China’s Shifting Role in Yemen

Since the onset of conflict in Yemen, China’s approach to the issue has undergone several shifts. The country has moved away from a largely passive attitude on the diplomatic periphery to a slightly more proactive approach marked by attempts at limited facilitation. This came as a surprise to some, given Yemen’s position, which is geographically distant, and with seemingly no specific interest to Beijing. History does suggest that it is not the first time China has perceived a more strategic value in trying to expand its influence in Yemen. Still, its approach has been mainly guided by its own interest in wider Great Power competition and through the lenses of its other regional relationships. And unlike previously, it has also moved away from ideology toward a pragmatic policy aimed primarily at stability.

For these reasons, this chapter aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding China’s role in Yemen over time and why its mediation efforts are better understood as limited attempts at facilitation. China has essentially stopped short of trying to come up with a balanced approach and seemingly shifted toward a more vocal Saudi-aligned position, right after the visit of the Houthi delegation in Beijing in 2016. Despite this, it maintained its narrative of facilitation, most likely in an attempt to remain seemingly neutral and perpetuate its role of a peaceful mediator in the region as well as globally. Indeed, since its seeming shift in policy a few years ago, there have been no indications that China has amended its stance. If anything, it has further improved its relationship with Saudi Arabia, particularly in pursuit of the intensifying narrative around the U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East. And despite some first signs of Washington trying to counter this narrative, the Chinese diplomatic and economic footprints in the area suggest that China will only become increasingly important when it comes to regional mediation and conflict settlement in the years to come.

China’s historical engagement with Yemen

North Yemen

Since the early establishment of diplomatic ties between China and North Yemen in 1956, Beijing has approached its relations with Yemen through the lens of wider geopolitical interest globally. Yemen was among the first wave of countries to recognize the PRC as a part of a broader push by China during the Bandung Conference in 1955. The theme of non-aligned movement and opposing colonialism would remain among the guiding principles of China’s policies in Yemen during the years to come. However, this shows that Beijing has since the beginning thought about its interests in Yemen more as a part of a broader picture rather than singling it out as a separate entity. In fact, only a few months after this wave of recognition, the three Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, and North Yemen) would for the first time oppose the postponement of China debate in the UN in November 1956, indicating that Beijing had begun to grow a base in the UN that would ultimately lead to its admission into the institution in 1971.¹Yitzhak Schichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy: 1949-1977 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 41.

In addition to the benefit of alliance-building, Beijing’s actions in North Yemen were motivated by its recognition of the geostrategic importance of the region. This mainly includes China’s competition with the Soviet Union. As Copper puts it, China’s economic support in North and South Yemen “appeared directly related to the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and to Moscow’s efforts at gaining a foothold in South Yemen. Elsewhere China’s aid efforts were largely symbolic.”²John Franklin Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1978,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 29, no. 8 (1979): 37. Over the span of several years, China has funded several projects, such as the 1958 construction of the Sana’a-Hodeida highway, a textile mill, a hospital, and an international conference hall.³Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1978.” All this took place while the Soviet Union was also trying to expand its influence by providing funding for other development projects, albeit these were much more focused on infrastructure such as building Hodeida port facilities (completed in 1961), expansion of the airport near Sana’a (1963), a road from Hodeida o Taiz (1969), and a cement plant at Bajil (1973).⁴Mark N. Katz, “Moscow’s Double-Track Policy: Sanna and the Soviets,” Problems of Communism (January-February 1984): 29. However, one could argue that Chinese aid efforts in North Yemen came to fruition, with the country eventually reorienting itself away from the Soviet Union while strengthening its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United States. Beijing, however, was able to maintain its position of influence and keep its balancing policy until the Yemeni unification in 1990.

South Yemen

The situation was not much different in the case of South Yemen, particularly in terms of wider competition with the Soviet Union. The socialist country recognized the PRC in 1968, as the Chinese press “hailed”⁵Fred Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy 1967–1982” (doctoral thesis), London School of Economics, Department of International History (April 1985), 285. the Yemeni independence and carried “favourable reports of the new government.”⁶Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy,” 285. However, the leadership of South Yemen would be politically divided between a wing that wanted to pursue a stronger relationship with Beijing and those who wanted to orient themselves toward Moscow.⁷Muhammad S. Olimat, China and the Middle East since World War II (London: Lexington Books, 2014), 281. This set a perfect stage for Sino-Soviet competition in South Yemen during which each side provided competing aid to undermine the other’s influence. Rising Soviet influence in South Yemen became particularly evident as its military footprint began to increase, especially taking into account its maritime interest and naval build-up in the Indo-Pacific. This military engagement seems to have been the main trigger for China to double down on its campaign against Soviet influence, particularly considering Soviet control of strategic waterways in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Oman.⁸Charles T. Creekman Jr., “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” Naval War College Review 32, no. 4 (July-August 1979): 73-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44641916.

However, as concluded by Halliday,⁹Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy,” 293. divergence from wider Chinese foreign policy has ultimately led to Beijing’s inability to address South Yemen’s security needs, contributing to overall cooling of the relationship. Indeed, the South had proved repeatedly resistant to the Chinese pressure to break off its ties with the Soviets. And with Beijing’s increasing focus on strengthening its ties with countries that were more receptive to this cause, the relationship eventually weakened. That said, according to Halliday, the primary causes are rooted in other external factors rather than any specific conflict between Beijing and Aden. He stresses the geographical distance between the two countries as probably contributing to China’s inability and unwillingness to provide the country with enough military supplies and guarantees. The geostrategic reality of Yemen has continued to be a factor in Beijing’s policy, often limiting its interactions, and is discussed in more detail below.

Establishing a framework of engagement

Great Power competition

Three main trends have emerged throughout Chinese historical engagement in Yemen. First and foremost, Beijing’s policy was almost always motivated by political competition and strategic considerations, which in this instance was Chinese competition with the Soviet Union. While this is to some extent common to all foreign policy, for China it seems to be one of the main and primary determinants of how it will manage the relationship. This continues to apply today; while Beijing is often motivated by its own economic interests, Great Power relations remain the anchor in its engagement in Yemen. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, both sides were effectively competing over the leadership of world communism. In the Middle East particularly, this has manifested in rivalry over which country will be perceived as the main backer of national liberation movements. And while prior to the split, there was a significant alignment in Sino-Soviet policy in Yemen, the changing realities appear to have prompted Beijing to shift its position and even push on South Yemen to side with China against the Soviet Union in the late 1960s.¹⁰Mohamed Mousa Mohamed Ali Binhuwaidin, “China’s Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsular Region, 1949-1999” (doctoral thesis), Durham University (2001), 261, available at Durham E-Theses Online, http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4947/. Generally, both China and the Soviet Union used economic and political support (with occasional military aid) for local governments as their primary tools. This was particularly the case in South Yemen, led by an openly Marxist government. Indeed, this was a part of a larger regional trend in which China attempted to represent itself as the main leader of national liberation movements and so people’s war. And because of its competing ideology with the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet split and the competition that followed have only intensified this.¹¹Gangzheng She, “The Cold War and Chinese Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1963–1975,” Journal of Cold War Studies 22, no. 1 (2020), 125-174.

Beijing seems to have recognized the rivalry early on; Chinese state-owned media had on multiple occasions published unfavorable articles commenting on Soviet activity in the region while accusing it of “rolling up the whole of Africa.”¹²Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” 77. However, Creekman cites another compelling example demonstrating the rivalry and its more violent aspects: the assassination of the president of North Yemen, President Ahmad al-Ghasmi, on 24 June 1978 during his meeting with a South Yemeni envoy who passed him a booby-trapped briefcase.  According to Creekman, circumstances surrounding the event suggest “a high degree of Soviet coordination,”¹³Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” 78. with the aim of discrediting the South Yemeni president and boosting his pro-Soviet rival. In fact, Chinese media eventually directly accused the Soviets of masterminding the attack.¹⁴Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” 78. Creekman concludes that following the incident it became clear that “the Soviets had consolidated their hold on South Yemen at the expense of the pro-Peking faction,” effectively demonstrating an instance of Sino-Soviet rivalry spreading outside of the traditional realm of competing support.¹⁵Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,”

From ideology to pragmatism

Beijing’s approach in Yemen during the years discussed here also demonstrates a wider shift in China’s policy in the late 1980s, marked by a transition to a less ideological policy of engagement. According to Olimat, since the late 1980s, China has progressively weakened its support for leftist and nationalist movement more broadly and progressed toward more pragmatic policy that favored stability and economic development.¹⁶Olimat, China and the Middle East since World War II, 284. This thinking reflected a larger internal change within China that took place following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 and the arrival of Deng Xiaoping with his economic reforms agenda. It is during this period that the legitimacy of the Communist Party has shifted from fulfilling the communist ideology to being able to maintain stability and economic prosperity. And even decades since then, this premise seems to hold today, particularly when looking at the Communist Party’s emphasis on economic development and growth.

In light of this, it then becomes apparent why China has moved away from support for leftist causes in the Middle East as its main tool of exerting its regional influence and why it ultimately supported the unification of Yemen in 1990. In addition, following the unification, China has opposed attempts to divide the country again and continued to argue for the importance of finding diplomatic resolution to the differences, given its support for territorial integrity driven by the One China policy, which the government of Yemen has continuously supported. It has also stressed the importance of Yemen’s ”neutral, good-neighbouring foreign policy” that could be interpreted as China’s attempt to prevent other major powers from strengthening their influence in Yemen.¹⁷Binhuwaidin, “China’s Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsular Region,” 272. However, even in such a scenario, such efforts could have been easily aimed at ensuring China maintains its nascent footing in oil and gas sectors in Yemen while making sure the country does not succumb to a renewed period of instability; in 1996, China and Yemen signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the oil sector alongside other economic and technical cooperation projects. Even today, China’s policy in various countries can be analyzed through the lenses of economic prosperity and stability first, and there are few—if any—recent instances in which Beijing has prioritized ideology in its approach.

China’s wider strategy in the Middle East 

Yemen’s importance for China has also been a question of more geographical realities and how Yemen fits into Beijing’s wider strategic calculus in the Middle East. The country’s position in the Arabian and Red Seas, as well as the importance of Bab al-Mandab strait and the Port of Aden, provides for natural strategic advantage for maritime control, connectivity between the East and West, and as protection of the lines of communication. However, there is an argument to be made regarding the importance of the wider region, which for China today is primarily tied to its interest in natural resources. With the rapid economic development under Deng Xiaoping, economic factors have become more important in China’s international relations because of the country’s rising demand for natural resources. This has led to increasing relevance of the Middle East for China, particularly as the country became a net importer of oil in 1993. Still, Beijing has carefully refrained from taking on additional responsibilities or trying to fill the void of a security guarantor.

Another important aspect of Beijing’s involvement in the Middle East is its approach that could be described as a “balancing strategy” to avoid falling into regional disputes such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁸Barbara Kelemen, “China in the Middle East: A ‘Quiet Strategy’ of Balancing,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies, February 24, 2018, https://ceias.eu/china-in-the-middle-east-a-quiet-strategy-of-balancing/. The policy is marked by trying to walk a fine line between two sides (such as Israel and Arab countries) while remaining outwardly neutral and at the same time following its own interests. This strategy brings a number of positives, as it allows China to maintain cordial relationships with all parties involved and also provides it with enough maneuvering space to continue to amend its policy as the situation develops. While this is particularly helpful in a region historically divided by long-lasting disputes, the approach has been eventually replicated by China in other parts of the world and has now effectively become its signature policy, given Beijing’s self-proclaimed policy of noninterference. Still, there are potential limits to this strategy, particularly once Beijing has strong economic or security interests in a given issue. Probably the most pronounced example of this is China’s role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite China’s outwardly neutral stance and continued balancing, Beijing probably saw the invasion as a strategic opportunity for its long-term goals. And while it has spoken up for Ukraine’s “territorial integrity,”¹⁹Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Expounds China’s Five-Point Position on the Current Ukraine Issue” (26 February 2022), retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202202/t20220226_10645855.html. it has directed little public criticism toward Russia and has continued to support Moscow economically. This is probably because it sees its relationship with Russia as strategically more important and beneficial, ultimately tipping the scale in Russia’s favor. It is thus not difficult to imagine Beijing being caught between a rock and a hard place should a similar situation develop in the context of the Middle East.

China’s mediation in Yemen today and its engagement with the Houthis

Since the onset of the current conflict in Yemen in 2011, Beijing’s approach has shifted over time. Careful examination suggests that China has slightly moved away from a largely passive attitude toward a more active position marked by attempts at facilitation, although those have remained very limited and largely symbolic at best. In the earlier stages of the conflict, China has mainly remained on the diplomatic periphery of the issue, supporting UN Security Council Resolution 2014 for transition of power.²⁰United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2014 (21 October 2011), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/YEMEN%20S%20RES%202014.pdf. Following the resolution, Beijing has also called for all sides to “exercise restraint” and resolve the issue via a “Yemen-led political transitional process.”²¹Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on October 21, 2011” (22 October 2011), retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgtrt/eng/fyrthhz/lxjzzdh/t871197.htm.

Such an attitude largely reflects Beijing’s traditional policy toward international matters that either are considered not to be in China’s direct interests or on which Beijing lacks significant resort. This also includes considering stability to be Beijing’s main priority in these cases (albeit this applies more generally, as China almost always sees stability to be in its main interest). According to Ramani,²²Samuel Ramani, “China’s Role in the Yemen Crisis,” The Diplomat (11 August 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/. this pursuit of stability is what initially led Beijing to perceive the Gulf Cooperation Council alongside Saudi Arabia as “unilateral aggressors” in Yemen. However, it is much more likely that China was trying to prevent both sides from escalating the situation into further violence and was in fact since the very beginning tilting toward Riyadh, as can be seen in its support for Resolution 2216 from April 2015 imposing sanctions on a Houthi leader.²³I-wei Jennifer Chang, “China and Yemen’s Forgotten War,” United States Institute of Peace, January 2018, https://www.usip.org/ sites/default/files/2018-01/pb241-china-and-yemens-forgotten-war.pdf. And while it publicly did not condemn the intervention, this can be interpreted through its noninterference and balancing principles, as well as its seeming initial prioritization of its efforts on unprecedented evacuations of foreign and Chinese nationals in March and April of 2015.

However, the Houthis’ territorial stagnation following Operation Decisive Storm seems to have been what pushed China to fully reaffirm and reveal its position more publicly. With their weakening control over the territory, Hadi’s government probably seemed to eventually be a more viable alternative to ensuring the country’s stability. Again, rather than an ideological choice, such a slight shift in attitude can be largely understood as China’s desire to pursue stability through a path of lesser resistance, as well as a strategic calculus given its growing ties with Riyadh. In fact, the shift was gradual and was preceded by a phase of Chinese efforts for what could be characterized as facilitation.

Following its initial stage of passivity, around 2016 China had eventually begun to try to establish channels of communications with the Houthis, most likely in an attempt to try to pursue neutral talks to achieve stability.²⁴Barbara Kelemen, “Engaging the Houthis in Yemen: A Repeat of China’s Afghanistan Mediation Strategy?,” King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (February 2020). In addition, this move was probably motivated by China’s desire to balance all of its regional relations, including Iran, while still refraining from full-out backing for the Saudi-led intervention. In fact, the Chinese special envoy had previously also traveled to Tehran to discuss the situation and political solution to the crisis.²⁵“China’s Middle East Policy Identical to Iran’s: Envoy,‘’ Tasnim News Agency, April 5, 2015, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/04/08/704373/china-s-middle-east-policy-identical-to-iran-s-envoy. The position of special envoy was created in 2002 as a reflection of Beijing’s effort to become more active in addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁶Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim, Great Power Projection in the Middle East: The China-Russia Relationship as a Force Multiplier?, Atlantic Council, March 2022, 6. But despite this mandate, the ambassadors usually have extensive regional experience, with their activities ranging over and covering a number of regional issues.

In the case of Yemen, China’s efforts for more active engagement took the form of both multilateral and bilateral approaches. The multilateral ones included China’s former ambassador to Yemen Tian Qi taking part in the two rounds of the UN-backed Yemen peace talks. This was aided by bilateral efforts by the Chinese special envoy to the Middle East, Gong Xiaosheng, who also repeatedly engaged in shuttle diplomacy.²⁷Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Niv Horesh, How China’s Rise Is Changing the Middle East (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019). Indeed, it was due to the activities by the special envoy that the Chinese media praised Beijing for its peace efforts.²⁸Wang Xu, “China Wins International Praise for Yemen Peace Efforts,” China Daily, July 4, 2016, retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-04/07/content_24351534.htm.  In addition to talking to all parties involved, Gong Xiaosheng reportedly helped to bolster the UN ceasefire in 2016 and helped facilitate peace talks in Kuwait.²⁹Wang Xu, “China Wins International Praise.”

Such efforts for facilitation, particularly after communication between the Houthis and the UN Special Envoy broke down following three rounds of unsuccessful talks, eventually culminated in a meeting between a Houthi delegation led by Mohammed Abdulsalam and the Chinese officials in Beijing in December 2016.³⁰Robert Cusack, “Houthis Go to China: Yemen’s Rebel Delegation Discuss Peace-Deal,” The New Arab, December 1, 2016, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/houthis-go-china-yemens-rebel-delegation-discuss-peace-deal. The visit lasted three days, during which the Houthis met with Deng Li, Director-General of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department for West Asian and North African Affairs. According to local reports, the visit took place after an official invitation by China and mainly revolved around discussions about the political solution of the conflict in Yemen. However, details around this meeting remain unclear, with the Chinese side providing little information; during a regular press conference of the Chinese MFA on 29 November 2016, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson brushed off a question about the Houthi visit.³¹Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2016,” retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgrecife//por/wjbfyrth_8/t1419810.htm.  

The days following the Houthis’ visit to Beijing could be described as China’s reckoning with its own position, which had been already tilting toward Riyadh, and its eventual public backing of the pro-Saudi coalition. Only a day after the visit had concluded, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson publicly condemned the Houthi’s formation of a national salvation government in Sana’a, saying it did not approve of “unilateral moves by any side” while reaffirming its backing for the “legitimate government of Yemen.”³²Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on Yemen’s Houthi Group and General People’s Congress Party Declaring Formation of ‘National Salvation Government,’ ” December 12, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/201612/t20161203_696775.html. Although any attempts to interpret what took place during the talks between the Houthis and Director-General are speculation at best, it is reasonable to assume that China did not see maintaining its seeming neutrality as the most beneficial option at its disposal. In fact, the refusal to acknowledge, or at least not condemn, the Houthi’s formation of the new government only formalized what was already China’s tilt toward the Saudi position; already in January 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping had visited Saudi Arabia, where the two countries reaffirmed their support for Yemeni unity and independence. This was finalized by comments of the Chinese ambassador in 2017 that condemned the Houthi-Saleh militias, blaming them for a deterioration of the situation in Yemen.³³“China Confirms Support for Yemen,” Al-Sahwah, March 27, 2017, https://alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-5371.

Since then, the Chinese approach toward the conflict has remained largely unchanged. Like its position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this means appearing neutral in theory while supporting one side over the other. In fact, its alliance has been demonstrated over the years by a number of steps such as China’s repeated backing for the Riyadh agreement as the solution for the conflict as well as supporting Saudi Arabia in its “important role.”³⁴Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Statement by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the Security Council Briefing on Yemen,” October 15, 2020, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/202010/t20201016_8417033.htm. At the same time, however, Beijing has moved toward greater openness for communication with all parties involved; China’s ambassador to Yemen, Kong Yong, has continued to meet with various representatives of the Yemeni government as well as maintaining communication with the Houthis.³⁵Kelemen, “Engaging the Houthis in Yemen’’, p. 9. In addition, China has suggested it is willing to facilitate communication between the two to ensure peace in the region. But rather than pursuing such efforts in a more substantial manner, this mainly remained in the realm of public statements. Lastly, since China’s breakaway from the Houthis in 2017, the country has ramped up its economic and humanitarian aid to Yemen. This includes 11,700 metric tons of food aid between 2017 and 2020 and is largely in line with Beijing’s strategy of economic stabilization in other countries such as Afghanistan.³⁶Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the Table?,” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-economic-stabilization-efforts-afghanistan-new-party-table.

Analysis of Chinese shift in policy: Pragmatic realism?

The previous section has demonstrated that Beijing’s policy in Yemen has over time shifted from a passive role of bystander into a slightly more proactive one marked by attempts at what could be described as facilitation. However, such attempts remained largely limited in scope and mostly symbolic. In addition, it is also evident that as time progressed, China has aligned its stance increasingly alongside the interests of the Saudi coalition in regard to the conflict in Yemen. To understand why, this section will analyze the evolution of China’s policy through the previously established framework, which includes three levels of analysis: Great Power competition, pragmatism, and China’s wider strategy in the Middle East.

Great Power competition: U.S.-China rivalry

While Beijing’s policy in North and South Yemen was shaped by its competition with the Soviet Union, today the United States has emerged as the main challenger of China’s ambitions globally. In the Middle East, this has been manifested by Beijing’s rising importance in the light of the seeming U.S. retrenchment. This narrative has been exacerbated by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and questions around the U.S. commitment to its allies during the Trump administration. It continues to feature in political circles, although there are reasons to believe that the idea of U.S. retrenchment is largely a matter of perception, given continuing high levels of military commitment to the region.³⁷March Lynch, “Does the Decline of U.S. Power Matter For the Middle East?,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, March 19, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/19/does-decline-of-u.s.-power-matter-for-middle-east-pub-78645.

It was in support of this narrative that Beijing has started projecting itself as a new potential successor of the U.S. in the Middle East. This is despite the fact that in recent years China has continuously emphasized it is not seeking to displace the U.S. in the region nor to provide security guarantees to local governments. That said, China’s first Arab policy paper in 2016 became one of the focal points of its strategy in the Middle East, suggesting a continuing evolution of its role in the region that is now increasingly perceived as rivalling that of the U.S. In addition, it has signed several important agreements with regional countries, including a comprehensive strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia in 2016. And while its reason for doing so was most likely motivated by China’s energy interests rather than an effort to displace the U.S., Saudi Arabia’s political importance for Washington is probably why some political commentators perceive Beijing cozying up to Riyadh as a direct challenge to the U.S.-led order.³⁸Ahmed Aboudouh, “China May Now Feel Confident to Challenge the US in the Gulf. Here’s Why It Won’t Succeed,” Atlantic Council, February 3, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china-may-now-feel-confident-to-challenge-the-us-in-the-gulf-heres-why-it-wont-succeed/.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia seems to have become the focus of China’s regional policy recently. In fact, the country had been China’s biggest supplier of crude oil and was pushed to second place only recently by Russia following the invasion.³⁹“Russia Replaces Saudi Arabia as China’s Biggest Crude Oil Supplier,” Business Standard, June 20, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/russia-replaces-saudi-arabia-as-china-s-biggest-crude-oil-supplier-122062000745_1.html. China’s direct foreign investment into Saudi Arabia has also been soaring since 2013, reaching a record high of $654 million in 2019.⁴⁰Dongmei Chen, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Vision 2030: A Review of the Partnership for Sustainability,” King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, May 2021, DOI: 10.30573/KS–2021-DP016, p. 4. And most recently, international press reports, citing the China-based Green Finance & Development Center, suggested that in the first six months of 2022, Saudi Arabia was the biggest recipient of Belt and Road Initiative investments by China, particularly in the oil and gas sector.⁴¹“China Belt & Road Spending Dips in H1, with No Investment in Russia – Research,” Reuters, July 25, 2022, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/china-silkroad-investment-idAFL1N2Z602L. In addition, Beijing continues to participate in various projects under the Saudi Vision 2030, with Chinese exports to Saudi Arabia reaching $28 billion in 2020, a 50% increase from 2013.⁴²Chen, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Vision 2030,” 12.

All this points to the Kingdom becoming one of the main pillars of Chinese policy in the region, which explains a rationale behind Beijing’s tilt toward a pro-Saudi position on the issue of Yemen. Besides more pragmatic factors that are considered in the next section, the pro-Saudi coalition includes other regional powers, such as the UAE, with whom China has similarly close ties. This makes China’s strategic calculus heavily inclined toward its current position. However, in a more counterintuitive outcome of this balancing, the issue of Yemen has become one of the issues on which the U.S. and China now have a shared position. In an interview in August 2022, the U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen pointed toward the very same issue, stating that adversarial relationships between great powers are not playing out on the issue of Yemen conflict, which has become an element where China, Russia, and the U.S. “can find commonality.”⁴³K. Gilchrist, “U.S. Is ‘Not Going Anywhere,’ Middle East Envoy Says, as China’s Xi Expected to Visit Saudi Arabia,” CNBC, August 12, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/12/us-is-not-going-anywhere-as-china-and-saudi-bolster-ties.html.

Pragmatism: Changing relationship dynamics

Despite China’s seeming alignment with Saudi Arabia, it would be incorrect to assume that Beijing is pursuing a specific outcome in Yemen. As discussed previously, China’s policies abroad have in recent decades become primarily guided by pragmatic—which often equates with economic—pursuits. There are exceptions to this rule, such as China’s core interests when it comes to the question of its territorial pursuit. However, on balance it can be argued that Beijing’s policies have become less ideological and guided by specific principles such as balancing or nonintervention (although the reality of the latter could be disputed).

The conflict in Yemen is no different. As shown in the previous section, Beijing is primarily interested in the wider dynamics of this issue, which is also tied to its economic interest as it pertains to Saudi Arabia. In addition, a stronger alliance with Riyadh would allow Beijing to expand its influence in the region. Still, as a result of its varied regional alliances and ties with often-competing sides, China also often pursues “balanced policy” guided by efforts to establish channels of communication with all parties to the conflict. The latter approach enables it to claim impartiality and neutrality, although that might be disputed in some instances.

This pursuit of balanced policy probably pushed Beijing to establish channels of communications with the Houthis and attempt some type of facilitation. That said, in the absence of major economic investment or security implications for China (in fact, trade between China and Yemen has dropped significantly in recent years as a result of the conflict⁴⁴Gordon Houlden and Noureddin M. Zaamout, “A New Great Power Engages with the Middle East: China’s Middle East Balancing Approach,” January 2019, China Institute, University of Alberta, 22. ), Beijing’s outreach to the Houthis should be mainly understood on two levels: as an attempt at political balancing between appeasing both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and also as a strategic effort to expand China’s sphere of influence given Yemen’s geostrategic position and its implications for trade, connectivity, and security. Indeed, China has been a party to similar efforts previously, most recently in the case of Afghanistan. However, as was the case with South Yemen, there appear to be clear limits to China’s ability in trying to engage in facilitation (and its interest in doing so) that would yield any results. This includes geographical proximity; in other words, Yemen is too far away for Beijing to perceive the issue as having a concrete security implication for China. For this reason, Chinese attempts at “mediation”—such as establishing communication channels with the Houthis and engaging in shuttle diplomacy—could be better described as mere attempts at facilitation at best, limited in scope, time, and space.

Moreover, China does not have a particularly strong relationship with the Houthis, meaning it lacks leverage over the group. Unlike with the Taliban, with whom it began its engagement back in the 1990s, with the Houthis Beijing had to build its relationship from scratch.⁴⁵Barbara Kelemen, “China & the Taliban: Pragmatic Relationship,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies (26 June 2019), https://ceias.eu/china-the-taliban-pragmatic-relationship/. And while it could have leaned on its ties with Iran to gain leverage in potential mediation, China’s emphasis on pragmatism has probably still made this option less attractive. This is because Iran continues to be a controversial player in the Middle East, and China has been careful and managing its ties with Tehran in a way not to upset other countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. From this perspective, China probably did not perceive its stake in the conflict in Yemen to be high enough to disrupt its delicate regional balancing.

Wider strategy in the Middle East: Peaceful rise?

Lastly, China’s approach in Yemen has also been framed around its wider strategy in the Middle East. (Because of the interconnectedness of these issues, the balancing approach as well as the importance of Saudi Arabia has previously been discussed at length.) China perceives the Middle East as its own separate building block in its global policy, particularly as it pertains to the Belt and Road Initiative. In this regard, and particularly taking into account the coverage of Chinese peace efforts by domestic media, Beijing also probably sees its attempts at conflict resolution as a way to showcase its benevolence. An article discussing Chinese peace efforts in Yemen also cited China’s Special Envoy describing the Belt and Road Initiative project’s ‘‘greatest contribution to the peace process in the Middle East.⁴⁶Wang Xu, “China Wins International Praise for Yemen Peace Efforts,” China Daily, July 4, 2016, retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-04/07/content_24351534.htm. For this reason, there are layers to its policy in Yemen that are aimed at a larger audience rather than just Saudi Arabia and are a part of Beijing’s wider calculations around what type of actor it wants to be in the Middle East. This includes China’s humanitarian assistance to Yemen through both bilateral and humanitarian channels over the years, including most recently medical assistance related to COVID-19 dynamics such as test kits, medical masks, and personal protection equipment. By taking these steps, China has been aiming to expand its soft power in the region; by trying to position itself as a leader in containment of the virus through providing material and equipment to many of the Middle Eastern countries, China was able to expand its relations from primarily focused on a state level to wider engagement with societies and to partially offset some of the adversarial attitudes present across the region.⁴⁷Guy Burton, “China and Covid-19 in MENA,” Project on the Middle East Political Science, 2020, https://pomeps.org/china-and-covid-19-in-mena.

In addition, China taking upon itself a role of a facilitator is another way the country has been trying to enhance its image of a peace-seeking power. This narrative is inextricably linked to its concept of “Chinese peaceful rise” and its signature principles of “peaceful coexistence” and related narratives.⁴⁸Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Turkey, “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development,” June 28, 2004, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cetur/eng/xwdt/t140777.htm. As pointed out by the U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen, China probably saw the extension of the truce in Yemen and progress in conflict resolution as particularly in its interest as it headed toward the UN Security Council presidency in 2022. In fact, this would very likely allow it to double down on its narrative of neutrality and peaceful development. That said, it is highly likely that these efforts are mainly narrative exercises, with Beijing unlikely to get involved and substantial mediation in local conflict any time soon.

Conclusion: Facilitating over mediating?

Examining Beijing’s current policy in Yemen, it becomes evident that China is factoring several aspects in its diplomatic calculus. Since the establishment of their diplomatic ties, Beijing’s interest in the country seems to have been entirely driven by a wider, strategic calculation given Yemen’s geostrategic position and external factors rather than a specific domestic issue. This is at least partially due to geographical realities and the fact that the country is perhaps too distant from China for it to directly affect some of Beijing’s core interests such as domestic security. These aspects seem to have for decades kept China at arm’s length and contributed to Beijing never becoming a prolific player in the country. In addition, they seem to be directly tied to China’s weak and limited ties to the Houthis and so its inability to exercise any meaningful leverage over the group.

The lack of direct security interest that has a potential to impact Chinese domestic stability is probably one of the main reasons that China’s attempt to facilitate some type of a dialogue between the two opposing sides has never translated into a more substantial approach for mediation. This also seems to be one of the differences between China and other major powers that participate in similar efforts. While it is reasonable to assume that other countries also see such venues as an opportunity to project their soft power, for Beijing this seems to be a secondary concern. In fact, one could argue that the Chinese interest in Yemen has since the beginning mainly focused on projecting China’s power in the region. With Beijing’s growing ties with Saudi Arabia as one of the main pillars of China’s policy in the Middle East, the country had little choice but to follow the Kingdom’s suit in the conflict in Yemen.

Lastly, China’s wider policy in the Middle East seems to be another factor that dictates how Beijing executes its policy in the region. The complex nature of China’s relationship with many opposing powers pushes Beijing to pursue a very delicate policy of balancing that often prevents it from taking a more direct and stronger stance on regional issues. And while this on occasion provides China with an opportunity to remain neutral and in a way could strengthen its ability to facilitate a dialogue, it usually limits to what extent Beijing can get directly involved. One could argue that relying on Iran to improve its ties with the Houthis would have the potential to upset other important players in the region with whom China has close ties. This suggests that unless Beijing chooses to substantially overhaul its engagement in the region, it might remain caught in a place where it has enough interest to care about the regional conflicts, but not enough impetus to engage in meaningful mediation.

Barbara Kelemen is a Research Fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS).

Notes

• 1
  Yitzhak Schichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy: 1949-1977 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 41.
• 2
  John Franklin Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1978,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 29, no. 8 (1979): 37.
• 3
  Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1978.”
• 4
  Mark N. Katz, “Moscow’s Double-Track Policy: Sanna and the Soviets,” Problems of Communism (January-February 1984): 29.
• 5
  Fred Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy 1967–1982” (doctoral thesis), London School of Economics, Department of International History (April 1985), 285.
• 6
  Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy,” 285.
• 7
  Muhammad S. Olimat, China and the Middle East since World War II (London: Lexington Books, 2014), 281.
• 8
  Charles T. Creekman Jr., “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” Naval War College Review 32, no. 4 (July-August 1979): 73-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44641916.
• 9
  Halliday, “Aspects of South Yemen’s Foreign Policy,” 293.
• 10
  Mohamed Mousa Mohamed Ali Binhuwaidin, “China’s Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsular Region, 1949-1999” (doctoral thesis), Durham University (2001), 261, available at Durham E-Theses Online, http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4947/.
• 11
  Gangzheng She, “The Cold War and Chinese Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1963–1975,” Journal of Cold War Studies 22, no. 1 (2020), 125-174.
• 12
  Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” 77.
• 13
  Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” 78.
• 14
  Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,” 78.
• 15
  Creekman, “Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens,”
• 16
  Olimat, China and the Middle East since World War II, 284.
• 17
  Binhuwaidin, “China’s Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsular Region,” 272.
• 18
  Barbara Kelemen, “China in the Middle East: A ‘Quiet Strategy’ of Balancing,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies, February 24, 2018, https://ceias.eu/china-in-the-middle-east-a-quiet-strategy-of-balancing/.
• 19
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Expounds China’s Five-Point Position on the Current Ukraine Issue” (26 February 2022), retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202202/t20220226_10645855.html.
• 20
  United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2014 (21 October 2011), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/YEMEN%20S%20RES%202014.pdf.
• 21
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on October 21, 2011” (22 October 2011), retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgtrt/eng/fyrthhz/lxjzzdh/t871197.htm.
• 22
  Samuel Ramani, “China’s Role in the Yemen Crisis,” The Diplomat (11 August 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/.
• 23
  I-wei Jennifer Chang, “China and Yemen’s Forgotten War,” United States Institute of Peace, January 2018, https://www.usip.org/ sites/default/files/2018-01/pb241-china-and-yemens-forgotten-war.pdf.
• 24
  Barbara Kelemen, “Engaging the Houthis in Yemen: A Repeat of China’s Afghanistan Mediation Strategy?,” King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (February 2020).
• 25
  “China’s Middle East Policy Identical to Iran’s: Envoy,‘’ Tasnim News Agency, April 5, 2015, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/04/08/704373/china-s-middle-east-policy-identical-to-iran-s-envoy.
• 26
  Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim, Great Power Projection in the Middle East: The China-Russia Relationship as a Force Multiplier?, Atlantic Council, March 2022, 6.
• 27
  Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Niv Horesh, How China’s Rise Is Changing the Middle East (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019).
• 28
  Wang Xu, “China Wins International Praise for Yemen Peace Efforts,” China Daily, July 4, 2016, retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-04/07/content_24351534.htm. 
• 29
  Wang Xu, “China Wins International Praise.”
• 30
  Robert Cusack, “Houthis Go to China: Yemen’s Rebel Delegation Discuss Peace-Deal,” The New Arab, December 1, 2016, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/houthis-go-china-yemens-rebel-delegation-discuss-peace-deal.
• 31
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2016,” retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgrecife//por/wjbfyrth_8/t1419810.htm.
• 32
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on Yemen’s Houthi Group and General People’s Congress Party Declaring Formation of ‘National Salvation Government,’ ” December 12, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/201612/t20161203_696775.html.
• 33
  “China Confirms Support for Yemen,” Al-Sahwah, March 27, 2017, https://alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-5371.
• 34
  Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Statement by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the Security Council Briefing on Yemen,” October 15, 2020, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/202010/t20201016_8417033.htm.
• 35
  Kelemen, “Engaging the Houthis in Yemen’’, p. 9.
• 36
  Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the Table?,” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-economic-stabilization-efforts-afghanistan-new-party-table.
• 37
  March Lynch, “Does the Decline of U.S. Power Matter For the Middle East?,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, March 19, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/19/does-decline-of-u.s.-power-matter-for-middle-east-pub-78645.
• 38
  Ahmed Aboudouh, “China May Now Feel Confident to Challenge the US in the Gulf. Here’s Why It Won’t Succeed,” Atlantic Council, February 3, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china-may-now-feel-confident-to-challenge-the-us-in-the-gulf-heres-why-it-wont-succeed/.
• 39
  “Russia Replaces Saudi Arabia as China’s Biggest Crude Oil Supplier,” Business Standard, June 20, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/russia-replaces-saudi-arabia-as-china-s-biggest-crude-oil-supplier-122062000745_1.html.
• 40
  Dongmei Chen, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Vision 2030: A Review of the Partnership for Sustainability,” King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, May 2021, DOI: 10.30573/KS–2021-DP016, p. 4.
• 41
  “China Belt & Road Spending Dips in H1, with No Investment in Russia – Research,” Reuters, July 25, 2022, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/china-silkroad-investment-idAFL1N2Z602L.
• 42
  Chen, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Vision 2030,” 12.
• 43
  K. Gilchrist, “U.S. Is ‘Not Going Anywhere,’ Middle East Envoy Says, as China’s Xi Expected to Visit Saudi Arabia,” CNBC, August 12, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/12/us-is-not-going-anywhere-as-china-and-saudi-bolster-ties.html.
• 44
  Gordon Houlden and Noureddin M. Zaamout, “A New Great Power Engages with the Middle East: China’s Middle East Balancing Approach,” January 2019, China Institute, University of Alberta, 22.
• 45
  Barbara Kelemen, “China & the Taliban: Pragmatic Relationship,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies (26 June 2019), https://ceias.eu/china-the-taliban-pragmatic-relationship/.
• 46
  Wang Xu, “China Wins International Praise for Yemen Peace Efforts,” China Daily, July 4, 2016, retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-04/07/content_24351534.htm.
• 47
  Guy Burton, “China and Covid-19 in MENA,” Project on the Middle East Political Science, 2020, https://pomeps.org/china-and-covid-19-in-mena.
• 48
  Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Turkey, “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development,” June 28, 2004, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cetur/eng/xwdt/t140777.htm.