Experts React: What the Epic Fury Iran Strikes Signal to the World
From the limits of airpower to the risks of oil shocks and constitutional crisis at home, our experts break down the far-reaching geopolitical consequences of the U.S.–Israel strikes on Iran
In the early hours of Saturday, February 28, the United States and Israel launched a major attack on Iran, targeting at least nine cities across the country. Iran vowed swift retaliation for the joint operation “Epic Fury,” targeting U.S. interests and allies across the Middle East with missile attacks reported in Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as attacks targeting U.S. military facilities in Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
As a volatile region – and the wider world – braces for widespread conflict, Stimson experts unpack Saturday’s strikes on Iran to gauge the full geopolitical implications of the Epic Fury attack.
“When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take.”
So said President Trump addressing the Iranian people in the early hours of Saturday morning, after the United States began what he described as “major combat operations” in Iran. The joint U.S.-Israeli operation—dubbed “Epic Fury” by the Pentagon—struck hundreds of targets across Iran, including the compound of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office, government ministries, and military facilities stretching from Tehran to the southern coast.
It was, by any measure, an impressive display of military capability. It was also, if history is any guide, unlikely to produce the result Trump is promising. He vowed to destroy Iran’s military power and demanded that its security forces lay down their arms or “face certain death”—an effort to weaken not only the regime’s capabilities but its hold on power. The goal, in effect, is regime change. Yet the history of airpower gives little reason to believe that even the most sophisticated bombing campaign can deliver it.
Airpower can destroy hardened facilities, degrade military capabilities, and kill commanders. What it cannot do is reorder domestic politics. Despite a century of promises to the contrary, it has never by itself toppled a government. The closest recent example that regime-change advocates might cite is Libya in 2011, but Libya proves the opposite point. What began as a UN-mandated “responsibility to protect” mission quietly evolved into the destruction of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Yet NATO airpower did not accomplish that alone. Indigenous rebel forces on the ground—organized, motivated, and militarily capable—exploited the pressure airpower created. Today, in Iran, there is no comparable force.
History reinforces this lesson. When a government believes it is fighting for its survival, it does not capitulate. A study of thirty asymmetric interstate conflicts involving the United States from 1918 to 2003 shows that coercion most often failed when U.S. demands threated a weaker state’s survival, prompting resistance rather than capitulation. Regime change is the maximalist demand par excellence, and the Iranian government has every reason to believe its survival is at stake because Trump has said so explicitly. With everything to lose, they have no incentive to hold anything back.
Tactical brilliance and strategic wisdom are different things. Suppressing Iran’s air defenses and killing senior officers, however skillfully executed, does not answer the central question: what political mechanism converts military punishment into regime change? The mechanism that regime-change advocates implicitly rely on is decapitation—the idea that striking leaders and the instruments of state power will weaken the regime enough that the population, seizing its moment, will revolt. The theory has a certain logic, but it has almost no historical support. What strategic bombing campaigns have reliably produced, across a century of evidence, is not rebellion but solidarity. Even when populations despise and fear their leaders, they have a powerful tendency, when bombs fall, to close ranks against the external aggressor.
No matter how precise or devastating, air strikes alone cannot topple a government, and Iran in 2026 is likely to emerge battered but not broken—a costly example of American hubris and the limits of airpower.
Who Decides When America Goes to War?
By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program Director
President Trump has initiated a war against Iran without congressional approval, without a serious public debate, and in the face of overwhelming public opposition. In short, this war is unconstitutional, unwise, and a betrayal of his promise to put the interests of the American people first.
Terminology matters. This is a premeditated, preventive war, not a defensive action to address an imminent threat to the United States. The Constitution’s Article II authority, pertaining to the executive branch, has long been understood to allow the president to repel sudden attacks – it was never intended to allow a single person to launch the entire country into a war. That power was reserved for the Congress.
To be sure, in practice, past Congresses have shirked this duty, often allowing presidents to wage war at will. But the brazenness of President Trump’s decision to ignore that body, and the cowardice of those sitting members of Congress who refuse to uphold their obligations, is nothing short of breathtaking.
These obligations are not to a mere document. Members of Congress have a responsibility to represent the best interests of their constituents. And the American people have clearly communicated that they do not want a war with Iran. They especially do not want a regime-change war (just 5 percent of Democrats, and only 17 percent of Republicans). They understand the risks. They have learned from the past failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. It is shocking that so many in Washington, DC have not.
With just over a year into his second term, President Trump has demonstrated that America First means whatever he wants it to mean. The claims of senior Trump advisors in the waning days of the campaign, that “Trump = Peace”, and that he would keep Americans out of foreign wars, have aged badly. It turns out that President Trump is just as fond of war as his predecessors, and arguably more so.
But every member of Congress still has a chance, and indeed a duty, to stand up for the people that they serve. They must behave as the co-equal branch of government that they are, and the check on presidential power that they were always meant to be. They must debate the costs and risks of this war. They must use their platform to elevate the best arguments, not merely those who desire war with Iran, and who will say anything to get it. And every Senator, and every House member, must stand and be counted, by voting yes or no on taking this country to war.
In his State of the Union address on Tuesday, President Donald Trump spent significant amount of time on cost-of-living concerns, an issue that is highly salient for many Americans. With sometimes misleading statistics, he touted his administration’s achievements in bringing down the price of eggs, consumer goods, and even gasoline, and in typical Trumpian fashion, engaged in some exaggeration, citing gas prices as low as $1.99 a gallon in some places.
Yet one of the biggest questions raised by the administration’s attack on Iran this weekend is whether it will also trigger inflation and increased fuel prices, worsening Americans’ cost-of-living concerns in a midterm election year. An attack on Iran is particularly concerning economically, as the conflict could directly impact some of the world’s most important oil transit routes. Around 20 percent of global oil supplies transit the Strait of Hormuz on any given day, and Iran has threatened repeatedly to close the Straits with mines or missiles if a major US attack occurs. Scholars are divided on whether such a closure is possible in practice, but history suggests that initial price spikes are possible even from partial closures — or even if insurers start to become wary about safe access to the waterway.
It’s certainly possible that oil prices will not spike through the roof; oil markets have been remarkably resilient in the face of geopolitical shocks over the last few years, in part due to the growth of US shale production and alternative energy sources. If the war stays limited to Iranian targets, the impact could be relatively minor. But a major war with Iran that spills over to impact shipping from other Gulf States could easily send prices skyrocketing, raising costs for consumers around the world. In a worst-case scenario, these price spikes could trigger a recession or economic downturn.
Donald Trump may be about to discover that Americans are not particularly supportive of a war that could raise their already high cost-of-living.
President Donald Trump has abandoned diplomacy as an avenue to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapon’s program. The consequences for US diplomacy and international arms control extends far beyond Iran, however. The administration’s stated view that diplomacy is an “effective way to increase stability, strengthen America’s global influence, realign countries and regions toward our interests, and open new markets,” will be seen as a farce. Trump’s explicit rejection of diplomacy in favor of force has the ultimate effect of incentivizing proliferation and making adversaries hesitant to participate in diplomacy with the United States.
Prior to the June 2025 US strikes against Iran, the Trump administration had engaged in talks with Iran about limits on the country’s nuclear program. Those attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities were justified by the Trump administration as setting the program back and improving the US negotiating position for new talks.
Now it appears doubtful that the administration was ever focused on just curtailing Iran’s nuclear program. While Trump stated that his administration had “sought repeatedly to make a deal,” there was no sense of compromise necessary for successful diplomatic negotiations. The administration insisted on zero enrichment, without offering any sanctions relief (including from sanctions that were put on Iran specifically for its development of a nuclear program). Negotiations ended with Trump launching attacks that are intended to eliminate not just Iran’s nuclear program but its government. In hindsight, the talks look less like negotiation and more like pretext for undertaking regime change.
The consequences of the Trump administration’s approach to Iran will be felt for decades. This use of force sends a message that regimes may be safer if they develop a nuclear program first to avoid being susceptible to US-led overthrow, then use their nuclear program to force negotiations. It is telling that there is little talk from this administration of imposing regime change on North Korea.
Additionally, adversaries will be less likely to engage in diplomacy with the United States. The abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro at the end of diplomatic talks, followed quickly by the rejection of diplomacy in favor of a major bombing campaign against Iran, frames US negotiations as PR stunts meant to buy time, gain information, and conclude with regime change. Beyond the monetary costs, instability, and loss of life, the Trump administration’s approach to Iran will curtail its future use of diplomacy.
Digital Disruption: The Role of Cyber in Epic Fury
By Allison Pytlak, Senior Fellow and Cyber Program Director
There has been a lot to process concerning the recent US-Israeli “Epic Fury” operation against Iran. On Monday, March 2, we learned more about the role of cyber capabilities.
In a press conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Dan Caine confirmed that the U.S. Cyber Command was involved in “coordinated space and cyber operations [that] effectively disrupted communications and sensor networks… leaving the adversary without the ability to see, coordinate, or respond effectively.” The objectives of these operations were disruption, disorientation, and confusion.
The Financial Times separately reported that intelligence from compromised traffic cameras and mobile phone networks contributed to the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The affected devices and networks provided intelligence with information about Khamenei’s meeting with senior officials, which, in turn, determined the timing of the strike. The same report also noted that a cyber operation disrupted the mobile phone system near Khamenei’s compound, affecting his security team’s ability to receive warnings about an impending attack. Meanwhile, other reporting stated that a popular Iranian prayer app was hacked in order to push out disinformation and encourage Iranian military members to “join the forces of liberation.” Of course, all of the above has taken place against the backdrop of ongoing, regime-imposed internet outages in Iran.
Official acknowledgments from the U.S. government or military about the role of cyber capabilities in this level of detail are rare, but this disclosure was not wholly surprising. Cyber-enabled disruption has become standard practice in sophisticated military operations. In a recent Stimson Center commentary, I reflected on a similar acknowledgement concerning the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, as well as the fact that there was already some speculation in January about the potential for the U.S. to use its cyber capabilities in Iran.
What is significant is not just what cyber capabilities did in this operation but also what their open acknowledgment signals. The U.S. is no longer treating cyber as a covert adjunct to kinetic military force; it is being normalized as a visible and legitimate instrument of warfare. That normalization carries consequences: for deterrence, for accountability, and for escalation dynamics, including how adversaries will adapt.
In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. and Israel’s attack on Iran, South Korean presidential spokesperson released a press notice stating that President Lee Jae Myung ordered a full review of possible repercussions for South Korea and related countermeasures while prioritizing the safety of Korean nationals in the region. The two most immediate concerns for the South Korean authorities the safety of South Korean nationals in the region and the impact on its energy price and the broader economy.
According to the latest statistic from the Overseas Korean Agency, there were approximately 17,823 South Korean nationals residing in the Middle East in 2025, most of whom (17,233) were there on temporary visa and an additional 368 students studying in the region. The statistic on travelers from South Korea is not readily available but some estimates show that about 295,000 South Koreans visited the region in 2025.
Second impact, which is likely to be more consequential for the South Korean economy can come from a constrained energy supply. South Korea imports almost all of its crude oil and natural gas from abroad with nearly 70% of crude and up to 30% of natural gas coming from the region. A quick review of the South Korean trade data shows that countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and UAE are important sources of crude while Oman and Qatar are crucial sources of natural gas.
Figure 1. South Korean Import of Crude and Natural Gas from Gulf States, 2021-25
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), crude oil and natural gas account for over 56% of South Korea’s total energy mix, with oil taking up nearly 37% of total energy supply and natural gas 20%. For power generation, 25% of electricity is produced from natural gas. 51% of crude is used to heat and cool buildings, run lights, devices and appliances, and power vehicles, machines and factories; a large portion is also refined and exported. The good news is that South Korea maintains nine strategic stockpiling bases, which currently hold over 100 million barrels of crude. With regards to LNG, South Korea has approximately 52 days worth of annual demand in storage as well. What this means is that as long as the conflict does not have a prolonged impact on the movement of cargoes across the Strait or Hormuz, South Korea will manage. But if the conflict drags on for a prolonged period with Strait of Hormuz being inaccessible to international shipping, there is likely to be a noticeable impact on South Korea’s ability to not only keep its lights on but also manufacture and export products as part of the global supply chain.
Figure 2. South Korean KNOC Stockpiling Facilities
Experts React: What the Epic Fury Iran Strikes Signal to the World
By Kelly A. Grieco • Christopher Preble • Emma Ashford • Evan Cooper • J. James Kim
Grand Strategy
In the early hours of Saturday, February 28, the United States and Israel launched a major attack on Iran, targeting at least nine cities across the country. Iran vowed swift retaliation for the joint operation “Epic Fury,” targeting U.S. interests and allies across the Middle East with missile attacks reported in Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as attacks targeting U.S. military facilities in Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
As a volatile region – and the wider world – braces for widespread conflict, Stimson experts unpack Saturday’s strikes on Iran to gauge the full geopolitical implications of the Epic Fury attack.
The Limits of Airpower Against Iran
By Kelly Grieco, Distinguished Fellow
“When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take.”
So said President Trump addressing the Iranian people in the early hours of Saturday morning, after the United States began what he described as “major combat operations” in Iran. The joint U.S.-Israeli operation—dubbed “Epic Fury” by the Pentagon—struck hundreds of targets across Iran, including the compound of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office, government ministries, and military facilities stretching from Tehran to the southern coast.
It was, by any measure, an impressive display of military capability. It was also, if history is any guide, unlikely to produce the result Trump is promising. He vowed to destroy Iran’s military power and demanded that its security forces lay down their arms or “face certain death”—an effort to weaken not only the regime’s capabilities but its hold on power. The goal, in effect, is regime change. Yet the history of airpower gives little reason to believe that even the most sophisticated bombing campaign can deliver it.
Airpower can destroy hardened facilities, degrade military capabilities, and kill commanders. What it cannot do is reorder domestic politics. Despite a century of promises to the contrary, it has never by itself toppled a government. The closest recent example that regime-change advocates might cite is Libya in 2011, but Libya proves the opposite point. What began as a UN-mandated “responsibility to protect” mission quietly evolved into the destruction of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Yet NATO airpower did not accomplish that alone. Indigenous rebel forces on the ground—organized, motivated, and militarily capable—exploited the pressure airpower created. Today, in Iran, there is no comparable force.
History reinforces this lesson. When a government believes it is fighting for its survival, it does not capitulate. A study of thirty asymmetric interstate conflicts involving the United States from 1918 to 2003 shows that coercion most often failed when U.S. demands threated a weaker state’s survival, prompting resistance rather than capitulation. Regime change is the maximalist demand par excellence, and the Iranian government has every reason to believe its survival is at stake because Trump has said so explicitly. With everything to lose, they have no incentive to hold anything back.
Tactical brilliance and strategic wisdom are different things. Suppressing Iran’s air defenses and killing senior officers, however skillfully executed, does not answer the central question: what political mechanism converts military punishment into regime change? The mechanism that regime-change advocates implicitly rely on is decapitation—the idea that striking leaders and the instruments of state power will weaken the regime enough that the population, seizing its moment, will revolt. The theory has a certain logic, but it has almost no historical support. What strategic bombing campaigns have reliably produced, across a century of evidence, is not rebellion but solidarity. Even when populations despise and fear their leaders, they have a powerful tendency, when bombs fall, to close ranks against the external aggressor.
No matter how precise or devastating, air strikes alone cannot topple a government, and Iran in 2026 is likely to emerge battered but not broken—a costly example of American hubris and the limits of airpower.
Who Decides When America Goes to War?
By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program Director
President Trump has initiated a war against Iran without congressional approval, without a serious public debate, and in the face of overwhelming public opposition. In short, this war is unconstitutional, unwise, and a betrayal of his promise to put the interests of the American people first.
Terminology matters. This is a premeditated, preventive war, not a defensive action to address an imminent threat to the United States. The Constitution’s Article II authority, pertaining to the executive branch, has long been understood to allow the president to repel sudden attacks – it was never intended to allow a single person to launch the entire country into a war. That power was reserved for the Congress.
To be sure, in practice, past Congresses have shirked this duty, often allowing presidents to wage war at will. But the brazenness of President Trump’s decision to ignore that body, and the cowardice of those sitting members of Congress who refuse to uphold their obligations, is nothing short of breathtaking.
These obligations are not to a mere document. Members of Congress have a responsibility to represent the best interests of their constituents. And the American people have clearly communicated that they do not want a war with Iran. They especially do not want a regime-change war (just 5 percent of Democrats, and only 17 percent of Republicans). They understand the risks. They have learned from the past failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. It is shocking that so many in Washington, DC have not.
With just over a year into his second term, President Trump has demonstrated that America First means whatever he wants it to mean. The claims of senior Trump advisors in the waning days of the campaign, that “Trump = Peace”, and that he would keep Americans out of foreign wars, have aged badly. It turns out that President Trump is just as fond of war as his predecessors, and arguably more so.
But every member of Congress still has a chance, and indeed a duty, to stand up for the people that they serve. They must behave as the co-equal branch of government that they are, and the check on presidential power that they were always meant to be. They must debate the costs and risks of this war. They must use their platform to elevate the best arguments, not merely those who desire war with Iran, and who will say anything to get it. And every Senator, and every House member, must stand and be counted, by voting yes or no on taking this country to war.
The Iran Strike and America’s Cost-of-Living Test
By Emma Ashford, Senior Fellow
In his State of the Union address on Tuesday, President Donald Trump spent significant amount of time on cost-of-living concerns, an issue that is highly salient for many Americans. With sometimes misleading statistics, he touted his administration’s achievements in bringing down the price of eggs, consumer goods, and even gasoline, and in typical Trumpian fashion, engaged in some exaggeration, citing gas prices as low as $1.99 a gallon in some places.
Yet one of the biggest questions raised by the administration’s attack on Iran this weekend is whether it will also trigger inflation and increased fuel prices, worsening Americans’ cost-of-living concerns in a midterm election year. An attack on Iran is particularly concerning economically, as the conflict could directly impact some of the world’s most important oil transit routes. Around 20 percent of global oil supplies transit the Strait of Hormuz on any given day, and Iran has threatened repeatedly to close the Straits with mines or missiles if a major US attack occurs. Scholars are divided on whether such a closure is possible in practice, but history suggests that initial price spikes are possible even from partial closures — or even if insurers start to become wary about safe access to the waterway.
It’s certainly possible that oil prices will not spike through the roof; oil markets have been remarkably resilient in the face of geopolitical shocks over the last few years, in part due to the growth of US shale production and alternative energy sources. If the war stays limited to Iranian targets, the impact could be relatively minor. But a major war with Iran that spills over to impact shipping from other Gulf States could easily send prices skyrocketing, raising costs for consumers around the world. In a worst-case scenario, these price spikes could trigger a recession or economic downturn.
Donald Trump may be about to discover that Americans are not particularly supportive of a war that could raise their already high cost-of-living.
A War That Kills Diplomacy
By Evan Cooper, Research Analyst
President Donald Trump has abandoned diplomacy as an avenue to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapon’s program. The consequences for US diplomacy and international arms control extends far beyond Iran, however. The administration’s stated view that diplomacy is an “effective way to increase stability, strengthen America’s global influence, realign countries and regions toward our interests, and open new markets,” will be seen as a farce. Trump’s explicit rejection of diplomacy in favor of force has the ultimate effect of incentivizing proliferation and making adversaries hesitant to participate in diplomacy with the United States.
Prior to the June 2025 US strikes against Iran, the Trump administration had engaged in talks with Iran about limits on the country’s nuclear program. Those attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities were justified by the Trump administration as setting the program back and improving the US negotiating position for new talks.
Now it appears doubtful that the administration was ever focused on just curtailing Iran’s nuclear program. While Trump stated that his administration had “sought repeatedly to make a deal,” there was no sense of compromise necessary for successful diplomatic negotiations. The administration insisted on zero enrichment, without offering any sanctions relief (including from sanctions that were put on Iran specifically for its development of a nuclear program). Negotiations ended with Trump launching attacks that are intended to eliminate not just Iran’s nuclear program but its government. In hindsight, the talks look less like negotiation and more like pretext for undertaking regime change.
The consequences of the Trump administration’s approach to Iran will be felt for decades. This use of force sends a message that regimes may be safer if they develop a nuclear program first to avoid being susceptible to US-led overthrow, then use their nuclear program to force negotiations. It is telling that there is little talk from this administration of imposing regime change on North Korea.
Additionally, adversaries will be less likely to engage in diplomacy with the United States. The abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro at the end of diplomatic talks, followed quickly by the rejection of diplomacy in favor of a major bombing campaign against Iran, frames US negotiations as PR stunts meant to buy time, gain information, and conclude with regime change. Beyond the monetary costs, instability, and loss of life, the Trump administration’s approach to Iran will curtail its future use of diplomacy.
Digital Disruption: The Role of Cyber in Epic Fury
By Allison Pytlak, Senior Fellow and Cyber Program Director
There has been a lot to process concerning the recent US-Israeli “Epic Fury” operation against Iran. On Monday, March 2, we learned more about the role of cyber capabilities.
In a press conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Dan Caine confirmed that the U.S. Cyber Command was involved in “coordinated space and cyber operations [that] effectively disrupted communications and sensor networks… leaving the adversary without the ability to see, coordinate, or respond effectively.” The objectives of these operations were disruption, disorientation, and confusion.
The Financial Times separately reported that intelligence from compromised traffic cameras and mobile phone networks contributed to the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The affected devices and networks provided intelligence with information about Khamenei’s meeting with senior officials, which, in turn, determined the timing of the strike. The same report also noted that a cyber operation disrupted the mobile phone system near Khamenei’s compound, affecting his security team’s ability to receive warnings about an impending attack. Meanwhile, other reporting stated that a popular Iranian prayer app was hacked in order to push out disinformation and encourage Iranian military members to “join the forces of liberation.” Of course, all of the above has taken place against the backdrop of ongoing, regime-imposed internet outages in Iran.
Official acknowledgments from the U.S. government or military about the role of cyber capabilities in this level of detail are rare, but this disclosure was not wholly surprising. Cyber-enabled disruption has become standard practice in sophisticated military operations. In a recent Stimson Center commentary, I reflected on a similar acknowledgement concerning the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, as well as the fact that there was already some speculation in January about the potential for the U.S. to use its cyber capabilities in Iran.
What is significant is not just what cyber capabilities did in this operation but also what their open acknowledgment signals. The U.S. is no longer treating cyber as a covert adjunct to kinetic military force; it is being normalized as a visible and legitimate instrument of warfare. That normalization carries consequences: for deterrence, for accountability, and for escalation dynamics, including how adversaries will adapt.
Implications of the Iran Conflict for South Korea
By J. James Kim, Korea Program Director
In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. and Israel’s attack on Iran, South Korean presidential spokesperson released a press notice stating that President Lee Jae Myung ordered a full review of possible repercussions for South Korea and related countermeasures while prioritizing the safety of Korean nationals in the region. The two most immediate concerns for the South Korean authorities the safety of South Korean nationals in the region and the impact on its energy price and the broader economy.
According to the latest statistic from the Overseas Korean Agency, there were approximately 17,823 South Korean nationals residing in the Middle East in 2025, most of whom (17,233) were there on temporary visa and an additional 368 students studying in the region. The statistic on travelers from South Korea is not readily available but some estimates show that about 295,000 South Koreans visited the region in 2025.
Second impact, which is likely to be more consequential for the South Korean economy can come from a constrained energy supply. South Korea imports almost all of its crude oil and natural gas from abroad with nearly 70% of crude and up to 30% of natural gas coming from the region. A quick review of the South Korean trade data shows that countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and UAE are important sources of crude while Oman and Qatar are crucial sources of natural gas.
Figure 1. South Korean Import of Crude and Natural Gas from Gulf States, 2021-25
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), crude oil and natural gas account for over 56% of South Korea’s total energy mix, with oil taking up nearly 37% of total energy supply and natural gas 20%. For power generation, 25% of electricity is produced from natural gas. 51% of crude is used to heat and cool buildings, run lights, devices and appliances, and power vehicles, machines and factories; a large portion is also refined and exported. The good news is that South Korea maintains nine strategic stockpiling bases, which currently hold over 100 million barrels of crude. With regards to LNG, South Korea has approximately 52 days worth of annual demand in storage as well. What this means is that as long as the conflict does not have a prolonged impact on the movement of cargoes across the Strait or Hormuz, South Korea will manage. But if the conflict drags on for a prolonged period with Strait of Hormuz being inaccessible to international shipping, there is likely to be a noticeable impact on South Korea’s ability to not only keep its lights on but also manufacture and export products as part of the global supply chain.
Figure 2. South Korean KNOC Stockpiling Facilities
Source: Korea National Oil Company
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