Editor’s Note: Rebecca Synder is a young expert in the Global Governance Innovation Network. This commentary is part of the GGIN’s Next Generation Experts series in an effort to elevate youth research and writing.
This commentary is based on a report titled “An Assessment of the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Action in Light of UNSC Resolution 2664,” written by Rebecca Snyder, Irene Abarca, and Hannah Kim under the mentorship of Richard Towle and Peter Hoffman. Opinions and recommendations based on independent research and interviews with UN officials, humanitarian actors and agencies, and academics.
By Nudhara Yusuf, Executive Coordinator, Global Governance Innovation Network
Sanctions are intended to punish those causing harm, but instead, they often hurt civilians and stifle humanitarian aid. By creating a hostile environment for the private sector, sanctions limit access to essential resources and severely disrupt the delivery of aid to those in need. To combat this, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2664 in December 2022. The resolution permits exceptions for humanitarian aid in all UN sanctions, marking a significant step forward after years of advocacy by humanitarian groups, human rights organizations, and civil society to uphold the protection of populations under international law. Though the resolution has enabled better access to humanitarian aid in sanctioned countries, failure to address structural issues means limits persist. Until the international community confronts structural issues, like the chilling effect on the private sector, the complexities of overlapping sanctions, and a lack of a unified compliance framework–sanctions, despite their intent, will remain an obstacle to peace and humanitarian aid.
Sanctions were intended as an alternative to military action, becoming the go-to response to threats to international peace and security. Sanctioning countries argue that they are a tool to enforce international norms. Sanctioned countries claim that unilateral sanctions (referred to as unilateral coercive measures) are a tool of economic warfare that infringe on state sovereignty and non-intervention in the affairs of another state. The debate has prompted a shift in the practice from comprehensive sanctions (blocking most transactions with a country) to targeted or “smart” sanctions (focused on specific individuals or industries). However, “smart” sanctions have become comprehensive by targeting industries that comprise a significant portion of a country’s economy. Whether comprehensive or targeted, sanctions have impacted civilians by contributing to the collapse of domestic economies, devaluation of currencies, hyperinflation, and development obstacles. These unintended consequences have led many to critique sanctions on how they limit the enjoyment of human rights, with the UN creating a Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.
Before Resolution 2664, there were no permanent exemptions in UN sanctions. Humanitarian groups requested exemptions on a case-by-case basis to allow certain activities and goods to be excluded for humanitarian purposes. This process drained time, resources, and expertise, often causing delays in responding to emergencies. Even when exemptions were granted, sanctions rarely considered the unavoidable direct or indirect payments to sanctioned entities that are crucial for providing aid, especially in conflict zones or cases of state capture.
Resolution 2664 standardized humanitarian exemptions across all 14 active UNSC sanctions regimes, binding to all UN Member States. This resolution was much-needed for humanitarian organizations, providing predictability and operational comfort. While the resolution applies strictly to UN asset freeze measures, many countries, especially the U.S. and in the EU– two of the world’s biggest sanctioning powers–have quickly adopted key aspects into their unilateral sanctions.
The rise in unilateral sanctions poses a serious challenge to UNSC resolutions regarding sanctions. After all, the UNSC is supposed to hold the exclusive right to impose sanctions, and by bypassing the Council, unilateral sanctions undermine its authority and effectiveness. Worse, the growing divide between sanctioning states, who view unilateral sanctions as “restrictive measures,” and sanctioned states, who see them as “unilateral coercive measures,” further complicates the conversation.
Actors have expressed that the main roadblock to delivering humanitarian aid in sanctioned countries isn’t the sanctions themselves, it’s the chilling effect they create. The private sector has taken to de-risk by withdrawing from sanctioned contexts entirely, leaving humanitarian agencies without suppliers. Many aid agencies, overwhelmed by the legal complexity of sanctions, overcomply and pull out altogether, often citing a lack of resources and expertise. De-risking and overcompliance stem from liberal versus conservative interpretations of sanctions, driven by fear of fines and punishment from unilateral and multilateral sanctioning entities without established standards.
The chilling caused by de-risking and overcompliance impede the flow of humanitarian aid, even when allowed under Resolution 2664. The fear of violating vague and overlapping sanctions have stopped businesses from selling essential goods and materials. Deliveries are often delayed, and local salaries are difficult to pay because financial restrictions cause banks to stop operating. Banks and private businesses are risk-averse towards sanctions since they prioritize profitability and lack incentives to operate in high-risk areas. This disengagement creates significant obstacles for the humanitarian sector.
The extension of protection under Resolution 2664 to the UN 1267 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime in December 2024 is a crucial win for the humanitarian community which feared that without it, their ability to operate would be severely restricted, especially given the tense geopolitical climate surrounding the protection of humanitarian work. Despite its support, challenges to the effectiveness of Resolution 2664 remain. Multi-stakeholder dialogues that engage all actors impacted by sanctions–at both national and multilateral levels–could foster trust, provide clearer regulatory guidance, and improve the effectiveness of aid. These conversations could also encourage Member States who have been slow or resistant to implementing Resolution 2664 in their domestic legislation. One of the most urgent needs is the creation of a standardized list of protected actors and activities. Such a list, accessible to all relevant actors, would be beneficial in cutting through the confusion of overlapping sanctions regimes. With clear guidelines and coordinated efforts, we can stop sanctions from becoming a barrier by reducing de-risking and overcompliance. Moreover, expanding the scope of humanitarian activity for exemptions and introducing sunset and review clauses on sanctions would provide better protections and enable proper transition out of their prolonged negative effects.
While UNSC Resolution 2664 has made strides in improving humanitarian access in sanctioned contexts, its impact remains hindered by unilateral sanctions and the private sector’s risk-averse behavior. Despite exemptions, sanctions’ chilling effect on businesses–who are hesitant to engage in sanctioned contexts–remains a barrier to effective aid delivery. Unlocking Resolution 2664’s potential requires more than a framework for exemptions: multi-stakeholder dialogues, streamlined compliance, and broader scope of protected humanitarian activities are essential. Ultimately, to prevent sanctions from disproportionately harming civilians, there must be more targeted, transparent, and time-bound policies that prioritize human rights and minimize human suffering. Without these changes, sanctions will continue to punish the wrong people and leave civilians to bear the consequences.
International & Regional Organizations, International & Regional Organizations
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Editor’s Note: Rebecca Synder is a young expert in the Global Governance Innovation Network. This commentary is part of the GGIN’s Next Generation Experts series in an effort to elevate youth research and writing.
This commentary is based on a report titled “An Assessment of the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Action in Light of UNSC Resolution 2664,” written by Rebecca Snyder, Irene Abarca, and Hannah Kim under the mentorship of Richard Towle and Peter Hoffman. Opinions and recommendations based on independent research and interviews with UN officials, humanitarian actors and agencies, and academics.
By Nudhara Yusuf, Executive Coordinator, Global Governance Innovation Network
Sanctions are intended to punish those causing harm, but instead, they often hurt civilians and stifle humanitarian aid. By creating a hostile environment for the private sector, sanctions limit access to essential resources and severely disrupt the delivery of aid to those in need. To combat this, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2664 in December 2022. The resolution permits exceptions for humanitarian aid in all UN sanctions, marking a significant step forward after years of advocacy by humanitarian groups, human rights organizations, and civil society to uphold the protection of populations under international law. Though the resolution has enabled better access to humanitarian aid in sanctioned countries, failure to address structural issues means limits persist. Until the international community confronts structural issues, like the chilling effect on the private sector, the complexities of overlapping sanctions, and a lack of a unified compliance framework–sanctions, despite their intent, will remain an obstacle to peace and humanitarian aid.
Sanctions were intended as an alternative to military action, becoming the go-to response to threats to international peace and security. Sanctioning countries argue that they are a tool to enforce international norms. Sanctioned countries claim that unilateral sanctions (referred to as unilateral coercive measures) are a tool of economic warfare that infringe on state sovereignty and non-intervention in the affairs of another state. The debate has prompted a shift in the practice from comprehensive sanctions (blocking most transactions with a country) to targeted or “smart” sanctions (focused on specific individuals or industries). However, “smart” sanctions have become comprehensive by targeting industries that comprise a significant portion of a country’s economy. Whether comprehensive or targeted, sanctions have impacted civilians by contributing to the collapse of domestic economies, devaluation of currencies, hyperinflation, and development obstacles. These unintended consequences have led many to critique sanctions on how they limit the enjoyment of human rights, with the UN creating a Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.
Before Resolution 2664, there were no permanent exemptions in UN sanctions. Humanitarian groups requested exemptions on a case-by-case basis to allow certain activities and goods to be excluded for humanitarian purposes. This process drained time, resources, and expertise, often causing delays in responding to emergencies. Even when exemptions were granted, sanctions rarely considered the unavoidable direct or indirect payments to sanctioned entities that are crucial for providing aid, especially in conflict zones or cases of state capture.
Resolution 2664 standardized humanitarian exemptions across all 14 active UNSC sanctions regimes, binding to all UN Member States. This resolution was much-needed for humanitarian organizations, providing predictability and operational comfort. While the resolution applies strictly to UN asset freeze measures, many countries, especially the U.S. and in the EU– two of the world’s biggest sanctioning powers–have quickly adopted key aspects into their unilateral sanctions.
The rise in unilateral sanctions poses a serious challenge to UNSC resolutions regarding sanctions. After all, the UNSC is supposed to hold the exclusive right to impose sanctions, and by bypassing the Council, unilateral sanctions undermine its authority and effectiveness. Worse, the growing divide between sanctioning states, who view unilateral sanctions as “restrictive measures,” and sanctioned states, who see them as “unilateral coercive measures,” further complicates the conversation.
Actors have expressed that the main roadblock to delivering humanitarian aid in sanctioned countries isn’t the sanctions themselves, it’s the chilling effect they create. The private sector has taken to de-risk by withdrawing from sanctioned contexts entirely, leaving humanitarian agencies without suppliers. Many aid agencies, overwhelmed by the legal complexity of sanctions, overcomply and pull out altogether, often citing a lack of resources and expertise. De-risking and overcompliance stem from liberal versus conservative interpretations of sanctions, driven by fear of fines and punishment from unilateral and multilateral sanctioning entities without established standards.
The chilling caused by de-risking and overcompliance impede the flow of humanitarian aid, even when allowed under Resolution 2664. The fear of violating vague and overlapping sanctions have stopped businesses from selling essential goods and materials. Deliveries are often delayed, and local salaries are difficult to pay because financial restrictions cause banks to stop operating. Banks and private businesses are risk-averse towards sanctions since they prioritize profitability and lack incentives to operate in high-risk areas. This disengagement creates significant obstacles for the humanitarian sector.
The extension of protection under Resolution 2664 to the UN 1267 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime in December 2024 is a crucial win for the humanitarian community which feared that without it, their ability to operate would be severely restricted, especially given the tense geopolitical climate surrounding the protection of humanitarian work. Despite its support, challenges to the effectiveness of Resolution 2664 remain. Multi-stakeholder dialogues that engage all actors impacted by sanctions–at both national and multilateral levels–could foster trust, provide clearer regulatory guidance, and improve the effectiveness of aid. These conversations could also encourage Member States who have been slow or resistant to implementing Resolution 2664 in their domestic legislation. One of the most urgent needs is the creation of a standardized list of protected actors and activities. Such a list, accessible to all relevant actors, would be beneficial in cutting through the confusion of overlapping sanctions regimes. With clear guidelines and coordinated efforts, we can stop sanctions from becoming a barrier by reducing de-risking and overcompliance. Moreover, expanding the scope of humanitarian activity for exemptions and introducing sunset and review clauses on sanctions would provide better protections and enable proper transition out of their prolonged negative effects.
While UNSC Resolution 2664 has made strides in improving humanitarian access in sanctioned contexts, its impact remains hindered by unilateral sanctions and the private sector’s risk-averse behavior. Despite exemptions, sanctions’ chilling effect on businesses–who are hesitant to engage in sanctioned contexts–remains a barrier to effective aid delivery. Unlocking Resolution 2664’s potential requires more than a framework for exemptions: multi-stakeholder dialogues, streamlined compliance, and broader scope of protected humanitarian activities are essential. Ultimately, to prevent sanctions from disproportionately harming civilians, there must be more targeted, transparent, and time-bound policies that prioritize human rights and minimize human suffering. Without these changes, sanctions will continue to punish the wrong people and leave civilians to bear the consequences.
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