Issue Brief

Partnerships in Proliferation Prevention Program

Leveraging UN Sustainable Development Goals and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Synergies: The Case for Responsible Chemical Management

Analyzing how two different UN instruments can be used to manage hazardous chemicals for both international security and sustainable development

By William Marshall • Christina McAllister • Gabriel Savagner • Andrea Viski

Trade Risk Mitigation

July 3, 2023

As global chemical production and trade grows, so too do the environmental and public health risks – as well as the proliferation risks of dual-use chemicals that have both industrial and chemical weapons applications. Some States, particularly those with limited resources, may see their obligation to implement the security provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1540 to prevent dual use chemicals (and other weapons of mass destruction and related materials) from falling into the wrong hands as an additional burden or even an obstacle as they work on higher priority development, health, and safety goals. Yet their work towards sustainable development under the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals can help meet UNSCR 1540 obligations, and vice versa, as this brief will highlight. Approaching the management of hazardous chemicals holistically through the lens of both sustainable development and international security can lead to better outcomes as well as more efficient application of scarce resources.

Introduction

In 2015, the United Nations adopted 17 universal Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the objective to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that by 2030 all people enjoy peace and prosperity. The SDGs have guided UN Member States in their effort to achieve safety, security, and development, especially in emerging economies and countries with limited resources. With much attention on the specific goals themselves, linkages between the SDGs and other United Nations legal instruments have so far received little recognition. However, identifying synergies between SDGs and compliance with, for example, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions can yield a novel approach to working towards international peace and security. As many countries focus national resources on developing and expanding trade and economic interests, dual pursuit of instruments to accomplish greater safety and sustainability while also strengthening international security can reveal synchronicities and mutual benefits. This could allow UN Member States to streamline efforts and resources while addressing both concerns simultaneously.

UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) serves as the principal framework for UN Member States to implement measures countering non-state actor WMD proliferation or use. Over the nearly two decades since its adoption by the UN Security Council, countries have had varying degrees of success in implementing the specific measures called for in the resolution. Exploring linkages between the UN SDGs and UNSCR 1540 may assist Member States in working towards the achievement of specific goals through compliance with the resolution, while also raising awareness of potential synergies between the pursuit of the SDGs and the implementation of Resolution 1540. Doing so harnesses the power of UNSCR 1540 implementation to yield additional positive effects – such as equality, innovation, and safety, among others – and enhances a country’s motivation for, and prioritization of, compliance. In addition, linking the SDGs to UNSCR 1540 can facilitate effective capacity-building and broaden the incentives for compliance with the resolution beyond the focus on WMD nonproliferation.

To demonstrate the utility and potential benefits of establishing linkages between UNSCR 1540 and SDGs, this paper builds on the approach put forth by Richard T. Cupitt in his brief, “Sustainability and UNSCR 1540: Making the Link.”¹ The authors will use the example of chemical-related SDGs and resolution 1540 obligations to demonstrate that sound management of chemicals contributes both to SDG goals as well as compliance with UNSCR 1540. As this brief will demonstrate, the approach taken here can be applied to other cross-cutting domains in the nuclear, biological, or means of delivery arenas.

The paper will link the two UN instruments and demonstrate the benefits of identifying overlaps and synergies by first providing a brief background on UNSCR 1540 obligations and chemical-related SDGs. As global production and trade in chemicals expands, the role of both the SDGs and resolution 1540 in ensuring safe and secure management of the most hazardous chemicals will only grow in relevance and importance. This brief will shed light on specific SDGs that link to UNSCR 1540 obligations, and vice versa, and provide recommendations to leverage the synergies between these instruments. It will conclude with insights and lessons learned as well as recommendations on how to apply synergies in different ways for a secure, peaceful, equal, and prosperous world.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and Management of Chemicals of Proliferation Concern

UNSCR 1540 (2004), adopted pursuant to the United Nations Charter as a Chapter VII resolution, obligates all UN Member States to adopt domestic legal frameworks and enforcement measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or their components from contributing to WMD proliferation, especially by non-state actors. These frameworks must prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.² Some UNSCR 1540 obligations support or parallel States Parties’ obligations under other threat-specific treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).³

To prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and chemical-related dual-use goods and technologies, States must focus their efforts on controlling not just known chemical warfare agents but also the broad array of dual-use chemicals that, while having legitimate industrial, commercial, or other beneficial applications also have potential utility in the production of chemical weapons and their precursors. Some of these chemicals are defined in the three CWC Schedules and in other national and international control lists.⁴ Since many of these chemicals have legitimate civilian uses, their production and trade cannot be prohibited outright. They should therefore be carefully managed through trade controls, physical protection, and other measures as identified by UNSCR 1540 to ensure they are not misused for non-peaceful purposes.

The UN 1540 Committee and its Panel of Experts, which UNSCR 1540 established under the UN Security Council and whose obligations and mandate are delineated by resolution 1540 and subsequent resolutions, reports to the UN Security Council on the status of the resolution’s implementation. As part of its work, the Panel of Experts prepares a matrix for each UN Member State that is approved by the 1540 Committee. The Committee uses the matrices as their primary method to organize information regarding implementation of the resolution.⁵ The matrices also break down, in more detailed form, requirements of the resolution as follows:

Adherence to legally binding international agreements (e.g., the CWC, Geneva Protocol of 1925⁶)
Enactment of national legislation prohibiting manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer, or use of WMD (including chemical weapons) or their means of delivery, or any attempt to engage in, participate as an accomplice in, assist in, or finance such activities
Enactment of measures to account for and secure production, use, storage, and transport of materials related to WMD and their means of delivery
Physical protection measures and personnel reliability programs
Border control and law enforcement to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking
Border control detection measures and control of brokering services
Export control legislation and regulations along with licensing provisions and the use of control lists of materials, equipment and technology
End-user, transit, trans-shipment, and re-export controls and catch-all clauses⁷
Control over financing of and services (including transportation) related to exports/ transshipments that could contribute to the proliferation of WMD and their components and delivery systems.

While the requirements above apply to all WMD-related materials, not just to dual-use chemicals, the 1540 Committee also calls upon States to demonstrate specifically for chemical non-proliferation that they have, inter alia:

A National Authority in place for the implementation of the CWC;
Legal measures to require licensing and registration of installations, facilities, persons, entities, use, and handling of related materials;
Domestic control over old or abandoned chemical weapons.⁸

Sustainable Development Goals and Chemical Management

According to the 2019 Global Sustainable Development Report, the Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General predicted that the global chemical sector would double in size between 2015 and 2030 and introduce a substantial quantity of new chemical products to the global market.⁹ The International Conference on Chemicals Management has also estimated that, as of 2020, developing countries would produce and use more than 30% of global chemicals.¹⁰

While the interest of many United Nations Member States in the sustainable development of the chemical industry may be focused more on economic incentives, as global chemical production and trade grows, so too do the environmental and public health risks. Thus, it is not surprising that several of the 17 UN SDGs are directly related to the management of chemicals, and particularly the safe production, transportation, and storage of substances potentially hazardous to the environment and public health. Goals 3, 6, 12, and 16 in particular, include targets and indicators that are directly or indirectly related to the broader concern of chemical safety or safeguarding of the environment and public from harmful chemicals, through accidents or misuse.

Before detailing these chemical-related targets and indicators it should be noted that chemicals of proliferation concern constitute a clear subset of the broader class of hazardous chemicals with which the SDGs are concerned. Chemical weapons themselves, which are by design and by definition the most toxic chemical substances on earth, fall squarely within the purview of SDG 16, as outlined below. And old chemical weapons dumped at sea or abandoned on land clearly pose a hazard to the environment and to human safety.¹¹

But many precursor chemicals, though not as acutely toxic, are nevertheless also hazardous to humans or the environment, or both, as can be understood by reviewing the Australia Group Common Control List Handbook, one publicly available resource on chemicals subject to non-proliferation export controls that also includes hazard information.¹² For 89 specific precursor chemicals subject to member state export controls for nonproliferation purposes, the Handbook provides – where known or applicable – the associated UN Hazard Placard as well as its hazard pictogram under the Globally Harmonized System (GHS) of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals. Whereas the UN Hazard Placards are associated with chemicals in transport, the GHS hazard pictograms are applicable to chemical use and disposal as well as transportation.¹³ Because many of these 89 chemicals also have important commercial and industrial applications, they should be of concern to governments and other stakeholders seeking to make progress on the SDGs.

For example, the Australia Group’s first listed chemical, thiodiglycol, a precursor for chemical weapon blister agents as well as an element in in the production of water-based inks, textile dyes, plastics, and coatings, is marked with the pictograms for UN Hazard Class 9 (Miscellaneous Dangerous Substances and Articles, Including Environmentally Hazardous Substances) and for GHS hazards including skin sensitization, skin irritation, eye irritation, acute toxicity, specific organ toxicity – single exposure, and hazardous to the ozone layer.¹⁴

All but 30 chemicals in the Australia Group Handbook are associated with either a UN Hazard Placard, a GHS pictogram or both. Of those 30 chemicals, two are listed as lacking a UN Hazard Placard and a GHS pictogram because they are “not applicable.”¹⁵ The other 28 chemicals are all precursors for nerve agents, one of the most highly toxic classes of chemical weapons. The Handbook notes that little is known about these precursors, or that they have limited or no availability or commercial application. Their UN Hazard Placards and GHS pictograms are listed as “unknown.”

In support of UN SDG 3 to ‘ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all,’ target 3.9 aims to ‘substantially reduce’ risks to human health as a result of exposure to hazardous chemicals.¹⁶ One of the indicators listed for target 3.9, for example, is the ‘mortality rate attributed to unintentional poisoning,’ such as due to chemical contamination of the environment. Similarly, SDG 6, to ‘ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’ includes target 6.3, which is aimed at reducing the risk of environmental damage and the negative effects on human health due to hazardous chemicals.¹⁷ In a similar vein, UN SDG 12 urges Member States to promote ‘sustainable consumption and production’ in the manufacture, transport, use, and disposal of industrial goods, including through the enforcement of ‘environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle… and significantly reduce… their adverse impacts on human health and the environment’ (target 12.4).¹⁸ Unlike SDGs 3 and 6, which apply more generally to broader chemical hazards to the environment and human health, SDG 12 specifically addresses the chemical industry’s manufacturing and supply chains, urging Member States to introduce measures to govern the production, transportation, and storage of hazardous chemicals and to safeguard against potential risks to the environment and public. Finally, targets for SDG 16, which calls upon Member States to promote peace and justice through the fostering of strong national institutions supported by international cooperation¹⁹ include several that can very clearly be read to include chemical weapons and precursor material. These targets include the obligation to reduce the illicit arms trade, combat organized crime (16.4) and strengthen national institutions through international cooperation to prevent violence and terrorism (16.a).

Unlike UNSCR 1540, the SDGs do not constitute an obligation on UN Member States to manage chemicals in a certain way. However, voluntary international policy frameworks on chemical management have developed over recent decades and today expressly reference support for the achievement of the SDGs.

The Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM), a multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral non-binding policy framework was established in 2006 to minimize the adverse effects of chemicals on human health and the environment and is closely associated with SDG 12.4 (originally targeted for achievement by 2020). The International Conference on Chemicals Management, the implementing body for SAICM, and its stakeholders are scheduled to host a conference in September, 2023, in order to chart a course on international chemicals management policy into the future in support of the SDGs.²⁰

It would therefore be prudent to review the legacy Global Plan of Action through 2020 and its almost three hundred recommended actions to be taken in support of its five main objectives:²¹

Risk Reduction
Strengthening Knowledge and Information
Governance: Strengthening Institutions, Law, and Policy
Enhancing Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation
Addressing Illegal International Traffic

Related to these efforts, the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) promotes the Responsible Care® framework), a voluntary initiative to improve chemicals management globally, among its members. The Responsible Care® framework includes a Global Charter that commits its members to:²²

A corporate leadership culture that proactively supports safe chemicals management through the global Responsible Care initiative
Safeguarding people and the environment by continuously improving environmental, health and safety performance; the security of facilities, processes and technologies; and by driving continuous improvement in chemical product safety and stewardship throughout the supply chain
Strengthening chemicals management systems by participating in the development and implementation of lifecycle-oriented, sound-science and risk-based chemical safety legislation and best practices
Influencing business partners to promote the safe management of chemicals within their own operations
Engaging stakeholders, understanding and responding to their concerns and expectations for safer operations and products and communicating openly on their performance and products
Contributing to sustainability through improved performance, expanded economic opportunities and the development of innovative technologies and other solutions to meet societal challenges

ICCA reports that Responsible Care® is currently implemented in nearly 70 economies and that CEOs from more than 580 global chemical manufacturing companies, representing 96 percent of the world’s largest chemical companies, have signed the Responsible Care Global Charter.²³ While voluntary for ICCA membership, Responsible Care® is mandatory for industry members of some national associations, including the American Chemistry Council (ACC). In addition to making CEO-level pledges, ACC members and Responsible Care Partner companies track and report related metrics, undergo third party audit and certification on the Responsible Care Management System® and implement ‘Product Safety, Process Safety, and Security’ codes.²⁴

Responsible Management of Chemicals: Links between UNSCR 1540 and SDGs

As scholars have noted, finding synergies between development and security needs and obligations allow States to leverage scarce resources to address both more efficiently.²⁵ While the obligation to implement UNSCR 1540 and enforce greater chemical security may be perceived as an additional burden by some States, particularly those with limited resources, Finlay et al highlight the potential for ‘dual-benefit opportunities’. They argue that efforts to curb illicit trafficking and proliferation may also have a direct, beneficial impact on economic development and social stability.²⁶ Similarly, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention, has recognized the potential for “synergies [to] be found between the OPCW’s work to implement the [CWC] and the SDGs.”²⁷ In a meeting of chemical industry professionals, civil society experts, and national authorities, the OPCW sponsored a discourse on how Article XI of the Convention supports economic and technological growth in the global chemical industry, drawing linkages between the implementation of the CWC and SDGs for dual benefit to ‘chemical safety, security and sustainability.’²⁸ Thus, despite surface level disparity of aims, there are considerable synergies between the SDGs’ chemical safety and sound chemical management objectives and the goals of UNSCR 1540’s chemical security obligations. These synergies are related to common concerns with illicit trafficking, security of materials within national borders, and capacity building and technical cooperation.

Illicit Trafficking

As noted above, SDG 16’s targets of reducing the illicit arms trade, combating organized crime (16.4), and strengthening national institutions through international cooperation to prevent violence and terrorism (16.a), clearly encompass chemical weapons and precursors and are therefore directly related to UNSCR 1540’s overarching obligation on UN Member States to prevent the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to control related materials. As noted above, SAICM’s Global Plan of Action includes the objective of addressing illicit trafficking. This objective relates to UNSCR 1540 obligations on all States to implement border and trade controls to ensure only legitimate use of chemicals of proliferation concern. Recommended actions under this objective include No. 204, ‘Develop national strategies for prevention, detection and control of illegal traffic, including the strengthening of laws, judicial mechanisms and the capacity of customs administrations and other national authorities to control and prevent illegal shipments of toxic and hazardous chemicals.’²⁹

Other recommended actions include No. 234, to ‘provide the necessary technical training and financial resources for national Governments to detect and prevent the illegal traffic in toxic and dangerous goods and hazardous wastes’ and No. 261, to ‘train customs officials to detect illegal transboundary movements of waste.’ Recommended activity 267 calls for applying international conventions related to the sound management of chemicals more effectively to transboundary movement. Activity 267, while referencing the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade and Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, makes no mention of the CWC or UNSCR 1540.³⁰

Finally, recommended activities Nos. 263-271 all have to do with the combatting of the illicit trafficking in toxic and hazardous chemicals and wastes as well, whether through building customs’ capacity, conducting assessments of the extent of the problem, or expanding stakeholder coordination and cooperation to address the issue. The SAICM Global Plan of Action recommended activities should be understood in the context of the Basel Convention. Nonetheless, this provides a clear opportunity to work with national governments and other stakeholders to add UNSCR 1540 stakeholders to the conversation in order to leverage such activities and to address related UNSCR 1540 obligations.

Security of Materials

At first glance, the SDGs concern with chemicals seems exclusively focused on safety: protection of human health and the environment. Chemical security has become an increasing focus of chemical sector stakeholder groups responsible for supporting the achievement of the SDGs and has been closely integrated into chemical management approaches. With increasing attention to security issues since, for example, the events of September 11, 2001, practitioners operating within various international non-proliferation regimes have found it helpful to draw conceptual distinctions between safety, the traditional focus of nuclear, biological, and chemical scientists, and security. One delegate at the 2003 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) meetings summed up the difference in a concise formulation: ‘Biosafety protects people from germs – biosecurity protects germs from people.’ As expanded upon by the 2008 BWC Implementation Support Unit background paper in which the quote appears, safety in this context is defined as the protection of humans from the adverse effects of dangerous or toxic material and security as the ‘physical protection’ of the material from humans with intentions to misuse it for nefarious and destructive purposes.³¹ This distinction is also useful in the context of international regimes to control nuclear and radioactive material, where the IAEA has issued several guidance documents on security in the past decade to supplement existing safety guidance. It applies equally to the chemical industry, where safety has a long regulatory history and security has more recently risen to equal prominence.

Despite the distinction between the concepts of safety and security, it is notable that the chemical industry offers numerous examples of holistic approaches to addressing them in integrated guidance frameworks. The National Academies of Science’s Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security: A Guide to Prudent Chemical Management offers one example of such an approach.³²

The OPCW’s Report on Needs and Best Practices on Chemical Safety and Security Management offers another.³³

Most notable for the purposes of this brief, however, is the integration of security best practices into the chemical industry’s Responsible Care® framework given its close association with the achievement of the SDGs. The case of the American Chemistry Council is particularly instructive, as it added a security code under its own Responsible Care® Initiative in 2002, even before the passage of UNSCR 1540 with its focus on the security of dual-use materials. While the overlapping sets of chemicals constituting the focus of the SDGs versus UNSCR 1540 are different, the security practices applied to both may be similar.

There is potential for Member States to implement legislation and implementation measures that not only address chemical safety in relation to the UN’s SDGs but also chemical security to fulfil resolution 1540 obligations. Where possible, the integration of the principles and practices of chemical safety and security should be no less a priority for governments seeking to maximize limited resources to address development goals and security obligations.

It is possible that security measures implemented by Member States to improve the regulation of chemical manufacturing, transport, and waste management under resolution 1540 could also substantially reduce the risk of chemical disasters. Increased physical security, monitoring, and stronger controls on chemical transport, for example, could reduce the risk of environmental accidents, reduce the risk of chemical weapons proliferation as well as the risks that hazardous chemicals pose to both human health and the environment if mishandled or improperly disposed of.

It is also notable that both SDG-related guidance and 1540-related obligations emphasize a lifecycle approach to safety and security concerns, respectively. The World Health Organization (WHO) broadly defines chemical safety as ‘all activities involving chemicals in such a way as to ensure the safety of human health and the environment’ including during manufacturing, transport, use, and waste disposal. The 2019 Global Sustainable Development Report highlights the need for ‘sound management [of chemicals] at all levels’ to ensure that the global expansion of chemical manufacturing and trade does not pose greater risks to human health and the environment.³⁴ The report also encourages the transition of the chemical sector towards greater sustainability, especially accounting for the ‘whole life cycle of chemicals’ including manufacturing, transport, and waste management.³⁵ Likewise, the 1540 Committee’s Matrices, which provide a template to organize information on individual Member States’ progress towards national implementation of the Resolution,³⁶ include a variety of data points, including whether national measures have been established to secure, control, or otherwise physically protect materials related to chemical weapons during production, use, storage and transport.³⁷ While the 1540 Matrices are used to better understand the measures taken by each Member State to implement the Resolution, rather than to enforce adoption, the template itself reflects the importance of domestic mechanisms to ensure the security of dual-use chemicals throughout their industrial lifecycle, from manufacture and consumption to storage and transport.

Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation

A third key area of implementation synergy between the SDGs and UNSCR 1540 concerns capacity building and technical cooperation. At the most fundamental level, both instruments recognize the need for capacity building and technical cooperation to achieve full implementation. SDG 17 calls on States to ‘strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development,’³⁸ while UNSCR 1540 Operative Paragraph 7 ‘recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions.³⁹

Beyond this similarity, however, the SAICM Global Plan of Action provides multiple examples of capacity building and technical cooperation activities needed to fully realize the SDGs. SAICM’s vision of responsible chemical management for the protection of human health and environment could be adapted to help meet a State’s 1540 obligations. These include the examples provided previously, such as:

No. 204, ‘Develop national strategies for prevention, detection and control of illegal traffic, including the strengthening of laws, judicial mechanisms and the capacity of customs administrations and other national authorities to control and prevent illegal shipments of toxic and hazardous chemicals’;
No. 234, to ‘provide the necessary technical training and financial resources for national Governments to detect and prevent illegal traffic in toxic and dangerous goods and hazardous wastes’; and,
No. 261, to ‘train customs officials to detect illegal transboundary movements of waste’.

Each of these could be expanded to ensure that the training and capacity building is applicable to dual use, chemical weapons precursor chemicals as well as to other toxic and hazardous chemicals and wastes. Likewise, and especially in developing countries with limited capacity for training, numerous 1540- or CWC-related export control trainings on offer from the OPCW and U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program would be applicable broadly to preventing illicit trade in other hazardous chemicals and wastes.

In addition, the SDGs and SAICM’s Global Plan of Action call in multiple instances for leveraging multilateral agreements, treaties, and conventions. One of the metrics used to measure Member States’ efforts to achieve SDG 12, on the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, is the number of States which are party to ‘international multilateral environmental agreements on hazardous waste, and other chemicals…’ (indicator 12.4.1).⁴⁰ This focus on multilateral cooperation potentially presents Member States with an opportunity to combine their efforts in seeking collaborative partnerships to address both chemical safety and security concerns. Issues such as chemical transport safety, chemical export controls, and end-use verification for dual-use chemicals are just some of the chemical safety and security concerns related to both the UN SDGs and UNSCR 1540. These could provide the basis for productive engagement between Member States while strengthening multilateral partnerships to combat the proliferation of chemicals of concern. As noted previously, recommended activity 267 could be interpreted beyond the Rotterdam and Basel conventions to include the CWC and UNSCR 1540.

Other SDGs pertaining to capacity building and technical assistance can be more broadly applicable to UNSCR 1540 requirements as well. For example, SDG 4.b calls for substantially expanding globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular, to less developed countries, small island developing States, and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programs, in developed countries and other developing countries. Conceptualizing such programs broadly can ensure that stakeholders receive training in support of both the SDGs and UNSCR 1540. Illustrative of such an approach are the European Union‘s CBRN Center of Excellence projects which give scholarships to students to learn about nonproliferation and the U.S. EXBS Program that runs a strategic trade management academy providing vocational and technical training. As another example, the OPCW offers a capacity building Chemical Safety and Security Management Programme for chemistry practitioners, policy makers, National Authorities, and chemical industry associations applicable to both sustainable development goals and to meeting UNSCR 1540 obligations.⁴¹

What Goes Around Comes Around

The aforementioned examples of commonalities between the objectives of both the UN SDGs and UNSCR 1540 demonstrate how sound chemical management could simultaneously achieve related SDG targets and fulfill 1540 chemical security and chemical dual-use strategic trade-related obligations.

One needs to guard against the imposition of control measures that may infringe on a States’ right to access material for peaceful application. It is thus important that a country’s adoption of stronger trade controls should go hand-in-hand with assurances to trading partners that responsible transfers of dual use and advanced technology will be facilitated.⁴²

Case studies and anecdotal evidence support this. India, for example, won significant economic rewards, in the form of increased access to dual-use technology, for implementing robust export controls.⁴³ More recently, a 2020 seminar organized by the Pacific Forum on strategic trade controls (STC) in Southeast Asia highlighted the economic value of STC. ‘Aside from the non-proliferation and internal security angles, ASEAN Member States must also continue to raise awareness of the positive-sum benefits of STC for local economies to fast track adoption. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains a key driver for the economic development in Southeast Asia, thus, bridging the gap between national security and economic prosperity is paramount for STC to succeed.’⁴⁴ While these examples are not specific to the chemical sector, the principles would apply to it in the same way. Just as countries can leverage their sound chemical management work supporting the SDGs to also boost implementation of their obligations under the 1540 resolution, 1540 implementation efforts with respect to chemical security and export controls may provide the foundation to attract responsible investment and job growth in the chemical sector. Such 1540-enabled investment would clearly support SDG 8 on Decent Work and Economic Growth, as well as SDG 9 aiming to boost Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure.

Conclusions and Next Steps

Since the passage of UNSCR 1540, the international community has sought to identify incentives, beyond simply the legal obligation to comply with international law, for appropriate and effective implementation of the resolution. Nearly twenty years since the UN Security Council passed the resolution, the necessity of identifying such incentives and keeping the momentum of effective implementation remains critical.

In this context, identifying synergies between the SDGs and UNSCR 1540 offers a novel approach to strengthening implementation. As this brief has demonstrated, through the example of sound management of chemicals, work towards achieving the SDGs can directly fulfil an obligation to comply with UNSCR 1540 chemical-related obligations or can be leveraged indirectly to do so. This approach has the power, especially when viewed through the lens of all UNSCR 1540 obligations in the nuclear, chemical, biological and means of delivery domains, to help Member States recognize the benefits that 1540 compliance can yield to bettering the lives of their citizens and in safeguarding the environment in which we live.

Looking ahead at the steps UN Member States could take to effectively integrate their efforts to implement both UNSCR 1540 and the SDGs in the chemical sector, the following are broad recommendations for national policymakers:

Streamline the use of national resources to ensure safe management of hazardous chemicals and chemical waste by integrating measures to secure chemicals of proliferation concern from illicit trafficking.

Synergize efforts to strengthen industry’s chemical management and introduce safety legislation by including measures to increase the security of hazardous chemicals throughout the industrial lifecycle (manufacture, transport, storage, waste disposal).

Socialize and educate national chemical industries on SAICM and the ICCA’s Responsible Care® framework, as well as industry’s obligation under the CWC to declare the manufacture, consumption, and international trade of controlled chemicals.

Engage in capacity building and technical cooperation with other Member States to safeguard hazardous chemicals in transport and address not only environmental protection, but also border controls and transshipment security.

Utilize international partnerships through global initiatives such as SAICM to raise awareness of UNSCR 1540 and the CWC, and leverage non-proliferation focused efforts such as industry outreach via the Wiesbaden process to strengthen SDG-UNSCR 1540 links.

Effectively working toward such integration may require other shifts in approach as well, such as intentionally bringing together development and security stakeholder groups—groups that may not otherwise communicate frequently. For example, engaging civil society, such as research organizations, academia, and professional associations that are involved in SDG work, in UNSCR 1540, can augment the landscape of stakeholders committed to UNSCR 1540 implementation. Engaging these groups has the potential to generate ideas and new frameworks for facing the challenges of implementing UNSCR 1540 in a fast-changing world.

In addition, further research is needed into the implementation of chemical safety measures and chemical security mechanisms to identify specific areas of overlap as well as areas of conflict that need to be intentionally managed. While this brief established this important link through the example of chemical-related UNSCR 1540 obligations, it is only the first step in paving the way towards a more comprehensive analysis of all specific obligations in each WMD domain and their linkages to the UN SDGs. Performing this comprehensive analysis, as well as using effective communication tools to raise awareness of these synergies, could potentially help fast track compliance with the resolution especially in low-resourced countries.

Notes

1
Richard T. Cupitt, “Sustainability and UNSCR 1540: Making the Link,” World ECR, (June, 2021).
2
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, Adopted during the 4956th meeting of the Security Council, available from https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1540(2004)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
3
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 3 September 1992, United National Treaty Series, 26 3 XXVI 495, available from https://treaties.un.org/Pages/CTCTreaties.aspx?id=26&subid=A&clang=_en
4
For example, international lists include the Australia Group Chemical Weapons Precursors List, Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List 7 and 8, World Customs Organization Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Implementation Guide Annex V, UN Sanctions against North Korea lists (S/2006/853, November 7, 2006; S/2016/308, April 4, 2016; S/2017/728, August 22, 2017).
5
https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrices.shtml
6
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol 94 p. 65, available from https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280167ca8&clang=_en
7
These controls provide a legal and/or regulatory basis to require government permission to export unlisted items when there is reason to believe such items are intended for a WMD/Missile end-use or end-user.
8
Approved 1540 Committee Matrix, United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee, available from https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrices/matrix-template.shtml.
9
United Nations, Global Sustainable Development Report 2019: The Future is Now – Science for Achieving Sustainable Development, Sustainable Management of Chemicals Throughout their Life Cycle, New York, 2019, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p.100, available from https://www.sdgindex.org/reports/sustainable-development-report-2019/.
10
International Conference on Chemicals Management, Stepping up the Approach to make our future chemical-safe, clean, and healthy, 23 January 2017, accessible from https://www.saicm.org/Resources/SAICMnbsp;Stories/Achemicalsafefuture/tabid/5518/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
11
Kaszeta, Dan. Toxic: A History of Nerve Agents from Nazi Germany to Putin’s Russia, Oxford University Press, New York, 2021, provides examples of governments abandoning chemical weapons at sea, for example the United Kingdom’s Operation Sandcastle (p 87) or Operation CHASE in the United States (pp 133-5). See also “Japan Court Scraps Chinese Chemical Victims Ruling,” Reuters, July 18, 2007, accessed June 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUST150824.
12
Australia Group, “Common Control List Handbook Volume I: Chemical Weapons-Related Common Control Lists,” Revision 6, (2021) pp 17-140. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australia-group-common-control-list-handbook-volume-i.pdf
13
Ibid, pp 9 and 13.
14
Ibid, p. 17.
15
The Handbook (p82 and p93) lists those chemicals as Triethanolamine (TEA), a blister agent precursor that is widely traded due to numerous industrial applications, and Triethanolamine Hydrochloride, also a blister agent precursor with uncertain use as a reagent for biological applications and limited availability.
16
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Sustainable Development Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages, Target 3.9, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3.
17
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Sustainable Development Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all, Target 6.3, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal6.
18
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Sustainable Development Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns, Target 12.4, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal12.
19
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Development Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16.
20
Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection, International Chemicals Management: Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), updated March 13, 2023, accessible from https://www.bmuv.de/en/topics/health-chemicals/chemicals/international-chemicals-management.
21
SAICM Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Geneva, Switzerland, February 2006, Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management: SAICM Texts and Resolutions of the International Conference on Chemicals Management, accessible from https://www.saicm.org/About/Documents/tabid/5460/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
22
International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), Responsible Care Global Charter, 29 May 2014, accessible from https://icca-chem.org/resources/responsible-care-global-charter/.
23
International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), Responsible Care, 2023, accessible from https://icca-chem.org/focus/responsible-care/.
24
American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care: Driving Safety & Industry Performance, 2023, accessible from https://www.americanchemistry.com/chemistry-in-america/responsible-care-driving-safety-industry-performance.
25
Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Esha Mufti, Beyond Boundaries in Southeast Asia: Dual-Benefit Capacity Building to Bridge the Security/Development Divide, The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, 2012, p.8, accessible from https://stanleycenter.org/publications/beyond-boundaries-in-southeast-asia-dual-benefit-capacity-building-to-bridge-the-security-development-divide/.
26
Ibid, pgs. 21-22.
27
OPCW, “OPCW to Further Enhance Contributions to United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals,” 26 October 2018, https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2018/10/opcw-further-enhance-contributions-united-nations-sustainable-development.
28
Article XI: Economic and Technological Development states that “The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties,” including international cooperation on chemical production, trade, scientific and technological research, and other activities not prohibited under the Convention.” See https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-xi-economic-and-technological-development.
29
SAICM Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme, “Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management: SAICM Texts and Resolutions of the International Conference on Chemicals Management,” Geneva, Switzerland, 2006, p. 78, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/publications/saicm-texts-and-resolutions-international-conference-chemicals-management-17476.
30
The Rotterdam Convention entered into force on 24 February 2004 and has 161 states parties. The Convention promotes cooperative efforts and the exchange of information between countries on the management of certain hazardous chemicals during export and import that present a risk to human and environmental safety. Accessible from https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-14&chapter=27. The Basel Convention entered into force in 1992 and has 191 states parties. The Convention aims to minimize risk to human health and the environment posed by hazardous waste by reducing its production and employing regulatory measures to manage the international transportation of waste. Accessible from https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-3&chapter=27&clang=_en.
31
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, “Biosafety and Biosecurity,” (Geneva: United Nations, 2008), accessible from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/636795?ln=en.
32
Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security: A Guide to Prudent Chemical Management (Washington DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016), accessible from https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/21918/chemical-laboratory-safety-and-security-a-guide-to-developing-standard.
33
‘The systems required to adequately prevent, detect, or respond to a chemical accident or chemical security incident are often found to overlap. As such, an integrated approach to chemical safety and security risk management may support more effective implementation of risk reduction measures, provide better detection and risk communication, can be used to support a culture of safety and security within the chemical sector, and allow for the more effective implementation of limited resources. OPCW, Report on Needs and Best Practices on Chemical Safety and Security, (The Hague: OPCW, 2016) p.5, accessible from https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/ICA/ICB/OPCW_Report_on_Needs_and_Best_Practices_on_Chemical_Safety_and_Security_ManagementV3-2_1.2.pdf.
34
United Nations, Global Sustainable Development Report 2019: The Future is Now – Science for Achieving Sustainable Development, Sustainable Management of Chemicals Throughout their Life Cycle, New York, 2019, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p.100, available from https://www.sdgindex.org/reports/sustainable-development-report-2019/.
35
Ibid.
36
Approved 1540 Committee Matrix, United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee, available from https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrices/matrix-template.shtml.
37
Ibid, p.5.
38
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Development Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal17.
39
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, Adopted during the 4956th meeting of the Security Council, p. 7, accessible from https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1540(2004)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
40
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Development Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns, accessible from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal12.
41
https://www.opcw.org/resources/capacity-building/international-cooperation-programmes/chemical-safety-and-security
42
Scott Jones, Johannes Karreth, United States Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Assessing the Economic Impact of Adopting Strategic Trade Controls,” December 2010, pp. 10 – 16, accessible from https://media.nti.org/pdfs/off_us_dept_21.pdf.
43
Fuhrman, Matthew, “Making 1540 Work: Achieving Universal Compliance with Nonproliferation Export Control Standards,” World Affairs, Winter 2007, Vol. 169, No. 3 (Winter 2007), pp. 146-148.
44
Pacific Forum, “2020 Seminar on Strategic Trade Controls in Southeast Asia: Key Findings,” 28 July 2020 – 29 July 2020 & 6 August 2020 – 7 August 2020, accessible from https://pacforum.org/events/2020-seminar-on-strategic-trade-controls-in-southeast-asia.

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