In the late hours of Saturday, April 13, the sounds of drones flying overhead startled residents of Tehran just as they were ready to go to sleep. Iran had begun a long overdue punitive operation against the “malicious Zionist regime,” as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had vowed during the Eid al-Fitr prayers on April 10.
Iran’s operation against Israel was not unprovoked. On April 1, Israel attacked the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus with F-35s, killing seven officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as six Syrians and a major Hezbollah official. Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Zahedi, former IRGC Ground Forces Commander and head of the Lebanon-Syria Unit of the external branch of the IRGC, the Quds Force, was the top official killed in the Israeli airstrike.
The loss of Zahedi, who was the right hand of IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qa’ani, was heavy for Tehran to bear. Many Iranians immediately thought back to Jan. 3, 2020, when the U.S., under President Donald Trump, killed the then long-time commander of the Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, in a drone strike in Baghdad that also killed a senior leader of Iraqi militias. Iran retaliated then with a barrage of ballistic missiles against an Iraqi base where Americans were located but warned Iraq in advance so the Americans could take cover; still more than 100 suffered brain injuries.
Immediately after Israel struck Iran’s diplomatic compound in Syria, Tehran expressed a strongly worded condemnation, followed by a vow of revenge based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which gives Iran “an inherent right to self-defence.”
Iran summoned the charge d’affaires of the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Tehran, at midnight on April 2 to convey Tehran’s anger over the Israeli airstrike. According to the well-informed sources who spoke to this reporter, Iran conveyed the message to the U.S. that a response was imminent, and that it should stay away and not engage in further escalation.
What followed was ten days of pleas and gatherings of hardliners and supporters of the Islamic Republic to respond to Israel for attacking an Iranian diplomatic mission. People in various cities of Iran, even in Tehran, gathered to condemn the Israeli airstrike that killed the IRGC personnel.
Calls from Iranian hardliners to rush to the aid of Palestinians also intensified. As pressure was mounting on Khamenei to react and even send a convoy of Iranian forces to Gaza to fight Israel, the Iranian Leader met a group of university students on April 7. During the meeting, as is customary, a number of students from various factions stated their expectations from the Leader. A member of the Basij, a paramilitary youth group created during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war to fight Iraq, got up and begged Khamenei to let the Basij forces go to Gaza.
“This dear young person said: ‘Send us to Palestine,’ well, this is one thing; Be sure that if we could send the youths to Palestine, it would have been done before you said it,” Khamenei responded.
Khamenei has shown no willingness for Iranians to enter the Gaza war. From the very beginning of the conflict, he denied any Iranian involvement in the planning and execution of the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas, which killed over 1,000 Israelis and led to a massive Israeli retaliation that has now killed more than 33,000 people, most of them Palestinian civilians, and threatened to expand regionally.
The vow for revenge for the April 1 killings of the Iranian officers, however, was a different story. Much like after the Soleimani assassination, the Leader’s position could have been in great jeopardy had he decided not to respond.
The Iranian foreign ministry and armed forces began cooperating closely in the ensuing days to devise a plan that would satisfy the hardliners in Iran but would not enter Iran in a full-fledged war with Israel and the U.S. Iran sent several messages to Washington indicating that it would retaliate, but in a contained manner. In response, Washington assured Tehran that it had no desire to go to war with Iran.
According to sources who spoke to this reporter, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was an important intermediary. He spoke to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on April 11 and then conveyed the U.S. message to his Iranian counterpart, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.
Amir-Abdollahian asked Fidan not to allow attacks on Iran from U.S. bases in Turkey, to which Fidan responded positively, according to the sources. Amir-Abdollahian also issued a warning to that effect on the social media site X posted at 23:22 pm, local Tehran time, on April 13, just 30 minutes before Iran started its operation.
Iran choreographed what appears to have been the largest drone strike in history aiming at the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Israeli F-35s overflew in striking Iran’s diplomatic mission in Syria, and the Nevatim airbase, from which the F-35s had taken off. Iran’s foreign minister confirmed on April 14 that the airbase Iran hit was the one that Israel used to strike the Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria.
He also confirmed that the U.S. and neighboring countries were kept in the loop and that the predominant use of slow-moving, unmanned Shahed-238 drones indicated that Tehran had calculated and possibly even coordinated its operation with the U.S.
If there is a silver lining in the attacks, it was that close contacts between Iran and the U.S. were maintained to try to avoid a further escalation. The question remains whether the U.S. will be able to convince the Israelis that this episode is now closed and whether the U.S.-Iran channels used in the run-up to the Iranian attack can remain open and active.
Saeed Azimi is a political journalist based in Tehran. Find him on Twitter at @saeedazimi1772.
Iran’s “Limited Response” Pleases Hardliners and Used Channels with the US
By Saeed Azimi
Middle East & North Africa
In the late hours of Saturday, April 13, the sounds of drones flying overhead startled residents of Tehran just as they were ready to go to sleep. Iran had begun a long overdue punitive operation against the “malicious Zionist regime,” as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had vowed during the Eid al-Fitr prayers on April 10.
Iran’s operation against Israel was not unprovoked. On April 1, Israel attacked the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus with F-35s, killing seven officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as six Syrians and a major Hezbollah official. Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Zahedi, former IRGC Ground Forces Commander and head of the Lebanon-Syria Unit of the external branch of the IRGC, the Quds Force, was the top official killed in the Israeli airstrike.
The loss of Zahedi, who was the right hand of IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qa’ani, was heavy for Tehran to bear. Many Iranians immediately thought back to Jan. 3, 2020, when the U.S., under President Donald Trump, killed the then long-time commander of the Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, in a drone strike in Baghdad that also killed a senior leader of Iraqi militias. Iran retaliated then with a barrage of ballistic missiles against an Iraqi base where Americans were located but warned Iraq in advance so the Americans could take cover; still more than 100 suffered brain injuries.
Immediately after Israel struck Iran’s diplomatic compound in Syria, Tehran expressed a strongly worded condemnation, followed by a vow of revenge based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which gives Iran “an inherent right to self-defence.”
Iran summoned the charge d’affaires of the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Tehran, at midnight on April 2 to convey Tehran’s anger over the Israeli airstrike. According to the well-informed sources who spoke to this reporter, Iran conveyed the message to the U.S. that a response was imminent, and that it should stay away and not engage in further escalation.
What followed was ten days of pleas and gatherings of hardliners and supporters of the Islamic Republic to respond to Israel for attacking an Iranian diplomatic mission. People in various cities of Iran, even in Tehran, gathered to condemn the Israeli airstrike that killed the IRGC personnel.
Calls from Iranian hardliners to rush to the aid of Palestinians also intensified. As pressure was mounting on Khamenei to react and even send a convoy of Iranian forces to Gaza to fight Israel, the Iranian Leader met a group of university students on April 7. During the meeting, as is customary, a number of students from various factions stated their expectations from the Leader. A member of the Basij, a paramilitary youth group created during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war to fight Iraq, got up and begged Khamenei to let the Basij forces go to Gaza.
“This dear young person said: ‘Send us to Palestine,’ well, this is one thing; Be sure that if we could send the youths to Palestine, it would have been done before you said it,” Khamenei responded.
Khamenei has shown no willingness for Iranians to enter the Gaza war. From the very beginning of the conflict, he denied any Iranian involvement in the planning and execution of the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas, which killed over 1,000 Israelis and led to a massive Israeli retaliation that has now killed more than 33,000 people, most of them Palestinian civilians, and threatened to expand regionally.
The vow for revenge for the April 1 killings of the Iranian officers, however, was a different story. Much like after the Soleimani assassination, the Leader’s position could have been in great jeopardy had he decided not to respond.
The Iranian foreign ministry and armed forces began cooperating closely in the ensuing days to devise a plan that would satisfy the hardliners in Iran but would not enter Iran in a full-fledged war with Israel and the U.S. Iran sent several messages to Washington indicating that it would retaliate, but in a contained manner. In response, Washington assured Tehran that it had no desire to go to war with Iran.
According to sources who spoke to this reporter, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was an important intermediary. He spoke to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on April 11 and then conveyed the U.S. message to his Iranian counterpart, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.
Amir-Abdollahian asked Fidan not to allow attacks on Iran from U.S. bases in Turkey, to which Fidan responded positively, according to the sources. Amir-Abdollahian also issued a warning to that effect on the social media site X posted at 23:22 pm, local Tehran time, on April 13, just 30 minutes before Iran started its operation.
Iran choreographed what appears to have been the largest drone strike in history aiming at the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Israeli F-35s overflew in striking Iran’s diplomatic mission in Syria, and the Nevatim airbase, from which the F-35s had taken off. Iran’s foreign minister confirmed on April 14 that the airbase Iran hit was the one that Israel used to strike the Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria.
He also confirmed that the U.S. and neighboring countries were kept in the loop and that the predominant use of slow-moving, unmanned Shahed-238 drones indicated that Tehran had calculated and possibly even coordinated its operation with the U.S.
If there is a silver lining in the attacks, it was that close contacts between Iran and the U.S. were maintained to try to avoid a further escalation. The question remains whether the U.S. will be able to convince the Israelis that this episode is now closed and whether the U.S.-Iran channels used in the run-up to the Iranian attack can remain open and active.
Saeed Azimi is a political journalist based in Tehran. Find him on Twitter at @saeedazimi1772.
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