In April 2011, in an unprecedented statement, Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, remarked, “We intervened in anti-Israel conflicts, resulting in the triumph of the 33-day war [referring to a 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah] and the success of the 22-day war [alluding to a 2008-2009 conflict in Gaza]. From this point forward, wherever any nation, any group combats the Zionist regime, we unequivocally stand by them, offering our unwavering support, and we have no qualms about saying this.”
Khamenei’s acknowledgment of Iranian involvement in those two wars came five years after the Lebanon conflict and two years after the fighting in Gaza. He refrained from such admissions during the heat of those conflicts.
Fast forward to October 10, 2023, just three days after the massive Hamas attack on Israel. Khamenei not only commended the Hamas operations in the most fervent terms but also asserted that those who doubted this being the handiwork of Palestinians “do not know the Palestinian nation and are miscalculating.” He emphasized that while “the entire Islamic world stands in solemn obligation to support the Palestinians and will do so with divine consent, this is the work of Palestinians themselves.”
While no conclusive evidence directly points to Iran, the intricacy of the meticulously orchestrated attack by Hamas, characterized by a high level of coordination and deception, has led many to speculate that Iran was involved. The use of paragliders has also raised questions not only about the source of these gliders but about how Hamas operatives were trained to operate them. However, it’s important to distinguish between providing support and being in full command and control. It is unlikely that Tehran has taken on the latter role.
On October 15, Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, was quoted by Iranian state media as saying, “We have conveyed our message to Israel through its allies that if they do not cease their atrocities in Gaza, Iran cannot simply remain an observer.” Only a few hours later, however, Iran’s UN mission softened the hawkish tone and issued a statement emphasizing that if Israel “does not intend to attack Iran, its interests, and its citizens, Iran will not intervene in this conflict.”
Two days later, on October 17, Khamenei issued a sterner warning to Israel, stating, “If the crimes of the Zionist regime continue, Muslims and resistance forces will become impatient, and no one can stop them.”
Do these seemingly conflicting positions indicate confusion in Tehran regarding its approach to the Gaza crisis, which is escalating rapidly? In fact, Tehran is seeking to score propaganda points from the crisis without triggering a wider war. Direct involvement in a head-on war with Israel could potentially invite U.S. intervention, resulting in monumental damage to Iran. This could lead to a loss of command and control, potentially even causing a government collapse.
Khamenei vehemently shuns war. A striking instance is after the attack on the Iranian consulate in Afghanistan in August 1998 during the rule of the Taliban, who are sworn enemies of Shi’ite Muslims. Armed assailants raided the consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, resulting in the death of ten Iranian diplomats. Tens of thousands of Iranian troops amassed at the Afghan border, poised for a full-scale assault. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council, headed then by moderate President Mohammad Khatami, endorsed the plan. However, at the last minute, Khamenei objected, and the operations were called off.
Another clear example of Khamenei’s war aversion came after the U.S. assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani in 2020. Soleimani was not only a military leader who oversaw Iran’s extraterritorial military activities but also played a key role in Iran’s regional foreign policy. He was considered the second most powerful figure in Iran after Khamenei.
After his death, top Iranian military and civilian figures, from Khamenei on down, vowed vengeance. Many Western analysts expected a military conflict. Iran launched a missile attack on the Ain Al Assad base in Iraq, where American forces were stationed. However, Americans were informed in advance about the attack via Iranian leaks to the Iraqi government. No American soldiers were killed, although some 100 were treated for concussions. The less conventional analysis that suggested war was improbable then still holds today.
While the Islamic government of Iran doesn’t desire a full-scale war, it also wants to retain its reputation as the leading external force spearheading the struggle against Israel in the Muslim world, especially given the devastating situation in Gaza. To navigate this delicate balance, the Iranian government employs bombastic rhetoric against Israel while providing support and blessings to its Lebanese proxy group, Hezbollah, and allowing it to engage in low-intensity conflict with Israel. Furthermore, Iran appears to be encouraging attacks on U.S. targets in Iraq and Syria through other proxy forces. The U.S. retaliated on Oct. 27 with two strikes on Iran-linked targets in Syria.
This calibrated policy could help explain why the Secretary General of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has been noticeably quiet, much to the surprise of observers, politicians, and the Arab world. The dilemma is that if he appears in public, he is obliged to take a radical stance regarding the ongoing events in Gaza, which would contradict what his group is doing on the ground.
On the other hand, if Nasrallah refrains from his usual bombastic style, it could disappoint his followers and undermine his position as the figure known for belligerent rhetoric and actions against Israel. Even a handwritten letter by him, published by Nour News, the outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council on October 25, designating those who have been killed since October 7 as martyrs, lacked his usual saber-rattling tone. However, on October 25, Nour News reported that Nasrallah had a meeting “with the officials of the Resistance groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”
An Oct. 24 article by Tasnim News, associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), cited Israeli and Western media to argue that Israel has not launched a ground attack on Gaza so far out of fear of escalation of a new front in the north against Hezbollah.
One could argue that Iran might prompt Hezbollah to engage in a full-fledged war with Israel if, or when, Hamas seems on the brink of collapse. However, given Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s earlier warning that Israel would “return Lebanon to the Stone Age” in response to a Hezbollah-initiated conflict, Lebanon – and Hezbollah –could face irreparable damage. Given that Hezbollah’s primary role in the Iranian theocratic system is as a deterrent force against a potential Israeli attack on Iran, Iran would lose one of its most vital deterrents against Israel if Hezbollah sustained major damage. In this context, even if Hamas endures a severe setback, Iran is unlikely to trigger Hezbollah to initiate a war with Israel.
Does all this imply that a regional war is impossible? The late Robert Jervis, a renowned expert in International Relations who thoroughly studied conflicts, argued that “War can occur without misperception, but rarely. Misperception encompasses inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences, and misjudgments about how others will react.”
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with a focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.
Decoding Iran’s Position on the Gaza War
By Shahir Shahidsaless
Middle East & North Africa
In April 2011, in an unprecedented statement, Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, remarked, “We intervened in anti-Israel conflicts, resulting in the triumph of the 33-day war [referring to a 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah] and the success of the 22-day war [alluding to a 2008-2009 conflict in Gaza]. From this point forward, wherever any nation, any group combats the Zionist regime, we unequivocally stand by them, offering our unwavering support, and we have no qualms about saying this.”
Khamenei’s acknowledgment of Iranian involvement in those two wars came five years after the Lebanon conflict and two years after the fighting in Gaza. He refrained from such admissions during the heat of those conflicts.
Fast forward to October 10, 2023, just three days after the massive Hamas attack on Israel. Khamenei not only commended the Hamas operations in the most fervent terms but also asserted that those who doubted this being the handiwork of Palestinians “do not know the Palestinian nation and are miscalculating.” He emphasized that while “the entire Islamic world stands in solemn obligation to support the Palestinians and will do so with divine consent, this is the work of Palestinians themselves.”
While no conclusive evidence directly points to Iran, the intricacy of the meticulously orchestrated attack by Hamas, characterized by a high level of coordination and deception, has led many to speculate that Iran was involved. The use of paragliders has also raised questions not only about the source of these gliders but about how Hamas operatives were trained to operate them. However, it’s important to distinguish between providing support and being in full command and control. It is unlikely that Tehran has taken on the latter role.
On October 15, Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, was quoted by Iranian state media as saying, “We have conveyed our message to Israel through its allies that if they do not cease their atrocities in Gaza, Iran cannot simply remain an observer.” Only a few hours later, however, Iran’s UN mission softened the hawkish tone and issued a statement emphasizing that if Israel “does not intend to attack Iran, its interests, and its citizens, Iran will not intervene in this conflict.”
Two days later, on October 17, Khamenei issued a sterner warning to Israel, stating, “If the crimes of the Zionist regime continue, Muslims and resistance forces will become impatient, and no one can stop them.”
Do these seemingly conflicting positions indicate confusion in Tehran regarding its approach to the Gaza crisis, which is escalating rapidly? In fact, Tehran is seeking to score propaganda points from the crisis without triggering a wider war. Direct involvement in a head-on war with Israel could potentially invite U.S. intervention, resulting in monumental damage to Iran. This could lead to a loss of command and control, potentially even causing a government collapse.
Khamenei vehemently shuns war. A striking instance is after the attack on the Iranian consulate in Afghanistan in August 1998 during the rule of the Taliban, who are sworn enemies of Shi’ite Muslims. Armed assailants raided the consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, resulting in the death of ten Iranian diplomats. Tens of thousands of Iranian troops amassed at the Afghan border, poised for a full-scale assault. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council, headed then by moderate President Mohammad Khatami, endorsed the plan. However, at the last minute, Khamenei objected, and the operations were called off.
Another clear example of Khamenei’s war aversion came after the U.S. assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani in 2020. Soleimani was not only a military leader who oversaw Iran’s extraterritorial military activities but also played a key role in Iran’s regional foreign policy. He was considered the second most powerful figure in Iran after Khamenei.
After his death, top Iranian military and civilian figures, from Khamenei on down, vowed vengeance. Many Western analysts expected a military conflict. Iran launched a missile attack on the Ain Al Assad base in Iraq, where American forces were stationed. However, Americans were informed in advance about the attack via Iranian leaks to the Iraqi government. No American soldiers were killed, although some 100 were treated for concussions. The less conventional analysis that suggested war was improbable then still holds today.
While the Islamic government of Iran doesn’t desire a full-scale war, it also wants to retain its reputation as the leading external force spearheading the struggle against Israel in the Muslim world, especially given the devastating situation in Gaza. To navigate this delicate balance, the Iranian government employs bombastic rhetoric against Israel while providing support and blessings to its Lebanese proxy group, Hezbollah, and allowing it to engage in low-intensity conflict with Israel. Furthermore, Iran appears to be encouraging attacks on U.S. targets in Iraq and Syria through other proxy forces. The U.S. retaliated on Oct. 27 with two strikes on Iran-linked targets in Syria.
This calibrated policy could help explain why the Secretary General of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has been noticeably quiet, much to the surprise of observers, politicians, and the Arab world. The dilemma is that if he appears in public, he is obliged to take a radical stance regarding the ongoing events in Gaza, which would contradict what his group is doing on the ground.
On the other hand, if Nasrallah refrains from his usual bombastic style, it could disappoint his followers and undermine his position as the figure known for belligerent rhetoric and actions against Israel. Even a handwritten letter by him, published by Nour News, the outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council on October 25, designating those who have been killed since October 7 as martyrs, lacked his usual saber-rattling tone. However, on October 25, Nour News reported that Nasrallah had a meeting “with the officials of the Resistance groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”
An Oct. 24 article by Tasnim News, associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), cited Israeli and Western media to argue that Israel has not launched a ground attack on Gaza so far out of fear of escalation of a new front in the north against Hezbollah.
One could argue that Iran might prompt Hezbollah to engage in a full-fledged war with Israel if, or when, Hamas seems on the brink of collapse. However, given Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s earlier warning that Israel would “return Lebanon to the Stone Age” in response to a Hezbollah-initiated conflict, Lebanon – and Hezbollah –could face irreparable damage. Given that Hezbollah’s primary role in the Iranian theocratic system is as a deterrent force against a potential Israeli attack on Iran, Iran would lose one of its most vital deterrents against Israel if Hezbollah sustained major damage. In this context, even if Hamas endures a severe setback, Iran is unlikely to trigger Hezbollah to initiate a war with Israel.
Does all this imply that a regional war is impossible? The late Robert Jervis, a renowned expert in International Relations who thoroughly studied conflicts, argued that “War can occur without misperception, but rarely. Misperception encompasses inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences, and misjudgments about how others will react.”
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with a focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.
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