Almost a month has passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Caught off-guard, China struggled to respond to the invasion, with a sense of uncertainty, dilemma, and defensiveness. Internally, there were also strong voices questioning China’s alignment with Russia, leading to a debate both in the public and in the policy community about China’s next steps.
This initial stage of confusion is over. What has emerged is a clear dual strategy of “not opposing Russia” and “not abandoning Ukraine.” While many in China are cognizant of the costs the country will carry for its alignment with Russia, mainstream scholars and senior leaders are increasingly convinced that the war in Ukraine presents a “window of strategic opportunity,” especially in terms of U.S.-China relations. In other words, China will not abandon Russia. To manage the costs of this position, China’s approach is becoming more nuanced, taking different positions in its propaganda, diplomacy, and real actions, respectively.
China will not abandon Russia
Despite the voices inside and outside of China calling for an overhaul of China’s current Russia policy and to recalibrate its relations with Russia, a major shift of position is unlikely for two reasons. First, abandoning Russia does not solve or alleviate China’s most important external national security challenge, which remains the United States. In fact, strong voices in China advocate against abandoning Russia because the U.S. offers no “rewards” for doing so and they fear China “will be the next on the list after Russia.” At a minimum, Russia’s existence alone is both a counterbalance and a strategic distraction that draws U.S. focus to Europe. Abandoning Russia, and mitigating its threat to the West, could very well leave China to face the full attention and force of a hostile U.S. later — alone.
Another reason for China’s persistence on the current policy course is domestic. Even if China were to adjust its policy towards Russia, as many believe that China will, it will not happen during the Ukraine War. The reason is simple: it is simply too close to the February 4 Joint Statement issued by Xi and Putin. Such a prompt change of policy direction would inevitably raise questions about the wisdom of Xi’s decision to take the position in the first place. The 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for this Fall, is where Xi is expected break the established succession tradition in the Party and ink his third term. Given the discontent within the Party and the country, a reorientation of China’s policy toward Russia equates to a tacit admission of a policy mistake; that is simply untenable in Chinese politics today.
Unlike China’s initial struggle to respond to the repercussions of the Russian invasion, the Chinese policy community is currently prone to the view that the war presents an opportunity for China. China is not a party to the conflict, this is not Chinese territory, and China’s ties with Russia are seen as the leverage to chart a middle way approach between Russia and the West. The war is believed to have increased China’s leverage vis-à-vis the U.S., created a dilemma for the U.S. between its Russia policy and China policy, and deepened the security anxiety in the Asia-Pacific region about U.S. abandonment.
Differentiated approach
Having said that, a decision not to abandon Russia does not equate to a decision to lend all support to Russia – just like the lack of China’s open opposition to the Russian invasion does not equate to a support of the invasion either. China now differentiates its approach to the Ukraine crisis across three axes: Rhetoric and propaganda that is pro-Russia; diplomacy that balances Russia, Ukraine, and the West; and concrete actions or support that are notably cautious.
Since the beginning of the war, Chinese support for Russia has been most vocally manifested in propaganda and narratives. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has continued its defense of Russia by accusing the West, especially the U.S., of “throwing gas over fire” and calls for “properly resolving Russia’s legitimate security concerns.” The Cyberspace Administration of China has also purged Chinese social media and internet of anti-war and anti-Russia rhetoric. Letters and articles that openly condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine have been completely removed from the internet. Beijing fears mass movement, even if the target is Russia, as it could challenge Beijing’s policy eventually. This pro-Russia propaganda appears a bit more balanced since last Friday, with criticisms of Russia on national TV, but the main theme has not changed.
But support for Russia in rhetoric is being neutralized by China’s balancing diplomacy. Any Chinese reference to Russia’s “legitimate security concerns” is now accompanied by an emphasis on “sovereignty and territorial integrity”, which refers to Ukraine, and in the Chinese view constitutes direct but implicit criticism of the Russian invasion. In fact, even the sequence matters. Foreign Minister Wang Yi discussed “sovereignty and territorial integrity” before “legitimate security concerns” in his press conference at the Two Sessions on March 7 when asked about China’s position on Ukraine. That order is also seen as a sign of Beijing’s implicit support of Ukraine and criticism of Russia. This balancing diplomacy has been a key feature of China’s response to the war in Ukraine, demonstrating the tension between recent commitment to “no limits” cooperation with Russia, and China’s long-term foreign policy principles, as well as relations with the rest of the world.
This self-proclaimed neutrality, or a pro-Russia neutrality is evidently unsatisfactory for the world, and greater demands are being made for China to take a clear position. Despite the Chinese hypocrisy, clear opposition or condemnation is unlikely.
Despite China’s refusal to oppose Russia and its suggested support for Ukraine, concrete action is lacking on both fronts. Two batches of Chinese humanitarian aid to Ukraine are extremely small- $2 million in total. Concrete material support to Russia that is specific to the war has not yet been identified. This could be the result of the Biden administration’s repeated preemptive leaking of intelligence that put China and its actions under a spotlight. But it also reflects the Chinese calculus that assisting Russia at this time, against international scrutiny and criticism and without any deniability, is not in line with China’s national interests.
Aid to Russia?
China did not suspend its economic ties with Russia after either the 2008 Georgia War or the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. The question this time is whether China will provide military and economic aid to Russia. Military aid is highly unlikely, as Chinese arms can be easily identified on the battlefield. Economic assistance, however, is much more difficult to define. For example, in early February, China signed 15 economic cooperation agreements with Russia, including for energy export and infrastructure development. Along with economic deals signed before 2022, these agreements, if implemented, will create revenue for Russia that will inevitably be used to support the war against Ukraine. Whether the implementation of deals signed before the invasion should constitute economic assistance to Russia is an open question. For Beijing, there is comfort in the fact that if the U.S. sanctions China for energy imports and arms purchases from Russia, it would also have to sanction Europe and India for similar deals, respectively.
China’s desired endgame
China’s approach to the Ukraine war reflects its calculus between costs and benefits. During the initial stage, China wanted the war to end as quickly as possible. It has been concerned about the reputational damage from China’s glaring acquiescence to Russia, as well as its relationship with key players such as Europe, which has been driven closer to the U.S. by the war. China also does not want to see a prolonged war in Ukraine that significantly weakens Russia. As China sees it, the current path of events will leave Russia an international pariah by the end of the war, similar to North Korea but with a bigger nuclear arsenal — not the most reassuring or stabilizing situation. A weak Russia is a less helpful a partner in China’s strategic competition with the United States.
However, China’s desired endgame in the Ukraine war has become more relational than situational: It is about China’s relationship to the war rather than the outcome of the war itself. Because many in China see the war as an opportunity to leverage against the U.S., the key to success lies in the maintenance of a neutrality—even if self-perceived—that leaves room for imagination and other’s efforts to gain China’s cooperation. In this light, the Biden-Xi phone call is seen as China’s success as the U.S. turned to China for consensus. In this sense, not picking a side, or selectively picking certain positions with each side, is itself a position. China sides with Russia on its security concerns, sides with Ukraine on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, sides with Europe on its role to lead the negotiation. But ultimately, China sides with China.
Ukraine: China’s Desired Endgame
By Yun Sun
China
Almost a month has passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Caught off-guard, China struggled to respond to the invasion, with a sense of uncertainty, dilemma, and defensiveness. Internally, there were also strong voices questioning China’s alignment with Russia, leading to a debate both in the public and in the policy community about China’s next steps.
This initial stage of confusion is over. What has emerged is a clear dual strategy of “not opposing Russia” and “not abandoning Ukraine.” While many in China are cognizant of the costs the country will carry for its alignment with Russia, mainstream scholars and senior leaders are increasingly convinced that the war in Ukraine presents a “window of strategic opportunity,” especially in terms of U.S.-China relations. In other words, China will not abandon Russia. To manage the costs of this position, China’s approach is becoming more nuanced, taking different positions in its propaganda, diplomacy, and real actions, respectively.
China will not abandon Russia
Despite the voices inside and outside of China calling for an overhaul of China’s current Russia policy and to recalibrate its relations with Russia, a major shift of position is unlikely for two reasons. First, abandoning Russia does not solve or alleviate China’s most important external national security challenge, which remains the United States. In fact, strong voices in China advocate against abandoning Russia because the U.S. offers no “rewards” for doing so and they fear China “will be the next on the list after Russia.” At a minimum, Russia’s existence alone is both a counterbalance and a strategic distraction that draws U.S. focus to Europe. Abandoning Russia, and mitigating its threat to the West, could very well leave China to face the full attention and force of a hostile U.S. later — alone.
Another reason for China’s persistence on the current policy course is domestic. Even if China were to adjust its policy towards Russia, as many believe that China will, it will not happen during the Ukraine War. The reason is simple: it is simply too close to the February 4 Joint Statement issued by Xi and Putin. Such a prompt change of policy direction would inevitably raise questions about the wisdom of Xi’s decision to take the position in the first place. The 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for this Fall, is where Xi is expected break the established succession tradition in the Party and ink his third term. Given the discontent within the Party and the country, a reorientation of China’s policy toward Russia equates to a tacit admission of a policy mistake; that is simply untenable in Chinese politics today.
Unlike China’s initial struggle to respond to the repercussions of the Russian invasion, the Chinese policy community is currently prone to the view that the war presents an opportunity for China. China is not a party to the conflict, this is not Chinese territory, and China’s ties with Russia are seen as the leverage to chart a middle way approach between Russia and the West. The war is believed to have increased China’s leverage vis-à-vis the U.S., created a dilemma for the U.S. between its Russia policy and China policy, and deepened the security anxiety in the Asia-Pacific region about U.S. abandonment.
Differentiated approach
Having said that, a decision not to abandon Russia does not equate to a decision to lend all support to Russia – just like the lack of China’s open opposition to the Russian invasion does not equate to a support of the invasion either. China now differentiates its approach to the Ukraine crisis across three axes: Rhetoric and propaganda that is pro-Russia; diplomacy that balances Russia, Ukraine, and the West; and concrete actions or support that are notably cautious.
Since the beginning of the war, Chinese support for Russia has been most vocally manifested in propaganda and narratives. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has continued its defense of Russia by accusing the West, especially the U.S., of “throwing gas over fire” and calls for “properly resolving Russia’s legitimate security concerns.” The Cyberspace Administration of China has also purged Chinese social media and internet of anti-war and anti-Russia rhetoric. Letters and articles that openly condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine have been completely removed from the internet. Beijing fears mass movement, even if the target is Russia, as it could challenge Beijing’s policy eventually. This pro-Russia propaganda appears a bit more balanced since last Friday, with criticisms of Russia on national TV, but the main theme has not changed.
But support for Russia in rhetoric is being neutralized by China’s balancing diplomacy. Any Chinese reference to Russia’s “legitimate security concerns” is now accompanied by an emphasis on “sovereignty and territorial integrity”, which refers to Ukraine, and in the Chinese view constitutes direct but implicit criticism of the Russian invasion. In fact, even the sequence matters. Foreign Minister Wang Yi discussed “sovereignty and territorial integrity” before “legitimate security concerns” in his press conference at the Two Sessions on March 7 when asked about China’s position on Ukraine. That order is also seen as a sign of Beijing’s implicit support of Ukraine and criticism of Russia. This balancing diplomacy has been a key feature of China’s response to the war in Ukraine, demonstrating the tension between recent commitment to “no limits” cooperation with Russia, and China’s long-term foreign policy principles, as well as relations with the rest of the world.
This self-proclaimed neutrality, or a pro-Russia neutrality is evidently unsatisfactory for the world, and greater demands are being made for China to take a clear position. Despite the Chinese hypocrisy, clear opposition or condemnation is unlikely.
Despite China’s refusal to oppose Russia and its suggested support for Ukraine, concrete action is lacking on both fronts. Two batches of Chinese humanitarian aid to Ukraine are extremely small- $2 million in total. Concrete material support to Russia that is specific to the war has not yet been identified. This could be the result of the Biden administration’s repeated preemptive leaking of intelligence that put China and its actions under a spotlight. But it also reflects the Chinese calculus that assisting Russia at this time, against international scrutiny and criticism and without any deniability, is not in line with China’s national interests.
Aid to Russia?
China did not suspend its economic ties with Russia after either the 2008 Georgia War or the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. The question this time is whether China will provide military and economic aid to Russia. Military aid is highly unlikely, as Chinese arms can be easily identified on the battlefield. Economic assistance, however, is much more difficult to define. For example, in early February, China signed 15 economic cooperation agreements with Russia, including for energy export and infrastructure development. Along with economic deals signed before 2022, these agreements, if implemented, will create revenue for Russia that will inevitably be used to support the war against Ukraine. Whether the implementation of deals signed before the invasion should constitute economic assistance to Russia is an open question. For Beijing, there is comfort in the fact that if the U.S. sanctions China for energy imports and arms purchases from Russia, it would also have to sanction Europe and India for similar deals, respectively.
China’s desired endgame
China’s approach to the Ukraine war reflects its calculus between costs and benefits. During the initial stage, China wanted the war to end as quickly as possible. It has been concerned about the reputational damage from China’s glaring acquiescence to Russia, as well as its relationship with key players such as Europe, which has been driven closer to the U.S. by the war. China also does not want to see a prolonged war in Ukraine that significantly weakens Russia. As China sees it, the current path of events will leave Russia an international pariah by the end of the war, similar to North Korea but with a bigger nuclear arsenal — not the most reassuring or stabilizing situation. A weak Russia is a less helpful a partner in China’s strategic competition with the United States.
However, China’s desired endgame in the Ukraine war has become more relational than situational: It is about China’s relationship to the war rather than the outcome of the war itself. Because many in China see the war as an opportunity to leverage against the U.S., the key to success lies in the maintenance of a neutrality—even if self-perceived—that leaves room for imagination and other’s efforts to gain China’s cooperation. In this light, the Biden-Xi phone call is seen as China’s success as the U.S. turned to China for consensus. In this sense, not picking a side, or selectively picking certain positions with each side, is itself a position. China sides with Russia on its security concerns, sides with Ukraine on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, sides with Europe on its role to lead the negotiation. But ultimately, China sides with China.
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