A Jan. 3 terrorist attack in Kerman that killed nearly 100 people – the worst such incident in recent memory for the Islamic Republic – was a stark reminder of the Iranian intelligence community’s vulnerabilities and failures.
The failure to protect the Soleimani commemoration is especially glaring considering prior attacks. Just two weeks before twin suicide bombers targeted the commemoration for the late Gen. Qasem Soleimani – killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2020 in another Iranian intelligence fiasco — Baluch militants launched an attack on a border patrol station in Sistan-Baluchestan province, near Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, resulting in the death of 11 police officers. This province in southeastern Iran has historically been a gateway for radical Sunni and separatist militants to penetrate the country. In May 2006, for example, some 30 terrorists infiltrated Iran and traveled to Kerman province where they blocked a major road and opened fire on cars, killing 12 people. Public events, particularly those associated with the military, have been frequent targets for terrorist attacks. In 2018, gunmen assaulted a military parade in Ahwaz, killing 29 people.
Yet Iran’s intelligence services have repeatedly failed to implement effective preventative measures. However, these were not the only failures of Iran’s intelligence community, other failures include the assassination of a half dozen nuclear scientists, the theft of nuclear archives, and the cyber sabotage of crucial facilities, including drone factories, uranium enrichment centers, ballistic missile bases, and gas stations.
The series of events raises questions about the factors that have undermined the performance of the Iranian intelligence community. The range and scope of threats Iran faces have grown significantly over the past two decades. Iran’s adversarial relationship with the U.S. and its allies — a function of Iran’s advancing nuclear program as well as its aggressive regional posture — has increased its enemies’ motivation to target it. Iran also faces rising domestic discontent that makes it more vulnerable to penetration.
Iran’s first massive intelligence failure was the Stuxnet incident in 2010, when a malicious computer virus devised by the U.S. and Israel inflicted substantial damage on Iran’s nuclear program by destroying about 1,000 centrifuges— at the time, approximately 10% of Iran’s total. Stuxnet was reportedly introduced into the facility at Natanz by a Dutch engineer recruited by the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD, underscoring the multifaceted and global nature of the challenges facing Iranian intelligence.
Additionally, the Islamic Republic has incurred the wrath of Arab regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia. The Saudis notably sponsored the UK-based Iran International TV, a Persian-language news channel that played such a pivotal role in broadcasting the 2022 protests over enforced veiling that it was declared a terrorist organization by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. Additionally, Turkey’s expanding alliance with Azerbaijan has heightened Iranian concerns about Turkey’s growing influence in the Caucasus as well as pro-Turkic sentiment among Iranian Azeris, the largest ethnic group in the country after Persians.
Iran must contend with chaotic or hostile neighbors that serve as safe havens for opposition forces. To the east, Iran faces an Afghanistan once again under the rule of the Taliban. Besides engaging in minor armed clashes with Iran over border disputes and drug trafficking, the Taliban is struggling to neutralize the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K), a sworn enemy of Shi’ite Iran that according to US intelligence community, was responsible for the Jan. 3 attack in Kerman. Additionally, there’s Pakistan, where the government has failed to contain Baloch separatists. Northern Pakistan has become a refuge for Iranian Baloch separatists, such as the group Jaish al-Adl.
To the west, Iran faces Iraqi Kurdistan, whose Qandil Mountains have afforded sanctuary to various armed Iranian Kurdish separatists, including the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), designated as a terrorist group by the United States.
To the north, Azerbaijan not only has growing ties with Turkey but a deepening relationship with Israel. Iranian officials allege that Azerbaijan allowed Israel to establish a spy network within its borders. From this base, Iran claims, Israeli agents have planned and executed missions targeting Iranian scientists. Tehran alleges that Baku played a role in facilitating the transfer of confidential documents related to Iran’s nuclear program. These documents are believed to have been stolen in Tehran by Mossad agents in early 2018 and subsequently transported back to Israel. Then President Trump cited the archive when he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal later in 2018.
Iranian intelligence has also had to contend with rising levels of domestic discontent. In its first three decades, the Islamic Republic witnessed only two major national protests – student protests of 1999 and the Green Movement of 2009 after a questionable presidential election. The last decade has seen four major and bloody series of demonstrations, including economic protests in 2017-18, 2019, and 2020, and the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement after the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody. These protests have not only stretched the capabilities of the intelligence community but have likely impacted its morale and focus.
It is telling that the surge in assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists – attributed to Israel – followed the crushing of the Green Movement. That movement was led by individuals who were once high-ranking officials, including a former prime minister, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Saeed Hajjarian, the architect of Iran’s intelligence service. This suggests that an ideological split may have penetrated the ranks of active intelligence officers.
Typically, spies and other assets are motivated by a desire for money, ideological differences with the regime, or blackmail. Domestic crises as well as Iran’s severe financial problems have provided opportunities for Iran’s rivals to recruit assets within the country. Meanwhile, the strict moral and social codes enforced by the regime provide leverage against individuals who may have engaged in activities that the Islamic Republic considers immoral or sinful.
Some Iranian strategies to tackle intelligence failures may have inadvertently compounded vulnerabilities. In 2009, during the Green Movement, Iran elevated the intelligence wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to a full-scale organization. Although officially aimed at enhancing the country’s capabilities, the new body’s responsibilities and authority overlap with those of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, leading to potential internal competition and conflicts, which even Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has acknowledged.
Former Intelligence Minister Seyyed Mahmoud Alavi claimed that his organization had precise details about the time and location of a planned attack on Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. However, he said the ministry did not act because a prime suspect was in the military and beyond its jurisdiction. The ministry reportedly shared the intelligence with IRGC counterparts, who failed to take appropriate measures. Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on Nov. 27, 2020, by a remote-controlled machine gun in an elaborate Israeli plot.
A final reason why Iran has been so vulnerable to terrorism has been a lack of an effective deterrent capability. Indeed, Iran finds itself in a complex situation when it comes to responding to intelligence threats, especially from more capable players like the United States or Israel. Iran is aware that responding aggressively to espionage or sabotage could potentially lead to a full-scale war, a scenario the Islamic Republic is keen to avoid.
In the current context, Iran’s options to overcome intelligence failures are limited. These include redefining the division of labor within the intelligence community, re-vetting security forces, and de-escalating tensions with Israel and Western nations.
Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer and scholar of international relations, focusing on Russia and the Middle East, at the University of South Florida (USF). His handle on X, formerly known as Twitter, is @MahmoudianArman.
Kerman Terrorist Attack Highlights Iranian Intelligence Failures
By Arman Mahmoudian
Middle East & North Africa
A Jan. 3 terrorist attack in Kerman that killed nearly 100 people – the worst such incident in recent memory for the Islamic Republic – was a stark reminder of the Iranian intelligence community’s vulnerabilities and failures.
The failure to protect the Soleimani commemoration is especially glaring considering prior attacks. Just two weeks before twin suicide bombers targeted the commemoration for the late Gen. Qasem Soleimani – killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2020 in another Iranian intelligence fiasco — Baluch militants launched an attack on a border patrol station in Sistan-Baluchestan province, near Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, resulting in the death of 11 police officers. This province in southeastern Iran has historically been a gateway for radical Sunni and separatist militants to penetrate the country. In May 2006, for example, some 30 terrorists infiltrated Iran and traveled to Kerman province where they blocked a major road and opened fire on cars, killing 12 people. Public events, particularly those associated with the military, have been frequent targets for terrorist attacks. In 2018, gunmen assaulted a military parade in Ahwaz, killing 29 people.
Yet Iran’s intelligence services have repeatedly failed to implement effective preventative measures. However, these were not the only failures of Iran’s intelligence community, other failures include the assassination of a half dozen nuclear scientists, the theft of nuclear archives, and the cyber sabotage of crucial facilities, including drone factories, uranium enrichment centers, ballistic missile bases, and gas stations.
The series of events raises questions about the factors that have undermined the performance of the Iranian intelligence community. The range and scope of threats Iran faces have grown significantly over the past two decades. Iran’s adversarial relationship with the U.S. and its allies — a function of Iran’s advancing nuclear program as well as its aggressive regional posture — has increased its enemies’ motivation to target it. Iran also faces rising domestic discontent that makes it more vulnerable to penetration.
Iran’s first massive intelligence failure was the Stuxnet incident in 2010, when a malicious computer virus devised by the U.S. and Israel inflicted substantial damage on Iran’s nuclear program by destroying about 1,000 centrifuges— at the time, approximately 10% of Iran’s total. Stuxnet was reportedly introduced into the facility at Natanz by a Dutch engineer recruited by the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD, underscoring the multifaceted and global nature of the challenges facing Iranian intelligence.
Additionally, the Islamic Republic has incurred the wrath of Arab regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia. The Saudis notably sponsored the UK-based Iran International TV, a Persian-language news channel that played such a pivotal role in broadcasting the 2022 protests over enforced veiling that it was declared a terrorist organization by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. Additionally, Turkey’s expanding alliance with Azerbaijan has heightened Iranian concerns about Turkey’s growing influence in the Caucasus as well as pro-Turkic sentiment among Iranian Azeris, the largest ethnic group in the country after Persians.
Iran must contend with chaotic or hostile neighbors that serve as safe havens for opposition forces. To the east, Iran faces an Afghanistan once again under the rule of the Taliban. Besides engaging in minor armed clashes with Iran over border disputes and drug trafficking, the Taliban is struggling to neutralize the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K), a sworn enemy of Shi’ite Iran that according to US intelligence community, was responsible for the Jan. 3 attack in Kerman. Additionally, there’s Pakistan, where the government has failed to contain Baloch separatists. Northern Pakistan has become a refuge for Iranian Baloch separatists, such as the group Jaish al-Adl.
To the west, Iran faces Iraqi Kurdistan, whose Qandil Mountains have afforded sanctuary to various armed Iranian Kurdish separatists, including the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), designated as a terrorist group by the United States.
To the north, Azerbaijan not only has growing ties with Turkey but a deepening relationship with Israel. Iranian officials allege that Azerbaijan allowed Israel to establish a spy network within its borders. From this base, Iran claims, Israeli agents have planned and executed missions targeting Iranian scientists. Tehran alleges that Baku played a role in facilitating the transfer of confidential documents related to Iran’s nuclear program. These documents are believed to have been stolen in Tehran by Mossad agents in early 2018 and subsequently transported back to Israel. Then President Trump cited the archive when he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal later in 2018.
Iranian intelligence has also had to contend with rising levels of domestic discontent. In its first three decades, the Islamic Republic witnessed only two major national protests – student protests of 1999 and the Green Movement of 2009 after a questionable presidential election. The last decade has seen four major and bloody series of demonstrations, including economic protests in 2017-18, 2019, and 2020, and the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement after the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody. These protests have not only stretched the capabilities of the intelligence community but have likely impacted its morale and focus.
It is telling that the surge in assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists – attributed to Israel – followed the crushing of the Green Movement. That movement was led by individuals who were once high-ranking officials, including a former prime minister, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Saeed Hajjarian, the architect of Iran’s intelligence service. This suggests that an ideological split may have penetrated the ranks of active intelligence officers.
Typically, spies and other assets are motivated by a desire for money, ideological differences with the regime, or blackmail. Domestic crises as well as Iran’s severe financial problems have provided opportunities for Iran’s rivals to recruit assets within the country. Meanwhile, the strict moral and social codes enforced by the regime provide leverage against individuals who may have engaged in activities that the Islamic Republic considers immoral or sinful.
Some Iranian strategies to tackle intelligence failures may have inadvertently compounded vulnerabilities. In 2009, during the Green Movement, Iran elevated the intelligence wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to a full-scale organization. Although officially aimed at enhancing the country’s capabilities, the new body’s responsibilities and authority overlap with those of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, leading to potential internal competition and conflicts, which even Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has acknowledged.
Former Intelligence Minister Seyyed Mahmoud Alavi claimed that his organization had precise details about the time and location of a planned attack on Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. However, he said the ministry did not act because a prime suspect was in the military and beyond its jurisdiction. The ministry reportedly shared the intelligence with IRGC counterparts, who failed to take appropriate measures. Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on Nov. 27, 2020, by a remote-controlled machine gun in an elaborate Israeli plot.
A final reason why Iran has been so vulnerable to terrorism has been a lack of an effective deterrent capability. Indeed, Iran finds itself in a complex situation when it comes to responding to intelligence threats, especially from more capable players like the United States or Israel. Iran is aware that responding aggressively to espionage or sabotage could potentially lead to a full-scale war, a scenario the Islamic Republic is keen to avoid.
In the current context, Iran’s options to overcome intelligence failures are limited. These include redefining the division of labor within the intelligence community, re-vetting security forces, and de-escalating tensions with Israel and Western nations.
Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer and scholar of international relations, focusing on Russia and the Middle East, at the University of South Florida (USF). His handle on X, formerly known as Twitter, is @MahmoudianArman.
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