The Middle East and the world at large were shocked by Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7, which killed 1,200 Israelis, including hundreds of civilians. Many countries condemned the attack, but China was not among them. Instead, Beijing called on all parties to “remain calm and exercise restraint.”
Israel was the first state in the Middle East to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950, although the countries did not exchange ambassadors until 1992. Since the early 1990s, relations have expanded particularly in the economic sphere. Chinese companies have made significant investments in Israel, upgrading ports and building infrastructure, and China now ranks as Israel’s second-largest trading partner. Bilateral trade, which amounted to just $50 million in 1992, increased to $24.45 billion in 2022.
But these trade and technological ties did not appear to influence China’s reaction to the Hamas attack. Indeed, after Israel retaliated with strikes on Gaza, China called for a cease-fire and expressed sympathy for the Palestinians.
There are three main reasons for China’s response:
In the strategic horizon of the Chinese leadership, Israel is seen as a member of the Western bloc. China, as America’s main rival in the international arena, understands that the competition between the two countries could become even more intense in the not-too-distant future. It is hard to imagine that Israel would not side with the U.S. in a struggle between the leader of the democratic world and a rising dictatorial power. For example, while Israel has adopted a position of neutrality on Taiwan, which China considers a key issue., Beijing is also aware that Israel will likely side with the U.S. and its allies should it choose to invade Taiwan.
From the point of view of the Chinese leadership, what places Israel in the Western bloc is the country’s economic, political, and military structure, which is largely Western. Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war and the full support of the United States and its allies for Ukraine have made the Chinese more worried that the same Western consensus will form against them should they move against Taiwan.
Israel has not taken a clear position in the Russia-Ukraine war. The reasons for this ambiguity include the fact that a large number of Israeli citizens emigrated from Russia. Israel also needs Russian acquiescence to Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria, particularly weapons transiting Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In a possible confrontation between the U.S. and China, however, such complicating factors do not exist for Israel. In addition, Israel’s military and intelligence cooperation with NATO, the strong support for Israel shown by NATO leaders, and the Western condemnation of the Hamas attack have convinced the Chinese more than ever that Israel is an important ally of the U.S. and other Western governments. So, China sees little advantage in siding with Israel in the current conflict.
The second reason for China’s failure to condemn Hamas is that China lacks any obligation to safeguard Israel’s security and existence. Since Israeli independence in 1948, U.S. and European powers have maintained support for Israel’s survival. The interests of these states in the Middle East, coupled with powerful domestic pro-Israel lobbies, have bolstered the perception that supporting Israel’s survival is a crucial responsibility. In this context, leaders of the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany all visited Israel in the aftermath of the Hamas attack to express condolences and reaffirm solidarity with the Israeli people. The U.S. also dispatched American warships and two aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean Sea, as well as transferred more weapons to Israel.
China, however, lacks a historic role in the creation of Israel and possesses neither a powerful domestic political lobby in support of the Jewish state nor a military or security commitment to ensure Israel’s survival.
The third factor behind China’s initial reaction to the Hamas attack is China’s expanding relations with the Islamic countries of the Middle East. In recent years, China has increased political, economic, and even security ties with Arab states and Iran. On the economic front, China has signed strategic cooperation agreements with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and several other countries. China imports most of its oil from the Middle East and has become the region’s most important trading partner. Trade volume between China and Arab countries reached $330 billion by 2021.
China has also increased its diplomatic role, acting as a mediator in the resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. To build on this role in a region that the U.S. has historically dominated, China wants to avoid antagonizing Muslim countries on sensitive matters.
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries blamed Israeli repression of the Palestinians for motivating the Hamas attack, reflecting strong pro-Palestinian sentiments among their populations. Iran has long backed Hamas as a member of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”; China has also been a consistent supporter of the Palestinian cause and recognized Palestine as a state in 1988. What China describes as “pro-Palestinian neutrality” could be an important tool to improve China’s position in the Arab and Muslim world vis-à-vis the U.S.
In summary, it can be stated that the Chinese government refrained from condemning Hamas’s assault on Israel because it perceives Israel as an ally of the U.S. and the West, has no tradition or commitment to support Israel’s existence and security, and is prioritizing enhanced relations with the Muslim states of the Middle East. These reasons can also be assessed in the broader context of China’s growing strategic rivalry with the U.S.
Eisa Moradi Afrapoli holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Tehran and is a former research fellow at the Jahanpajooh Institute for Strategic Studies in Tehran. His research interests include Middle East studies, China’s foreign policy in the Middle East, and Iranian foreign and security policy.
Majid Dashtgard holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran and is a former research fellow at the Jahanpajooh Institute for Strategic Studies in Tehran. His research focuses on great power security and politics, Middle East studies, and Iranian foreign policy.
Why China Has Not Condemned the Hamas Attack on Israel
By Eisa Moradi Afrapoli • Majid Dashtgard
Middle East & North Africa
The Middle East and the world at large were shocked by Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7, which killed 1,200 Israelis, including hundreds of civilians. Many countries condemned the attack, but China was not among them. Instead, Beijing called on all parties to “remain calm and exercise restraint.”
Israel was the first state in the Middle East to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950, although the countries did not exchange ambassadors until 1992. Since the early 1990s, relations have expanded particularly in the economic sphere. Chinese companies have made significant investments in Israel, upgrading ports and building infrastructure, and China now ranks as Israel’s second-largest trading partner. Bilateral trade, which amounted to just $50 million in 1992, increased to $24.45 billion in 2022.
But these trade and technological ties did not appear to influence China’s reaction to the Hamas attack. Indeed, after Israel retaliated with strikes on Gaza, China called for a cease-fire and expressed sympathy for the Palestinians.
There are three main reasons for China’s response:
In the strategic horizon of the Chinese leadership, Israel is seen as a member of the Western bloc. China, as America’s main rival in the international arena, understands that the competition between the two countries could become even more intense in the not-too-distant future. It is hard to imagine that Israel would not side with the U.S. in a struggle between the leader of the democratic world and a rising dictatorial power. For example, while Israel has adopted a position of neutrality on Taiwan, which China considers a key issue., Beijing is also aware that Israel will likely side with the U.S. and its allies should it choose to invade Taiwan.
From the point of view of the Chinese leadership, what places Israel in the Western bloc is the country’s economic, political, and military structure, which is largely Western. Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war and the full support of the United States and its allies for Ukraine have made the Chinese more worried that the same Western consensus will form against them should they move against Taiwan.
Israel has not taken a clear position in the Russia-Ukraine war. The reasons for this ambiguity include the fact that a large number of Israeli citizens emigrated from Russia. Israel also needs Russian acquiescence to Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria, particularly weapons transiting Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In a possible confrontation between the U.S. and China, however, such complicating factors do not exist for Israel. In addition, Israel’s military and intelligence cooperation with NATO, the strong support for Israel shown by NATO leaders, and the Western condemnation of the Hamas attack have convinced the Chinese more than ever that Israel is an important ally of the U.S. and other Western governments. So, China sees little advantage in siding with Israel in the current conflict.
The second reason for China’s failure to condemn Hamas is that China lacks any obligation to safeguard Israel’s security and existence. Since Israeli independence in 1948, U.S. and European powers have maintained support for Israel’s survival. The interests of these states in the Middle East, coupled with powerful domestic pro-Israel lobbies, have bolstered the perception that supporting Israel’s survival is a crucial responsibility. In this context, leaders of the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany all visited Israel in the aftermath of the Hamas attack to express condolences and reaffirm solidarity with the Israeli people. The U.S. also dispatched American warships and two aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean Sea, as well as transferred more weapons to Israel.
China, however, lacks a historic role in the creation of Israel and possesses neither a powerful domestic political lobby in support of the Jewish state nor a military or security commitment to ensure Israel’s survival.
The third factor behind China’s initial reaction to the Hamas attack is China’s expanding relations with the Islamic countries of the Middle East. In recent years, China has increased political, economic, and even security ties with Arab states and Iran. On the economic front, China has signed strategic cooperation agreements with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and several other countries. China imports most of its oil from the Middle East and has become the region’s most important trading partner. Trade volume between China and Arab countries reached $330 billion by 2021.
China has also increased its diplomatic role, acting as a mediator in the resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. To build on this role in a region that the U.S. has historically dominated, China wants to avoid antagonizing Muslim countries on sensitive matters.
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries blamed Israeli repression of the Palestinians for motivating the Hamas attack, reflecting strong pro-Palestinian sentiments among their populations. Iran has long backed Hamas as a member of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”; China has also been a consistent supporter of the Palestinian cause and recognized Palestine as a state in 1988. What China describes as “pro-Palestinian neutrality” could be an important tool to improve China’s position in the Arab and Muslim world vis-à-vis the U.S.
In summary, it can be stated that the Chinese government refrained from condemning Hamas’s assault on Israel because it perceives Israel as an ally of the U.S. and the West, has no tradition or commitment to support Israel’s existence and security, and is prioritizing enhanced relations with the Muslim states of the Middle East. These reasons can also be assessed in the broader context of China’s growing strategic rivalry with the U.S.
Eisa Moradi Afrapoli holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Tehran and is a former research fellow at the Jahanpajooh Institute for Strategic Studies in Tehran. His research interests include Middle East studies, China’s foreign policy in the Middle East, and Iranian foreign and security policy.
Majid Dashtgard holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran and is a former research fellow at the Jahanpajooh Institute for Strategic Studies in Tehran. His research focuses on great power security and politics, Middle East studies, and Iranian foreign policy.
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