This month the world celebrates a historic achievement and milestone: the elimination of the last declared chemical weapons (CW) stockpile. Twenty-six years after the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997, the United States announced on July 7 that it had completed the elimination of the last of its chemical weapons stockpile at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant in Kentucky. Once the holder of the world’s second largest CW stockpile, the United States joins the six other countries that declared chemical weapons stockpiles to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in completing the destruction of those declared weapons, as verified by the OPCW. The significance of this milestone cannot be overstated. Since the beginning of modern chemical warfare in World War One and continuing through colonial wars, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Syrian conflict, CW are estimated to have killed or maimed more than a million people, including women and children.
Challenges
CW stockpile declarations and elimination are not sufficient to protect the world against chemical weapons, however. Many ingredients, or precursors, of CWs have important legitimate use in the manufacture of many commercial products, such as personal care products, flame retardants, industrial lubricating oils, and anti-corrosive protectants, and concrete. These ingredients are produced and widely traded around the world. While contributing to the global economy and numerous every-day items, these chemicals could be misused or diverted for CW purposes. At the same time, new technologies may facilitate the development of new chemical weapons, and the speed of technological advancement and convergence further complicates efforts to counter potential and current threats.
The achievement of eliminating declared stockpiles also serves to highlight some key challenges to what once seemed well-established norms against CW development and use. Despite the elimination of Syria’s declared CW stockpile in 2016, the OPCW has found that CW were used or likely used in 20 of 71 cases of alleged CW in Syria’s ongoing conflict, and has identified the Syrian military as the perpetrator in five of those instances. These findings cast serious doubt over the completeness of the government’s declaration and elimination effort. The United States has also accused North Korea of using VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim Jong Nam, half brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in 2017. International accusations that a Novichok chemical weapons agent was used to attack former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England in 2018 and Putin critic Alexei Navalny in 2020 has also divided States Parties to the CWC over issues of accountability and attribution.
Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime Must Remain a Priority
In this international environment of emerging risks and contested norms, efforts to support and strengthen the global chemical weapons non-proliferation regime are more critical than ever. This regime includes the Convention’s robust inspection and verification framework, requiring countries to declare to the OPCW all sites that produce, and in some cases sites that process or consume the toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in the Convention’s three schedules, as well as details on that production and processing and on imports and exports of such chemicals. The OPCW and CWC States Parties each have vital and mutually supporting roles in implementing these foundational CW non-proliferation requirements. In addition, all UN member states have critical security, strategic trade controls, and other related obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 to prevent the proliferation of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. Many states have gone even further in coordinating and harmonizing their national non-proliferation efforts under voluntary multilateral agreements such as the Australia Group, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and others.
Other partners including civil society also have important roles to play in supporting CW non-proliferation. With support from Canada, for example, the Stimson Center is exploring how blockchain technology might help reconcile and reduce discrepancies in CWC States Parties’ annual chemical trade declarations and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. As the 20th anniversary approaches of UN Security Council resolution 1540, civil society can hold accountable the states that have yet to fully implement critical export control frameworks to manage trade in dual use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. Some states may prioritize development concerns over resolution 1540’s technical security obligations, and civil society can highlight the numerous areas of synergy that, if leveraged, could reduce the overall burden on governments and constrained resources. Even for countries with robust export control regimes, enforcement of chemical control lists is a complex task that could benefit from greater digitization and automation. The elimination of the world’s declared CW stockpiles is worth celebrating thoroughly. However, there is still much work ahead to reduce CW proliferation risks.
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Proliferation Prevention Efforts Remain Critical Despite Elimination of World’s Declared CW Stockpiles
By Christina McAllister Author • Sneha Nair Research • William Marshall Research
Nonproliferation
The Chemical Weapons Convention aims for the total elimination of all chemical weapons but also to ensure dual-use chemicals – those with both legitimate household or industrial uses as well as potential application to manufacturing of chemical weapons – are not produced or traded for the dangerous uses. With all declared chemical weapons stockpiles destroyed as of July 7, 2023, it is more important than ever to uphold the Convention’s provisions promoting the benefits of chemistry for all and preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
This month the world celebrates a historic achievement and milestone: the elimination of the last declared chemical weapons (CW) stockpile. Twenty-six years after the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997, the United States announced on July 7 that it had completed the elimination of the last of its chemical weapons stockpile at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant in Kentucky. Once the holder of the world’s second largest CW stockpile, the United States joins the six other countries that declared chemical weapons stockpiles to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in completing the destruction of those declared weapons, as verified by the OPCW. The significance of this milestone cannot be overstated. Since the beginning of modern chemical warfare in World War One and continuing through colonial wars, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Syrian conflict, CW are estimated to have killed or maimed more than a million people, including women and children.
Challenges
CW stockpile declarations and elimination are not sufficient to protect the world against chemical weapons, however. Many ingredients, or precursors, of CWs have important legitimate use in the manufacture of many commercial products, such as personal care products, flame retardants, industrial lubricating oils, and anti-corrosive protectants, and concrete. These ingredients are produced and widely traded around the world. While contributing to the global economy and numerous every-day items, these chemicals could be misused or diverted for CW purposes. At the same time, new technologies may facilitate the development of new chemical weapons, and the speed of technological advancement and convergence further complicates efforts to counter potential and current threats.
The achievement of eliminating declared stockpiles also serves to highlight some key challenges to what once seemed well-established norms against CW development and use. Despite the elimination of Syria’s declared CW stockpile in 2016, the OPCW has found that CW were used or likely used in 20 of 71 cases of alleged CW in Syria’s ongoing conflict, and has identified the Syrian military as the perpetrator in five of those instances. These findings cast serious doubt over the completeness of the government’s declaration and elimination effort. The United States has also accused North Korea of using VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim Jong Nam, half brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in 2017. International accusations that a Novichok chemical weapons agent was used to attack former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England in 2018 and Putin critic Alexei Navalny in 2020 has also divided States Parties to the CWC over issues of accountability and attribution.
Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime Must Remain a Priority
In this international environment of emerging risks and contested norms, efforts to support and strengthen the global chemical weapons non-proliferation regime are more critical than ever. This regime includes the Convention’s robust inspection and verification framework, requiring countries to declare to the OPCW all sites that produce, and in some cases sites that process or consume the toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in the Convention’s three schedules, as well as details on that production and processing and on imports and exports of such chemicals. The OPCW and CWC States Parties each have vital and mutually supporting roles in implementing these foundational CW non-proliferation requirements. In addition, all UN member states have critical security, strategic trade controls, and other related obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 to prevent the proliferation of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. Many states have gone even further in coordinating and harmonizing their national non-proliferation efforts under voluntary multilateral agreements such as the Australia Group, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and others.
Other partners including civil society also have important roles to play in supporting CW non-proliferation. With support from Canada, for example, the Stimson Center is exploring how blockchain technology might help reconcile and reduce discrepancies in CWC States Parties’ annual chemical trade declarations and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. As the 20th anniversary approaches of UN Security Council resolution 1540, civil society can hold accountable the states that have yet to fully implement critical export control frameworks to manage trade in dual use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. Some states may prioritize development concerns over resolution 1540’s technical security obligations, and civil society can highlight the numerous areas of synergy that, if leveraged, could reduce the overall burden on governments and constrained resources. Even for countries with robust export control regimes, enforcement of chemical control lists is a complex task that could benefit from greater digitization and automation. The elimination of the world’s declared CW stockpiles is worth celebrating thoroughly. However, there is still much work ahead to reduce CW proliferation risks.
Photoheader: “The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.”
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