While Western attention often focuses on Iran’s growing influence in the Levant, Iran’s connections to the old Soviet republics in the South Caucasus are also strategically significant and have become even more important as Iran seeks to build links with Russia and China.
But rising tensions with Azerbaijan are threatening those efforts as Azerbaijan strengthens ties with Iranian foe Israel, builds an alliance with Turkey, and seeks to reclaim more territory from Nagorno-Karabakh, a land-locked enclave largely inhabited by Armenians that is located inside Azerbaijan.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have now fought two wars over Nagorno-Karabakh since the collapse of the Soviet Union reanimated old disputes. The second war, in 2020, left Baku in control of one-third of the enclave. Iran, which has historically sided with Armenia, has had difficulty deciding how to react.
During the first Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from 1992 to 1994, the Islamic Republic tried to restore peace between its two neighbors by offering mediation. In May 1992, Iran brought both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to Tehran for peace talks, but they failed after Armenia captured the city of Lachin. Iran’s pivot toward Armenia intensified after then Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey fomented anti-Iranian sentiment and endorsed the unification of his country with Iran’s Turkish-speaking ethnic Azeri regions.
By early 1993, Iran had saved landlocked Armenia from industrial and financial collapse by providing electricity and other supplies. Turkish sources claim that Iran also became Armenia’s leading arms supplier at the time. The war ended in a cease-fire that left Armenia in control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. The then prime minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, called Iran his nation’s lifesaver.
Iran-Azerbaijani relations further deteriorated after the war as Azerbaijan expanded ties with Israel and allowed a militant Iranian Azeri separatist movement to establish a headquarters in Baku. Iran retaliated with support for Islamist movements in Azerbaijan as well as closer ties to Armenia.
A second round of fighting in 2020 further complicated Tehran-Baku relations. Azerbaijani media started an online petition against Iranian and Russian support of Armenia, which triggered protests across Iran’s Azeri regions. Iranian officials tried to calm the situation by making statements supportive of Azeris on both sides of the border. For example, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ale-Hashem, the representative of Iran’s supreme leader to East Azerbaijan province, referred to Nagorno-Karabakh as the “land of Islam” and said Iran prayed for its freedom as it does for the liberation of Jerusalem. When the war broke out, however, Iran remained Armenia’s primary outlet for trade with the rest of the world. Azerbaijani sources accused Iran of supporting Armenia by allowing the delivery of Russian arms to Armenia via Iranian territory, although Tehran denied the claims.
The second war ended in favor of Azerbaijan, which recaptured much of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts. Since then, Iran has held war games across from the border with Azerbaijan, and well-connected Iranian media outlets have speculated about a possible Iranian invasion of its neighbor.
Iran is also concerned about trends in Georgia, which has grown closer to NATO and the United States. At the same time, Azerbaijan has expanded military and intelligence cooperation with Israel and Iran’s other major regional rival, Turkey.
From early 2000, Ankara and Baku have advanced their military cooperation by establishing a Center for Training and Education of the Azerbaijan Armed Forces as a complimentary institution of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense. The partnership evolved in 2010 into a semi-military alliance through a treaty that obliges each country to come to the defense of the other in case of foreign attack. Indeed, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev jointly attended a victory parade after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war.
To make matters worse for Iran, Azerbaijan has been deepening its relationship with Tel Aviv. In an echo of the Abraham Accords normalizing Israel’s relations with Sunni Arab states, Shiite Muslim Azerbaijan has just appointed its first ambassador to Israel, solidifying an anti-Iran Azerbaijani-Israeli front.
Iran is most concerned about intelligence cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv. Iranian officials claim that Azerbaijan allowed Israel to establish a spy network from which Israelis have carried out assassination missions against Iranian scientists. In addition, Tehran believes that Baku facilitated the transfer of secret documents about the origins of Iran’s nuclear program, which were stolen in Tehran by Mossad agents and brought back to Israel in early 2018 and used by the Trump administration to justify its unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018. Iran’s fear of Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation escalated when sources claimed that Baku had granted Israel access to airfields for possible future attacks on Iran. Azerbaijani officials have denied the reports, but Iranians remain concerned.
One might say that after four decades of dealing with Iran-backed militants in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, Israel is giving Iran a taste of its own medicine by forming a front at Iran’s northern doorstep. However, Iran needs to retain its border with Armenia to realize ambitious plans for a so-called International North-South Transit Corridor. The Russia-backed corridor would shorten transit time between India and Europe and link Russian ports with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean via the Caucasus and Iran. Azerbaijan has its own ideas about a route from Central Asia to Europe that would marginalize Russia and Iran.
If Iran increases tensions with Baku by acting directly against Azerbaijan or siding even more obviously with Armenia, Tehran could face growing separatist sentiment among its Azeri population, the second largest ethnic group in Iran after Persians. If Tehran chooses not to react to Baku’s expanding ties with Turkey and Israel, however, Azerbaijan is likely to double down on these alliances.
Recent incidents between Iran and Azerbaijan do not bode well. In January 2023, a gunman broke into the Azerbaijan Embassy in Tehran and killed its security chief. On April 6, Azerbaijan arrested six Azerbaijani men in Baku that it said were Iranian agents plotting a coup.
In recent days, the foreign ministers of Iran and Azerbaijan have spoken by telephone several times to try to de-escalate the situation. It is unclear how successful those efforts will be.
Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer and scholar of international relations, focusing on Russia and the Middle East, at the University of South Florida (USF). Follow Arman on Twitter @MahmoudianArman. Photo: Michael Taylor.
Iran Fears Rising Israeli and Turkish Influence in Azerbaijan
By Arman Mahmoudian
Middle East & North Africa
While Western attention often focuses on Iran’s growing influence in the Levant, Iran’s connections to the old Soviet republics in the South Caucasus are also strategically significant and have become even more important as Iran seeks to build links with Russia and China.
But rising tensions with Azerbaijan are threatening those efforts as Azerbaijan strengthens ties with Iranian foe Israel, builds an alliance with Turkey, and seeks to reclaim more territory from Nagorno-Karabakh, a land-locked enclave largely inhabited by Armenians that is located inside Azerbaijan.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have now fought two wars over Nagorno-Karabakh since the collapse of the Soviet Union reanimated old disputes. The second war, in 2020, left Baku in control of one-third of the enclave. Iran, which has historically sided with Armenia, has had difficulty deciding how to react.
During the first Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from 1992 to 1994, the Islamic Republic tried to restore peace between its two neighbors by offering mediation. In May 1992, Iran brought both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to Tehran for peace talks, but they failed after Armenia captured the city of Lachin. Iran’s pivot toward Armenia intensified after then Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey fomented anti-Iranian sentiment and endorsed the unification of his country with Iran’s Turkish-speaking ethnic Azeri regions.
By early 1993, Iran had saved landlocked Armenia from industrial and financial collapse by providing electricity and other supplies. Turkish sources claim that Iran also became Armenia’s leading arms supplier at the time. The war ended in a cease-fire that left Armenia in control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. The then prime minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, called Iran his nation’s lifesaver.
Iran-Azerbaijani relations further deteriorated after the war as Azerbaijan expanded ties with Israel and allowed a militant Iranian Azeri separatist movement to establish a headquarters in Baku. Iran retaliated with support for Islamist movements in Azerbaijan as well as closer ties to Armenia.
A second round of fighting in 2020 further complicated Tehran-Baku relations. Azerbaijani media started an online petition against Iranian and Russian support of Armenia, which triggered protests across Iran’s Azeri regions. Iranian officials tried to calm the situation by making statements supportive of Azeris on both sides of the border. For example, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ale-Hashem, the representative of Iran’s supreme leader to East Azerbaijan province, referred to Nagorno-Karabakh as the “land of Islam” and said Iran prayed for its freedom as it does for the liberation of Jerusalem. When the war broke out, however, Iran remained Armenia’s primary outlet for trade with the rest of the world. Azerbaijani sources accused Iran of supporting Armenia by allowing the delivery of Russian arms to Armenia via Iranian territory, although Tehran denied the claims.
The second war ended in favor of Azerbaijan, which recaptured much of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts. Since then, Iran has held war games across from the border with Azerbaijan, and well-connected Iranian media outlets have speculated about a possible Iranian invasion of its neighbor.
Iran is also concerned about trends in Georgia, which has grown closer to NATO and the United States. At the same time, Azerbaijan has expanded military and intelligence cooperation with Israel and Iran’s other major regional rival, Turkey.
From early 2000, Ankara and Baku have advanced their military cooperation by establishing a Center for Training and Education of the Azerbaijan Armed Forces as a complimentary institution of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense. The partnership evolved in 2010 into a semi-military alliance through a treaty that obliges each country to come to the defense of the other in case of foreign attack. Indeed, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev jointly attended a victory parade after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war.
To make matters worse for Iran, Azerbaijan has been deepening its relationship with Tel Aviv. In an echo of the Abraham Accords normalizing Israel’s relations with Sunni Arab states, Shiite Muslim Azerbaijan has just appointed its first ambassador to Israel, solidifying an anti-Iran Azerbaijani-Israeli front.
Iran is most concerned about intelligence cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv. Iranian officials claim that Azerbaijan allowed Israel to establish a spy network from which Israelis have carried out assassination missions against Iranian scientists. In addition, Tehran believes that Baku facilitated the transfer of secret documents about the origins of Iran’s nuclear program, which were stolen in Tehran by Mossad agents and brought back to Israel in early 2018 and used by the Trump administration to justify its unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018. Iran’s fear of Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation escalated when sources claimed that Baku had granted Israel access to airfields for possible future attacks on Iran. Azerbaijani officials have denied the reports, but Iranians remain concerned.
One might say that after four decades of dealing with Iran-backed militants in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, Israel is giving Iran a taste of its own medicine by forming a front at Iran’s northern doorstep. However, Iran needs to retain its border with Armenia to realize ambitious plans for a so-called International North-South Transit Corridor. The Russia-backed corridor would shorten transit time between India and Europe and link Russian ports with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean via the Caucasus and Iran. Azerbaijan has its own ideas about a route from Central Asia to Europe that would marginalize Russia and Iran.
If Iran increases tensions with Baku by acting directly against Azerbaijan or siding even more obviously with Armenia, Tehran could face growing separatist sentiment among its Azeri population, the second largest ethnic group in Iran after Persians. If Tehran chooses not to react to Baku’s expanding ties with Turkey and Israel, however, Azerbaijan is likely to double down on these alliances.
Recent incidents between Iran and Azerbaijan do not bode well. In January 2023, a gunman broke into the Azerbaijan Embassy in Tehran and killed its security chief. On April 6, Azerbaijan arrested six Azerbaijani men in Baku that it said were Iranian agents plotting a coup.
In recent days, the foreign ministers of Iran and Azerbaijan have spoken by telephone several times to try to de-escalate the situation. It is unclear how successful those efforts will be.
Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer and scholar of international relations, focusing on Russia and the Middle East, at the University of South Florida (USF). Follow Arman on Twitter @MahmoudianArman. Photo: Michael Taylor.
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