Editor’s Note: The Stimson Center is fortunate to have several writers based in Iran including this young journalist, Saeed Azimi. He covered the June 28 presidential election and has also written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign policy decisions.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Iran witnessed a rare scene on July 31, hours after its new President Masoud Pezeshkian was inaugurated. Ismail Haniyeh, political leader of the Palestinian Hamas movement, was assassinated in a government guest house in Tehran.
Although Israel never officially claimed responsibility for the targeted assassination, Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet were widely considered responsible for a brazen act that undermined Iran’s security and deterrence and put the Middle East at risk of an even wider war.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed revenge for the killing. Initial reports suggested that Tehran had prepared an ambitious offensive plan to target Israel, as well as a defensive plan, should Israel retaliate for the retaliation. One U.S. website even suggested that Iran’s response would come this week before new Gaza ceasefire talks scheduled for August 15.
However, the situation appears to have calmed down. While commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) constantly repeat vows of revenge, nothing has yet happened. This begs the question: Is Iran going to respond militarily to Haniyeh’s killing and violation of its territorial integrity?
The answer is yes, but the response is not likely to be a large-scale military operation, though perhaps similar to the telegraphed barrage of missiles and drones Iran unleashed in April after Israel killed seven IRGC officers in an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus. With the region already in turmoil after 10 months of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias and Americans in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis against a variety of targets, an even wider war is the last thing the “Axis of Resistance” wants.
After Iran vowed revenge, a number of top diplomats and even heads of state sent de-escalatory messages to Tehran. French President Emmanuel Macron spoke to his newly elected counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on Aug. 7, urging restraint. Similarly, the U.S. sent several messages to Iran via a hotline established by Oman after the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas. The messages asked Tehran to refrain from launching an all-out war that could cause even more destruction to the Middle East, diplomatic sources speaking on condition of anonymity told this author.
Iran is now weighing two options. The first is a calculated, calibrated military response similar to the April 13 attacks on Israel, which caused no fatalities. The second option is to foreswear a military response in favor of a permanent ceasefire established in Gaza and a return to negotiations intended to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The bellicose rhetoric, however, will stay the same. Iranian officials will continue to threaten “revenge at the right place and time,” but mostly as a psychological operation intended to keep Israelis on edge.
Iran’s real intentions were evident in a statement issued by its UN mission on Aug. 9.
“Our priority is to establish a lasting ceasefire in Gaza; any agreement accepted by Hamas will also be recognized by us,” the statement said. “The Israeli regime has violated our national security and sovereignty through its recent act of terrorism. We have the legitimate right to self-defense—a matter totally unrelated to the Gaza ceasefire. However, we hope that our response will be timed and conducted in a manner not to the detriment of the potential ceasefire.”
The statement also noted that “direct and intermediary official channels to exchange messages have always existed between Iran and the United States, the details of which both parties prefer to remain untold.”
Meanwhile, Tehran’s strategic allies China and Russia have been busy urging Iran to forswear a large-scale military response. On Aug. 12, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke to his outgoing Iranian counterpart Ali Bagheri Kani, saying that “China supports Iran’s legal efforts to defend its sovereignty, security and national dignity.”
The top Chinese diplomat, added, however, that his country “is willing to maintain close communications with Iran in order to preserve peace and stability in the region.”
At the same time, Russia is also signaling a desire for de-escalation, according to Nicole Grajewski, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and PhD from Oxford University.
During a visit to Tehran on Aug. 5 by Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, Shoigu delivered a message from Russian leader Vladimir Putin to Ayatollah Khamenei, asking him to avoid civilian casualties, should Iran hit Israel.
“Russia would likely urge de-escalation,” Grajewksi told this author. “Russia’s main concern is the stability of Syria at the moment; any spillover would be disadvantageous for Moscow’s effort to rebuild the country,” she said.
According to Grajewski, Russians also do not want to “inflame Iran since they are dependent on them for [arms supplies for] the war in Ukraine.” “Russia,” she added, “won’t have any direct involvement in hostilities. In essence, a war is not in Russia’s interests.”
Considering that Lebanon’s economy has long been teetering, Lebanese officials, citizens, and even Hezbollah are also not looking for a larger-scale war. Therefore, it seems likely that Iranian officials would be able to convince Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to skip a large retaliatory response for the assassination of his right-hand commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut the day before Haniyeh was killed in Tehran.
In any event, Iran seeks a diplomatic win, and may save face via a calibrated response with minimal damage to infrastructure, should wise men in power prevail.
Saeed Azimi is a Tehran-based political journalist and commentator.
Diplomacy is Iran’s Preferred Response to Haniyeh’s Killing
By Saeed Azimi
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: The Stimson Center is fortunate to have several writers based in Iran including this young journalist, Saeed Azimi. He covered the June 28 presidential election and has also written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign policy decisions.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Iran witnessed a rare scene on July 31, hours after its new President Masoud Pezeshkian was inaugurated. Ismail Haniyeh, political leader of the Palestinian Hamas movement, was assassinated in a government guest house in Tehran.
Although Israel never officially claimed responsibility for the targeted assassination, Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet were widely considered responsible for a brazen act that undermined Iran’s security and deterrence and put the Middle East at risk of an even wider war.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed revenge for the killing. Initial reports suggested that Tehran had prepared an ambitious offensive plan to target Israel, as well as a defensive plan, should Israel retaliate for the retaliation. One U.S. website even suggested that Iran’s response would come this week before new Gaza ceasefire talks scheduled for August 15.
However, the situation appears to have calmed down. While commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) constantly repeat vows of revenge, nothing has yet happened. This begs the question: Is Iran going to respond militarily to Haniyeh’s killing and violation of its territorial integrity?
The answer is yes, but the response is not likely to be a large-scale military operation, though perhaps similar to the telegraphed barrage of missiles and drones Iran unleashed in April after Israel killed seven IRGC officers in an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus. With the region already in turmoil after 10 months of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias and Americans in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis against a variety of targets, an even wider war is the last thing the “Axis of Resistance” wants.
After Iran vowed revenge, a number of top diplomats and even heads of state sent de-escalatory messages to Tehran. French President Emmanuel Macron spoke to his newly elected counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on Aug. 7, urging restraint. Similarly, the U.S. sent several messages to Iran via a hotline established by Oman after the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas. The messages asked Tehran to refrain from launching an all-out war that could cause even more destruction to the Middle East, diplomatic sources speaking on condition of anonymity told this author.
Iran is now weighing two options. The first is a calculated, calibrated military response similar to the April 13 attacks on Israel, which caused no fatalities. The second option is to foreswear a military response in favor of a permanent ceasefire established in Gaza and a return to negotiations intended to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The bellicose rhetoric, however, will stay the same. Iranian officials will continue to threaten “revenge at the right place and time,” but mostly as a psychological operation intended to keep Israelis on edge.
Iran’s real intentions were evident in a statement issued by its UN mission on Aug. 9.
“Our priority is to establish a lasting ceasefire in Gaza; any agreement accepted by Hamas will also be recognized by us,” the statement said. “The Israeli regime has violated our national security and sovereignty through its recent act of terrorism. We have the legitimate right to self-defense—a matter totally unrelated to the Gaza ceasefire. However, we hope that our response will be timed and conducted in a manner not to the detriment of the potential ceasefire.”
The statement also noted that “direct and intermediary official channels to exchange messages have always existed between Iran and the United States, the details of which both parties prefer to remain untold.”
Meanwhile, Tehran’s strategic allies China and Russia have been busy urging Iran to forswear a large-scale military response. On Aug. 12, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke to his outgoing Iranian counterpart Ali Bagheri Kani, saying that “China supports Iran’s legal efforts to defend its sovereignty, security and national dignity.”
The top Chinese diplomat, added, however, that his country “is willing to maintain close communications with Iran in order to preserve peace and stability in the region.”
At the same time, Russia is also signaling a desire for de-escalation, according to Nicole Grajewski, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and PhD from Oxford University.
During a visit to Tehran on Aug. 5 by Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, Shoigu delivered a message from Russian leader Vladimir Putin to Ayatollah Khamenei, asking him to avoid civilian casualties, should Iran hit Israel.
“Russia would likely urge de-escalation,” Grajewksi told this author. “Russia’s main concern is the stability of Syria at the moment; any spillover would be disadvantageous for Moscow’s effort to rebuild the country,” she said.
According to Grajewski, Russians also do not want to “inflame Iran since they are dependent on them for [arms supplies for] the war in Ukraine.” “Russia,” she added, “won’t have any direct involvement in hostilities. In essence, a war is not in Russia’s interests.”
Considering that Lebanon’s economy has long been teetering, Lebanese officials, citizens, and even Hezbollah are also not looking for a larger-scale war. Therefore, it seems likely that Iranian officials would be able to convince Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to skip a large retaliatory response for the assassination of his right-hand commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut the day before Haniyeh was killed in Tehran.
In any event, Iran seeks a diplomatic win, and may save face via a calibrated response with minimal damage to infrastructure, should wise men in power prevail.
Saeed Azimi is a Tehran-based political journalist and commentator.
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