The decades-long, internecine conflict between Israel and Palestine that re-erupted on Oct. 7, 2023, has caused massive civilian casualties and offers a rare acknowledgment that Israel possesses nuclear weapons.
An inflammatory statement by an Israeli minister threatening to drop a nuclear bomb on the Gaza Strip not only contradicted a decades-long Israel policy of ambiguity about its arsenal but met repeated censure during a United Nations-hosted conference in November 2023 on the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East.
Coming on the heels of yet another unsuccessful session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this saber-rattling only increased frustration at the continued lack of progress on the establishment of a NWFZ. Ahead of the next session of the Preparatory Committee — scheduled to take place in July 2024 in Geneva — the pressure to implement a 1995 Resolution on creating an NWFZ in the Middle East and supplementary agreements will only mount.
It is noteworthy that many signatories to, and groupings within, the NPT have not only lashed out at Israel’s concealed nuclear weapons program but also raised concerns about the United States’ unflinching support for it. The other cascading effect of U.S. espousal of Israel has been the prolongation and intensification of the war in Gaza and a rise in U.S. tensions with Iran. While this will certainly make it harder to reach a consensus on creating an NWFZ in the Middle East, it is still important to try to make substantive progress on the matter because a continued stalemate will likely engender new risks and challenges.
First, nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East could become a direct casualty from failing to make progress on such a zone. Iran and the U.S. will further harden their positions on the resuscitation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the Trump administration quit unilaterally in 2018. While hardliners within Iran will highlight what they consider a “nexus of evil” between the U.S. and Israel, the latter two will counter with Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East. Particularly as the U.S. enters a presidential election year in which any concessions to Iran would be domestically politically radioactive, Iran will have no incentive to come back to compliance with the terms of the JCPOA. Indeed, if Iran continues to enrich uranium to ever more dangerous levels, there will be new calls for taking punitive kinetic actions against that country. All this will heighten tensions and the risks of a major conflict in the Middle East.
Given the presence of nuclear weapons in the region, the risk of nuclear use, advertent or inadvertent, cannot be ruled out. This fear is valid, not least because the region lacks risk-reduction or arms control mechanisms to grapple with such crises. Also, with China a growing player in the region after having brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, managing such crises could become even more complicated.
Second, the level of trust in both the NPT and its review process will hit a nadir. This is primarily because Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), long dismayed by the Nuclear Weapon States’ continued refusal to fulfill disarmament-related commitments, will become further disillusioned at the continued non-implementation of consensus-based documents from previous Review Conferences. Further erosion of trust will, if anything, disturb and impede the whole review process.
Establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East was one of the major planks of the landmark 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. By torpedoing peaceful mechanisms aimed at ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons, the nuclear club will be unable to garner support from the nuclear have-nots on key issues, such as nuclear risk reduction. Notably, the world is facing a bevy of nuclear risks, especially because of the intensification of great power competition, as well as the advent of disruptive technologies. In such a scenario, another body blow to the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime will be bad news for global peace and stability. By virtue of already being ensnared in chaos, the Middle East will be the most affected region.
If no headway is made in creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, the risk of nuclear proliferation will rise. It must be noted that this danger will also grow because nuclear weapons states appear to be non-committal when it comes to giving negative security assurances to non-nuclear states. Therefore, while Iran has repeatedly said it will not develop nuclear weapons because they are un-Islamic, its threat matrix could necessitate a major rethink. It is noteworthy that, as of this writing, Iran is still enriching uranium up to 60%, which is very close to weapons grade, and has resumed amassing about 9 kilograms of this highly enriched uranium every month, up from 3 kilograms a month from June through November 2023. Therefore, it is unwise to rule out the possibility of Iran going nuclear, especially if it is faced with rising regional threats.
If Iran does decide to weaponize, Saudi Arabia will not hold back. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Muhammad Bin Salman, categorically said Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if and when Tehran goes nuclear. While Saudi Arabia’s nuclear-related activities so far are minimal, the revelation of secret cooperation between it and China on uranium mining and extraction has raised many an eyebrow. In addition, MBS has demanded that the U.S. provide uranium enrichment technology in return for any future normalization of diplomatic ties with Israel. The corollary of all this is a dangerous one: proliferation begets more proliferation, especially if the environment becomes more volatile as a result of Israel’s nuclear weapons, the risk of regional escalation in the Gaza war, and Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s insecurities.
Clearly, the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East adds to the region’s fragility, dents the credibility of the NPT and its review process, and adversely impacts the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is Deputy Director of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Policy Research (CSSPR). He can be reached on X @syedalizia1992.
Huma Rehman is a Senior Defense and Foreign Affairs Analyst and Fellow of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California.
The Middle East’s Costly Nuclear Conundrum
By Syed Ali Zia Jaffery • Huma Rehman
The decades-long, internecine conflict between Israel and Palestine that re-erupted on Oct. 7, 2023, has caused massive civilian casualties and offers a rare acknowledgment that Israel possesses nuclear weapons.
An inflammatory statement by an Israeli minister threatening to drop a nuclear bomb on the Gaza Strip not only contradicted a decades-long Israel policy of ambiguity about its arsenal but met repeated censure during a United Nations-hosted conference in November 2023 on the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East.
Coming on the heels of yet another unsuccessful session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this saber-rattling only increased frustration at the continued lack of progress on the establishment of a NWFZ. Ahead of the next session of the Preparatory Committee — scheduled to take place in July 2024 in Geneva — the pressure to implement a 1995 Resolution on creating an NWFZ in the Middle East and supplementary agreements will only mount.
It is noteworthy that many signatories to, and groupings within, the NPT have not only lashed out at Israel’s concealed nuclear weapons program but also raised concerns about the United States’ unflinching support for it. The other cascading effect of U.S. espousal of Israel has been the prolongation and intensification of the war in Gaza and a rise in U.S. tensions with Iran. While this will certainly make it harder to reach a consensus on creating an NWFZ in the Middle East, it is still important to try to make substantive progress on the matter because a continued stalemate will likely engender new risks and challenges.
First, nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East could become a direct casualty from failing to make progress on such a zone. Iran and the U.S. will further harden their positions on the resuscitation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the Trump administration quit unilaterally in 2018. While hardliners within Iran will highlight what they consider a “nexus of evil” between the U.S. and Israel, the latter two will counter with Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East. Particularly as the U.S. enters a presidential election year in which any concessions to Iran would be domestically politically radioactive, Iran will have no incentive to come back to compliance with the terms of the JCPOA. Indeed, if Iran continues to enrich uranium to ever more dangerous levels, there will be new calls for taking punitive kinetic actions against that country. All this will heighten tensions and the risks of a major conflict in the Middle East.
Given the presence of nuclear weapons in the region, the risk of nuclear use, advertent or inadvertent, cannot be ruled out. This fear is valid, not least because the region lacks risk-reduction or arms control mechanisms to grapple with such crises. Also, with China a growing player in the region after having brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, managing such crises could become even more complicated.
Second, the level of trust in both the NPT and its review process will hit a nadir. This is primarily because Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), long dismayed by the Nuclear Weapon States’ continued refusal to fulfill disarmament-related commitments, will become further disillusioned at the continued non-implementation of consensus-based documents from previous Review Conferences. Further erosion of trust will, if anything, disturb and impede the whole review process.
Establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East was one of the major planks of the landmark 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. By torpedoing peaceful mechanisms aimed at ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons, the nuclear club will be unable to garner support from the nuclear have-nots on key issues, such as nuclear risk reduction. Notably, the world is facing a bevy of nuclear risks, especially because of the intensification of great power competition, as well as the advent of disruptive technologies. In such a scenario, another body blow to the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime will be bad news for global peace and stability. By virtue of already being ensnared in chaos, the Middle East will be the most affected region.
If no headway is made in creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, the risk of nuclear proliferation will rise. It must be noted that this danger will also grow because nuclear weapons states appear to be non-committal when it comes to giving negative security assurances to non-nuclear states. Therefore, while Iran has repeatedly said it will not develop nuclear weapons because they are un-Islamic, its threat matrix could necessitate a major rethink. It is noteworthy that, as of this writing, Iran is still enriching uranium up to 60%, which is very close to weapons grade, and has resumed amassing about 9 kilograms of this highly enriched uranium every month, up from 3 kilograms a month from June through November 2023. Therefore, it is unwise to rule out the possibility of Iran going nuclear, especially if it is faced with rising regional threats.
If Iran does decide to weaponize, Saudi Arabia will not hold back. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Muhammad Bin Salman, categorically said Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if and when Tehran goes nuclear. While Saudi Arabia’s nuclear-related activities so far are minimal, the revelation of secret cooperation between it and China on uranium mining and extraction has raised many an eyebrow. In addition, MBS has demanded that the U.S. provide uranium enrichment technology in return for any future normalization of diplomatic ties with Israel. The corollary of all this is a dangerous one: proliferation begets more proliferation, especially if the environment becomes more volatile as a result of Israel’s nuclear weapons, the risk of regional escalation in the Gaza war, and Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s insecurities.
Clearly, the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East adds to the region’s fragility, dents the credibility of the NPT and its review process, and adversely impacts the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is Deputy Director of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Policy Research (CSSPR). He can be reached on X @syedalizia1992.
Huma Rehman is a Senior Defense and Foreign Affairs Analyst and Fellow of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California.
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