Half a century after the 1973 October Arab-Israeli war, the specter of a multi-front conflict looms over the Middle East again.
On Oct. 7, the Palestinian militant group Hamas launched what it called the Al-Aqsa storm, attacking military and civilian communities in southern Israel. The assault included launching more than 5000 rockets and missiles toward Israeli cities including Ashkelon, Sderot, and Tel Aviv.
Attacking the military bases of the Israeli army in areas near the Gaza Strip with the aim of destroying Israeli defense lines and disarming soldiers was one goal of the Hamas operation. The attackers also aimed at capturing Israeli soldiers and civilians to exchange them for Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails.
In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said his country was at war and began heavy bombardment of the Gaza Strip. Israel also began ground operations in Gaza with the aim of destroying Hamas.
In addition, there were rocket fire exchanges between Israel and Lebanon, home to another Iran-backed militant group, Hezbollah.
What makes this war different from previous Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts is the high death toll on both sides and the exposure of Israel’s vulnerabilities despite frequent rethinking of security doctrines after the October 1973 war. The conflict also exposed the failure of Israeli efforts to pacify the Palestinians without granting them political rights.
In addition, the war has undermined the prospect of normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv in the near future, a project being advanced by the United States.
The war has sent two main messages to the countries of the Middle East and to the U.S.
Regardless of the war’s outcome, Israel has demonstrated military and security vulnerability to Arab states that have normalized relations with Israel or have shown a desire to do so. This vindicates the view of Iranian leaders and leaders of Iran-backed militant groups known as the “Axis of Resistance” that relying on Israel for security is not a formula for success.
Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, have referred to Israel as “weaker than spider’s web.” This metaphor, which is taken from one of the verses of the Qur’an, condemns Muslims who rely on friendship with non-believers instead of trusting in God, and compares their actions to counting on the strength of a spider’s web.
Nasrallah repeated the phrase on Nov. 3 in his first major speech since the start of the war. “This great, large-scale operation was purely the result of Palestinian planning and implementation,” Nasrallah said in Beirut. It came as “proof that Israel is weaker than a spider’s web” and that Israel “has not been able to make any achievement” in the month since the Hamas attack, he said.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s warning that some governments – specifically Saudi Arabia – were “betting on a losing horse” if they normalized relations with Israel should also be seen in this context.
By surprising Israel with such a massive attack, Hamas – a member of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, but not the strongest or closest to Tehran — punctured the myth of Israel’s invincibility and showed that reliance on Israel for security is unreliable. This is an important message to Arab countries that looked to Israel as a balancing power against Iran. These countries include the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which opened diplomatic relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham accords and which have participated in a U.S.-led effort to create an integrated air defense system including Israel to deal with threats from Iran and its allies.
The second message from Iran and its partners is addressed to the United States, which has adopted what Tehran regards as a contradictory policy towards Iran. While trying to manage tensions in recent months through measures such as an agreement on the exchange of several prisoners, Washington has also sought to limit Iran’s regional influence by promoting Israeli-Saudi normalization. The U.S. goal appeared to be the creation of a new security architecture that would change the balance of power in the region to the detriment of the Iranian bloc.
At the same time, considering the right-wing policies of the Netanyahu government, meaningful concessions to the Palestinians were seen as unlikely.
For Iran and its allies, the goal is to neutralize the efforts of the United States to shape a new order in the Middle East without entering a full-scale war. This concept is referred to in Iranian political literature as the “battle of wills.” It entails an asymmetric battle between Tehran and Washington and their respective partners over the future of the region.
The first major battle occurred in 2006 in a three-week war between Israel and Hezbollah, which then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described as the “birth pangs of a new Middle East.” The current war between Hamas and Israel is a continuation of the same battle on another scale. The message is clear: there can be no new security architecture in the Middle East that does not take into account the interests of Iran and its partners.
For more than three decades, the United States has sought to ignore or contain Iran in brokering Arab-Israeli peace and establishing a new regional security order. Perhaps after the Gaza war, there will be an opportunity to revise this policy to recognize Iran’s interests as a regional power and seek to resolve the Palestinian issue. Without addressing these two components, no sustainable peace can be achieved in the Middle East.
Amir Hossein Vazirian holds a PhD in political science from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran. His research is primarily focused on Iran’s foreign and security policies.
The ‘Al-Aqsa Storm’ Surprises Israel and Upsets Plans For a New Security Order
By Amir Hossein Vazirian
Middle East & North Africa
Half a century after the 1973 October Arab-Israeli war, the specter of a multi-front conflict looms over the Middle East again.
On Oct. 7, the Palestinian militant group Hamas launched what it called the Al-Aqsa storm, attacking military and civilian communities in southern Israel. The assault included launching more than 5000 rockets and missiles toward Israeli cities including Ashkelon, Sderot, and Tel Aviv.
Attacking the military bases of the Israeli army in areas near the Gaza Strip with the aim of destroying Israeli defense lines and disarming soldiers was one goal of the Hamas operation. The attackers also aimed at capturing Israeli soldiers and civilians to exchange them for Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails.
In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said his country was at war and began heavy bombardment of the Gaza Strip. Israel also began ground operations in Gaza with the aim of destroying Hamas.
In addition, there were rocket fire exchanges between Israel and Lebanon, home to another Iran-backed militant group, Hezbollah.
What makes this war different from previous Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts is the high death toll on both sides and the exposure of Israel’s vulnerabilities despite frequent rethinking of security doctrines after the October 1973 war. The conflict also exposed the failure of Israeli efforts to pacify the Palestinians without granting them political rights.
In addition, the war has undermined the prospect of normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv in the near future, a project being advanced by the United States.
The war has sent two main messages to the countries of the Middle East and to the U.S.
Regardless of the war’s outcome, Israel has demonstrated military and security vulnerability to Arab states that have normalized relations with Israel or have shown a desire to do so. This vindicates the view of Iranian leaders and leaders of Iran-backed militant groups known as the “Axis of Resistance” that relying on Israel for security is not a formula for success.
Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, have referred to Israel as “weaker than spider’s web.” This metaphor, which is taken from one of the verses of the Qur’an, condemns Muslims who rely on friendship with non-believers instead of trusting in God, and compares their actions to counting on the strength of a spider’s web.
Nasrallah repeated the phrase on Nov. 3 in his first major speech since the start of the war. “This great, large-scale operation was purely the result of Palestinian planning and implementation,” Nasrallah said in Beirut. It came as “proof that Israel is weaker than a spider’s web” and that Israel “has not been able to make any achievement” in the month since the Hamas attack, he said.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s warning that some governments – specifically Saudi Arabia – were “betting on a losing horse” if they normalized relations with Israel should also be seen in this context.
By surprising Israel with such a massive attack, Hamas – a member of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, but not the strongest or closest to Tehran — punctured the myth of Israel’s invincibility and showed that reliance on Israel for security is unreliable. This is an important message to Arab countries that looked to Israel as a balancing power against Iran. These countries include the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which opened diplomatic relations with Israel within the framework of the Abraham accords and which have participated in a U.S.-led effort to create an integrated air defense system including Israel to deal with threats from Iran and its allies.
The second message from Iran and its partners is addressed to the United States, which has adopted what Tehran regards as a contradictory policy towards Iran. While trying to manage tensions in recent months through measures such as an agreement on the exchange of several prisoners, Washington has also sought to limit Iran’s regional influence by promoting Israeli-Saudi normalization. The U.S. goal appeared to be the creation of a new security architecture that would change the balance of power in the region to the detriment of the Iranian bloc.
At the same time, considering the right-wing policies of the Netanyahu government, meaningful concessions to the Palestinians were seen as unlikely.
For Iran and its allies, the goal is to neutralize the efforts of the United States to shape a new order in the Middle East without entering a full-scale war. This concept is referred to in Iranian political literature as the “battle of wills.” It entails an asymmetric battle between Tehran and Washington and their respective partners over the future of the region.
The first major battle occurred in 2006 in a three-week war between Israel and Hezbollah, which then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described as the “birth pangs of a new Middle East.” The current war between Hamas and Israel is a continuation of the same battle on another scale. The message is clear: there can be no new security architecture in the Middle East that does not take into account the interests of Iran and its partners.
For more than three decades, the United States has sought to ignore or contain Iran in brokering Arab-Israeli peace and establishing a new regional security order. Perhaps after the Gaza war, there will be an opportunity to revise this policy to recognize Iran’s interests as a regional power and seek to resolve the Palestinian issue. Without addressing these two components, no sustainable peace can be achieved in the Middle East.
Amir Hossein Vazirian holds a PhD in political science from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran. His research is primarily focused on Iran’s foreign and security policies.
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