Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is the author of the book “Iran and the Security Order in the Persian Gulf,” which was published by Routledge in 2025.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The January 2026 protests in Iran began in Tehran’s labyrinthine Grand Bazaar and quickly spread to other cities, taking on an anti-government character. This was the first time since the 1979 revolution that the Bazaar played the role of catalyst and initiator for widespread popular unrest.
The main reason the protests began in the Bazaar was the severe economic crisis and the collapse of the Iranian currency. In late December 2025, the Iranian rial fell to its lowest historical level against the U.S. dollar, about 1.4 million rials per dollar, placing immense pressure on the public and on merchants struggling to price their goods.
The Bazaar is the most conservative and religiously traditional sector of Iranian society and played a key role in the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in 1979. Ironically, the Islamic Republic’s very success in repressing political opposition and civil society has given the Bazaar a bigger role. As New York University scholar Arang Keshavarzian writes in his book, “Bazaar and State in Iran,” the Bazaar is not merely an economic space, but a network of social and political relations where information, trust, and social capital are exchanged. This provides a potential foundation for collective organization and political action.
In the contemporary history of the Islamic Republic, the Bazaar has usually allied with the ruling system. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, commented in 1982: “We must preserve the Bazaar with all our might; we are all obliged. The Bazaar has maintained it, maintained everyone; on the other hand, the Bazaar must preserve the government. If it lets go, what will the government do?”
The importance of the Bazaar led the government to initially sympathize with its economic grievances. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 as the Supreme Leader of Iran, stated: “The Bazaar and merchants are among the most loyal groups in the country to the Islamic system and the Islamic Revolution; in the name of the Bazaar and merchants, one cannot oppose the Islamic Republic and the Islamic system.” Khamenei added, “The merchant is correct that under these conditions, he cannot do business; the country’s officials also agree with this, and the honorable President and other senior officials are seeking to resolve this problem.”
Additionally, officials from the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian met with trade association leaders and made promises to address their concerns.
However, the protests quickly spread across Iran and to other social groups, reaching more than 400 cities as well as 100 locations in Tehran.
Although various social classes participated in the January 2026 protests, the presence of women, the middle class, and ethnic and religious minorities was not as extensive as in the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022-2023, the last major protests in Iran. Nevertheless, Kurds participated through strikes and shop closures. Demonstrations also occurred in Tabriz and Urmia, which have majority Azeri Turkish speaking citizens, and at Friday prayers in the predominantly Sunni Muslim Sistan and Baluchestan province.
Additionally, students were at the forefront in the early days of the protests. However, with the closure of major universities and evacuation of some dormitories, many returned home.
Unlike the situation in 1979, however, there was no visible break between political officials or military personnel and the ruling system. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as the regime’s military arm, forcefully put down the protests, unlike in 1979 when the armed forces declared neutrality and withdrew from enforcing allegiance to the regime. The Shah fled Iran on January 16, 1979, never to return.
One reason why the Iranian government responded so harshly to the latest protests may have been to compensate for the weakening of the regime at the regional level — due to the decline of proxy forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, compounded by the 12-day war last June in which Israel and the U.S. attacked Iran’s nuclear and other military sites.
The regime justified its harsh approach by categorizing the protesters as “rioters who were deceived” and “terrorists working for Israel and the U.S.” According to the government, many of those killed were the victims of ISIS and foreign agents.
Iran’s Martyrs Foundation stated that 3,117 people died, of whom 2,427 were “martyrs,” including security personnel and ordinary citizens, and the remainder were “terrorists” and “rioters.” However, outside sources, including human rights organizations, say the toll was far, far higher.
As in previous protests, Iranians outside the country encouraged people within Iran to take to the streets. Among them was the son of the late shah, Reza Pahlavi. However, his influence declined after the government shut down the internet and access to social media.
Many leftists, republicans, liberals, and others have fundamental disagreements with the idea of restoring the monarchy even as a figurehead. On the other hand, the lack of a single leader may prevent disparate movements from coalescing around a central axis, thereby reducing their capacity to effect regime change.
The main challenge for both domestic and exiled opposition is polarization and the division of Iranians into “insiders” versus “outsiders,” which exacerbates divisions among elites and political, social, and civil society activists.
Some experts assert that the most credible hope for a more democratic and free Iran lies within the country among civil society activists, labor organizers, students, professionals, women’s groups, and reformist forces in the government who understand how Iran’s complex, labyrinthine system functions. Any successful democratic transition requires deep knowledge of the country’s political economy, elite networks, and bureaucracy, and the ability to secure at least passive cooperation from large segments of the government and security apparatus. This cannot be designed from abroad.
In a best-case scenario, domestic democratic forces and supporters abroad should act in close coordination. Together, they could help unlock Iran’s significant political, economic, and international potential. However, Iran remains far from this point.
Moreover, a gap exists in the country between elites and Iranian society. One reason is that protesters from various sectors have not yet created institutional or organizational counter spaces, such as those that existed during the Shah’s era before the revolution. According to Iranian sociologist, Mohammad Reza Nikfar, currently, this counter space exists only in street protests, which alone is insufficient.
Some protest movements believe that serious change is impossible without foreign intervention — although there is no reliable way to gauge how widely this view is held. However, many Iranians doubt they can rely on the Trump administration — or any foreign power — for protection against government repression. There is also the question of what would follow regime change and who would deal with the likely chaos.
Accordingly, one scenario in Iran is a continuation of the current system, with stronger political clout. A more positive alternative is a negotiated transitional scenario in which moderate elements within the regime and broader society recognize the unsustainability of the status quo and engage in dialogue to outline a constitutional transition toward a more representative system.
What the protesters demand — in their slogans and courage — is self-determination. Iran possesses abundant internal leadership capacity, as well as exiled supporters willing to help restore the country to its rightful international position. Ultimately, however, this is an Iranian struggle, and the U.S. should not assume it can direct events on the ground.
Why the Latest Iran Protests Started in the Tehran Bazaar
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is the author of the book “Iran and the Security Order in the Persian Gulf,” which was published by Routledge in 2025.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The January 2026 protests in Iran began in Tehran’s labyrinthine Grand Bazaar and quickly spread to other cities, taking on an anti-government character. This was the first time since the 1979 revolution that the Bazaar played the role of catalyst and initiator for widespread popular unrest.
The main reason the protests began in the Bazaar was the severe economic crisis and the collapse of the Iranian currency. In late December 2025, the Iranian rial fell to its lowest historical level against the U.S. dollar, about 1.4 million rials per dollar, placing immense pressure on the public and on merchants struggling to price their goods.
The Bazaar is the most conservative and religiously traditional sector of Iranian society and played a key role in the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in 1979. Ironically, the Islamic Republic’s very success in repressing political opposition and civil society has given the Bazaar a bigger role. As New York University scholar Arang Keshavarzian writes in his book, “Bazaar and State in Iran,” the Bazaar is not merely an economic space, but a network of social and political relations where information, trust, and social capital are exchanged. This provides a potential foundation for collective organization and political action.
In the contemporary history of the Islamic Republic, the Bazaar has usually allied with the ruling system. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, commented in 1982: “We must preserve the Bazaar with all our might; we are all obliged. The Bazaar has maintained it, maintained everyone; on the other hand, the Bazaar must preserve the government. If it lets go, what will the government do?”
The importance of the Bazaar led the government to initially sympathize with its economic grievances. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 as the Supreme Leader of Iran, stated: “The Bazaar and merchants are among the most loyal groups in the country to the Islamic system and the Islamic Revolution; in the name of the Bazaar and merchants, one cannot oppose the Islamic Republic and the Islamic system.” Khamenei added, “The merchant is correct that under these conditions, he cannot do business; the country’s officials also agree with this, and the honorable President and other senior officials are seeking to resolve this problem.”
Additionally, officials from the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian met with trade association leaders and made promises to address their concerns.
However, the protests quickly spread across Iran and to other social groups, reaching more than 400 cities as well as 100 locations in Tehran.
Although various social classes participated in the January 2026 protests, the presence of women, the middle class, and ethnic and religious minorities was not as extensive as in the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022-2023, the last major protests in Iran. Nevertheless, Kurds participated through strikes and shop closures. Demonstrations also occurred in Tabriz and Urmia, which have majority Azeri Turkish speaking citizens, and at Friday prayers in the predominantly Sunni Muslim Sistan and Baluchestan province.
Additionally, students were at the forefront in the early days of the protests. However, with the closure of major universities and evacuation of some dormitories, many returned home.
Unlike the situation in 1979, however, there was no visible break between political officials or military personnel and the ruling system. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as the regime’s military arm, forcefully put down the protests, unlike in 1979 when the armed forces declared neutrality and withdrew from enforcing allegiance to the regime. The Shah fled Iran on January 16, 1979, never to return.
One reason why the Iranian government responded so harshly to the latest protests may have been to compensate for the weakening of the regime at the regional level — due to the decline of proxy forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, compounded by the 12-day war last June in which Israel and the U.S. attacked Iran’s nuclear and other military sites.
The regime justified its harsh approach by categorizing the protesters as “rioters who were deceived” and “terrorists working for Israel and the U.S.” According to the government, many of those killed were the victims of ISIS and foreign agents.
Iran’s Martyrs Foundation stated that 3,117 people died, of whom 2,427 were “martyrs,” including security personnel and ordinary citizens, and the remainder were “terrorists” and “rioters.” However, outside sources, including human rights organizations, say the toll was far, far higher.
As in previous protests, Iranians outside the country encouraged people within Iran to take to the streets. Among them was the son of the late shah, Reza Pahlavi. However, his influence declined after the government shut down the internet and access to social media.
Many leftists, republicans, liberals, and others have fundamental disagreements with the idea of restoring the monarchy even as a figurehead. On the other hand, the lack of a single leader may prevent disparate movements from coalescing around a central axis, thereby reducing their capacity to effect regime change.
The main challenge for both domestic and exiled opposition is polarization and the division of Iranians into “insiders” versus “outsiders,” which exacerbates divisions among elites and political, social, and civil society activists.
Some experts assert that the most credible hope for a more democratic and free Iran lies within the country among civil society activists, labor organizers, students, professionals, women’s groups, and reformist forces in the government who understand how Iran’s complex, labyrinthine system functions. Any successful democratic transition requires deep knowledge of the country’s political economy, elite networks, and bureaucracy, and the ability to secure at least passive cooperation from large segments of the government and security apparatus. This cannot be designed from abroad.
In a best-case scenario, domestic democratic forces and supporters abroad should act in close coordination. Together, they could help unlock Iran’s significant political, economic, and international potential. However, Iran remains far from this point.
Moreover, a gap exists in the country between elites and Iranian society. One reason is that protesters from various sectors have not yet created institutional or organizational counter spaces, such as those that existed during the Shah’s era before the revolution. According to Iranian sociologist, Mohammad Reza Nikfar, currently, this counter space exists only in street protests, which alone is insufficient.
Some protest movements believe that serious change is impossible without foreign intervention — although there is no reliable way to gauge how widely this view is held. However, many Iranians doubt they can rely on the Trump administration — or any foreign power — for protection against government repression. There is also the question of what would follow regime change and who would deal with the likely chaos.
Accordingly, one scenario in Iran is a continuation of the current system, with stronger political clout. A more positive alternative is a negotiated transitional scenario in which moderate elements within the regime and broader society recognize the unsustainability of the status quo and engage in dialogue to outline a constitutional transition toward a more representative system.
What the protesters demand — in their slogans and courage — is self-determination. Iran possesses abundant internal leadership capacity, as well as exiled supporters willing to help restore the country to its rightful international position. Ultimately, however, this is an Iranian struggle, and the U.S. should not assume it can direct events on the ground.
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