In March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached a deal mediated by China to restore bilateral relations after seven years of diplomatic estrangement. In June, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud visited Tehran to mark the formal restoration of ties.
For Saudi Arabia, a key reason for détente with its main regional rival was to insure against attacks on its homeland by Houthi rebels and, if possible, end a civil war in its perennially troubled southern neighbor.
Reports suggested that, as part of the Iran-Saudi agreement, Tehran would halt supplying weapons to the Houthis. Iran’s mission to the United Nations highlighted positive consequences for Yemen in the deal. But questions remain about whether an end to Iranian arms transfers can bring sustained peace to Yemen.
The Houthis are a venerable political/religious/tribal group originating in northwestern Yemen. They have been accused of being Iranian surrogates since at least 2004, when they started battling the central Yemeni state in what was known as the Saada Wars, which lasted until 2010.
Although the Houthis were never “Iranian cats-paws,” as the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh put it in 2004, Iranian-Houthi ties have rapidly intensified over the last decade.
This was particularly the case after the Houthi takeover of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, in September 2014, which prompted a Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in March 2015 to try to roll back Houthi territorial advances. Iran, which had seen its own relations with Saudi Arabia broken following the Saudi execution of a prominent Saudi Shi’ite leader and a subsequent attack on Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran, stepped up support for the Houthis.
Over the years, Iran and the Houthis have nurtured a political and military partnership. Tehran advocated for Houthi interests at the UN and established a presence in the educational sector of Houthi-controlled Yemen. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has expressed his support for the Houthis, although denying that Iran is providing them with weapons.
There is ample evidence to the contrary. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, in the two years that followed the Saudi-led intervention, Iran transferred to the Houthis small arms and light weapons, drones, improvised explosive devises and sea mines. Tehran started providing missile technology in the second half of 2017. Iran also delivered new drone components in 2018, enabling the Houthis to dramatically expand their range and hit targets deep inside Saudi Arabia. UAV attacks, often carried out simultaneously with missile strikes, increased in number and sophistication. In March 2021, for instance, Houthi drones set an oil facility on fire in Riyadh. Meanwhile, the flow of Iranian small arms and light weapons continued.
The partnership between Iran and the Houthis has often been misunderstood, however. The first misconception is that Iran and the Houthis are tied together by sectarian affinities. Houthi leaders have indeed expressed admiration for the Iranian revolution and the figure of its leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. However, the Houthis largely adhere to Zaydism, a form of Shi’ite Islam that is close to Sunnism and significantly differs from Iran’s Twelver Shiism. What Iran and the Houthis share is a common worldview, as they both espouse anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Zionism – often resorting to anti-Semitic tropes.
The second misconception is that the Houthis have become part of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, and pro-Iran militias in Iraq. This is inaccurate because Iran’s relationship with the “Axis” goes back many decades and entails commitments that cannot be compared with support for the Houthis. Simply put, the Houthis are on a lower echelon in Tehran’s hierarchy of regional alliances.
Nevertheless, Iran found in the Houthis an ally that could directly threaten Saudi Arabia and force it to devote significant military and economic resources to Yemen. Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa and an expert on Iran-Houthi ties, succinctly described Iran’s policy towards the Houthis as “a limited return on a modest investment.”
Even before the Iran-Saudi deal, there was a truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia that lasted from April to October of 2022. Truce violations were numerous, with the Houthis being responsible for most of them. But Yemen experienced a general decrease in the level of violence, which continued even though the truce was not formally renewed. The last report of the UN Panel of Experts, published in February 2023, showed, however, that Iran continued to provide military aid to the Houthis at volumes similar to previous years.
There is no doubt that Iran is the main external backer of the Houthis. Still, the rebels’ military effort depends only to a limited extent on Iranian support. A sudden stop in Iranian help would hurt the movement but not cause a collapse of its fighting capabilities. Furthermore, a sudden halt in military support is highly unlikely.
While de-escalation with Riyadh in the broader region, particularly in Iraq and Syria, ranks higher on the Iranian agenda, military cooperation with the Houthis has a certain inertia, especially considering that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is largely in charge of the Yemen file. A gradual decrease in military help is easier to imagine. Its consequences would be softened by the fact that the Houthis have been recently stocking up on weapons. Moreover, the Houthis have succeeded in domestically manufacturing some UAV parts.
A long-term ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is largely dependent on direct talks. The Iran-Saudi deal has the potential to facilitate these conversations but are not decisive. The talks, which began in 2022, appeared to have made some advances around April this year, suggesting that the Iran-Saudi agreement played a role. However, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg sounded a cautionary note in a recent speech at the Yemen International Forum.
Even if the Saudis and the Houthis reach an agreement, it is unlikely to bring peace to all of Yemen. The still internationally recognized government of Yemen has not been allowed to participate in talks and the same is true for factions supported by the United Arab Emirates, such as Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces and the Southern Transitional Council. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains capable of playing the spoiler.
If the Saudi-Houthi talks do bear fruit, there is no guarantee that they will pave the way for inclusive negotiations. Saudi Arabia wants to extricate itself from the conflict in Yemen as soon as it receives guarantees that its border with Houthi-controlled territory will remain quiet. The Houthis seek to consolidate their statelet in northern Yemen and ensure its economic viability by taking over the resource-rich Marib province, which has been the locus of fierce fighting in the last few years. Meanwhile, the internationally recognized government of Yemen, embroiled in a deep internal crisis, can barely agree with the UAE-supported factions on anything beyond their mutual rejection of the Saudi-Houthi talks.
Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. He is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss and other publications.
Peace for Yemen Elusive Despite Iran-Saudi Deal and Saudi-Houthi Talks
By Marc Martorell Junyent
Middle East & North Africa
In March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached a deal mediated by China to restore bilateral relations after seven years of diplomatic estrangement. In June, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud visited Tehran to mark the formal restoration of ties.
For Saudi Arabia, a key reason for détente with its main regional rival was to insure against attacks on its homeland by Houthi rebels and, if possible, end a civil war in its perennially troubled southern neighbor.
Reports suggested that, as part of the Iran-Saudi agreement, Tehran would halt supplying weapons to the Houthis. Iran’s mission to the United Nations highlighted positive consequences for Yemen in the deal. But questions remain about whether an end to Iranian arms transfers can bring sustained peace to Yemen.
The Houthis are a venerable political/religious/tribal group originating in northwestern Yemen. They have been accused of being Iranian surrogates since at least 2004, when they started battling the central Yemeni state in what was known as the Saada Wars, which lasted until 2010.
Although the Houthis were never “Iranian cats-paws,” as the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh put it in 2004, Iranian-Houthi ties have rapidly intensified over the last decade.
This was particularly the case after the Houthi takeover of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, in September 2014, which prompted a Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in March 2015 to try to roll back Houthi territorial advances. Iran, which had seen its own relations with Saudi Arabia broken following the Saudi execution of a prominent Saudi Shi’ite leader and a subsequent attack on Saudi diplomatic facilities in Iran, stepped up support for the Houthis.
Over the years, Iran and the Houthis have nurtured a political and military partnership. Tehran advocated for Houthi interests at the UN and established a presence in the educational sector of Houthi-controlled Yemen. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has expressed his support for the Houthis, although denying that Iran is providing them with weapons.
There is ample evidence to the contrary. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, in the two years that followed the Saudi-led intervention, Iran transferred to the Houthis small arms and light weapons, drones, improvised explosive devises and sea mines. Tehran started providing missile technology in the second half of 2017. Iran also delivered new drone components in 2018, enabling the Houthis to dramatically expand their range and hit targets deep inside Saudi Arabia. UAV attacks, often carried out simultaneously with missile strikes, increased in number and sophistication. In March 2021, for instance, Houthi drones set an oil facility on fire in Riyadh. Meanwhile, the flow of Iranian small arms and light weapons continued.
The partnership between Iran and the Houthis has often been misunderstood, however. The first misconception is that Iran and the Houthis are tied together by sectarian affinities. Houthi leaders have indeed expressed admiration for the Iranian revolution and the figure of its leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. However, the Houthis largely adhere to Zaydism, a form of Shi’ite Islam that is close to Sunnism and significantly differs from Iran’s Twelver Shiism. What Iran and the Houthis share is a common worldview, as they both espouse anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Zionism – often resorting to anti-Semitic tropes.
The second misconception is that the Houthis have become part of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, and pro-Iran militias in Iraq. This is inaccurate because Iran’s relationship with the “Axis” goes back many decades and entails commitments that cannot be compared with support for the Houthis. Simply put, the Houthis are on a lower echelon in Tehran’s hierarchy of regional alliances.
Nevertheless, Iran found in the Houthis an ally that could directly threaten Saudi Arabia and force it to devote significant military and economic resources to Yemen. Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa and an expert on Iran-Houthi ties, succinctly described Iran’s policy towards the Houthis as “a limited return on a modest investment.”
Even before the Iran-Saudi deal, there was a truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia that lasted from April to October of 2022. Truce violations were numerous, with the Houthis being responsible for most of them. But Yemen experienced a general decrease in the level of violence, which continued even though the truce was not formally renewed. The last report of the UN Panel of Experts, published in February 2023, showed, however, that Iran continued to provide military aid to the Houthis at volumes similar to previous years.
There is no doubt that Iran is the main external backer of the Houthis. Still, the rebels’ military effort depends only to a limited extent on Iranian support. A sudden stop in Iranian help would hurt the movement but not cause a collapse of its fighting capabilities. Furthermore, a sudden halt in military support is highly unlikely.
While de-escalation with Riyadh in the broader region, particularly in Iraq and Syria, ranks higher on the Iranian agenda, military cooperation with the Houthis has a certain inertia, especially considering that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is largely in charge of the Yemen file. A gradual decrease in military help is easier to imagine. Its consequences would be softened by the fact that the Houthis have been recently stocking up on weapons. Moreover, the Houthis have succeeded in domestically manufacturing some UAV parts.
A long-term ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is largely dependent on direct talks. The Iran-Saudi deal has the potential to facilitate these conversations but are not decisive. The talks, which began in 2022, appeared to have made some advances around April this year, suggesting that the Iran-Saudi agreement played a role. However, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg sounded a cautionary note in a recent speech at the Yemen International Forum.
Even if the Saudis and the Houthis reach an agreement, it is unlikely to bring peace to all of Yemen. The still internationally recognized government of Yemen has not been allowed to participate in talks and the same is true for factions supported by the United Arab Emirates, such as Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces and the Southern Transitional Council. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains capable of playing the spoiler.
If the Saudi-Houthi talks do bear fruit, there is no guarantee that they will pave the way for inclusive negotiations. Saudi Arabia wants to extricate itself from the conflict in Yemen as soon as it receives guarantees that its border with Houthi-controlled territory will remain quiet. The Houthis seek to consolidate their statelet in northern Yemen and ensure its economic viability by taking over the resource-rich Marib province, which has been the locus of fierce fighting in the last few years. Meanwhile, the internationally recognized government of Yemen, embroiled in a deep internal crisis, can barely agree with the UAE-supported factions on anything beyond their mutual rejection of the Saudi-Houthi talks.
Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. He is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss and other publications.
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