legacy that the public can tangibly experience, based on its short- and medium-to-long-term core agendas. Whether it succeeds in doing this will determine the administration’s overall success.
Professor Ahn, you were selected to be a part of the State Policy Planning Committee at the onset of the new administration. What was the selection process, and how did you end up in this role?
The Committee was formed around the exceptional circumstances under which the new administration was elected to power after a presidential impeachment. A normal transition team could not be launched, so it was formed after the new government was installed and already functioning, but simultaneously it was tasked to formulate a plan for future governance. As a scholar specializing in the U.S. presidency and advising the campaign during the election, I believe I had some insights into designing a practical framework for this Policy Planning Committee. I believe the Committee Chairman Lee Han-joo considered my contributions to this work during the campaign and my expertise in national future strategic planning to assign me to this role in the Committee.
Can you tell us anything about the five-year plan as it was formulated by the Committee?
The overall framework of the five-year plan was guided by five national objectives:
- Overcome conflict and division to build “one nation.”
- Break through into the new era of growth through future industries (i.e., AI).
- Achieve balanced growth by resolving regional and structural inequalities (e.g., small and medium vs. large firms).
- Strengthen and secure citizens’ basic living standards – housing, healthcare, etc. – through active state intervention.
- Pursue pragmatic diplomacy and security, prioritizing national interest.
Based on these objectives, the Committee laid out 23 strategic guidance and 123 policy tasks, with detailed action plans spelled out in the 1,600-page white paper. Seven subcommittees (planning, economy 1, economy 2, society 1, society 2, political, administrative, diplomacy/security) and 10 task forces (AI, climate/energy, etc.) were involved.
Importantly, we created a National Popular Sovereignty Committee that took requests or suggestions from citizens. This Committee reviewed over 14,000 public submissions, some of which were incorporated into the five-year plan.
There was some news reporting that President Lee decided not to release the plan as recommended by the Committee. Is this true? If so, can you share with us why he decided to do this?
Government reorganization involves many sensitive vested interests, so the administration had to be cautious about publicly releasing those details. But aside from the reorganization plan, the detailed five-year plan was in fact released to the media and published in a white paper form. Government restructuring is moving along and becoming clearer on a day-to-day basis. From what I hear, ministries are already using the Committee’s detailed guidance as their roadmap.
What do you think are major reform agenda items for the new administration in Seoul? And why?
In my view, the Committee’s core reform agendas can be summarized into six areas:
- Democratic consolidation, including prosecutorial reform.
- Regulatory and financial reforms plus talent development to make Korea one of the world’s top three AI powers.
- Energy transition toward renewable energy.
- Decentralization and balanced growth.
- Address[ing] the demographic challenge through health, welfare, and building a “basic society.”
- Advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula and stabilizing regional relations.
Among these, I believe the Committee placed the greatest emphasis on reforms to generate new growth engines.
“I believe the [State Affairs Planning] Committee placed the greatest emphasis on reforms to generate new growth engines.”
That said, I anticipate tension between the push for deregulation and sovereign AI strategies on the one hand, and citizens’ stability and rights on the other. The key will be whether the administration can establish a reform agenda that is inclusive and balanced during what looks to be a major shift in the economy due to technological change. The Committee’s vision of an “AI-based society” must evolve beyond simply using AI; it should become part of a broader liberal vision and reform philosophy of the Lee administration.
What do you think are the challenges that the new administration faces as it attempts to move forward with its reform agenda? How should the Lee Jae Myung administration deal with them?
I believe Korea has already entered an era of long-term low growth. With manufacturing jobs moving overseas, labor instability due to accelerating AI adoption, and the worsening demographic crisis, the pain of stagnation and transition will likely intensify. The most difficult challenges will therefore be securing sustainable public finances, creating new industrial strategies, and preventing the collapse of people’s livelihoods.
Past governments have failed in this area because ministries operated in silos, lacking integrated leadership. That is why I paid attention to the August 13 presidential meeting on fiscal savings. Fortunately, we could see that the president had a strong sense of crisis regarding weakened growth engines and fiscal vulnerabilities. Going forward, he must stay on top of this and lead bold changes in revenue and expenditure.
Moreover, I hope this administration will, through role-sharing with the prime minister, establish a National Strategy Committee and a Basic Society Committee focused on fiscal, AI, and other core short- and long-term strategic tasks. Only competent, future-oriented committees empowered by the president can overcome bureaucratic inertia and achieve real transformation. Success in this area will determine the Lee administration’s legacy after five years.
What do you think about the prospects for US–Korea relations in the Trump–Lee era? Please explain. Also, what do you think about the recent incident in the LG Battery plant in Georgia? Do you think this would have any lasting negative impact on US-ROK relations? Why or why not?
As we saw at the recent summit, President Lee has a good understanding of President Trump and is acutely aware of U.S. concerns about Korea’s new administration. For example, his statement that the era of “security with the U.S., economy with China” (anmi-gyeongjung) is no longer viable marked a surprisingly pragmatic shift – unthinkable for past liberal presidents.
At the same time, President Lee places great emphasis on popular sovereignty, so he is expected to continue stressing Korea’s national interest and citizen rights. For President Trump, Lee’s pragmatism matches well with his own style, opening opportunities for win-win cooperation in industries such as shipbuilding.
That said, because the Trump administration strongly emphasizes alliance modernization, there will be many issues requiring coordination. This first summit was merely the successful end of a beginning. However, given President Lee’s pragmatism and realism – more so than any past liberal leader — and the orientation of his top aides, I believe the relationship will mature well.
Still, the difficult task remains to forge a new bipartisan line for Korea through public debate so that we can bridge the conservative-progressive divide. I hope that, like the debates between Kim Dae-jung and Lee Kuan Yew, President Lee will spark constructive discussions by proposing a new diplomatic doctrine. If this doctrine articulates a vision that goes beyond “security with the U.S., economy with China” toward a new vision for US–Korea relations and ties with surrounding countries, it could form a meaningful legacy.
“Still, the difficult task remains to forge a new bipartisan line for Korea through public debate so that we can bridge the conservative-progressive divide.”
With regards to the incident in Georgia, the U.S. government crackdown on improperly documented Korean workers is deeply regrettable. I wonder whether this was largely motivated by political concerns leading up to next year’s midterm elections. The anger in Korea was that the actions taken by the U.S. government led to inhumane treatment of Korean workers. It is worth noting that these companies and workers came to invest in the United States because the government asked them to. The horrifying images of arrests and poor conditions of the detention facilities make this incident one of the worst moments in the bilateral relationship.
This happened even though the general attitude about the United States is favorable in South Korea, especially among younger generations. This might no longer be the case. It could also embolden those progressives, who are ideologically critical of the United States, while weakening the Lee administration’s pragmatic approach.
From the perspective of the United States and the Trump administration, this incident was [a] profoundly foolish [one] that worsens their position across all dimensions of domestic and international politics, including the U.S. economy and US–Korea relations. This is because this could discourage corporate investment and even fuel early signs of stagflation. The economy is a central factor in Trump’s previous electoral performance, and it could also impact results next year and in 2028.
Given President Lee’s character as a leader who emphasizes national sovereignty and the primacy of national interest, he cannot ignore the deterioration of public opinion. As a result, during the remainder of the Trump administration — and even under subsequent U.S. administrations — South Korea will be compelled to take a firmer and more confrontational stance not only on economic and trade issues but also on matters of alliance modernization. The future of US–Korea relations is deeply concerning.
A View from Seoul: First 100 Days of the Lee Jae Myung Administration
By J. James Kim
Korean Peninsula
The Stimson Center hosted Professor Ahn Byong-jin on September 18, 2025 for an assessment of President Lee Jae Myung’s first 100 days in office. Ahn, who served on the State Affairs Planning Committee, stated that the administration has thus far honored the public’s mandate to restore competent and responsible governance after the previous administration’s collapse. With an approval rating around 63 percent, Lee’s early successes included effective diplomacy in tariff negotiations with President Trump.
Ahn outlined the administration’s five-year plan built on objectives such as overcoming division, promoting AI-driven growth, addressing inequality, expanding welfare, and pursuing pragmatic diplomacy. The plan involved over 120 detailed policy tasks and incorporated citizen input. Reform priorities included prosecutorial reform, AI leadership, energy transition, decentralization, demographic policy, and peacebuilding. Key challenges for South Korea ahead include low growth, demographic decline, and fiscal pressures. Ahn emphasized the need for integrated leadership and bold fiscal reforms. On US–Korea ties, he noted Lee’s pragmatic alignment with Trump but warned that a U.S. crackdown on Korean workers risked undermining goodwill and could strain bilateral relations going forward.
The Stimson Center Korea Program invited Professor Ahn Byong-jin of the Global Academy of Future Civilizations at Kyung Hee University on September 18, 2025 to share his assessment of the first 100 days of the Lee Jae Myung administration at a closed-door meeting. Professor Ahn offered a unique insider perspective, having recently served on the Planning Subcommittee of the State Affairs Planning Committee. Below is the content of an interview that the Stimson Center Korea Program conducted with Professor Ahn after the event
Professor Ahn’s distinguished academic career spans positions at Kyung He-e University, Changwon National University, and the City University of New York. Dr. Ahn holds a PhD in American Politics from the New School for Social Research, where he was awarded the prestigious Hannah Arendt Award for his dissertation. He will join Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as a visiting scholar in Fall 2025.
Professor Ahn, thank you for agreeing to join us at the Stimson Center to talk about the new administration, which recently hit its first 100 days as of September 11th. So, what is your assessment of the first 100 days of the Lee Jae Myung administration?
First, we need to consider the voters’ mandate for the Lee Jae Myung administration. Historically, many Korean administrations have tended to neglect this and instead pursue the agendas they want. In my view, the majority voters’ mandate was to restore a competent administration that reflects the people’s will and takes responsibility – this was especially so after what happened with the previous administration and the attempted autocoup. In this respect, Lee Jae Myung’s first 100 days can be rated highly for faithfully upholding the people’s mandate. Indeed, approval ratings in polls were about 10% higher than the historical average (63%).
“…the majority voters’ mandate was to restore a competent administration that reflects the people’s will and takes responsibility…”
When it comes to presidential evaluations, citizens value not so much the policy agenda emphasized by intellectuals, but performance. And in performance, “defining moments” matter. I believe there were two such moments during the early part of the Lee administration.
The first was the image of President Lee eating gimbap while chairing a Cabinet meeting. The image for the broader Korean public in these meetings and town halls was his sense of responsibility and his “I feel your pain” attitude. Many of these meetings were also televised and reported on, and the public was astonished by his detailed understanding of policy. This also left a strong impression, especially when contrasted with the previous leader, who was less outward facing.
The second was his handling of the summit with President Trump, where he conveyed messages with ease and produced good results in the tariff negotiations. These two defining moments will likely be the basis for his performance evaluation for many months to come.
Now that 100 days have passed, however, difficult challenges lie ahead – economic hardship, international uncertainty, opposition party challenges, and media scrutiny. In a book titled Year Zero, author Christopher Liddell posits that a president’s first question during the campaign should be: “What legacy do I want to leave at the end of my term?” The Lee administration should keep asking itself this question over the next five years. From here on out, it must focus with laser precision on creating a legacy that the public can tangibly experience, based on its short- and medium-to-long-term core agendas. Whether it succeeds in doing this will determine the administration’s overall success.
Professor Ahn, you were selected to be a part of the State Policy Planning Committee at the onset of the new administration. What was the selection process, and how did you end up in this role?
The Committee was formed around the exceptional circumstances under which the new administration was elected to power after a presidential impeachment. A normal transition team could not be launched, so it was formed after the new government was installed and already functioning, but simultaneously it was tasked to formulate a plan for future governance. As a scholar specializing in the U.S. presidency and advising the campaign during the election, I believe I had some insights into designing a practical framework for this Policy Planning Committee. I believe the Committee Chairman Lee Han-joo considered my contributions to this work during the campaign and my expertise in national future strategic planning to assign me to this role in the Committee.
Can you tell us anything about the five-year plan as it was formulated by the Committee?
The overall framework of the five-year plan was guided by five national objectives:
Based on these objectives, the Committee laid out 23 strategic guidance and 123 policy tasks, with detailed action plans spelled out in the 1,600-page white paper. Seven subcommittees (planning, economy 1, economy 2, society 1, society 2, political, administrative, diplomacy/security) and 10 task forces (AI, climate/energy, etc.) were involved.
Importantly, we created a National Popular Sovereignty Committee that took requests or suggestions from citizens. This Committee reviewed over 14,000 public submissions, some of which were incorporated into the five-year plan.
There was some news reporting that President Lee decided not to release the plan as recommended by the Committee. Is this true? If so, can you share with us why he decided to do this?
Government reorganization involves many sensitive vested interests, so the administration had to be cautious about publicly releasing those details. But aside from the reorganization plan, the detailed five-year plan was in fact released to the media and published in a white paper form. Government restructuring is moving along and becoming clearer on a day-to-day basis. From what I hear, ministries are already using the Committee’s detailed guidance as their roadmap.
What do you think are major reform agenda items for the new administration in Seoul? And why?
In my view, the Committee’s core reform agendas can be summarized into six areas:
Among these, I believe the Committee placed the greatest emphasis on reforms to generate new growth engines.
“I believe the [State Affairs Planning] Committee placed the greatest emphasis on reforms to generate new growth engines.”
That said, I anticipate tension between the push for deregulation and sovereign AI strategies on the one hand, and citizens’ stability and rights on the other. The key will be whether the administration can establish a reform agenda that is inclusive and balanced during what looks to be a major shift in the economy due to technological change. The Committee’s vision of an “AI-based society” must evolve beyond simply using AI; it should become part of a broader liberal vision and reform philosophy of the Lee administration.
What do you think are the challenges that the new administration faces as it attempts to move forward with its reform agenda? How should the Lee Jae Myung administration deal with them?
I believe Korea has already entered an era of long-term low growth. With manufacturing jobs moving overseas, labor instability due to accelerating AI adoption, and the worsening demographic crisis, the pain of stagnation and transition will likely intensify. The most difficult challenges will therefore be securing sustainable public finances, creating new industrial strategies, and preventing the collapse of people’s livelihoods.
Past governments have failed in this area because ministries operated in silos, lacking integrated leadership. That is why I paid attention to the August 13 presidential meeting on fiscal savings. Fortunately, we could see that the president had a strong sense of crisis regarding weakened growth engines and fiscal vulnerabilities. Going forward, he must stay on top of this and lead bold changes in revenue and expenditure.
Moreover, I hope this administration will, through role-sharing with the prime minister, establish a National Strategy Committee and a Basic Society Committee focused on fiscal, AI, and other core short- and long-term strategic tasks. Only competent, future-oriented committees empowered by the president can overcome bureaucratic inertia and achieve real transformation. Success in this area will determine the Lee administration’s legacy after five years.
What do you think about the prospects for US–Korea relations in the Trump–Lee era? Please explain. Also, what do you think about the recent incident in the LG Battery plant in Georgia? Do you think this would have any lasting negative impact on US-ROK relations? Why or why not?
As we saw at the recent summit, President Lee has a good understanding of President Trump and is acutely aware of U.S. concerns about Korea’s new administration. For example, his statement that the era of “security with the U.S., economy with China” (anmi-gyeongjung) is no longer viable marked a surprisingly pragmatic shift – unthinkable for past liberal presidents.
At the same time, President Lee places great emphasis on popular sovereignty, so he is expected to continue stressing Korea’s national interest and citizen rights. For President Trump, Lee’s pragmatism matches well with his own style, opening opportunities for win-win cooperation in industries such as shipbuilding.
That said, because the Trump administration strongly emphasizes alliance modernization, there will be many issues requiring coordination. This first summit was merely the successful end of a beginning. However, given President Lee’s pragmatism and realism – more so than any past liberal leader — and the orientation of his top aides, I believe the relationship will mature well.
Still, the difficult task remains to forge a new bipartisan line for Korea through public debate so that we can bridge the conservative-progressive divide. I hope that, like the debates between Kim Dae-jung and Lee Kuan Yew, President Lee will spark constructive discussions by proposing a new diplomatic doctrine. If this doctrine articulates a vision that goes beyond “security with the U.S., economy with China” toward a new vision for US–Korea relations and ties with surrounding countries, it could form a meaningful legacy.
“Still, the difficult task remains to forge a new bipartisan line for Korea through public debate so that we can bridge the conservative-progressive divide.”
With regards to the incident in Georgia, the U.S. government crackdown on improperly documented Korean workers is deeply regrettable. I wonder whether this was largely motivated by political concerns leading up to next year’s midterm elections. The anger in Korea was that the actions taken by the U.S. government led to inhumane treatment of Korean workers. It is worth noting that these companies and workers came to invest in the United States because the government asked them to. The horrifying images of arrests and poor conditions of the detention facilities make this incident one of the worst moments in the bilateral relationship.
This happened even though the general attitude about the United States is favorable in South Korea, especially among younger generations. This might no longer be the case. It could also embolden those progressives, who are ideologically critical of the United States, while weakening the Lee administration’s pragmatic approach.
From the perspective of the United States and the Trump administration, this incident was [a] profoundly foolish [one] that worsens their position across all dimensions of domestic and international politics, including the U.S. economy and US–Korea relations. This is because this could discourage corporate investment and even fuel early signs of stagflation. The economy is a central factor in Trump’s previous electoral performance, and it could also impact results next year and in 2028.
Given President Lee’s character as a leader who emphasizes national sovereignty and the primacy of national interest, he cannot ignore the deterioration of public opinion. As a result, during the remainder of the Trump administration — and even under subsequent U.S. administrations — South Korea will be compelled to take a firmer and more confrontational stance not only on economic and trade issues but also on matters of alliance modernization. The future of US–Korea relations is deeply concerning.
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