There are well-grounded fears of regional escalation in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attack that killed 1,200 people in Israel on Oct. 7 and the Israeli response, which has led to more than 15,000 deaths in the Gaza Strip. Perhaps the most unlikely actor that could expand the scope of the conflict is the Houthi movement, which has controlled most of north-western Yemen since 2014. The Houthis’ response to the Israel-Hamas war is testing an uneasy balance between the group’s ideological commitments and its pursuit of pragmatic objectives.
In the almost two months since the war began, the Houthis have repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and drones toward the southern Israeli city of Eilat. On Oct. 31, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Sarei announced that more strikes would follow “until the Israeli aggression stops” and Palestinians are “victorious.” All the ballistic missiles have fallen short or been destroyed by Israel’s “Arrow” defense system, while the U.S. Navy has repeatedly shot down drones in the waters off the Yemeni coast.
While Houthi missiles have missed their targets, the group has been more successful in maritime operations in the Red Sea north of Bab al-Mandeb, a critical chokepoint for global trade. On Nov. 19, the Houthis hijacked the Galaxy Leader, a vessel traveling from Turkey to India, while it was sailing about 57 miles off the Yemeni city of Hodeida. The ship was operated by a Japanese company and flew under a Bahamian flag, and the crew was largely from the Philippines. However, the owner of the Galaxy Leader is Abraham Ungar, one of the richest men in Israel and a close friend of Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. Efforts to free the crew are currently being led by Japan.
On Dec. 3, tensions in the southern Red Sea rose further after the Houthis launched missiles against three commercial vessels in the vicinity of the place where the Galaxy Leader was hijacked. The USS Carney provided assistance to the ships and brought down at least three drones coming from Houthi-controlled territory. Houthi military spokesman Sarei claimed the attacks were carried out in solidarity with Palestinians, while Israel has denied the ships had any Israeli ties.
The Houthis’ opposition to Israel, as well as their antisemitism, are long-standing. During a series of conflicts, starting in 2004 when the Houthis rebelled against the central government of then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the group has rallied followers under the slogan: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.”
Hussein al-Houthi, the founder of the movement, believed that the U.S. and Israel had plans to occupy both Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest cities. His brother Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, the current leader of the movement, has frequently mentioned Israel in the context of the Yemeni war despite Tel Aviv playing no known role in the conflict. For instance, in 2021 Abdel-Malek al-Houthi announced that his movement intended to gain control of the areas held by their enemies in Yemen, who “want to subjugate them [the areas] to the Americans, British, and Israelis.” Also in 2021, the Houthis deported the last Jews living under their rule.
An analysis of the Houthis’ social media posts shows that their content often features anti-Semitic tropes. Meanwhile, Luca Nevola, who carried out field research in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in 2012, reported that conspiracy theories were being circulated that U.S. and Israeli agents were responsible for poisoning trees.
By targeting Israel and Israeli-owned ships in the context of the current Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis are signaling that their harsh rhetoric against Israel and the Jewish people is not just empty words. At the same time, these attacks seek to align the Houthis more closely with the so-called “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran and comprising Hamas, Hezbollah, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
The Houthis have received significant political and military support from Iran during the last decade. However, Iran-Houthi ties are of limited duration and intensity compared with Iran’s relations with other members of the axis, particularly Hezbollah.
Since Oct. 7, Hezbollah and Israel have been engaged in almost continuous skirmishing along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria have also targeted U.S. troops based in both countries, prompting the U.S. to respond in kind. In this sense, the Houthis are seeking to show that their movement is doing its part to combat Israel and the U.S. in the Middle East.
Still, the extent to which the Houthis are willing to go in expressing support for Hamas should not be over-estimated. To begin with, Iran does not seem to be interested in a regional escalation that would seriously threaten its allies or the Iranian homeland. Both Israeli and U.S. officials have said that they have no proof that Iran was directly involved in the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. As explained recently by analyst Shahir Shahidsaless, “Tehran is seeking to score propaganda points from the crisis without triggering a wider war.”
As a result of the Israel-Hamas war, the U.S. Navy has beefed up its presence in the Red Sea. Thus, the price of miscalculation on the part of the Houthis could be very high. Furthermore, the Biden administration is already considering whether to re-designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Listing the Houthis as a FTO was one of the last decisions of the Trump administration while removing them from the list was one of the Biden administration’s first foreign policy moves. The well-being of Yemeni civilians is certainly not the Houthis’ top priority. Even so, re-designation as a FTO would have deleterious effects on civilians living under Houthi rule and force the group to be even more repressive to stay in power.
It is also important to note that, for all their ideologically charged messaging and actions, the Houthis are primarily focused on internal goals. A formal truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia expired in October 2022 but has largely held since then. Both the Saudis and the Houthis are interested in going beyond a cease-fire and have been meeting regularly. At the same time, the Houthis continue to have their sights on the resource-rich Marib province. The capture of Marib would be a political and economic blow against pro-government forces that control the area and the anti-Houthi front more broadly.
The Israel-Hamas war has slowed the prospects for formal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Still, if the Houthis were to engage in a broader confrontation with Israel and the U.S., that could complicate if not terminate Saudi-Houthi negotiations. A regional escalation would also force the Houthis to divert attention and resources away from the Marib front. The Houthis appear to be preparing a renewed assault around the city of Marib, having assembled forces there during the last few weeks.
The focus of the Houthis remains domestic. Given this, it is logical to expect the Houthis to calibrate their attacks against Israel and Israeli interests. Even so, in a current context of such extreme tension, with the Houthis engaging in ever more daring operations and the strong presence of the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea, the possibility of a miscalculation cannot be discounted.
Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. He is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss, and other publications.
Why Are the Houthis Getting Involved in a War Between Israel and Hamas?
By Marc Martorell Junyent
Middle East & North Africa
There are well-grounded fears of regional escalation in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attack that killed 1,200 people in Israel on Oct. 7 and the Israeli response, which has led to more than 15,000 deaths in the Gaza Strip. Perhaps the most unlikely actor that could expand the scope of the conflict is the Houthi movement, which has controlled most of north-western Yemen since 2014. The Houthis’ response to the Israel-Hamas war is testing an uneasy balance between the group’s ideological commitments and its pursuit of pragmatic objectives.
In the almost two months since the war began, the Houthis have repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and drones toward the southern Israeli city of Eilat. On Oct. 31, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Sarei announced that more strikes would follow “until the Israeli aggression stops” and Palestinians are “victorious.” All the ballistic missiles have fallen short or been destroyed by Israel’s “Arrow” defense system, while the U.S. Navy has repeatedly shot down drones in the waters off the Yemeni coast.
While Houthi missiles have missed their targets, the group has been more successful in maritime operations in the Red Sea north of Bab al-Mandeb, a critical chokepoint for global trade. On Nov. 19, the Houthis hijacked the Galaxy Leader, a vessel traveling from Turkey to India, while it was sailing about 57 miles off the Yemeni city of Hodeida. The ship was operated by a Japanese company and flew under a Bahamian flag, and the crew was largely from the Philippines. However, the owner of the Galaxy Leader is Abraham Ungar, one of the richest men in Israel and a close friend of Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. Efforts to free the crew are currently being led by Japan.
On Dec. 3, tensions in the southern Red Sea rose further after the Houthis launched missiles against three commercial vessels in the vicinity of the place where the Galaxy Leader was hijacked. The USS Carney provided assistance to the ships and brought down at least three drones coming from Houthi-controlled territory. Houthi military spokesman Sarei claimed the attacks were carried out in solidarity with Palestinians, while Israel has denied the ships had any Israeli ties.
The Houthis’ opposition to Israel, as well as their antisemitism, are long-standing. During a series of conflicts, starting in 2004 when the Houthis rebelled against the central government of then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the group has rallied followers under the slogan: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.”
Hussein al-Houthi, the founder of the movement, believed that the U.S. and Israel had plans to occupy both Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest cities. His brother Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, the current leader of the movement, has frequently mentioned Israel in the context of the Yemeni war despite Tel Aviv playing no known role in the conflict. For instance, in 2021 Abdel-Malek al-Houthi announced that his movement intended to gain control of the areas held by their enemies in Yemen, who “want to subjugate them [the areas] to the Americans, British, and Israelis.” Also in 2021, the Houthis deported the last Jews living under their rule.
An analysis of the Houthis’ social media posts shows that their content often features anti-Semitic tropes. Meanwhile, Luca Nevola, who carried out field research in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in 2012, reported that conspiracy theories were being circulated that U.S. and Israeli agents were responsible for poisoning trees.
By targeting Israel and Israeli-owned ships in the context of the current Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis are signaling that their harsh rhetoric against Israel and the Jewish people is not just empty words. At the same time, these attacks seek to align the Houthis more closely with the so-called “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran and comprising Hamas, Hezbollah, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
The Houthis have received significant political and military support from Iran during the last decade. However, Iran-Houthi ties are of limited duration and intensity compared with Iran’s relations with other members of the axis, particularly Hezbollah.
Since Oct. 7, Hezbollah and Israel have been engaged in almost continuous skirmishing along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria have also targeted U.S. troops based in both countries, prompting the U.S. to respond in kind. In this sense, the Houthis are seeking to show that their movement is doing its part to combat Israel and the U.S. in the Middle East.
Still, the extent to which the Houthis are willing to go in expressing support for Hamas should not be over-estimated. To begin with, Iran does not seem to be interested in a regional escalation that would seriously threaten its allies or the Iranian homeland. Both Israeli and U.S. officials have said that they have no proof that Iran was directly involved in the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. As explained recently by analyst Shahir Shahidsaless, “Tehran is seeking to score propaganda points from the crisis without triggering a wider war.”
As a result of the Israel-Hamas war, the U.S. Navy has beefed up its presence in the Red Sea. Thus, the price of miscalculation on the part of the Houthis could be very high. Furthermore, the Biden administration is already considering whether to re-designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Listing the Houthis as a FTO was one of the last decisions of the Trump administration while removing them from the list was one of the Biden administration’s first foreign policy moves. The well-being of Yemeni civilians is certainly not the Houthis’ top priority. Even so, re-designation as a FTO would have deleterious effects on civilians living under Houthi rule and force the group to be even more repressive to stay in power.
It is also important to note that, for all their ideologically charged messaging and actions, the Houthis are primarily focused on internal goals. A formal truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia expired in October 2022 but has largely held since then. Both the Saudis and the Houthis are interested in going beyond a cease-fire and have been meeting regularly. At the same time, the Houthis continue to have their sights on the resource-rich Marib province. The capture of Marib would be a political and economic blow against pro-government forces that control the area and the anti-Houthi front more broadly.
The Israel-Hamas war has slowed the prospects for formal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Still, if the Houthis were to engage in a broader confrontation with Israel and the U.S., that could complicate if not terminate Saudi-Houthi negotiations. A regional escalation would also force the Houthis to divert attention and resources away from the Marib front. The Houthis appear to be preparing a renewed assault around the city of Marib, having assembled forces there during the last few weeks.
The focus of the Houthis remains domestic. Given this, it is logical to expect the Houthis to calibrate their attacks against Israel and Israeli interests. Even so, in a current context of such extreme tension, with the Houthis engaging in ever more daring operations and the strong presence of the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea, the possibility of a miscalculation cannot be discounted.
Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. He is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss, and other publications.
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