Assassination of Quds Force General Stirs Right-Wing Anger in Iran

Despite the use of harsh rhetoric, the Iranian government has not carried out adequate retaliation for the assassination of its generals

By  Mohammad Mazhari

Israel’s recent assassination of Sayyed Razi Mousavi, the most senior Iranian commander in Syria, has ignited a new debate in Iran over how to respond.

The Christmas Day killing, which has parallels with the U.S. assassination of Quds Force leader Gen. Qassem Soleimani four years ago tomorrow, comes in the aftermath of the Oct. 7 Hamas assault on Israel that provoked rising tensions between Israel and Hezbollah as well as attacks on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea.

Mousavi, a senior Quds Force general, played a pivotal role in orchestrating Iran’s military endeavors in Syria. His contributions included facilitating the delivery of Fateh-class surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Hezbollah, thereby enhancing the military prowess of the Lebanese group. The Israeli assassination seemed to aim at inhibiting such transfers and deterring Hezbollah’s rocketing of northern Israel.

The Iranian public initially reacted with anger and protest to Mousavi’s killing.  According to Mehr News Agency, a group of hardline students rallied in front of the Supreme National Security Council, the nation’s chief foreign and military policy-making body, and called for a “painful response” to the assassination.

The terms “painful response” and “severe revenge” were used by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei after Soleimani’s death on Jan. 3, 2020.

“With his departure and by God’s power, his work and path will not halt; severe revenge awaits those criminals who stained their hands with his blood and the blood of other martyrs from last night’s incident,” Khamenei said at the time.

While some observers warned that the Trump administration’s audacious decision to kill Soleimani in a drone strike near Baghdad International Airport could jeopardize American lives and potentially ignite a war, Iran’s subsequent response was seen as relatively restrained.

On Jan. 8, 2020, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched a military operation targeting the Al-Asad airbase and another airbase in Erbil with ballistic missiles. However, Iran tipped off the Iraqi government in advance and while some 100 Americans suffered concussions, there were no fatalities.

When some months later, the high-ranking Iranian nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was killed on the outskirts of Tehran, a group of seminary students gathered in the city of Qom and harshly criticized political and military leaders for not taking decisive action in retaliation. They held placards demanding “real severe revenge,” underscoring increasing dissatisfaction within the regime’s religious base.

A protest in Qom, where seminary students are asking Iranian military authorities to explain why “severe revenge” was not carried out after the assassination of Fakhrizadeh.

Iran has responded to a series of assassinations and subversive acts attributed to Israel over the past decade with alleged efforts to kill Israeli citizens in Turkey and Europe.  The Times of Israel reported recently that Iran is still planning attacks on Israeli citizens in Thailand, a popular tourist destination for Israelis.

However, such plots have largely been unsuccessful and critics of the Iranian government from the right dismiss them as insufficient retaliation for the deaths of senior Iranian figures.

Towhid Azizi, a social media activist with close ties to hardliners, expressed a stern warning to the Iranian government on the social media platform X, formerly Twitter. “If you don’t respond to the assassination of Razi Mousavi swiftly, clearly, and with a significantly stronger reaction, you will face demise. Understand your predicament and reconsider your strategic patience!'”

Tellingly, the camp favoring restraint and a careful, calculated response is more prevalent among conservative politicians currently in power. While President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian have warned that Tel Aviv will face consequences, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Parliament, and other senior conservatives did not mention “harsh revenge” in their statements after Mousavi’s death. Hardline journalists Abdollah Ganji and Mohammad Shirvani argued instead that a prompt response against Israel would play into its hands.

A revised interpretation of “severe revenge” calls for a long-term battle of attrition instead of immediate retaliation. In a notable study entitled “The Doctrine of Harsh Revenge in the Defense Thought of Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei; Basics and Mechanisms of Realization,” Abdolhossein Allahkaram, a professor of political science at Azad University, and colleagues interpret Khamenei’s concept of revenge as a multifaceted strategy that aims to achieve an ideological triumph over the U.S. and its allies by removing American influence form the Middle East.

Allahkaram has an interesting background as an IRGC commander during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.  He currently heads the coordination council of Iran’s Hezbollah, a hardliner group that has been actively involved in quelling student and anti-government protests in recent years.

But this redefinition of “severe revenge” seems increasingly unsatisfactory to some hardline supporters of the Islamic regime. In a recent letter to Raisi, leaders of the Basij paramilitary organization wrote, “After the killing of military advisers in Syria, various Iranian government and military officials, including the Foreign Minister, condemned these acts and pledged a strong response against Israel. Despite these promises, there has been no significant action from Iran demonstrating its full capability, while Israel continues its aggressive stance, including repeated assaults on Iran’s forces and the killing of a key IRGC commander involved in the fight against ISIS.”

Statements from IRGC officials have made matters worse by highlighting differences within the organization. In an effort to respond to criticisms regarding the unfulfilled promise of “painful revenge,” Ramezan Sharif, the IRGC spokesperson, linked the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel to retribution for Qasem Soleimani’s assassination. Hamas, however, swiftly denied this linkage, asserting that its devastating attack on Israel was in response to “Israeli occupation and continuous hostilities against our people and holy sites.” Complicating matters further, the IRGC’s top commander, Hossein Salami, declared on Dec. 28, 2023, “We have not yet avenged the assassination of Martyr Qasem Soleimani. Such retribution will occur at an appropriate time. Our actions are transparent, and we harbor no fear in our pursuits.”

This statement contradicts both the IRGC spokesman and Khamenei’s earlier assertion that launching a barrage of ballistic missiles at two Iraqi military bases housing American troops was a “slap” against the U.S. military presence in the region.

Evidently, Iranian officials are confused and divided regarding the appropriate method of exacting revenge. Their relative inaction is in line with a policy of strategic patience that seeks to avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. or Israel.

Yet, remaining silent in response to Israeli attacks on Iranian facilities and forces could erode the legitimacy of the Islamic regime – already widely unpopular among ordinary Iranians — even among its staunchest supporters.

Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021.

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