International Nuclear Forensics Regime

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The transfer of nuclear weapons materials from emerging nuclear states
constitutes a grave threat to U.S. national security as well as global
peace and stability.  To address this threat, Daniel H. Chivers and Jonathan S. Snider from
the University of California discussed options for accelerated national
and international efforts to develop nuclear forensic capabilities to
attribute interdicted and post-detonation nuclear material samples to
their source. Will an international nuclear forensics regime strengthen
deterrence?  How can the US establish a credible retaliatory threat
while increasing incentives for states to upgrade the physical security
of their nuclear materials?  Is this consistent with UNSC Resolution
1540 and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material?

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