Editor’s Note: Jad Shahrour is a Lebanese writer and the communications manager at the Samir Kassir Foundation. His work focuses on media freedom, political reform, and public policy. He is also a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow through a U.S. State Department program and is recognized for his work on political communication.
Karim Safieddine is a researcher, writer, and PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh interested in social movements, political leadership, and the intellectual legacy of militant groups. He has an MSc in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics (LSE).
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Normalization with Israel is a recurrent topic in Lebanese politics. From the perspective of the Left and those coming from a largely Muslim vantage point, establishing normal diplomatic relations with Israel would amount to a national crime. This position rests on two factors: Israel’s legacy of what many perceive as war crimes, including mass killings of civilians, Israel’s periodic occupation of parts of Lebanon, and Lebanon’s deep connection to the question of Palestinian self-determination.
From the perspective of the Lebanese Right and those approaching politics from a largely Maronite Christian viewpoint, joined by Lebanese liberals who have revised their earlier commitment to the Palestinian cause, normalization may offer a sustainable solution to Lebanon’s recurrent episodes of regional war and conflict.
But the discussion over normalization is not taking place in a climate that allows for long-term strategic contemplation that would enable a sober assessment of Lebanon’s strategic and economic interests. Instead, it is happening under bombardment and the threat of a prolonged new occupation. And while Israel may have the upper hand today, prevailing public opinion and general instability suggest that this is neither a sustainable model nor a theory of change for achieving a just peace.
What Does Normalization Look Like in the Region Today?
Several models of treaties with Israel exist in the region. The Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel established a “cautious peace” following the 1973 war, in which Egypt fought to reclaim territory Israel had occupied in 1967. The agreement secured Israel’s full withdrawal from the Sinai in exchange for mutual recognition and an end to the war between the two countries — a peace between two regimes largely interested in their political security, effectively diluting the grander ideological dimension associated with former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Israel’s 1994 treaty with Jordan can similarly be described as cautious and strategic, focused on border regulation and water interests.
The Emirati model follows a different trajectory. It did not emerge from a direct war with Israel, but from a convergence of strategic and regional interests. Formulated within the framework of the 2020 Abraham Accords, it provided for full diplomatic relations and comprehensive normalization. Unlike the two previous models, economic and security integration is central to this agreement. It is also the most visible model in the Arab world today, raising political questions about what it means to normalize with Israel amid its harsh policies in Gaza and the West Bank.
Back to May 17, 1983
In Lebanon, a pathway toward normalization, even if not directly, was attempted in 1983, through the May 17 Agreement. With every crisis between rival domestic forces, the agreement returns to the political debate as a constant reminder of the deep fault lines running through the country.
After the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the gradual collapse of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a military apparatus, Israel had the upper hand to enforce a deal that charted a pathway toward normal relations between the two countries, conditional on “sustained security cooperation” in South Lebanon. The deal was eventually nullified by a coalition made up of the current Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal Movement, representing the Shi’ite Muslim side, and Walid Jumblatt, at the time leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, representing the Druze — a move that amounted to a coup against the central state and was aligned with Syrian interests.
The Lebanese state was not the decision-maker at the time. The Syrian regime had rejected the agreement because it also called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon alongside the withdrawal of the Israeli army.
Lebanon then was an arena of conflict between Israel, Syria, the United States, and local forces. That is why this memory remained tied to a clear framing: an agreement that sought to end the war with Israel through the Lebanese state but was brought down by the Syrian regime.
Today, the Ba’athist regime in Syria is gone. And Berri and Jumblatt, while verbally opposed to normalization, lack the military capacity to counter it. Hezbollah is Lebanon’s last militia, and its resources are clearly depleting, with few avenues left to receive cash, arms, and key materiel needed for local production and training. In other words, the on-the-ground political conditions that once existed to counter state-level normalization no longer exist. Moreover, Israel is no longer the Israel of Ariel Sharon — the gray area has collapsed, and the Jewish Israeli public is practically unified behind “a final resolution” to the “Lebanon problem.”
Lebanon also has few options to shield its citizens from the spillover of regional war. The April 8, 2026, Beirut massacre committed by Israel – killing more than 300 people in ten minutes of bombing — compels the state to radically rethink its strategy for securing Beirut’s residents, including thousands of displaced persons now among them. Hezbollah is aware of these limitations, as demonstrated by the muted declarations of its own ministers against the direct negotiation process. Its supporters on the ground have accused Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam of treason at more than one demonstration, calling him a “Zionist agent”; its ministers, clearly in coordination with Speaker of Parliament Berri, have quietly accepted the negotiation process while articulating mild reservations about the need for cross-sectarian consensus.
No Public Trust and the Risks of a Security Breakdown
Despite the material limitations on the Lebanese end, this remains a divisive topic, and a new generation of Lebanese youth has now learned, through the mass killings of the past few years, what an Israeli war really looks like. Whatever rational impulse may remain toward sustainable peace, popular trust among a significant share of the population simply does not exist. According to the 2025 Arab Opinion Index released by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 89% of the Lebanese population would reject formal recognition of Israel.
There is no doubt that Lebanon needs an upgraded armistice agreement. Such an agreement should pave the way for a serious conversation about border demarcation and a definite end to all wars that use South Lebanon as a launching pad. Whether this includes normalization requires a broader conversation — one that cannot be easily divorced from the Palestine question.
Implementing a full-fledged normalization faces major challenges. Compared to other Arab countries, Lebanon has been in a state of direct hostility and armed conflict with Israel for more than six decades. Hezbollah’s ideology, which resonates strongly among Lebanese Shiites and other groups, advanced a taboo on the Israeli question even when the PLO was negotiating with Israel in the 1990s. That ideological stance has only hardened, with strikingly absolute assumptions about how Israeli society is governed.
Moreover, unlike the peace deals concluded between Israel and Egypt or Jordan, normalization today is being raised in the middle of campaigns of mass erasure at an unprecedented scale. Israel has shifted significantly to the right, leaving it seemingly uninterested in achieving a sustained peace under what most Lebanese would regard as a fair political framework. The alternative to politics is brute force — in a country that is overwhelmingly opposed to normalization in principle.
This is further compounded by Lebanon’s existing social and security fragmentation, which makes it extremely difficult to control any actor that might attack independently and haphazardly. And if Hezbollah were to disintegrate, the process would likely be chaotic rather than orderly, producing splinter groups and factions inspired and hardened by the same social conditions that Israel’s occupation has created. That is why we return to the central argument: Israel cannot impose normalization through fire.
Israel Cannot Achieve Normalization with Lebanon by Bombing It
By Karim Safieddine • Jad Shahrour
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Jad Shahrour is a Lebanese writer and the communications manager at the Samir Kassir Foundation. His work focuses on media freedom, political reform, and public policy. He is also a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow through a U.S. State Department program and is recognized for his work on political communication.
Karim Safieddine is a researcher, writer, and PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh interested in social movements, political leadership, and the intellectual legacy of militant groups. He has an MSc in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics (LSE).
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Normalization with Israel is a recurrent topic in Lebanese politics. From the perspective of the Left and those coming from a largely Muslim vantage point, establishing normal diplomatic relations with Israel would amount to a national crime. This position rests on two factors: Israel’s legacy of what many perceive as war crimes, including mass killings of civilians, Israel’s periodic occupation of parts of Lebanon, and Lebanon’s deep connection to the question of Palestinian self-determination.
From the perspective of the Lebanese Right and those approaching politics from a largely Maronite Christian viewpoint, joined by Lebanese liberals who have revised their earlier commitment to the Palestinian cause, normalization may offer a sustainable solution to Lebanon’s recurrent episodes of regional war and conflict.
But the discussion over normalization is not taking place in a climate that allows for long-term strategic contemplation that would enable a sober assessment of Lebanon’s strategic and economic interests. Instead, it is happening under bombardment and the threat of a prolonged new occupation. And while Israel may have the upper hand today, prevailing public opinion and general instability suggest that this is neither a sustainable model nor a theory of change for achieving a just peace.
What Does Normalization Look Like in the Region Today?
Several models of treaties with Israel exist in the region. The Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel established a “cautious peace” following the 1973 war, in which Egypt fought to reclaim territory Israel had occupied in 1967. The agreement secured Israel’s full withdrawal from the Sinai in exchange for mutual recognition and an end to the war between the two countries — a peace between two regimes largely interested in their political security, effectively diluting the grander ideological dimension associated with former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Israel’s 1994 treaty with Jordan can similarly be described as cautious and strategic, focused on border regulation and water interests.
The Emirati model follows a different trajectory. It did not emerge from a direct war with Israel, but from a convergence of strategic and regional interests. Formulated within the framework of the 2020 Abraham Accords, it provided for full diplomatic relations and comprehensive normalization. Unlike the two previous models, economic and security integration is central to this agreement. It is also the most visible model in the Arab world today, raising political questions about what it means to normalize with Israel amid its harsh policies in Gaza and the West Bank.
Back to May 17, 1983
In Lebanon, a pathway toward normalization, even if not directly, was attempted in 1983, through the May 17 Agreement. With every crisis between rival domestic forces, the agreement returns to the political debate as a constant reminder of the deep fault lines running through the country.
After the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the gradual collapse of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a military apparatus, Israel had the upper hand to enforce a deal that charted a pathway toward normal relations between the two countries, conditional on “sustained security cooperation” in South Lebanon. The deal was eventually nullified by a coalition made up of the current Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal Movement, representing the Shi’ite Muslim side, and Walid Jumblatt, at the time leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, representing the Druze — a move that amounted to a coup against the central state and was aligned with Syrian interests.
The Lebanese state was not the decision-maker at the time. The Syrian regime had rejected the agreement because it also called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon alongside the withdrawal of the Israeli army.
Lebanon then was an arena of conflict between Israel, Syria, the United States, and local forces. That is why this memory remained tied to a clear framing: an agreement that sought to end the war with Israel through the Lebanese state but was brought down by the Syrian regime.
Today, the Ba’athist regime in Syria is gone. And Berri and Jumblatt, while verbally opposed to normalization, lack the military capacity to counter it. Hezbollah is Lebanon’s last militia, and its resources are clearly depleting, with few avenues left to receive cash, arms, and key materiel needed for local production and training. In other words, the on-the-ground political conditions that once existed to counter state-level normalization no longer exist. Moreover, Israel is no longer the Israel of Ariel Sharon — the gray area has collapsed, and the Jewish Israeli public is practically unified behind “a final resolution” to the “Lebanon problem.”
Lebanon also has few options to shield its citizens from the spillover of regional war. The April 8, 2026, Beirut massacre committed by Israel – killing more than 300 people in ten minutes of bombing — compels the state to radically rethink its strategy for securing Beirut’s residents, including thousands of displaced persons now among them. Hezbollah is aware of these limitations, as demonstrated by the muted declarations of its own ministers against the direct negotiation process. Its supporters on the ground have accused Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam of treason at more than one demonstration, calling him a “Zionist agent”; its ministers, clearly in coordination with Speaker of Parliament Berri, have quietly accepted the negotiation process while articulating mild reservations about the need for cross-sectarian consensus.
No Public Trust and the Risks of a Security Breakdown
Despite the material limitations on the Lebanese end, this remains a divisive topic, and a new generation of Lebanese youth has now learned, through the mass killings of the past few years, what an Israeli war really looks like. Whatever rational impulse may remain toward sustainable peace, popular trust among a significant share of the population simply does not exist. According to the 2025 Arab Opinion Index released by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 89% of the Lebanese population would reject formal recognition of Israel.
There is no doubt that Lebanon needs an upgraded armistice agreement. Such an agreement should pave the way for a serious conversation about border demarcation and a definite end to all wars that use South Lebanon as a launching pad. Whether this includes normalization requires a broader conversation — one that cannot be easily divorced from the Palestine question.
Implementing a full-fledged normalization faces major challenges. Compared to other Arab countries, Lebanon has been in a state of direct hostility and armed conflict with Israel for more than six decades. Hezbollah’s ideology, which resonates strongly among Lebanese Shiites and other groups, advanced a taboo on the Israeli question even when the PLO was negotiating with Israel in the 1990s. That ideological stance has only hardened, with strikingly absolute assumptions about how Israeli society is governed.
Moreover, unlike the peace deals concluded between Israel and Egypt or Jordan, normalization today is being raised in the middle of campaigns of mass erasure at an unprecedented scale. Israel has shifted significantly to the right, leaving it seemingly uninterested in achieving a sustained peace under what most Lebanese would regard as a fair political framework. The alternative to politics is brute force — in a country that is overwhelmingly opposed to normalization in principle.
This is further compounded by Lebanon’s existing social and security fragmentation, which makes it extremely difficult to control any actor that might attack independently and haphazardly. And if Hezbollah were to disintegrate, the process would likely be chaotic rather than orderly, producing splinter groups and factions inspired and hardened by the same social conditions that Israel’s occupation has created. That is why we return to the central argument: Israel cannot impose normalization through fire.
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