Editor’s Note: The Stimson Center is fortunate to have several writers based in Iran including this young journalist, Saeed Azimi. He covered the June 28 presidential election and has also written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign policy decisions.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Only 24 million of 61 million eligible Iranians voted on June 28 in snap presidential elections called after the untimely death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. The 39.9 percent turnout was the worst in the history of the Islamic Republic and reflected deep-seated unhappiness and uncertainty among Iranians about whether their votes could affect any change.
Economic woes, hijab crackdowns, internet restrictions, mismanagement, corruption, and negligence among high-level officials were seen as chief reasons for boycotting the elections. In addition, perhaps surprisingly for a country that calls itself an Islamic Republic, Iran’s religious community also appeared deeply dissatisfied with the status quo, judging from conversations this journalist had with many people.
Normally a low turnout has presaged a victory for a hardline candidate. However, a standard-bearer for Iran’s weakened reformist faction, parliament member Masoud Pezeshkian, won the largest number of votes though not the 50 percent required to avoid a run-off. Pezeshkian will now face ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili on July 5.
The fact that Pezeshkian took 10.4 million votes, 42.5 percent of those cast, sent a message to the leadership that even those loyal enough to participate believe that the system is in urgent need of major reform. Whether it be overhauling the economy, boosting social justice, equal rights for women or reducing Iran’s international isolation, Iranians are more united than ever against the status quo.
Pezeshkian, a cardiologist with a mild demeanor and no record of scandal, benefited from a split in the hardliner vote between Jalili, who came in second with 9.4 million votes, and perennial presidential hopeful and parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Ahead of the elections, many Iran experts outside the country predicted that the election was engineered to give a victory to Qalibaf, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander and Tehran mayor. But Qalibaf attracted only 3.3 million votes.
Now on July 5, Iranians have a choice between radically different mindsets. Pezeshkian supports negotiations with the U.S. to try to obtain relief of economic sanctions, wants to lift internet restrictions and would ease enforcement of laws requiring mandatory veiling. Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator prone to lecturing his interlocutors, is more likely to withdraw from international deals and treaties such as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final say on such momentous decisions, Jalili would be amenable to building a nuclear weapon, enforcing a tightly controlled domestic intranet and cracking down on women wearing “bad hijab.” Pezeshkian would face pushback from the system in trying to pursue a more moderate agenda.
In a carefully worded statement, Qalibaf, who had tried to strike a pragmatic middle ground between Pezeshkian and Jalili, asked his voters to support Jalili for “the benefit of the Revolution Front.” The Revolution Front is a council consisting of conservative and hardline politicians and led by Mohsen Rezaei, a former long-time IRGC commander.
Qalibaf’s endorsement did not seem heartfelt but motivated by a desire to keep himself in the Iranian political game. Had he wanted to hand Jalili the presidency, he would have withdrawn in favor of him before the elections. This was the request of Rezaei and Esmaeil Qa’ani, current head of the elite IRGC Quds Force, who went so far as to fly from Tehran to Mashhad late on June 26 – the final day of campaigning –to try to bring unity to the hardline camp, as evident from a picture posted on X by one of Qalibaf’s advisors.
Ayatollah Khamenei, after casting his vote on June 28, told Iranian state television, “This (participation) is an essential need of the Islamic Republic. The word republic in the name ‘Islamic Republic’ indicates the presence of the people is a part of the foundation of this system. Therefore, the continuation of the Islamic Republic, the strength of the Islamic Republic, the dignity of the Islamic Republic, and the honor of the Islamic Republic in the world depend on the participation of the people.”
The record-low turnout amplified the very strong message that Iranian society has been trying to send to Khamenei at least since 2019 when economic protests over an increase in fuel prices turned extremely violent. In the 2021 presidential elections, only 48 percent of eligible voters participated and many of the ballots were blank or spoiled. Alienation only increased after the 2022 protests against enforced veiling.
The people of Iran have changed and no longer respond to empty promises. In addition, most eligible voters for this election were born in or after the 2000s and have less connection to the ideological upbringing promoted by the country’s educational system.
Jalili and Pezeshkian, who are in their late 50s and 60s, respectively, represent opposite poles of permitted political activity in the Islamic Republic. But the days when reformists like Mohammad Khatami or pragmatists like Hassan Rouhani could attract huge enthusiasm are long over. It is possible that loyalists who voted for Qalibaf will now move to Jalili. It is also possible that Pezeshkian can convince some of the 60 percent of Iranians who boycotted the first round to vote on Friday out of “Jalili-phobia.”
Ayatollah Khamenei would appear to favor Jalili, who would be most likely to continue the policies of the previous government. The Raisi administration “used the capacities of the country well,” Khamenei said before the vote. “If that administration had continued, I’d give it a high probability that most of the country’s problems, mainly economic problems, would have been solved.”
Yet, the people have spoken otherwise.
Saeed Azimi is a political journalist and commentator based in Tehran
Iran Elections: Record-Low Turnout Shows Even Regime Loyalists Are Unhappy
By Saeed Azimi
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: The Stimson Center is fortunate to have several writers based in Iran including this young journalist, Saeed Azimi. He covered the June 28 presidential election and has also written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign policy decisions.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Only 24 million of 61 million eligible Iranians voted on June 28 in snap presidential elections called after the untimely death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. The 39.9 percent turnout was the worst in the history of the Islamic Republic and reflected deep-seated unhappiness and uncertainty among Iranians about whether their votes could affect any change.
Economic woes, hijab crackdowns, internet restrictions, mismanagement, corruption, and negligence among high-level officials were seen as chief reasons for boycotting the elections. In addition, perhaps surprisingly for a country that calls itself an Islamic Republic, Iran’s religious community also appeared deeply dissatisfied with the status quo, judging from conversations this journalist had with many people.
Normally a low turnout has presaged a victory for a hardline candidate. However, a standard-bearer for Iran’s weakened reformist faction, parliament member Masoud Pezeshkian, won the largest number of votes though not the 50 percent required to avoid a run-off. Pezeshkian will now face ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili on July 5.
The fact that Pezeshkian took 10.4 million votes, 42.5 percent of those cast, sent a message to the leadership that even those loyal enough to participate believe that the system is in urgent need of major reform. Whether it be overhauling the economy, boosting social justice, equal rights for women or reducing Iran’s international isolation, Iranians are more united than ever against the status quo.
Pezeshkian, a cardiologist with a mild demeanor and no record of scandal, benefited from a split in the hardliner vote between Jalili, who came in second with 9.4 million votes, and perennial presidential hopeful and parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Ahead of the elections, many Iran experts outside the country predicted that the election was engineered to give a victory to Qalibaf, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander and Tehran mayor. But Qalibaf attracted only 3.3 million votes.
Now on July 5, Iranians have a choice between radically different mindsets. Pezeshkian supports negotiations with the U.S. to try to obtain relief of economic sanctions, wants to lift internet restrictions and would ease enforcement of laws requiring mandatory veiling. Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator prone to lecturing his interlocutors, is more likely to withdraw from international deals and treaties such as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final say on such momentous decisions, Jalili would be amenable to building a nuclear weapon, enforcing a tightly controlled domestic intranet and cracking down on women wearing “bad hijab.” Pezeshkian would face pushback from the system in trying to pursue a more moderate agenda.
In a carefully worded statement, Qalibaf, who had tried to strike a pragmatic middle ground between Pezeshkian and Jalili, asked his voters to support Jalili for “the benefit of the Revolution Front.” The Revolution Front is a council consisting of conservative and hardline politicians and led by Mohsen Rezaei, a former long-time IRGC commander.
Qalibaf’s endorsement did not seem heartfelt but motivated by a desire to keep himself in the Iranian political game. Had he wanted to hand Jalili the presidency, he would have withdrawn in favor of him before the elections. This was the request of Rezaei and Esmaeil Qa’ani, current head of the elite IRGC Quds Force, who went so far as to fly from Tehran to Mashhad late on June 26 – the final day of campaigning –to try to bring unity to the hardline camp, as evident from a picture posted on X by one of Qalibaf’s advisors.
Ayatollah Khamenei, after casting his vote on June 28, told Iranian state television, “This (participation) is an essential need of the Islamic Republic. The word republic in the name ‘Islamic Republic’ indicates the presence of the people is a part of the foundation of this system. Therefore, the continuation of the Islamic Republic, the strength of the Islamic Republic, the dignity of the Islamic Republic, and the honor of the Islamic Republic in the world depend on the participation of the people.”
The record-low turnout amplified the very strong message that Iranian society has been trying to send to Khamenei at least since 2019 when economic protests over an increase in fuel prices turned extremely violent. In the 2021 presidential elections, only 48 percent of eligible voters participated and many of the ballots were blank or spoiled. Alienation only increased after the 2022 protests against enforced veiling.
The people of Iran have changed and no longer respond to empty promises. In addition, most eligible voters for this election were born in or after the 2000s and have less connection to the ideological upbringing promoted by the country’s educational system.
Jalili and Pezeshkian, who are in their late 50s and 60s, respectively, represent opposite poles of permitted political activity in the Islamic Republic. But the days when reformists like Mohammad Khatami or pragmatists like Hassan Rouhani could attract huge enthusiasm are long over. It is possible that loyalists who voted for Qalibaf will now move to Jalili. It is also possible that Pezeshkian can convince some of the 60 percent of Iranians who boycotted the first round to vote on Friday out of “Jalili-phobia.”
Ayatollah Khamenei would appear to favor Jalili, who would be most likely to continue the policies of the previous government. The Raisi administration “used the capacities of the country well,” Khamenei said before the vote. “If that administration had continued, I’d give it a high probability that most of the country’s problems, mainly economic problems, would have been solved.”
Yet, the people have spoken otherwise.
Saeed Azimi is a political journalist and commentator based in Tehran
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