The war that began on October 7, 2023, when the Palestinian group Hamas initiated the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, has not only the potential to escalate regionally but profound ripple effects beyond the Middle East.
The conflict and its outcome are likely to affect how China and Russia position themselves in the region, their relations with Israel, and more broadly, with Western countries.
The war is in one sense an opportunity for both China and Russia, a major distraction for the West from adversarial relations with the two Eurasian actors. Yet there are distinctions between them. In Russia’s case, the Gaza conflict has caused a welcome shift of attention from the war in Ukraine, although the respite may be brief.
For China, the Israel-Hamas war, coupled with the ongoing Ukraine crisis, has interfered with the American attempt to focus on the Indo-Pacific region and is providing China with much greater room for maneuver. Longer-term, the two wars could offer China significant breathing space comparable to U.S. distraction during the early 2000s when Washington was embroiled in the so-called war on terrorism. This might buy China enough time to prepare for deeper competition with the U.S. and possibly confrontation over Taiwan.
The war in Gaza is also a positive development for China and to a certain extent Russia because it looks likely to freeze attempts to create a new trade corridor from India to Europe via the Middle East. Moscow and especially Beijing were worried that this project could sideline the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative or undermine India’s ambition to join the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) running from Russia’s Baltic ports to the south of Iran.
The ramifications of the Middle East crisis are not all positive, however, for China or Russia.
One negative outcome for China is that its relations with Israel appear to be stalled if not in decline. Prior to the Hamas attack on Israel, relations were on an upswing. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been expected to visit China and discuss greater bilateral economic and potentially military cooperation, angering the United States. China, building on its success brokering a normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, was making inroads into Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking by hosting Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and unveiling a plan for a two-state solution. But the war in Gaza has changed the dynamics and China has grown increasingly supportive of Hamas, antagonizing Israel. The first negative impact on Israel-China relations occurred in October when Israel joined Britain and 50 other countries at the UN condemning China’s repression of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Gaza war has also made Israel even more dependent on the U.S. and less likely to jeopardize that relationship by getting closer to Beijing.
A similar shift might take place in relations between Israel and Russia. While Moscow is unlikely to get directly involved in the Gaza war, it has hosted high-ranking members of Hamas and has a growing security relationship with Hamas’s patron, Iran. At the same time, Russia aims to ensure that Israel remains restrained regarding the conflict in Ukraine and does not supply lethal weapons to Kyiv. Russia also worries that the Gaza war will escalate into a major conflict embroiling Lebanon and possibly Syria. That would stretch Russian forces in Syria that bolster the Assad regime. For Moscow, a moderate level of instability is more beneficial than a regional war between Israel and numerous Iran-backed proxies.
Israel has so far maintained a careful approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It has refused to join anti-Russia sanctions or to send weapons to Ukraine. Moscow, too, has been cautious not to antagonize the Jewish state and has not interfered with Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. This balancing worked well, but in an unstable region and chaotic era it is a tenuous play. Maintaining this balance is becoming increasingly difficult for Moscow. It wants to use the Gaza war as a testament to the failure of Western diplomacy without incentivizing Israel to recalibrate its policy toward Ukraine.
Russia is also seeking to promote the idea of “regionalism,” which requires that challenges in the region should be managed solely by regional states without the interference of Western countries. Indeed, there has been a flurry of Russian diplomatic activity with Iran and Turkey such as a meeting in Moscow on October 27 and a phone call between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayeb Erdogan to signal solidarity on a call for a cease-fire in Gaza. Some Russian analysts have also been suggesting potential use of the Astana Format, a grouping of Russia, Turkey, and Iran which has tried to resolve the Syrian conflict, to work on Gaza.
This perspective resonates with the broader discourse among Russian policymakers, who envision a new global order in which Eurasian powers enjoy greater autonomy. A similar conception of “regionalism” is already in operation in the South Caucasus in the so-called 3+3 format — Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan plus Russia, Turkey, and Iran – which had its latest meeting in Tehran in October.
The Gaza war also has had an impact on the U.S. posture in the Middle East. It has interfered with the U.S. focus on Ukraine and with the long-sought “pivot” to Asia. It has caused the U.S. to increase its military presence in the Middle East in an effort to prevent the war from escalating and also awakened Washington to the need to find a new diplomatic approach that does not minimize the plight of the Palestinians.
In conclusion, the war in Gaza presents an opportunity for major Eurasian powers to pursue their own agendas. Yet there are risks that the war could push Israel to scrap outreach to Beijing and Moscow and embrace more confrontational policies espoused by the West.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
For China and Russia, the Gaza War May Be a Blessing in Disguise
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
The war that began on October 7, 2023, when the Palestinian group Hamas initiated the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, has not only the potential to escalate regionally but profound ripple effects beyond the Middle East.
The conflict and its outcome are likely to affect how China and Russia position themselves in the region, their relations with Israel, and more broadly, with Western countries.
The war is in one sense an opportunity for both China and Russia, a major distraction for the West from adversarial relations with the two Eurasian actors. Yet there are distinctions between them. In Russia’s case, the Gaza conflict has caused a welcome shift of attention from the war in Ukraine, although the respite may be brief.
For China, the Israel-Hamas war, coupled with the ongoing Ukraine crisis, has interfered with the American attempt to focus on the Indo-Pacific region and is providing China with much greater room for maneuver. Longer-term, the two wars could offer China significant breathing space comparable to U.S. distraction during the early 2000s when Washington was embroiled in the so-called war on terrorism. This might buy China enough time to prepare for deeper competition with the U.S. and possibly confrontation over Taiwan.
The war in Gaza is also a positive development for China and to a certain extent Russia because it looks likely to freeze attempts to create a new trade corridor from India to Europe via the Middle East. Moscow and especially Beijing were worried that this project could sideline the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative or undermine India’s ambition to join the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) running from Russia’s Baltic ports to the south of Iran.
The ramifications of the Middle East crisis are not all positive, however, for China or Russia.
One negative outcome for China is that its relations with Israel appear to be stalled if not in decline. Prior to the Hamas attack on Israel, relations were on an upswing. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been expected to visit China and discuss greater bilateral economic and potentially military cooperation, angering the United States. China, building on its success brokering a normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, was making inroads into Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking by hosting Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and unveiling a plan for a two-state solution. But the war in Gaza has changed the dynamics and China has grown increasingly supportive of Hamas, antagonizing Israel. The first negative impact on Israel-China relations occurred in October when Israel joined Britain and 50 other countries at the UN condemning China’s repression of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Gaza war has also made Israel even more dependent on the U.S. and less likely to jeopardize that relationship by getting closer to Beijing.
A similar shift might take place in relations between Israel and Russia. While Moscow is unlikely to get directly involved in the Gaza war, it has hosted high-ranking members of Hamas and has a growing security relationship with Hamas’s patron, Iran. At the same time, Russia aims to ensure that Israel remains restrained regarding the conflict in Ukraine and does not supply lethal weapons to Kyiv. Russia also worries that the Gaza war will escalate into a major conflict embroiling Lebanon and possibly Syria. That would stretch Russian forces in Syria that bolster the Assad regime. For Moscow, a moderate level of instability is more beneficial than a regional war between Israel and numerous Iran-backed proxies.
Israel has so far maintained a careful approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It has refused to join anti-Russia sanctions or to send weapons to Ukraine. Moscow, too, has been cautious not to antagonize the Jewish state and has not interfered with Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. This balancing worked well, but in an unstable region and chaotic era it is a tenuous play. Maintaining this balance is becoming increasingly difficult for Moscow. It wants to use the Gaza war as a testament to the failure of Western diplomacy without incentivizing Israel to recalibrate its policy toward Ukraine.
Russia is also seeking to promote the idea of “regionalism,” which requires that challenges in the region should be managed solely by regional states without the interference of Western countries. Indeed, there has been a flurry of Russian diplomatic activity with Iran and Turkey such as a meeting in Moscow on October 27 and a phone call between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayeb Erdogan to signal solidarity on a call for a cease-fire in Gaza. Some Russian analysts have also been suggesting potential use of the Astana Format, a grouping of Russia, Turkey, and Iran which has tried to resolve the Syrian conflict, to work on Gaza.
This perspective resonates with the broader discourse among Russian policymakers, who envision a new global order in which Eurasian powers enjoy greater autonomy. A similar conception of “regionalism” is already in operation in the South Caucasus in the so-called 3+3 format — Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan plus Russia, Turkey, and Iran – which had its latest meeting in Tehran in October.
The Gaza war also has had an impact on the U.S. posture in the Middle East. It has interfered with the U.S. focus on Ukraine and with the long-sought “pivot” to Asia. It has caused the U.S. to increase its military presence in the Middle East in an effort to prevent the war from escalating and also awakened Washington to the need to find a new diplomatic approach that does not minimize the plight of the Palestinians.
In conclusion, the war in Gaza presents an opportunity for major Eurasian powers to pursue their own agendas. Yet there are risks that the war could push Israel to scrap outreach to Beijing and Moscow and embrace more confrontational policies espoused by the West.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
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