Chapter

China's Role in Conflict Mediation Project

China’s Conflict Resolution and Mediation Approach in Mali

China takes a cautious approach to conflict mediation in the Sahel, where there are high political risks and lower economic/security interests

By Lina Benabdallah

China

January 26, 2024

In this chapter of China and Conflict Mediation, Lina Benabdallah examines the drivers of China’s cautious approach to conflict resolution and mediation in the Sahel region, with a case study of Mali. Benabdallah analyzes China’s mediation activities in the Sahel, arguing that China seeks to avoid diplomatic entanglements with Western powers while protecting its economic and security interests, and offers lessons learned to better understand China’s engagements in other, similar regions.

China and Conflict Mediation Series

The China and Conflict Mediation series collects eight papers by senior experts on China’s evolving approach to conflict mediation around the world. Presenting case studies from four continents, each chapter examines the drivers, frameworks, and outcomes of China’s efforts to engage in conflict mediation. With analysis drawn from the historic context and current events that influence China’s decision to attempt mediation, this series provides insights into why China is increasingly active in this area, and what it means for China’s role in the international community.

On April 21, 2022, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for the Asia Annual Conference, proposing the Global Security Initiative for the first time.¹ Providing more details about the initiative, Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained that the initiative is “inspired by the diplomatic tradition and wisdom with unique Chinese characteristics” to maintain world peace and tranquility.² As evidenced by the initiative, China’s involvement in global security is evolving and growing. One of the main goals of this chapter is to unpack what Chinese wisdom and Chinese characteristics in conflict resolution entail and what are their unique strengths and weaknesses.

At first glance, China’s approach to conflict resolution is strategically ambiguous. Not having a well-defined or clearly spelled out doctrine or policy toward conflict resolution allows Beijing the flexibility to decide which conflicts or disputes are a priority and which are not. This chapter suggests that the likelihood of China’s involvement in dispute resolution is higher if two necessary conditions are met: 1) that the conflict is of urgent economic or security interest to Beijing (high economic and security interest gain), and 2) that there is relatively low risk diplomatically with regard to Western powers involved (low risk of entanglement with other powers). The second condition can help us understand Beijing’s reticence in being involved in conflict resolution in Nigeria despite Nigeria being China’s largest trading partner in the African continent. Furthermore, these two conditions—high gains and low risk—are necessary but not sufficient, as a basic condition is a political willingness and capability (from Beijing) to be involved in a given conflict resolution scenario.

In this way, it becomes immediately visible that countries in the Middle East, for instance, are more or less outside of this scope, given the high risk of being entangled not only with local actors but with the multitude of foreign powers present in the region and their diverging interests. In such a scenario, Beijing would calculate that the risks of intervening in conflict resolution (in a meaningful rather than symbolic way) outweigh the benefits. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, the urgency of economic and security interests is high, and risk of encroachment is relatively low, so we see more activity from Beijing in mediating conflicts in East Africa. It is this chapter’s contention that the climate in the Sahel (especially with the crisis in Mali) is more similar to the Middle East (low urgency in economic and security interests, with high political risk due to extensive foreign intervention) than it is to East Africa when it comes to China’s mediation behavior.

For this reason, Beijing had to be extra-creative, indirect, and practice mediation from afar in the Sahel region, since the amount of strategic Great Power game at play in the region is a deterrent for Beijing. In many ways, the Sahel region is an exceptional case when compared to the rest of Africa, which typically gets depicted in policy expert analyses in terms of a “power vacuum” that was left up to emerging powers such as China to fill. Such a “vacuum” does not exist in the case of the Sahel region given France’s strategic interest in the region and its overt (and paternalistic) sense of priority of intervention, European Union actors, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and Russia’s involvement, among other players. In light of such a complex picture of a cacophony of foreign interests in the region, Chinese officials have expressed their cautious approach. Many times over, Beijing signaled that its reticence toward a more involved engagement in Mali was due to being cautious so as to not alarm France with a heavy Chinese presence.

It is also the case that while the Sahel might be a rather exceptional region within Africa when it comes to China’s mediation practices, it is similar to other regions of the world where China has Belt and Road Initiative investment interests and Western powers have geostrategic interests or historic presence that remains on the political scene. In this way, learning about China’s mediation practices in the Sahel can help us understand its practices in many other places, including in the Middle East.

Therefore, this chapter asks why China’s approach to conflict resolution and mediation is proactive in some regions in the African continent and reticent in others. In this pursuit, the chapter develops as follows. The introductory section provides an overview of China’s views on conflict resolution from the perspective of noninterference policy. This section also introduces various conflict resolution tools and mechanisms that emerged as a response to the limitations of the noninterference principle. These include harmonious intervention, quasi-mediation diplomacy, special envoy diplomacy, and creative engagement. The second section identifies and expands on three drivers behind China’s interest in dispute resolution and mediation diplomacy in Africa. The third section focuses on the Sahel region with specific interest in examining China’s mediation approach in the Malian crisis. The fourth section analyzes the challenges and opportunities of China’s mediation approach in the Sahel and offers an assessment of what lessons we can learn about China’s mediation approach in the Middle East from studying the Sahel. A fifth section concludes the chapter.

Contours of China’s mediation in Africa: From noninterference to creative involvement

China’s policy towards the Sahel and in Africa more broadly is mostly based on its policy of noninterference in internal politics, which makes China a neutral player in conflict-zoned states. In 1954, after a meeting of Indian and Chinese officials, Zhou Enlai announced the five principles of peaceful coexistence. These five principles, which primarily center sovereignty and mutual noninterference, became a signature foreign policy characteristic of Chinese foreign policy conduct. Since then, for a variety of reasons, Chinese foreign policy had to gradually move away from a strict adherence to the principle of noninterference and embrace a more pragmatic approach.³ Often labeled noninterference “with Chinese characteristics,” this approach allows enough maneuvering for Chinese foreign policymakers to adapt to China’s growing presence globally both as an economic and as a political actor.

Moving away from a strict interpretation of the noninterference principle made way for a strategic ambiguity around China’s policy toward intervention. This has led scholars and policymakers to propose a multitude of concepts and theoretical frameworks to make sense of China’s future involvement in international disputes. Some of these include differentiating between interference, influence, and intervention. Others, like Huang and Shih,⁴ proposed “harmonious intervention” as a framework that can position China to maintain its core values of having long-term constructive relations with other countries while at the same time being able to adjust its foreign policy priorities.

Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou advanced “creative involvement” as a way to capture China’s pragmatic approach to and its more or less case-by-case evaluation of dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than one blanket policy of intervention vs. restraint. Far from advocating the use of force or seeking regime change in host countries, Wang proposes a flexible approach grounded in cooperation with regional actors whereby, in the event of Chinese involvement in conflict resolution, Beijing will ensure that there is international consensus in supporting China’s actions and that local and regional players welcome China’s participation in the process. Taking into account China’s reputation on the global scene as, ironically, simultaneously both a free-rider and a threat, Wang advocates that China plays first-mover advantage to its interest by proactively reaching out with creative involvement platforms that align with its strengths and interests. As a first-mover, or as Jesse Marks terms it, “conflict manager” in lieu of “conflict avoider,”⁵ China would be able to set the pace and tone of its creative involvement approach in international crises. This way, it would not be pressured to join intervention platforms that other actors have designed.

Marks further notes that from a Chinese government perspective, three modalities describe the rationale for Beijing to become a “conflict manager”: persuading peace, promoting talks, and mediation. These three modalities are predicated on the assumption that use of force or of power politics to impose a solution is a nonstarter for Beijing.⁶ Further making sense of Chinese approaches to conflict resolution, Sun and Zoubir propose “quasi-mediation,” explaining that “China reacts selectively and cautiously to different events according to what its policymakers consider to be of either vital or secondary interest.” This leads them to argue that this cautious approach where China participates but does not play a consequential role is a deliberate diplomacy that they dub quasi-mediation rather than a full mediation practice.⁷

Sun and Zoubir define mediation as “third-party intervention in conflicts with non-coercive and neutral ways through peaceful management and behavior to address a conflict whose direct outcome is the transformation of bilateral relations into trilateral ones.”⁸ In peace research scholarship, other terminologies that are close to mediation include arbitration, consultation, and conciliation.⁹ However, as we have seen, Chinese approaches to these concepts tend to be unique and to diverge from these to some degree, especially in practice.

For example, whereas mediation diplomacy is typically a discreet mechanism of diplomacy, even in its discretion, an actor acting as the mediator typically plays a dominant role, trying to sway involved parties in the direction of peace talks. In contrast with this approach, in China’s quasi-diplomacy approach, the mediating actor is not the dominant actor seeking to explore leverage created through Guanxi but is merely a participating actor.¹⁰

Burton, however, argues that “it does not appear that China is carrying out quasi-mediation in any of the three Middle East conflicts [Libya, Syria, and Yemen].”¹¹ Instead, for him, China’s approach in the region is more appropriately labeled as a “wait and see” approach.¹² For Sun and Zoubir, however, taking seriously China’s emphasis on the primacy of dialogue and peace talks over the use of violence or dominant actor behavior leads scholars to see Beijing’s subtle and discrete practices as part of a different model of mediation. Indeed, owing to the deep conviction that dialogue is the best path to peace, one meditation mechanism that China initiated to respond to the Darfur conflict was the special envoys mechanism. In 2007, Ambassador Liu Guijin made several visits to southern Sudan and neighboring African countries, as well as to Europe.¹³ Indeed, Western interpretations of what conflict mediation is and what it looks like in practice diverge from Chinese approaches in significant ways. The next section unpacks the drivers behind China’s involvement in mediation diplomacy in order to further clarify the difference and similarities.

Drivers of China’s involvement in mediation diplomacy

Several drivers can explain China’s increasing involvement in mediation efforts globally. Depending on the case at hand, a mix of drivers can be identified along the axis of ideologically to necessity motivated. Three drivers are specifically identified: Commercial, political, and reputational. These three categories are not mutually exclusive. More often than not, two or more drivers converge in one particular case.

Commercial: Where Chinese commercial interests are high, the likelihood of Beijing being involved in mediation is high. We have seen this in the Darfur conflict,¹⁴ where China’s oil interests and energy security were at the core of its motivation to engage in mediation. It is also observable in Afghanistan, Iran, and Korea. Additionally, the Belt and Road initiative has an added incentive for China to be more involved with mediation.

In comparison with other regions of Africa, China’s commercial interests in the Sahel countries are rather limited. In Niger, China has energy and mining interests that could at some point grow more significantly; in Mali, trade and investments by Chinese enterprises are not negligible; and in Chad and Burkina Faso (which only normalized relations with Beijing a few years ago), energy investments and trade relations have yet to bloom in significant ways. By contrast, in East Africa, for instance, China has deeper and more visible political, security, and economic investment partnerships with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Sudan. The intertwined nature of China’s interests in the Horn and East African region is incentive for China to be more involved in the various peace processes in these countries. In the Sahel, by contrast, China does not have as involved a portfolio as it does in other regions in the continent.¹⁵ Yet we still observe that in Chinese official statements, China is willing to play a constructive role in conflict mediation.

To be sure, it remains clear that Beijing sees direct benefits from ending the conflict in Mali given the potential for reconstruction, infrastructure projects, and other trade, mining, and commercial activities that could help Chinese enterprises. Additionally, as shown by a 2017 study by Merics Institute, China’s emphasis on mediating in conflicts has increased since the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. The study stated that by “2017, China was found to be mediating in nine conflicts as compared to three in 2012.”¹⁶

Political: In a climate of increasing competition between China and the United States and U.S. like-minded allies, the Chinese government sees its involvement in peacemaking in Africa (and globally) as an opportunity to ensure that China’s political priorities and strategic interests are represented. By shaping the conversation on peacemaking to concentrate more on development and the development-security nexus and less on democratic process, China can ensure that its preferences are represented rather than sidelined.

In Mali, Beijing’s competitive advantage for being involved in peacemaking mainly comes from being perceived as an outsider power that does not have a history as a colonial or imperial country in the Sahel. However, one of the biggest disadvantages to Beijing’s peacemaking diplomacy stems from this same source: as an outsider, Beijing does not have a good grasp of the origins of the conflicts, the diverse cultures, languages, and so on. A deep understanding of such things is essential to gaining the trust of local actors who then are instrumental to peacemaking. Beijing’s reticence to be involved in more meaningful than symbolic ways also contributes to this weaker political capital.

Reputational: If China engaged in mediation in the Darfur conflict primarily because of its commercial (energy, more specifically) interests in the Sudan, the same logic or motivation could not apply to explaining its involvement in Mali or with the G5 Sahel countries, since China’s commercial interests in the Sahel are, even if growing, still marginal to China’s global trade and investment volumes. Instead of being motivated to safeguard commercial interests that are already there, China’s interest in cautiously getting involved in peacemaking in the Malian crisis would be more related to reputational drivers. By demonstrating that Beijing is deploying diplomatic capital in mediation efforts, Chinese officials can increase the country’s international profile and reputation as a serious security partner.

Beijing’s deployment of the language of “community with a shared future,” in the context of its relations with African countries, suggests its normative commitment to values of stability, peace, and prosperity.¹⁷ Chinese officials also use the language of “international responsibility” to talk about Beijing’s recalibration of its commercial-security activities in Africa.¹⁸ These elements point out that Beijing’s motivations to increase its mediation profile in Mali are a mix between commercial/material and normative/reputational drivers.

Overview of China-Mali relations: Peacemaking through development in Mali

Mediation, at base, is a form of peacemaking. This section foregrounds Beijing’s interests, investments, and past engagements in Mali in order to best understand its approach to mediation. To be sure, the Sahel is not a homogenous place; it is marked by diverse populations, rich history, and unique challenges to each of the countries. It should also be noted that China does not have a “Sahel policy,” nor does the “Sahel” as a geopolitical concept exist in China’s foreign policy conduct toward Africa. The Sahel, owing to its heterogeneity, as Idrissa contends, is difficult to define, but it has nonetheless “entered Western chatter as a byword for drought, hunger, severe poverty and also . . . rapid demographic growth.”¹⁹ This oversimplification of such a large space has policy implications that we have seen in European and Western powers designing counterterrorism operations in the Sahel and treating it all with a one-size-fits-all blanket policy.

Moreover, since the 1960s France “has intervened militarily on average once every fifteen months for the past sixty years.”²⁰ French government officials speak about the Sahel as a “sphere of influence” that other foreign powers have to seek permission to be involved in. Sun and Zoubir, for instance, document that the “French Ambassador to Washington could inform his audience at the U.S. National War College in February 2000 that the Mediterranean–Africa–Middle East region was France’s ‘backyard,’ of vital strategic interest.”²¹ For these reasons, China along with other foreign players has had to tone down its discourse and practice related to mediation in Mali for fear of being entangled in a diplomatic crisis with France. Now that the relations between the Malian capital, Bamako, and Paris have frayed in the second half of 2022, there is most definitely a distinct opportunity for Beijing to play a more active role.

Instead of taking a front-row view of conflict resolution in Mali, Beijing has viewed the way forward for Mali as tied to supporting the central government’s goal of achieving national unification. This goal often means supporting the Malian army in regaining control over territories in the North and center of the country. For Beijing, contributing solutions to the Malian crisis has meant “addressing both the symptoms and the root causes.”²² While the symptoms can be viewed as the output of the conflict in terms of inter-communal disputes, Islamist insurgency, and rebel group attacks, the root cause in China’s view of the synchronous relationship between security and development is the deterioration of basic public goods and infrastructure, lack of economic growth, and poor economic performance of the country.²³

Because the conflict is multifaceted, one cannot get a good grasp of the challenges to China’s contribution without putting them in the broader context of local, regional (G5 Sahel), and international (EU trainings, U.S. efforts, UN mission) responses to the conflict. First and foremost, Chinese peacekeepers operate in Mali under the umbrella of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and, to a certain extent, the broad challenges of MINUSMA are also challenges to China’s presence. MINUSMA suffers a perception problem among many Malians, including those in the capital city of Bamako. MINUSMA’s headquarters in Bamako have been protested by Malians several times on the grounds that the mission has not provided civilian protection or stabilization as promised. Local perceptions are crucial for the smooth operations of MINUSMA, and the lack of trust in the mission by the people who are supposed to be protected by it can become a liability for China’s reputational cost.²⁴

In this way, the Chinese government via its embassy staff in Mali has been keen on using traditional and new media platforms to share stories, images, and other visuals of Chinese peacekeepers engaging in building school fences and drinking well water, among other activities that can help boost the reputation of Chinese peacekeeping operation troops. It is perhaps with this cautionary thinking in mind that, even if Beijing has been sending combat-ready troops to Mali, the Chinese narrative has been to steer clear from any counterterrorism activities to further distinguish the Chinese approach from the overly interventionist Western approach. Possibly except for a Chinese de-mining unit’s peacekeepers in Gao,²⁵ it is the G5 Sahel, French army, and several African peacekeeping contingents that are at the forefront of combat. As a result, Chinese peacekeepers are not typically directly engaged in combat and do not suffer from a direct reputational backlash. However, even in peacekeeping, the Chinese government puts a premium on “Chinese wisdom” being predicated on understanding peace and stability as intimately connected to economic and social development.

In this way, China’s development-security nexus is set to offer a much-needed fresh approach to conflict resolution and peacemaking in Mali. Focusing on nonmilitary aspects such as development has the potential to create opportunities to add value.²⁶

The conflict in Mali is multifaceted, complex, and evolving over time. Its many roots include decades of rebellions by Tuaregs, conflicts in bordering Algeria and Libya, and conflictual politics in the Lake Chad region. The evolution of the conflict is influenced by a fragmented ethnic composition (often along the lines of Peulh, or Fulani, and Dogon) expanding intercommunal violence.²⁷ Alongside this expanding complexity is the recent revival of many long-standing grievances around the difficulties of sharing resources between farming, fishing, and herding communities. These multiple fault lines mean that the conflict not only has multiple actors, but also changing alignments among those multiple actors, and very little common cause between the various groups.²⁸

At a critical time, when France recently announced the suspension of its development aid to Mali,²⁹ China’s rejuvenation of development as the source of security has returned an old theme of policy and academic debate to the fore in discussions around international interventions. While taking origin in China’s domestic politics, the development-security nexus has become a solid part of China’s foreign policy conduct and has recently been found in Chinese officials’ discourses about the Belt and Road Initiative. In Africa, for example, the nexus has been at the forefront of China’s expanding engagements. Indeed, the nexus is consistently cited by Beijing as a top example of China’s contribution to global peace and security. One clear distillation of Chinese thinking can be illustrated through a statement by Yang Jiechi, former foreign minister and current Politburo member and director of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Central Foreign Affairs Commission, that “development is the basis for peace in Africa. Conflicts are invariably accompanied by poverty, and they form a vicious cycle. . . Peace in Africa hinges on whether there is faster economic and social progress.” ³⁰

Discrete mediation activities by China in Mali and in the Sahel

On June 20 and 21, 2022, the Chinese embassy in Mali sponsored an international seminar on the right to development for Sahel countries. The seminar was held in Bamako and was co-organized with China by a Malian NGO, Alliance en faveur des droits de la personne et de la démocratie.With expertise from scholars and experts from China, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Senegal, and Burkina Faso, the participants discussed several themes, including “Global Governance: How to put the interests of the people first by adopting Chinese Wisdom.”³¹

During the meeting, Chinese Ambassador to Mali Chen Zhihong observed that “for developing countries including China and Sahel countries, priority should be given to ensuring survival and to development with the goal of improving the living standards of the populations.”³²

In April 2022, the Chinese permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, called on the international community to provide constructive help to Mali. Noting the importance of respecting the Malian government and Mali’s sovereignty, he further noted that China has been proud to support “African solutions to African problems.”³³ In 2019, a similar call had been made by his predecessor, Ma Zhaoxu, who pleaded for the Security Council to help the Malian government improve its security and counterterrorism capacity building, in addition to China’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, Wu Haitao, calling on all parties in Mali to “seize the opportunity of the national dialogue to work together for peace and development in the country and peacefully resolve their differences through consultations.”³⁴ Such calls by China on the international community to help support the G5 Sahel Taskforce or help the Malian government build capacity have become routine calls at UN meetings but, interestingly enough, China itself has yet to help the G5 Sahel Taskforce.³⁵ As noted earlier in this chapter, in practice, Beijing is resisting actively participating in counterterrorism efforts, but rhetorically and symbolically calling on international actors to increase their support seems like a low-cost investment in showing solidarity without having to commit significant contributions to the cause.

On November 27, 2018, a joint visiting delegation of the Malian government and relevant factions visited Beijing and met with Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong.³⁶ The delegation was headed by Mali’s Minister of Social Cohesion, Peace, and National Reconciliation Lassine Bouaré. During the meeting, the Chinese side used advancing development goals and implementing Forum on China-Africa Cooperation economic deliveries as incentives for all factions to think constructively about the potential benefits of moving faster toward peace and reconciliation.

On May 21, 2017, Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with his Malian counterpart Abdoulaye Diop during a visit to Bamako. Wang Yi confirmed China’s support of Mali’s “just cause of opposing and fighting against terrorism,” but also reiterated that China was also a developing country and that it hopes to increase Chinese enterprises’ engagements in Mali’s agricultural and industrial development. The Chinese foreign minister did not make any concrete promises beyond the promise to continue supporting Mali’s just cause at international fora.³⁷

The ministers met again in September 2022 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. The noncommittal rhetoric of China toward actively taking part in mediation and peacemaking diplomacy had not changed. Wang Yi stressed that China is “committed to providing public goods to the world and promoting peace, development and cooperation, rather than war, interference and subversion” without specific pledges for the Malian crisis.³⁸

China and G5 Sahel

The G5 Sahel countries comprise Niger, Mauritania (the G5 secretariat is in Nouakchott), Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad. One of the patterns of mediation that can be observed in China’s practices with regards to Africa (and the Sahel) is to focus on empowering and supporting regional actors, be it institutions or organizations. The emphasis on supporting regional actors stems from the conviction that the best way to resolve conflict must start with dialogue, and dialogue implies involving all the relevant stakeholders, including regional powers. Bringing in regional actors and empowering them to be involved is also coherent with the overall reticence by Beijing to jump headlong into a conflict. Under the prism of “African Solutions to African Problems,” Beijing has also pursued an approach to mediation that defers to regional institutions. In addition to working to support the African Union’s de-escalation efforts in the case of Mali and in the Sahel more broadly, Beijing has established mechanisms of cooperation with the G5 Sahel and with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

China has called on the international community to help the G5 Sahel with logistical and financial support, but China itself was not committing large amounts of money to the G5. It was not until 2018 that an initial budget of €1.5 million was provided by China for the secretariat of the G5. The delay was caused by the adherence to the One China policy, which is a condition to receive any kind of aid or financial support from China. Until 2018, Burkina Faso had official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, after Ouagadougou broke off its ties to Taipei and recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representation of China, cooperation between China and the G5 Sahel became possible. In December 2019, the Chinese ambassador in Nouakchott announced that China would donate 7 million USD of military equipment to each G5 member.

With the bulk of Beijing’s conflict resolution in Mali being about persuading peace and promoting talks,³⁹ Table 1 shows the exchanges and delegation visits, virtual meetings held by the International Department of the CPC with various political parties and leaders from the G5 Sahel states. The table demonstrates with concrete data Beijing’s discreet approach to mediation in Mali by focusing on the need to facilitate dialogue and promote cooperation among the various G5 Sahel stakeholders. The variety of actors and stakeholders involved in these dialogue efforts by Beijing showcase a typical diplomatic move from China that hedges by dealing with a multitude of actors/political parties in order to make sure it covered all the official representations of the various political factions in any relevant country. The table also shows how Beijing is prioritizing capacity-building webinars, dialogue, and people-to-people exchanges over concrete deals that could potentially influence mediation in a direct practical sense.

Table 1: China Promoting Talks and Interactions with G5 Sahel States

Date	Country	Party	Type of Exchange	Key Themes
January 26, 2021	Burkina Faso	People’s Movement for Progress (MPP)	Zoom and video link¹	• Celebratory meeting for the 100th anniversary of CPC founding and the MPP winning the presidential and legislative elections • Looking to further the development of Burkina Faso and China
July 23, 2020	Burkina Faso	People’s Movement for Progress (MPP)	Zoom and video link²	• Opening of an online cadre training class of the MPP • Anti-epidemic policies and programs
March 31, 2014	Mali	Rally for Mali Party	Meeting with delegation from Mali³	• Efforts to further ties between the two parties
March 31, 2014	Mali	Rally for Mali Party	Meeting with delegation from Mali⁴	• Developing relations between parties and encouraging cooperation
June 16, 2022	Mauritania	Union for the Republic of Mauritania	Webinar⁵	• Relations between the two countries and parties • Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative proposed by Xi Jinping
January 13, 2021	Mauritania	Union for the Republic of Mauritania	Opening ceremony of webinar for cadres of the Union for the Republic of Mauritania⁶	• CPC’s political guiding role of intraparty exchanges • Pushing China-Mauritania relations for continuous development • Sharing of knowledge in areas of agricultural development, rural revitalization, health, and climate change
August 26, 2020	Mauritania	Union for the Republic of Mauritania	Opening ceremony of webinar for cadres of the Union for the Republic of Mauritania⁷	• Advancement of the construction of a China-Africa community • Cooperation in fight against COVID-19 • Mauritania’s support for China’s political system
January 16, 2014	Chad	Patriotic Salvation Movement	Meeting in N’Djamena⁸	• Prospect for future cooperation • Chad learning from China’s development
February 3, 2015	Niger	Democratic and Socialist Party of Niger (PNDS)	Meeting between Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao and Nigerien Foreign Minister Mohamed Bazoum⁹	• Enhancement of coordination on international and regional affairs • Deepening mutually beneficial cooperation • Niger’s loan of 480 billion CFA francs from China to fund construction, agricultural, and industrial projects
February 3, 2015	Niger	Democratic and Socialist Party of Niger (PNDS)	Meeting with delegation from PNDS¹⁰	• Willingness of China to upgrade bilateral relations for the benefit of the two peoples • China support has enabled Niger success in transportation, telecommunication, education, healthcare, etc.
July 21, 2014	Niger	Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PDS)	Meeting with study group of PDS¹¹	• Furthering cooperation with PDS • Experience-sharing on governance • Niger gratefulness for Chinese support
January 12, 2014	Niger	Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PDS)	Meeting between Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou and Minister of the International Department Wang Jiarui¹²	• Boosting bilateral relations • Praise of China’s new security concept of mutual benefits • Future Chinese investors and businesses in Niger

How China’s mediation in Mali is closer to its role in Libya and Syria than in the Horn of Africa

As a result of the constraints described above—the crowdedness of the geopolitical environment in the Sahel, France’s dominant behavior, and the popular protests in the streets in Mali against French and other foreign presence—China’s peacemaking process has mostly focused on creative ways to both be present on the peacemaking scene and not be dominant. This approach sits in stark contrast with China’s mediation approach in the Horn of Africa, where Beijing has hosted several mediation events, the latest of which took place in the summer of 2022 and was co-hosted with Ethiopia and Kenya. Such initiative is lacking from China’s mediation arsenal in Mali, which is more similar to that in Libya and Syria.

Indeed, following the mass public protests that erupted in Libya on February 17, 2011, and the violent response with which they met from the Muammar Gaddafi regime, China’s initial response was limited to organizing last-minute massive evacuations of its nationals in the country. All the while staying away from what it saw as Libyan internal affairs, Beijing both expressed its concerns that Western powers might seek regime change in Libya through outside intervention and acknowledged regional actors’ (the African Union) denouncing of Gaddafi’s repressive response to protests. Mirroring this kind of polarized position on the matter, China abstained on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 in 2011 rather than vetoing it. China’s abstention meant that the resolution’s no-fly zone proposition passed. However, what China could not have power over was NATO forces, which interpreted the no-fly zone resolution as permission to assist rebel forces by conducting air strikes against Gaddafi’s air defenses.⁴⁰ Consequently, China voiced its opposition of what it termed “Western intervention” in Libya at every possible occasion.

As a consequence of the NATO attacks on Libya, China’s nonintervention principle and sovereignty-centered approach to peace processes were reinforced as Chinese officials and diplomats voiced Beijing’s frustration with the way UN Resolution 1973 was misused by NATO forces as a pretext for regime change. The-then Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, Li Baodong, explicitly referenced Libya, saying that “the original intention of resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) was to put an end to violence” and that China is “opposed to any attempt to willfully interpret the resolutions or to take actions that exceed those mandated” (UNSC 2011c). Beijing’s concerns were not enough to change the course of action, and the fall of the Gaddafi regime did not end the conflict in Libya. His power vacuum made way to a rivalry between two political factions that ended up in a situation of two rival parliaments installed: a UN-backed General National Council and the Haftar-led House of Representatives. In 2015, the UN called for mediation in Libya, which by then was the site of not only internal rivalries but also proxy conflicts from the outside with Qatar, the UAE, France, and other powers backing different factions.

China’s mediation approach in Libya was different from that of Western powers in a number of important ways. For one, China strived to remain neutral in Libya, as it “was providing humanitarian assistance to both groups.” What this neutral position also meant was that Beijing was supplying arms to both sides, and while it theoretically sounds like a balancing act, in practice, Beijing was under the heat of criticism from various sides.⁴¹ Secondly, China also worked with the African Union and regional institutions to formulate solutions to the conflict instead of going it alone and ignoring the UN totally, as done by the United States and NATO allies. Emphasis on dialogue rather than regime change is another difference. China insisted on sending high-level delegations to the African Union and the UN to discuss the conflict. China hedges toward neutrality for reasons of both national and economic interests. Relatedly, because of China’s willingness to speak and deal with both sides, it was also uniquely positioned to bring in Haftar’s side to the discussion table given that they had already received support from Beijing and trusted its impartiality.⁴²

Furthermore, China was not interested in seeing the Libya scenario repeat itself in Syria, so it decided to be proactive—meaning instead of just abstaining and sitting on the sidelines, it sought to pursue conflict resolution measures that were more in line with its norms and interests, “based on its normative convictions that intervention should not be made on behalf of rebellious forces, and that the [Responsibility to Protect] norm should be equally applied to all parties in the violence.”⁴³ This basically led Chinese officials to find “creative” and “constructive” ways to be involved, in a similar way to Mali.

To this effect, since 2013, Beijing has been hosting delegations from both sides—the government as well as opposition figures. One can observe many speeches from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the need for Syria and the international community to find a solution to the crisis. Chinese delegations attend talks. China has a four-step framework that includes cease-fire and other steps. Indeed, Chinese government officials “attended 9 high-level meetings in the same year, including special envoy’s [sic] visit to Syria in December. In December 2017 and January 2018, two high-level delegation-visited [sic] Beijing on the invitation of the Chinese Government. In those meetings, the Syrian side expressed thanks to China for its fair stance and precious support on the Syrian issue.”⁴⁴

Scholars agree that China’s approach to mediation in the Middle East can be said to be relatively limited at best and passive or even counterintuitive at times. Even though China’s economic and security interests were a high priority, also high was the likelihood of getting entangled diplomatically with the U.S. and European powers that were intervening at the time. This attitude of reticence and deference to some, pragmatism and convenience to others, was in line with what we observed in China’s behavior toward Mali and the crises in the Sahel.

Obstacles and opportunities facing China’s mediation role in Mali

A number of challenges stand in the way in Beijing’s peacemaking strategy in Mali. First, Beijing’s preference for a government-to-government modality for conducting diplomacy can prove to be an issue when a conflict has stakeholders who are not state entities or even recognized political factions. In the example discussed above where the joint delegation visited Beijing in 2018 for talks, the relevant factions represented during those talks were not only approved by the Malian government but actually were accompanied on the trip by Mali’s Minister of Social Cohesion. Such arrangements can be limiting in terms of the efficiency of the talks and the government-to-government modality being an essential element of China’s mediation diplomacy practices. To be sure, China’s interest in pursuing all political parties (as demonstrated in Table 1) should not be confused with an interest in negotiating with nongovernmental actors or unofficially recognized political parties.

Second, Beijing’s preference for bilateral over multilateral modalities of diplomacy can also be a challenge for China’s mediation practices. As much as it makes sense for China to vocally support regional institutions and actors, it is a little underwhelming to observe that it has not updated its funding preferences to reflect a multilateralized context of the G5 Sahel, for instance. China’s preference for bilateral agreements can undermine its own convictions that regional powers and institutions are important actors in the negotiation phase.

Third, mixed signals in the way China engages international organizations in its decision-making process in peacemaking can be another challenge. China and Russia blocked a UN motion by France to support the ECOWAS-led sanctions against the junta in Mali early 2022.⁴⁵ In the view of some African countries (Kenya, for instance), blocking this was counterintuitive to continuing the mediation efforts by ECOWAS. At the same time, China’s Dai Bing has made repeated calls for the international community to support mediation efforts (including ones led by ECOWAS). This is consistent with the observation made by Fung about how despite regional organizations being important to China’s decision-making process, China is “inconsistent in its responsiveness to regional groups.”⁴⁶ Another example of mixed signals in China’s mediation history in Africa was described by Daniel Large. In early 2008, “not long after a Khartoum-backed rebel attack aiming to overthrow President Deby of Chad, Ambassador Liu Guijin was careful to insist that China would not become involved in mediating proxy conflict between Khartoum and Ndjamena, although he urged both parties engaged in proxy war to practice ‘good neighborliness.’ ”⁴⁷ Similarly, Beijing encouraged neighbors to be vigorously involved in peace talks in Libya and did so vocally when the Tunisian foreign minister was visiting China in 2017, provoking some reporters to question why Beijing would advocate a course of mediation action to Tunisia that China itself has not yet fulfilled. Indeed, mixed signals put a dint in China’s credibility as a serious mediation actor.

Lastly, another obstacle that stands in the way of Beijing’s horizontal approach to mediation where external powers do not play a dominant role but instead are mere participants in the process is that this deferential attitude can not only undermine the whole efficiency of the process but also create doubt that China is seriously committed. Indeed, an emphasis on the role of host governments and actors to do the heavy lifting when it comes to actual decision-making and peace process implementations can be taken as a superficial commitment. As noted in the roundtable⁴⁸ on South Sudan hosted in the summer of 2021, it was evident that the Chinese side believes that the best it could do was to make the environment and conditions for peace talks possible but that it was up to the relevant political parties to show political will to resolve their divide. From the perspective of Beijing, taking a more hands-on approach to mediation would undermine the sovereignty principle.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that due to the complexity of the conflict in Mali, the historic background, the multitude of foreign power competing interests, and the potential cost of a rivalry with France/EU over influence in Mali, Beijing has had to take a more creative, indirect, and subtle approach to conflict mediation and resolution in Mali.⁴⁹ The chapter also argued that however exceptional this power rivalry over the Sahel might be in the rest of Africa for China’s mediation plans, the Sahel’s case is not exceptional in regions outside of Africa. This means that learning about China’s mediation priorities and mechanisms in the Sahel can help us understand how it might approach other similar regions.

However, some might argue that neither China’s approach nor its problems are unique: other states and even rebel movements have espoused and looked to apply principles related to peace through development.⁵⁰ To the extent that China’s efforts are similar to other international ones, China is likely to face similar frustrations, perhaps even more acutely given its status as a relative newcomer to navigating conflict zones. While the Chinese strategy does have different emphases and implementation strategies, it is not clear that those differences will have the same salience in Africa generally or Mali specifically as they have in China. On top of practical constraints, even Chinese leaders have, at times, doubted the development-security strategy. For example, Xi Jinping noted in relation to Xinjiang that “we say that development is the top priority and the basis for achieving lasting security, and that’s right . . . But it would be wrong to believe that with development every problem solves itself.”⁵¹ These concerns seem all the more appropriate in Mali, given that the security crisis presents a vastly different context from the Chinese domestic one in which the development-security nexus was constructed and found its initial successes. This is why it is important to explore the ways that China’s ideas travel, are applied, and are revised as China looks to respond to crises in Mali and the Sahel.

Lina Benabdallah, PhD, is an Associate Professor for the Politics & International Affairs Department at Wake Forest University.

Notes

1
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping Delivers a Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022,” April 24, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202204/t20220421_10671083.html.
2
See Wang Yi, “Acting on the Global Security Initiative to Safeguard World Peace and Tranquility,” April 24, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202205/t20220505_10681820.html.
3
See, among others, Richard Aidoo and Steve Hess, “Non-interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards a Changing Africa,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44, no. 1 (2015): 107-138; Chris Alden and Zheng Yixaio, “China’s Changing Role in Peace and Security in Africa” in China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent, ed. C. Alden, A. Alao, Z. Chun, and L. Barber (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 39-66; Lina Benabdallah, “China’s Peace and Security Strategies in Africa: Building Capacity Is Building Peace?,” African Studies Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2016): 17-34; Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Yun Sun, “How China Views France’s Intervention in Mali: An Analysis,” Brookings Institution, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-china-views-frances-intervention-in-mali-an-analysis/.
4
Chiung-chiu Huang and Chih-yu Shih, “Asymmetry: Harmonious Intervention,” Lecture, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Heidelberg, December 2014, https://www.zo.uni-heidelberg.de/md/zo/sino/research/tls/december_02.pdf.
5
Jesse Marks, “China’s Evolving Conflict Mediation in the Middle East,” Middle East Institute, March 25, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-evolving-conflict-mediation-middle-east.
6
See Marks, “China’s Evolving Conflict Mediation in the Middle East.”
7
Degang Sun and Yahia Zoubir, “China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case of Quasi-Mediation Diplomacy?,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 110 (2018): 224-243, pp. 225, 227.
8
Sun and Zoubir, “China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa,” 225.
9
For more on various schools and approaches to mediation studies, see Sun and Zoubir, “China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa,” 225; Eileen Carroll and Karl Machie, International Mediation — The Art of Business Diplomacy (The Hague, London, and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000); François Debrix, Rituals of Mediation: International Politics and Social Meaning (New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan, “When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 759-781.
10
Sun and Zoubir, “China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa,” 227.
11
Guy Burton, “Chinese Conflict Management in Libya, Syria and Yemen after the Arab Uprisings,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 13, no. 1 (2019): 18-34, p. 33.
12
Burton, “Chinese Conflict Management in Libya, Syria and Yemen after the Arab Uprisings,” 19.
13
See Yun Sun, “How China Views France’s Intervention in Mali.” For more on China’s special envoy diplomacy, see Dawn Murphy, China’s Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing’s Alternative World Order (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022).
14
See Daniel Large, “China’s Role in the Mediation and Resolution of Conflict in Africa,” Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, OSLO Forum Network of Mediators, 2008.
15
See Lina Benabdallah and Dan Large, “ ‘The Key to Solving All Problems’? Unpacking China’s Development-as-Security Approach in Mali,” Third World Quarterly, 2022, 1-19.
16
Merics 2018. https://www.merics.org/en/short-analysis/china-conflict-mediator
17
See Tom Bayes, China’s Growing Security Role in Africa: Views from West Africa, Implications for Europe (Berlin: Stiftung Konrad, 2020), 24.
18
See Wang Yi’s comment about China’s mediation in South Sudan being driven by international responsibility and obligations. Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Johannesburg, “Wang Yi: China’s Mediation on the South Sudanese Issue Is Entirely Driven by International Responsibilities and Obligations,” 2015. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/201503/t20150308_468552.html
19
Rahmane Idrissa, “The Sahel: A Cognitive Mapping,” New Left Review, 2021, 1-35, p. 5, https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii132/articles/rahmane-idrissa-the-sahel-a-cognitive-mapping.
20
Idrissa, “The Sahel: A Cognitive Mapping,” 22.
21
Sun and Zoubir, “China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa,” 87.
22
Dai Bing at the International High-Level Conference on the Sahel held in Brussels in February 2018. See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), “Representative of Foreign Minister and Director General of the Department of African Affairs of the Foreign Ministry Dai Bing Attends International High-Level Conference on the Sahel,” March 1, 2018, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/zzjw/201803/t20180301_7940964.htm.
23
On the development-security nexus in China-Africa relations, see Lina Benabdallah and Dan Large, “Development, Security, and China’s Evolving Role in Mali,” Working Paper No. 2020/40, China Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, retrieved from http://www.sais-cari.org/publications.
24
For more details on China’s contributions to MINUSMA, see Benabdallah and Large, “ ‘The Key to Solving All Problems’?”
25
See BBC, “Chinese Peacekeeper Among Four Killed in Mali Attacks,” 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36424583.
26
See Benabdallah and Large, “Development, Security, and China’s Evolving Role in Mali.”
27
For more on Mali’s ethnic politics, see William Assanvo, Baba Dakono, Lori Anne Theroux-Benoni, and Ibrahim Maiga, “Violent Extremism, Organized Crime and Local Conflicts in Liptako-Gourma,” Institute for Security Studies, December 10, 2019, https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/violent-extremism-organised-crime-and-local-conflicts-in-liptako-gourma; Jamie Bleck, Abdoulaye Dembele, and Sidiki Guindo, “Malian Crisis and the Lingering Problem of Good Governance,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 5 (2016): 1-18, p. 7. For more on the various militant groups, see Daniel Eizenga and Wendy Williams, “The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel,” Africa Security Brief 38 (2020), https://africacenter.org/publication/puzzle-jnim-militant-islamist-groups-sahel/; Alex Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
28
Assanvo et al., “Violent Extremism, Organized Crime and Local Conflicts in Liptako-Gourma,” 5.
29
RFI, “France Halts Development Aid to Mali,” November 19, 2022, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20221119-france-halts-development-aid-to-mali-over-wagner-russia-paramilitaries.
30
Yang 2007 http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zt/yangga62/200709/t20070925_8413735.htm. With Dan Large, I further discuss the ramifications, advantages, and challenges of Beijing’s development-as-security approach in Mali; see “Development, Security, and China’s Evolving Role in Mali.”
31
Translation by the author. For the original text in French and more details on the seminar, see Inter de Bamako, “Coopération Sino-Malienne: L’ambassade de Chine au Mali et une association malienne co-organisent un séminaire international à Bamako,” Maliweb, June 27, 2022,
https ://www.maliweb.net/contributions/cooperation-sino-malienne-lambassade-de-chine-au-mali-et-une-association-malienne-co-organisent-un-seminaire-international-a-bamako-2981543.html.
32
Translation by the author.
33
Translation by the author. For the original text, see Maliweb, “La Chine appelle la communauté internationale à fournir une aide constructive au Mali,” June 14, 2022, https://www.maliweb.net/nations-unies/la-chine-appelle-la-communaute-internationale-a-fournir-une-aide-constructive-au-mali-2979787.html.
34
Xinhua, “Chinese Envoy Calls for International Help with Mali’s Security Capacity Building,” April 1, 2019, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/zzjw/201904/t20190401_7941580.htm; Xinhua, “Chinese Envoy Calls on Malians to Engage in National Dialogue,” October 9, 2019, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/zzjw/201910/t20191009_8083634.htm.
35
Ma Zhaoxu had also called on the international community to support Mali in 2018. Xinhua, “Chinese Envoy Urges International Support for G5 Sahel Force,” November 16, 2018, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/zzjw/201811/t20181116_7941373.htm.
36
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong Meets with the Joint Visiting Delegation of the Malian Government and Relevant Factions,” November 30, 2018, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/zzjw/201811/t20181130_7941400.htm.
37
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdoulaye Diop of Mali,” May 22, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/2913_665441/3034_664094/3036_664098/201705/t20170523_545179.html.
38
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Meets with Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop of Mali,” September 21, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220923_10770366.html.
39
See note 5.
40
See Guy Burton. 2019. “Chinese Conflict Management in Libya, Syria and Yemen after the Arab Uprisings,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13(1): 18-34; Fung (2016; 39).
41
See Mohammed Abbas, “Libyans Say China, Europe Sent Arms to Gaddafi,” Reuters, September 4, 2011, https://jp.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-china-idUKTRE7840A320110905.
42
Mordechai Chaziza and Ogen Shlomo Goldman, “What Factors Increase the Probability of Chinese Interventions in Intrastate Wars?,” Asian Journal of Political Science 24, no. 1 (2016): 1-20.
43
Pak K. Lee & Lai-Ha Chan “China’s and India’s perspectives on military intervention: why Africa but not Syria?,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 2 (2016): 179-214.
44
Jayshree Borah, “Analyzing China’s Mediator Role in MENA: More than Just a Global Responsibility?,” Institute of Chinese Studies Delhi Occasional Paper 5 (2020): 9.
45
For more on the role of the junta-governed Mali, see Andrew Lebovich, “Mali’s Transitional Government: The Dangers of the Junta Clinging to Power,” European Council for Foreign Affairs, Commentary, October 6, 2020, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_malis_transitional_government_the_dangers_of_the_junta_clinging/; Michelle Gavin, “Mali’s Junta Sees Enemies Everywhere,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), September 29, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/malis-junta-sees-enemies-everywhere.
46
Courtney J. Fung (2016, 34) “Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars,” Third World Quarterly, 37(1): 33-50.
47
Large, “China’s Role in the Mediation and Resolution of Conflict in Africa,” 40.
48
Roundtable organized by Crisis Action titled “The Role of China in Re-Energising the Peace Process in South Sudan” and held virtually in July 2021.
49
For more on the competing interests of foreign powers in Mali including France/EU, Russia’s Wagner group, Turkey, and other actors, see Lebovich, “Mali’s Transitional Government: The Dangers of the Junta Clinging to Power”; Dennis Tull, “Mali: The Uncertain Prospects of Intervention,” SWP Berlin, 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB01_2022_Tull_Mali_The_uncertain_prospects_of_intervention.pdf.
50
See, for example, Peace through Development: Perspectives and Prospects in the Sudan, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, February 2000.
51
Ramzy and Buckley (2019) “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims” New York Times, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html

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