April 2024 will go down in history as the month when Iran and Israel’s “shadow war” ended and an era of direct state-to-state military confrontation began.
The region entered this dangerous new era after the unprecedented Iranian counterattack against Israel on April 13-14. Tehran fired hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel in response to the razing of an Iranian building in a diplomatic compound in Damascus and the killing of seven Iranian officers 12 days earlier. Israel followed with an attack near Isfahan on April 19 that damaged Iranian air defenses near a nuclear installation.
The United States, which has worked anxiously to try to contain and de-escalate the conflict, is not the only external power affected by this paradigm change.
Having spent the past decade shoring up networks and asserting its influence across the Middle East, Russia also has much at stake. President Vladimir Putin’s government worked closely with Iran in Syria to preserve the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, Russia has allowed Israel to strike Iranian-related targets at will in Syria, which remains a shattered state more than a decade after the outbreak of civil war.
What comes out of the new rules of engagement between Iran and Israel can significantly impact Russia’s future position in the region.
In general, like their counterparts in Beijing, officials in Moscow seek greater stability in the Middle East. Turmoil in the region can harm Russian interests. These include blunting violent Islamic extremism that has targeted Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, such as Tajikistan. On March 22, terrorists including Tajiks from the jihadist group ISIS-K attacked a concert hall in Moscow, killing nearly 150 people.
Beyond counterterrorism, Russia seeks to prop up friendly authoritarian Arab governments, protect Russia’s military presence in Syria, attract foreign investment from wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf, build trade ties with the region that circumvent Western sanctions over Ukraine and coordinate energy policies with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members.
Therefore, any all-out war would be detrimental for Russian interests. However, the recent escalation between Iran and Israel could potentially benefit Russia in several ways.
First, higher levels of insecurity in the Middle East nearly seven months into the Gaza war reinforce Russia’s message to Arab governments and societies that the United States is an irresponsible and ineffective guarantor of stability in this part of the world. Putin and other Russian officials blame decades of what they view as one-sided American support for Israel for failing to resolve a root cause of the Middle East’s crises — the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This message sits well with Arab audiences that are increasingly angry at the U.S. over the mounting humanitarian toll in Gaza.
Second, more headlines out of the Middle East shift global attention away from Ukraine, which Russia welcomes. Even with the U.S. Congress finally passing more aid to Ukraine, the war there appears to be in a stalemate and the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency puts the future of U.S. support for Kyiv in doubt. Already, Russia has benefited from months of delay in approving new U.S. aid while bombarding Kharkiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities at a heightened tempo.
Third, the end of the shadow war between Iran and Israel can strengthen Russia’s influence in the region in other ways. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government may see Putin as the leader with the most leverage with Iran given the deepening Russia-Iran military cooperation since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That is true despite the Kremlin’s condemnation of Israeli conduct in Gaza and Russia’s justification of Iran’s April 13-14 counterattack on Israel. Some GCC states may similarly view Russia as the global power to turn to in diplomatic efforts aimed at easing Iran-related tensions given the apparent inability of the U.S. and Western Europe to influence Tehran.
Fourth, if Iran comes under future Israeli attacks, the Islamic Republic’s partnership with Russia stands to become increasingly important to Iranian defense strategies. Specifically, the Iranians will have even greater need for Russia’s advanced air defense systems to help shoot down Israeli stealth fighter jets and missiles. Russia and Iran might also finalize agreements currently being negotiated for Moscow to supply Tehran with Russia’s most capable fighter jets, the Su-35s. In sum, Russian support for Iran could change Israeli calculations about the safety and viability of future attacks against Iran, serving to counter the Israeli threat to nuclear facilities, military bases, and other targets inside the country.
Even if the crisis has for now been contained, as suggested by Tehran’s initial dismissive response to Israel’s reported attack inside Iran suggests, the risk of hostilities widening into a regional war must not be dismissed. The continuation of the war in Gaza and other unresolved conflicts in the Middle East leaves open the possibility of future Israeli attacks against Iran and vice-versa that could, at a moment’s notice, restart the dangerous upward movement on the escalation ladder.
Despite Russia’s top foreign policy priority being the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin can’t afford to ignore daily developments in the Middle East as the more medium-term consequences of the new rules of engagement become clearer.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
Russia Benefits from Continued but Calibrated Iran-Israel Hostilities
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
April 2024 will go down in history as the month when Iran and Israel’s “shadow war” ended and an era of direct state-to-state military confrontation began.
The region entered this dangerous new era after the unprecedented Iranian counterattack against Israel on April 13-14. Tehran fired hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel in response to the razing of an Iranian building in a diplomatic compound in Damascus and the killing of seven Iranian officers 12 days earlier. Israel followed with an attack near Isfahan on April 19 that damaged Iranian air defenses near a nuclear installation.
The United States, which has worked anxiously to try to contain and de-escalate the conflict, is not the only external power affected by this paradigm change.
Having spent the past decade shoring up networks and asserting its influence across the Middle East, Russia also has much at stake. President Vladimir Putin’s government worked closely with Iran in Syria to preserve the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, Russia has allowed Israel to strike Iranian-related targets at will in Syria, which remains a shattered state more than a decade after the outbreak of civil war.
What comes out of the new rules of engagement between Iran and Israel can significantly impact Russia’s future position in the region.
In general, like their counterparts in Beijing, officials in Moscow seek greater stability in the Middle East. Turmoil in the region can harm Russian interests. These include blunting violent Islamic extremism that has targeted Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, such as Tajikistan. On March 22, terrorists including Tajiks from the jihadist group ISIS-K attacked a concert hall in Moscow, killing nearly 150 people.
Beyond counterterrorism, Russia seeks to prop up friendly authoritarian Arab governments, protect Russia’s military presence in Syria, attract foreign investment from wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf, build trade ties with the region that circumvent Western sanctions over Ukraine and coordinate energy policies with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members.
Therefore, any all-out war would be detrimental for Russian interests. However, the recent escalation between Iran and Israel could potentially benefit Russia in several ways.
First, higher levels of insecurity in the Middle East nearly seven months into the Gaza war reinforce Russia’s message to Arab governments and societies that the United States is an irresponsible and ineffective guarantor of stability in this part of the world. Putin and other Russian officials blame decades of what they view as one-sided American support for Israel for failing to resolve a root cause of the Middle East’s crises — the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This message sits well with Arab audiences that are increasingly angry at the U.S. over the mounting humanitarian toll in Gaza.
Second, more headlines out of the Middle East shift global attention away from Ukraine, which Russia welcomes. Even with the U.S. Congress finally passing more aid to Ukraine, the war there appears to be in a stalemate and the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency puts the future of U.S. support for Kyiv in doubt. Already, Russia has benefited from months of delay in approving new U.S. aid while bombarding Kharkiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities at a heightened tempo.
Third, the end of the shadow war between Iran and Israel can strengthen Russia’s influence in the region in other ways. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government may see Putin as the leader with the most leverage with Iran given the deepening Russia-Iran military cooperation since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That is true despite the Kremlin’s condemnation of Israeli conduct in Gaza and Russia’s justification of Iran’s April 13-14 counterattack on Israel. Some GCC states may similarly view Russia as the global power to turn to in diplomatic efforts aimed at easing Iran-related tensions given the apparent inability of the U.S. and Western Europe to influence Tehran.
Fourth, if Iran comes under future Israeli attacks, the Islamic Republic’s partnership with Russia stands to become increasingly important to Iranian defense strategies. Specifically, the Iranians will have even greater need for Russia’s advanced air defense systems to help shoot down Israeli stealth fighter jets and missiles. Russia and Iran might also finalize agreements currently being negotiated for Moscow to supply Tehran with Russia’s most capable fighter jets, the Su-35s. In sum, Russian support for Iran could change Israeli calculations about the safety and viability of future attacks against Iran, serving to counter the Israeli threat to nuclear facilities, military bases, and other targets inside the country.
Even if the crisis has for now been contained, as suggested by Tehran’s initial dismissive response to Israel’s reported attack inside Iran suggests, the risk of hostilities widening into a regional war must not be dismissed. The continuation of the war in Gaza and other unresolved conflicts in the Middle East leaves open the possibility of future Israeli attacks against Iran and vice-versa that could, at a moment’s notice, restart the dangerous upward movement on the escalation ladder.
Despite Russia’s top foreign policy priority being the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin can’t afford to ignore daily developments in the Middle East as the more medium-term consequences of the new rules of engagement become clearer.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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