News of the imminent resumption of relations between the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China, surprised many. But both countries have strong domestic reasons to try to tamp down their enmities.
For Iran, this second bout of “heroic flexibility” is meant to reverse the system’s current trajectory: a race to the bottom. The announcement followed months of popular protests after the death in police custody of a young Kurdish girl, Mahsa Amini, as well as mounting economic problems that have led to record lows for the Iranian currency and record highs for inflation.
For the Saudis, meanwhile, the announcement carries the promise of mitigating the threat of Iranian expansionism with an end or at least an easing of Iranian military support for the Houthi rebels and a prolonged cease-fire so that drones and missiles will not start falling on Saudi Arabia again from Yemen.
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia were U.S. allies before the 1979 Islamic revolution. However, Tehran’s dynamism in the region triggered the concerns of Riyadh. Even in 1971, when the Shah used force to seize three strategically placed islands at the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz, his display of aggressive activism increased anxieties in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were suspicious of the Shah’s motives, fearing that he might bring the entire Persian Gulf under Iranian control.
The first serious Iran-Saudi confrontation after the revolution took place in 1987, when Iranian pilgrims staged a march dubbed the ”Disavowal of the Pagans” in the holy city of Mecca. Clashes between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces killed hundreds of Iranians. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, at the time the Supreme Leader of Iran, accused Saudi leaders in a long statement of being “traitors to the holy shrines” and “puppets and servants of America.”
Hostilities gradually decreased after Khomeini’s death in 1989. In December 1997, after the election of reformist Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, then-Crown Prince Abdullah attended a summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Tehran. In March 1998, Khatami’s predecessor, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, met with King Fahd during a visit to Saudi Arabia. These contacts led to agreements negotiated by then-national security advisor (and future president) Hassan Rouhani on economic cooperation and a mutual security pact.
However, after the U.S. invaded Iraq and ousted the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the road was paved for the Iranian government to create a corridor to the west and the Mediterranean. The civil war in Syria that broke out during the 2011 Arab Spring led to the direct intervention of the Iranian government, which sought to protect the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This increased Iranian influence in Syria and facilitated access to the Mediterranean and finally to Lebanon, where Hezbollah, a close ally of the Islamic Republic, is a significant political and military player.
As Iranian influence in the region grew, Saudi Arabia, now effectively ruled by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, gradually took a more aggressive position. In 2015, the Saudis attacked Yemen to suppress Houthi rebels who practice a branch of Shia Islam rather than Sunni Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia’s dominant faith (an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran). Iran began to support the Houthis and increased its presence in Yemen.
Saudi-Iran relations broke in early 2016 after Riyadh executed the Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, who had studied in Iranian seminaries from 1979 to 1994. Iranian ultra-conservatives torched the Saudi embassy in Tehran in retaliation. Ensuing attacks on Saudi facilities by Houthi rebels using Iranian drones and missiles raised hostility to a new level.
Shiites in Saudi Arabia constitute between 10 and 15 percent of the country’s population and are the dominant population in the Eastern Province, site of Al Ghawar, the world’s largest oil reservoir. Due to Iranian efforts to expand its strategic depth and export the revolution, the Saudis worry about renewed unrest among its Shiite minority and the threat that could pose to the Kingdom’s lifeline.
At the same time, Iran has faced two major crises.
First: the protests following the death of Amini, which lasted some 100 days and drew far-reaching international attention and support. Iranian security, military, and law enforcement suppressed the protests at the cost of more than 500 lives, but serious questions were raised about the legitimacy and longevity of the system. A London-based satellite channel, Iran International, played a significant role in encouraging the protests. Despite denials by the channel, it is reported that “individuals connected to the Saudi royal court fund and helped launch” Iran International.
The Iranian government accuses the network of implementing Saudi policy, noting that bin Salman once said, “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.” In November 2022, at the peak of the protests, Hossein Salami, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), issued an ultimatum: “I warn the Al Saud regime, which has propaganda media that only promote mischief and are openly seeking to provoke our youth, to be careful with your behavior and control these media.”
Since the announcement of the Iran-Saudi deal, the network remains critical of the Iranian government but has significantly toned down its coverage.
The second crisis Iran faces is the ever-decreasing value of the rial, the national currency. It is 55% weaker than a year before, due to U.S. sanctions—a function of Iran’s failure to revive the 2015 nuclear deal—and political instability resulting from the protests. The devaluation has had an undeniable effect on inflation, especially for food. In January 2023, year over year inflation for food was officially announced at 70%, while it is an open secret that the real figure is likely much higher. In such circumstances another explosion of protests is likely.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has acknowledged the dire situation and said, “We are facing problems both in the field of the value of the national currency and of inflation and high prices. All possible ways to solve these economic problems have to be used.”
These economic woes motivate Iran to seek détente with other countries in the region and defuse tensions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran has promised to improve cooperation and monitoring of its rapidly expanding nuclear program. Rafael Grossi, the IAEA director, said on April 1 that “We are starting with the installment of cameras. We are starting with the reconnection of some online monitoring systems. … We are regaining the visibility that we have had lost.” It remains to be seen whether Iran will revive the nuclear deal, which could unlock billions in frozen assets, or opt for a smaller deal—perhaps over the release of three U.S. dual nationals—which would provide more limited sanctions relief.
However, any comprehensive agreement between the Islamic Republic and the United States is unstable. Since the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Khamenei has forbidden direct talks with the U.S. Hard-liners led by Khamenei consider enmity with America a justification of their existence and identity. Reconciliation would mean the end of the revolution and no need for a “supreme leader” or an IRGC to guard the revolution; thus, hard-liners become irrelevant. Indeed, the IRGC emphasizes that the U.S.-Iran conflict is “fundamental, ideological, and existential and cannot be resolved through negotiations.”
The announcement of Iran-Saudi reconciliation and cooperation with the IAEA are in the framework of a new strategy which reflects an understanding that it is not possible to fight internally with your own people and international community at the same time. But will this strategy be fully implemented?
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and the U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.
The Domestic Factors Driving Iran-Saudi Reconciliation
By Shahir Shahidsaless
In Middle East & North Africa
News of the imminent resumption of relations between the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China, surprised many. But both countries have strong domestic reasons to try to tamp down their enmities.
For Iran, this second bout of “heroic flexibility” is meant to reverse the system’s current trajectory: a race to the bottom. The announcement followed months of popular protests after the death in police custody of a young Kurdish girl, Mahsa Amini, as well as mounting economic problems that have led to record lows for the Iranian currency and record highs for inflation.
For the Saudis, meanwhile, the announcement carries the promise of mitigating the threat of Iranian expansionism with an end or at least an easing of Iranian military support for the Houthi rebels and a prolonged cease-fire so that drones and missiles will not start falling on Saudi Arabia again from Yemen.
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia were U.S. allies before the 1979 Islamic revolution. However, Tehran’s dynamism in the region triggered the concerns of Riyadh. Even in 1971, when the Shah used force to seize three strategically placed islands at the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz, his display of aggressive activism increased anxieties in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were suspicious of the Shah’s motives, fearing that he might bring the entire Persian Gulf under Iranian control.
The first serious Iran-Saudi confrontation after the revolution took place in 1987, when Iranian pilgrims staged a march dubbed the ”Disavowal of the Pagans” in the holy city of Mecca. Clashes between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces killed hundreds of Iranians. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, at the time the Supreme Leader of Iran, accused Saudi leaders in a long statement of being “traitors to the holy shrines” and “puppets and servants of America.”
Hostilities gradually decreased after Khomeini’s death in 1989. In December 1997, after the election of reformist Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, then-Crown Prince Abdullah attended a summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Tehran. In March 1998, Khatami’s predecessor, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, met with King Fahd during a visit to Saudi Arabia. These contacts led to agreements negotiated by then-national security advisor (and future president) Hassan Rouhani on economic cooperation and a mutual security pact.
However, after the U.S. invaded Iraq and ousted the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the road was paved for the Iranian government to create a corridor to the west and the Mediterranean. The civil war in Syria that broke out during the 2011 Arab Spring led to the direct intervention of the Iranian government, which sought to protect the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This increased Iranian influence in Syria and facilitated access to the Mediterranean and finally to Lebanon, where Hezbollah, a close ally of the Islamic Republic, is a significant political and military player.
As Iranian influence in the region grew, Saudi Arabia, now effectively ruled by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, gradually took a more aggressive position. In 2015, the Saudis attacked Yemen to suppress Houthi rebels who practice a branch of Shia Islam rather than Sunni Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia’s dominant faith (an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran). Iran began to support the Houthis and increased its presence in Yemen.
Saudi-Iran relations broke in early 2016 after Riyadh executed the Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, who had studied in Iranian seminaries from 1979 to 1994. Iranian ultra-conservatives torched the Saudi embassy in Tehran in retaliation. Ensuing attacks on Saudi facilities by Houthi rebels using Iranian drones and missiles raised hostility to a new level.
Shiites in Saudi Arabia constitute between 10 and 15 percent of the country’s population and are the dominant population in the Eastern Province, site of Al Ghawar, the world’s largest oil reservoir. Due to Iranian efforts to expand its strategic depth and export the revolution, the Saudis worry about renewed unrest among its Shiite minority and the threat that could pose to the Kingdom’s lifeline.
At the same time, Iran has faced two major crises.
First: the protests following the death of Amini, which lasted some 100 days and drew far-reaching international attention and support. Iranian security, military, and law enforcement suppressed the protests at the cost of more than 500 lives, but serious questions were raised about the legitimacy and longevity of the system. A London-based satellite channel, Iran International, played a significant role in encouraging the protests. Despite denials by the channel, it is reported that “individuals connected to the Saudi royal court fund and helped launch” Iran International.
The Iranian government accuses the network of implementing Saudi policy, noting that bin Salman once said, “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.” In November 2022, at the peak of the protests, Hossein Salami, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), issued an ultimatum: “I warn the Al Saud regime, which has propaganda media that only promote mischief and are openly seeking to provoke our youth, to be careful with your behavior and control these media.”
Since the announcement of the Iran-Saudi deal, the network remains critical of the Iranian government but has significantly toned down its coverage.
The second crisis Iran faces is the ever-decreasing value of the rial, the national currency. It is 55% weaker than a year before, due to U.S. sanctions—a function of Iran’s failure to revive the 2015 nuclear deal—and political instability resulting from the protests. The devaluation has had an undeniable effect on inflation, especially for food. In January 2023, year over year inflation for food was officially announced at 70%, while it is an open secret that the real figure is likely much higher. In such circumstances another explosion of protests is likely.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has acknowledged the dire situation and said, “We are facing problems both in the field of the value of the national currency and of inflation and high prices. All possible ways to solve these economic problems have to be used.”
These economic woes motivate Iran to seek détente with other countries in the region and defuse tensions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran has promised to improve cooperation and monitoring of its rapidly expanding nuclear program. Rafael Grossi, the IAEA director, said on April 1 that “We are starting with the installment of cameras. We are starting with the reconnection of some online monitoring systems. … We are regaining the visibility that we have had lost.” It remains to be seen whether Iran will revive the nuclear deal, which could unlock billions in frozen assets, or opt for a smaller deal—perhaps over the release of three U.S. dual nationals—which would provide more limited sanctions relief.
However, any comprehensive agreement between the Islamic Republic and the United States is unstable. Since the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Khamenei has forbidden direct talks with the U.S. Hard-liners led by Khamenei consider enmity with America a justification of their existence and identity. Reconciliation would mean the end of the revolution and no need for a “supreme leader” or an IRGC to guard the revolution; thus, hard-liners become irrelevant. Indeed, the IRGC emphasizes that the U.S.-Iran conflict is “fundamental, ideological, and existential and cannot be resolved through negotiations.”
The announcement of Iran-Saudi reconciliation and cooperation with the IAEA are in the framework of a new strategy which reflects an understanding that it is not possible to fight internally with your own people and international community at the same time. But will this strategy be fully implemented?
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and the U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.
Recent & Related