Editor’s Note: Binar FK worked for a decade as a journalist based in Iraqi Kurdistan, covering wars, politics and extremist groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda and Iranian proxies. He has also collaborated with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, YouGov, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, among other organizations working to resolve conflicts. He has asked that his last name be masked for reasons of personal safety.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
On Oct. 20, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is holding parliamentary elections. The upcoming vote, delayed for two years due to disagreements between rival parties over the voting system, is an opportunity to showcase Kurdish democracy amid the conflicts and instability plaguing the Middle East.
The region, which has considerable autonomy under the Iraqi federal system, was supposed to hold elections by the end of 2022. But the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) failed to reach an agreement on amending the electoral system, particularly regarding minority seats. As a result, the Kurdistan Parliament was suspended in May 2023.
Subsequently, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court ruled that a previous extension of the Kurdistan Parliament’s term was unconstitutional. The court mandated new elections, effectively dissolving the Kurdish legislature.
Under the new law, the Kurdistan Region has been divided into four electoral constituencies. This marks a departure from the 2018 system, which used an open-list proportional representation model within a single constituency.
There are 3,789,000 registered voters, compared to 3,085,461 eligible voters in 2018. The parties are competing for 100 seats, with five reserved for minorities and a 30 percent quota for women.
KDP president Masoud Barzani, running under the slogan “Stability, Prosperity, Unity, and Resilience,” has highlighted the party’s traditional nationalistic narrative, emphasizing the historic sacrifices of the Kurdish people. In a campaign address, Barzani portrayed the Kurdistan region as an achievement built on the “blood of martyrs, Anfal [an anti-Kurdish campaign pursued by the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein] victims, heroic Peshmerga fighters, and the broader Kurdish struggle.”
KDP Vice President Masrour Barzani reaffirmed the party’s long-standing role, stating, “Whenever the Kurdistan Region has come under attack, the KDP has been at the forefront of its defense and remains resolute in this role.”
The KDP has been led by descendants of Mustafa Barzani, while the PUK is stewarded by the descendants of its late founder, Jalal Talabani.
PUK President Bafel Talabani – Talabani’s eldest son — launched the party’s campaign with a fiery speech under the slogan “We will end it,” focusing on discontent with the KDP’s dominance of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). “For 17 of the past 19 years, the prime minister and key ministries have been controlled by the other party [the KDP],” Talabani said. “Are you satisfied with the current situation?”
Speaking at a stadium in his party’s stronghold of Sulaymaniyah, Talabani challenged the KDP’s patriotism, claiming that “the PUK is much stronger, bigger, more loyal, and more dedicated to the Kurdish cause than they are.”
Talabani emphasized the region’s potential, stating, “This country is a paradise if managed well. We have oil, gas, and water. We have a loyal, brave, capable, and educated population.” Talabani urged Barzani to “debate in front of all the Kurdish people to determine whose program is better for Kurdistan.”
The KRG also has a third party known as the Gorran Movement, which was founded in 2009 out of dissatisfaction with both major parties. Dana Ahmad Majid, the current leader, sought to rebuild voter trust by addressing past shortcomings as a result of joining previous KRG governments. He outlined a potential shift in strategy by emphasizing electoral gain over governmental participation, stating, “Whatever the election results, we will not participate in the government until we form a parliamentary majority.” However, in 2021, the party failed to win a single seat, a sharp decline from the 24 seats it secured in 2014 elections.
Another splinter party is led by Lahur Talabany, who was ousted as co-president of the PUK. Popularly known as Lahur Sheikh Jangi, he now heads the People’s Front party, which is focusing on reforms in governance, justice, and security.
In his first speech as party leader, Sheikh Jangi said, “The People’s Front is a serious political project, a diverse people’s movement that came into existence for major and crucial tasks, including reforming public salaries and providing security and stability for the people of the Kurdistan Region.” Jangi emphasized the need for public participation to address what he described as “corrupt governance.”
Another new party, the Halwest Movement, under Ali Hama Salah, also criticizes power concentration, stating that “governance in Kurdistan is in the hands of five people: Masoud Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani, Masrour Barzani, Bafel Talabani, and Qubad Talabani.” Salah invited these leaders to a public debate to discuss future governance and solutions to the region’s challenges. He emphasized that the Halwest Movement lacks a specific geographic “zone” of power, unlike the KDP and PUK.
Salah contended that both the PUK and KDP hindered the establishment of key national institutions. He argued that these parties operated as “companies,” exploiting the region’s oil and wealth, and holding on to power through repression.
Yet another new party, the New Generation Movement, is led by businessman Shaswar Abdulwahid. He launched his campaign by also criticizing the long-standing rule of the PUK and KDP. Abdulwahid, known for leading a movement in 2017 against an independence referendum that backfired with the loss of Kirkuk to the Baghdad government, urged voters to “open your eyes and tell them [KDP and PUK] you are lying.”
If elections are held peacefully in Kurdistan region of Iraq, they will carry broader significance, offering a counter-narrative to the violence and governance failures prevailing in much of the rest of the Middle East.
However, a deepening of the divided house could undermine the stability and democratic resilience that the election aims to project and even threaten the KRG’s existence.
The KRG has difficult relations with both Turkey and Iran, two neighbors that have historically vied for influence among Iraqi Kurds. Turkey’s military operations in northern Iraq and Iran’s backing of militia groups threaten KRG rule. Both Ankara and Tehran have their own strategic interests in Iraq, and the KRG’s ability to balance these relationships will be crucial to maintaining regional stability and safeguarding Kurdish autonomy.
Traditionally, Turkey enjoys a closer relationship with the KDP. Tensions between the PUK and Ankara have escalated over the past two years, with Turkey accusing PUK leader Talabani of ties to groups linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK, a group that has fought for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey. Ankara has closed its airspace to flights to and from Sulaimaniyah, citing increased ‘’PKK presence.’’ More ominously, a former Turkish military officer has called for the assassination of Talabani.
Historically, Iran has had a stronger relationship with the PUK. However, during a recent visit to Iraq, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held discussions with KRG President Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and KDP President Masoud Barzani.
The outcome of the election will influence the trajectory of the KRG’s relations with its neighbors as well as the United States. The U.S. is planning to reduce U.S. forces stationed at bases in central Iraq in 2025 and relocate some to Erbil, the capital of the KRI. Any shifts in U.S. foreign policy could leave the KRG more vulnerable to regional powers such as Turkey. The KRG must also navigate its complicated relations with the central government in Baghdad.
Binar FK is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Keough School of Global Affairs and a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA. Currently based in Washington, D.C., he formerly worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the Middle East for a decade, with a focus on extremist groups such as ISIL, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias.
Kurdish Elections: A Critical Juncture Amid Regional Instability
By Binar FK
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Binar FK worked for a decade as a journalist based in Iraqi Kurdistan, covering wars, politics and extremist groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda and Iranian proxies. He has also collaborated with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, YouGov, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, among other organizations working to resolve conflicts. He has asked that his last name be masked for reasons of personal safety.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
On Oct. 20, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is holding parliamentary elections. The upcoming vote, delayed for two years due to disagreements between rival parties over the voting system, is an opportunity to showcase Kurdish democracy amid the conflicts and instability plaguing the Middle East.
The region, which has considerable autonomy under the Iraqi federal system, was supposed to hold elections by the end of 2022. But the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) failed to reach an agreement on amending the electoral system, particularly regarding minority seats. As a result, the Kurdistan Parliament was suspended in May 2023.
Subsequently, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court ruled that a previous extension of the Kurdistan Parliament’s term was unconstitutional. The court mandated new elections, effectively dissolving the Kurdish legislature.
Under the new law, the Kurdistan Region has been divided into four electoral constituencies. This marks a departure from the 2018 system, which used an open-list proportional representation model within a single constituency.
There are 3,789,000 registered voters, compared to 3,085,461 eligible voters in 2018. The parties are competing for 100 seats, with five reserved for minorities and a 30 percent quota for women.
KDP president Masoud Barzani, running under the slogan “Stability, Prosperity, Unity, and Resilience,” has highlighted the party’s traditional nationalistic narrative, emphasizing the historic sacrifices of the Kurdish people. In a campaign address, Barzani portrayed the Kurdistan region as an achievement built on the “blood of martyrs, Anfal [an anti-Kurdish campaign pursued by the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein] victims, heroic Peshmerga fighters, and the broader Kurdish struggle.”
KDP Vice President Masrour Barzani reaffirmed the party’s long-standing role, stating, “Whenever the Kurdistan Region has come under attack, the KDP has been at the forefront of its defense and remains resolute in this role.”
The KDP has been led by descendants of Mustafa Barzani, while the PUK is stewarded by the descendants of its late founder, Jalal Talabani.
PUK President Bafel Talabani – Talabani’s eldest son — launched the party’s campaign with a fiery speech under the slogan “We will end it,” focusing on discontent with the KDP’s dominance of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). “For 17 of the past 19 years, the prime minister and key ministries have been controlled by the other party [the KDP],” Talabani said. “Are you satisfied with the current situation?”
Speaking at a stadium in his party’s stronghold of Sulaymaniyah, Talabani challenged the KDP’s patriotism, claiming that “the PUK is much stronger, bigger, more loyal, and more dedicated to the Kurdish cause than they are.”
Talabani emphasized the region’s potential, stating, “This country is a paradise if managed well. We have oil, gas, and water. We have a loyal, brave, capable, and educated population.” Talabani urged Barzani to “debate in front of all the Kurdish people to determine whose program is better for Kurdistan.”
The KRG also has a third party known as the Gorran Movement, which was founded in 2009 out of dissatisfaction with both major parties. Dana Ahmad Majid, the current leader, sought to rebuild voter trust by addressing past shortcomings as a result of joining previous KRG governments. He outlined a potential shift in strategy by emphasizing electoral gain over governmental participation, stating, “Whatever the election results, we will not participate in the government until we form a parliamentary majority.” However, in 2021, the party failed to win a single seat, a sharp decline from the 24 seats it secured in 2014 elections.
Another splinter party is led by Lahur Talabany, who was ousted as co-president of the PUK. Popularly known as Lahur Sheikh Jangi, he now heads the People’s Front party, which is focusing on reforms in governance, justice, and security.
In his first speech as party leader, Sheikh Jangi said, “The People’s Front is a serious political project, a diverse people’s movement that came into existence for major and crucial tasks, including reforming public salaries and providing security and stability for the people of the Kurdistan Region.” Jangi emphasized the need for public participation to address what he described as “corrupt governance.”
Another new party, the Halwest Movement, under Ali Hama Salah, also criticizes power concentration, stating that “governance in Kurdistan is in the hands of five people: Masoud Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani, Masrour Barzani, Bafel Talabani, and Qubad Talabani.” Salah invited these leaders to a public debate to discuss future governance and solutions to the region’s challenges. He emphasized that the Halwest Movement lacks a specific geographic “zone” of power, unlike the KDP and PUK.
Salah contended that both the PUK and KDP hindered the establishment of key national institutions. He argued that these parties operated as “companies,” exploiting the region’s oil and wealth, and holding on to power through repression.
Yet another new party, the New Generation Movement, is led by businessman Shaswar Abdulwahid. He launched his campaign by also criticizing the long-standing rule of the PUK and KDP. Abdulwahid, known for leading a movement in 2017 against an independence referendum that backfired with the loss of Kirkuk to the Baghdad government, urged voters to “open your eyes and tell them [KDP and PUK] you are lying.”
If elections are held peacefully in Kurdistan region of Iraq, they will carry broader significance, offering a counter-narrative to the violence and governance failures prevailing in much of the rest of the Middle East.
However, a deepening of the divided house could undermine the stability and democratic resilience that the election aims to project and even threaten the KRG’s existence.
The KRG has difficult relations with both Turkey and Iran, two neighbors that have historically vied for influence among Iraqi Kurds. Turkey’s military operations in northern Iraq and Iran’s backing of militia groups threaten KRG rule. Both Ankara and Tehran have their own strategic interests in Iraq, and the KRG’s ability to balance these relationships will be crucial to maintaining regional stability and safeguarding Kurdish autonomy.
Traditionally, Turkey enjoys a closer relationship with the KDP. Tensions between the PUK and Ankara have escalated over the past two years, with Turkey accusing PUK leader Talabani of ties to groups linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK, a group that has fought for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey. Ankara has closed its airspace to flights to and from Sulaimaniyah, citing increased ‘’PKK presence.’’ More ominously, a former Turkish military officer has called for the assassination of Talabani.
Historically, Iran has had a stronger relationship with the PUK. However, during a recent visit to Iraq, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held discussions with KRG President Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and KDP President Masoud Barzani.
The outcome of the election will influence the trajectory of the KRG’s relations with its neighbors as well as the United States. The U.S. is planning to reduce U.S. forces stationed at bases in central Iraq in 2025 and relocate some to Erbil, the capital of the KRI. Any shifts in U.S. foreign policy could leave the KRG more vulnerable to regional powers such as Turkey. The KRG must also navigate its complicated relations with the central government in Baghdad.
Binar FK is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Keough School of Global Affairs and a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA. Currently based in Washington, D.C., he formerly worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the Middle East for a decade, with a focus on extremist groups such as ISIL, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias.
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