To date, the Maldivian government has pursued measures at both the local and international levels to maintain the islands' habitability as long as possible. Nevertheless, the government has yet to create an official resettlement plan for its people. 

A coherent resettlement strategy is necessary not only to protect the Maldivian population, but also to help develop a broader global plan of adaption to deal with the most challenging international repercussions of climate change. A pre-planned relocation, for example, could take place voluntarily, and in advance of an island nation becoming uninhabitable.  The absence of a resettlement plan, on the other hand, could condemn hundreds of thousands of Maldivians to a forced migration in the face of possibly rapid land loss.  This latter scenario would place Maldivians at greatest risk, as forced environmental migrants have no long-term legal protection under the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees.  

Even if the Maldives develop a resettlement plan to contend with sudden storm surges or gradual sea-level rise, further questions arise regarding the nature, timeline, and location of resettlement. At what point in the de-territorialization process would the Maldivian people relocate? Would they move all at once, or in waves? Would all the nation's citizens migrate to a single location, or instead scatter to various resettlement destinations?

A key factor in formulating a practicable resettlement strategy will be the availability of land. Already, some high-ranking Maldivian government officials have floated the idea of purchasing land from India, Sri Lanka, or Australia, taking into consideration those countries' proximity, climate, and culture. However, as the global population grows and natural resource bases are further strained, what country would give up land to a newly homeless nation? Furthermore, even if land were available, it would need to be economically and environmentally viable for both the Maldivians and the host country before it could be considered a feasible resettlement location.

The currently accepted criteria of statehood further complicates resettlement planning.  According to the Montevideo Convention, statehood is determined by the existence of a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into negotiations with other states. If the Maldives eventually fall victim to rising seas, would they be able to maintain their statehood without tangible territory?     

The international community's decision on the issue will be a key determinant of Maldivians' resettlement options.  If the traditional definition of statehood stands, then the Maldivians will need to acquire new land to maintain sovereignty and citizenship. But if the Maldivian government cannot secure new land for its people, the population would become migrants or immigrants, an outcome that could cost them their collective national identity.

Conversely, the international community could decide that the Maldivians may maintain their sovereignty without a defined territory, following the precedent set by the Knights of Malta and governments in exile. Although resettlement would still be necessary, under these circumstances the Maldivian government would be able to advocate for the rights and well-being of its people, as well as continue to act as a full stakeholder in international policymaking deliberations.  

A third option, which would also allow for the preservation of Maldivian sovereignty without the acquisition of new land, would be the maintenance of the Maldivian exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Presently, under the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, EEZs are determined by ownership of inhabitable land. However, if the international community allowed for a freezing of the Maldivian EEZ in its current state, this ocean territory could serve as the "defined territory" needed for statehood.

Although the scenarios surrounding territorial loss and resettlement are multifaceted, it is better for the Maldivians and the international community to tackle them early and directly, rather than leave them unaddressed. A collective discussion about population displacement and relocation can lead to more holistic and sustainable solutions. The alternative - continuing to view de-territorialization as a hypothetical challenge - may be easier in the short term. But in the long term, ignoring these risks may not only threaten the Maldivian nation, but also deprive the international community of an opportunity to pursue proactive climate adaptation.

Photo Credit: By thetravelguru, via Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/photos/thetravelguru/6203635604/

The law passed last August to help resolve our fiscal crisis, the Budget Control Act (BCA), partly did so by capping discretionary funding.  It created two categories  in recognition of the differing political dynamics for different types of funding, much as was done in the 1990s. The total spending in each category is enforced with caps-limits on the amount of spending in each category.  But where in the 1990s the budget was divided between defense spending and non-defense spending with each category having its own cap, the BCA divided the budget between security and non-security each with its own cap.  This creates a larger category that combines defense with many civilian agencies and activities that contribute to our national security. International Affairs, encompasses the Department of State and all of our foreign assistance programs, from USAID, to multilateral assistance; Homeland Security; Veterans Affairs; some unclassified intelligence funding; as well as the National Nuclear Security Administration, which controls our nuclear weapons materiel and resides in the Department of Energy.  In some ways, this division was a triumph for those who argued that international affairs funding is as critical to our national security as defense spending.  

The President's budget request continues this security/non-security divide.  Under this divide, international affairs funding did particularly well.  The budget requests $4.3 billion more base funding for State and Other International Programs than was provided in FY12, the largest increase of any agency.  In contrast, the Defense Department saw a decrease of $5 billion from FY12 in its base budget, the third-largest cut after the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services. 

Unfortunately, the security/non-security divide is not the current law of the land.  The BCA also created a committee to recommend an additional $1.2 trillion in savings, called the supercommittee, and set up penalties if the supercommittee did not achieve those savings.  When the supercommittee failed to reach an agreement, a part of the penalties was a switch back to the defense/non-defense division, rather than security/non-security.  Under that division, the amounts the President's budget requests for national defense-which includes nuclear weapons funding and other defense-related activities besides just the Defense Department-would exceed the cap by $4 billion.  If Congress does not change how the caps are currently arrayed or appropriate less funds, all of national defense, including the Department of Defense, will be cut back by that $4 billion through an automatic enforcement process. The budget request seeks to avoid this by assuming Congress will change the law to codify the President's concept. 

But if the administration does get its request and Congress does change the law to restore the security/non-security divide, Congress may be encouraged to cut international affairs funding.  International affairs funding, with its $4 billion increase, will be under the same cap as the Defense Department, with its $5 billion decrease.  Since the two accounts are under the same account, Congress can move money between them without running afoul of the revised BCA's enforcement mechanisms.  If the traditional preferences of Congress hold, the two houses would be sorely tempted to filch some of the international affairs increase to prevent an unwanted cut to the Defense Department. 

The President's budget request endorses a modern understanding of national security funding.  But in doing so, it opens the door for Congress to take a more traditional view and use international affairs funding to pay for additional defense spending.  Advocates of international affairs spending face a dilemma.  Do they celebrate a strategic victory in having international affairs acknowledged as key to national security?  Or do they worry they'll lose tactically as Congress moves funding around?  As always, the budget's bottom line will differ from the President's request.

Photo Credit: DOD Photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo, http://www.flickr.com/photos/secdef/6641954431/

Findings in The Unfinished Crisis, include:

• The 2008-2009 Mumbai crisis remains unfinished. Ignited by terror attacks in late-November 2008 that were demonstrably launched from Pakistan, Indian grievances remained unresolved, while Pakistani policies remain dangerously subject to miscalculation. Further attacks in India by extremists trained, equipped, and based in Pakistan can be expected, making another crisis likely.
• Senior officials in the outgoing Bush administration had prior experience in crisis management on the subcontinent. They executed a crisis management plan - "Plan A" - that included familiar elements: top-level diplomacy, high-level official visits, playing for time, and close cooperation with British officials. There was no Plan B.
• US crisis management in 2008-2009 also gave unprecedented weight to sharing evidence with India and Pakistan. A related innovation in managing this crisis was US forensics and intelligence assistance to Indian authorities investigating the attacks. Institutionalizing law enforcement ties to India-and expanding them to Pakistan-could help resolve future crises and bolster US relations with both sides.
• US crisis management was helped by improved US-Indian ties, but hampered by strained ties to Pakistan and poor civil-military relations within its leadership. A continuation of these trends could reduce Washington's efficacy as an "honest broker" in future crises.
• Despite the spectacular nature of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and considerable loss of life, most US officials saw this crisis as less dangerous than the 1999 Kargil and 2001-2002 "Twin Peaks" crises. The Mumbai crisis carried risks of escalation, but the challenges facing US crisis managers were smaller in scope and duration.
• US and Indian leaders had very little leverage on Pakistani officials to take serious, lasting steps against Pakistan-based groups and individuals linked to attacks on Indian soil. The aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks confirmed anew that Pakistan's military, political, and judicial authorities could not-or would not-take punitive action against the perpetrators.
• The mid-crisis presidential transition from the George W. Bush to the Barack Obama administration had little effect on crisis management moves open-or not open-to Washington. The constraints on US leverage and diplomatic options were common to both White Houses.
• US crisis management after the Mumbai attacks was exemplary-but it was effective largely because Indian political leaders did not wish to risk an open-ended war that could lead to uncontrolled escalation and jeopardize other equities. New Delhi's costbenefit calculus could change.
• A key question will be how confident Indian officials are of Washington's ability to influence Pakistan's security establishment in a crisis, and how willing they remain to lean on Washington's good offices. If they lose faith in US diplomatic clout, Indian officials may be more inclined to respond militarily in the event of a future attack linked to Pakistan.
• Even if Washington has increased difficulty playing the role of an "honest broker" on the subcontinent, there is no obvious substitute on the horizon for the US as crisis manager.
• US crisis management will always pivot on a few individuals in Washington, but all plays in the US crisis management playbook require periodic re-evaluation and updating in advance of the next crisis. Successful strategies must take account of changing contexts and trends.
• Thoughtful contingency planning based on scenarios-not forecasts-can help sharpen preventive diplomacy and US crisis readiness by identifying emerging actors and developments in the region. Senior US officials would be well-advised to participate in contingency planning for high-level crisis prevention and management.
• Potential game-changers for US crisis management include an attack on the US homeland that could be traced back to Pakistan; the withdrawal of most US and NATO forces from Afghanistan; domestic political changes within Pakistan and further deterioration in US-Pakistan ties; changes in Indian political leadership; and strengthened Indian conventional military capabilities.
• US crisis management works best when ties between India and Pakistan are improving. Attempts to improve bilateral relations could prompt crisis-generating spoiler attacks, but such attacks could occur regardless of normalization efforts. Postponing efforts to improve bilateral ties merely guarantees more unfinished crises, any of which can fuel future escalation.

This study is the latest in a series of works by Stimson co-founder Michael Krepon and collaborating authors on South Asian security topics, from works on how to strengthen deterrence stability and prevent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, to a more recent focus on terrorism and crisis management.  Co-author Polly Nayak was the Intelligence Community's most senior expert and manager on South Asia from 1995-2001.

Click here to read The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks.

In November 2011, the government of Laos yielded to opposition from Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and suspended the construction of a 32-meter high dam across the Mekong mainstream in its northern Xayaburi Province for an unspecified period. The first of up to 12 dams planned for the Lao, Lao-Thai, and Cambodian stretches of the river, the future of the Xayaburi dam has huge environmental and socioeconomic consequences for all. Planned dams would block the spawning migration of hundreds of fish species and trap vital silt-borne nutrients, jeopardizing the food security, health, and livelihoods of 60-million people, as well as hard-won regional peace and stability.

The construction of environmentally and socioeconomically destructive dams continues uninterrupted on the upper half of the Mekong River in China's Yunnan Province, and on major tributaries in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. But as of early 2012 three critical factors have stalled the first proposed mainstream dam on the Lower Mekong:

• The Transboundary Difference - Growing awareness of transboundary impacts is a game-changer. Governments have begun to consider the regional political consequences of the mainstream projects as more than domestic concerns.
• Institutions Matter - The establishment of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 and the commitment of the four member governments to a specific protocol for establishing and considering-if not necessarily reconciling-the differing national and societal costs and benefits of mainstream dams.
• The Empowerment of Civil Society - Thai civil society organizations injected their opposition to the Xayaburi dam into the national election campaign; the Vietnamese government allowed NGOs to hold anti-dam public meetings and used popular opposition as justification for its refusal to accept the project.

Whether the delay of the Xayaburi project will be a permanent turning point towards cooperative and sustainable water development depends critically on follow-up action by the MRC, its member countries, and the international donor community to fund the studies necessary to support comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of proposed dams and water diversions. In the best case, a new norm, a "Mekong Standard" for project planning, engineering, and environmental and socioeconomic impact assessments will emerge and be accepted as a basis for regional decision making.

Click here to read the entire report, "Mekong Turning Point."

Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., former U.S. Special Envoy for MANPADS, introduced Keynote Speaker Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. An ensuing panel discussion included:

• Rachel Stohl, Fellow, Managing Across Boundaries, The Stimson Center;
• Colonel Mark Adams, Director of the MANPADS Interagency Task Force, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, U.S. Department of State; and
• Stuart McKillop, Assistant Head, Counter Proliferation Policy, Arms Control and Counter Proliferation Business Unit, U.K. Ministry of Defence.

The panel was moderated by Brian Finlay, Senior Associate and Director, Managing Across Boundaries, The Stimson Center.

To read Assistant Secretary Shapiro's remarks, please click here.

After seizing power in a bloodless military coup in 1969, Gadhafi amassed a large arsenal of weapons to fend off enemy threats and quell internal discord. In early 2011, as the opposition against him swelled and he began a violent fight to stay in power, Gadhafi moved these weapons caches into office buildings and other public spaces in a disorganized, haphazard, and undocumented manner. As his strongholds fell, fleeing Gadhafi loyalists abandoned those arms, leaving them unprotected from looters. As a result, thousands of weapons and rounds of ammunition were stolen, feeding the conditions for violence and instability in Libya and the region for years to come.

Libyan Weapons on the Loose

Looters, other criminals, former rebel fighters, and civilians took weapons for a variety of reasons, including to fight, to protect themselves, or to sell on the black market. Experts believe that some weapons were used in the training of opposition forces, while others were used during the conflict or were disassembled and their parts used to build other weapons systems. Some weapons were destroyed in their caches during airstrikes and the resulting fighting. But with Libya in transition, it is equally likely that many of these weapons have been stored for a potential internal conflict in the future, suggesting that their impact has yet to be fully realized.

Equally distressing is the likelihood that many of these weapons were transferred outside of Libya to feed violent conflict in other countries. During the chaos following the collapse of the regime, individuals were able to carry unsecured weapons on their person, in cars, or in trucks.  Because Libya's borders are porous, and amidst continued uncertainty over Libya's future, many have found arms sales an easy way to make quick cash. It is believed that many of these missing weapons could also be destined for groups outside of the country. Experts highlight the particular risk of the possibility of Libyan weapons ending up in the hands of al-Qaeda groups operating within North Africa. The governments of Chad and Niger have already said they have evidence that Libyan weapons have been smuggled into their countries, possible destined for al-Qaeda aligned groups there. Of course, there is also the risk the weapons could make their way into the hands of al Shabab in Somalia.

The international community has been paying the most attention to the estimated 20,000 shoulder-fired missiles known as MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems) that were abandoned by the Gadhafi regime. These weapons are of particular concern because they are heavily sought after by rogue elements and could be used to shoot down military helicopters or commercial airliners. In 2002, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists in Mombasa, Kenya, fired two MANPADS at an Arkia Israel Airlines plane. Fewer than the initial total estimated numbers of these weapons would be in circulation today, months after the fall of the regime, as some were taken by those who used them incorrectly, or have been destroyed by NATO airstrikes or other fighting.

Although MANPADS are of great concern, other small arms and light weapons pose a more immediate risk for the stability and security of Libya and its neighbors. Small arms can be used in criminal or internal violence, as well as in conflicts in neighboring countries. For instance, anti-tank shells or mines can be used in the development of car bombs or other explosive devices.  Arms experts have seen tens of thousands of landmines, munitions, and other weapons unguarded in warehouses, and it is conceivable that potentially hundreds of thousands more remain unaccounted for.

Responding to Libya's Weapons

The United States government, the largest supporter of weapons destruction programs, has been working to address the surplus weapons issue in Libya, and has supported Libyan efforts to recover, account for, and destroy weapons in a variety of ways. 

Working with the National Transitional Council (NTC) and Libya's neighbors, allied governments, and international institutions, even before the fall of Gadhafi, the United States provided funding and expertise to address the current and future challenges of the potential weapons proliferation.

Much more needs to be done to stop weapons trafficking within and outside of Libya.  The NTC must move weapons to safe storage areas, and register and log the weapons they have control over, to ensure they know what they have, where they are, and to prevent them from ending up in the hands of those who would use them for nefarious purposes. The NTC also should work with local communities to get individuals to turn in weapons, such as landmines or surface to air missiles, through amnesty programs that will free people from fear of prosecution. In addition, the NTC can also develop incentive buy-backs to get people to exchange their weapons for goods and services, both of which are better than the cash incentives currently being used, which fuel corruption and black market sales.  And, the NTC must develop comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs for former regime soldiers to give them opportunities for a productive future in Libya.

The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and others have promised significant new investments in an array of weapons abatement programs across Libya, but their role should not end there. These governments must also be pushing the National Transition Council to move more aggressively against the proliferation of these weapons both internally and beyond the borders of Libya. Although the immediate proliferation threat in Libya is being addressed by the NTC and its allies, the potential dangers of unsecured and unaccounted for weapons could haunt Libya for years to come. In the long term, countries will have to consider cross-border security and border management programs to ensure that Libya does not become a weapons proliferation hotbed and can provide for the security and stability of its people in order to dissuade disgruntled ex-fighters from picking up an easy to find weapon and renewing the conflict.

Photo Credit: Al Jazeera English, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brega_checkpoint_-_Flickr_-_Al_Jazeera_English_%282%29.jpg

It is with this background that the Managing Across Boundaries program (MAB) at the Stimson Center and the Africa Peace Forum, a Nairobi-based peace and conflict research institute, have partnered to challenge conventional wisdom. Through research, analysis, and outreach on the ground, in 2012, we will develop a Kenyan border security action plan detailing requirements in terms of high technology, communications equipment, training, and human capacity. It is our intention that this document will be a helpful tool for the Government of Kenya to solicit international assistance for building capacity at borders.

Development and security specialists agree that the cornerstone of any successful development strategy in East Africa must include a commitment to shoring up capacities at the borders. Porous and weak infrastructure and institutions at national boundaries are the common denominator for an array of security challenges that directly impact the prospects of economic and social progress on the African continent: proliferation and small arms trafficking, growth in organized crime, and terrorist activity.

Ultimately, it is our hope that the private sector, including manufacturers and trainers of many of the required technologies and services, will be a part of conversations with governments, and perhaps even tailor capacity-building programs that will effectively respond to the issues that Kenya and the East African region face. The global market for improving border security is worth $17 billion per year, which should serve as a market incentive for progressive high tech and communications corporations to cooperate with governments, development and infrastructure banks, and civil society.

For the local population, security problems, such as the unchecked flow of small arms across the continent, challenge sustainable development by fuelling conflict, spoiling a healthy business climate, threatening a functioning labor market and educational system, decreasing revenues from tourism, and endangering foreign direct investments. Indeed, it is estimated that armed violence and civil wars alone, made possible by illicit flows of arms, account for a 15-percent reduction in the gross domestic product annually in Africa. Our initiative seeks to create conditions that will enable poor and vulnerable people to improve their lives. This is sustainable development through security.

It is time to rethink the role of governments, civil society, and industry to create innovative new partnerships that benefit the greater good. In our interconnected world, it is in the interest of both governments and the private sector for corporations to become a greater force for good while making profits. We must therefore do a better job enlisting tech and communications companies' support in building stronger societies.

We hope that this "whole of society" pilot program in Kenya will trigger a chain reaction across the region, and we stand ready to communicate the lessons learned and facilitate similar projects throughout the African continent. Ultimately, our joint efforts are our attempt at turning Kofi Annan's persuasive rhetoric into equally powerful action.

Photo credit: Courtesy of International Security Assistance Force, http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5966113214/

With the Obama administration's declaration of intent, debate over a Code of Conduct will pick up speed.   It is hard to make the case against strengthening norms for responsible behavior in space, but domestic and international criticism has already taken shape.  One set of arguments finds the Code of Conduct lacking because it is insufficient.  In this view, the Obama administration should focus on a treaty that bans weapons and warfare in space.  This critique is voiced most strongly by Moscow, Beijing, and some U.S. analysts who note that space warfare capabilities are advancing, especially those inherent in U.S. theater missile defense systems. 

These arguments are weak for several reasons.  A treaty banning weapons that can be used in space is neither feasible nor verifiable, since many essential, multi-purpose military capabilities can be used to interfere with, disable, or destroy objects in space.  Some of these capabilities, such as land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, have existed for over half a century.  Their number has declined greatly, but they are not going to be eliminated any time in the foreseeable future. 

Other capabilities that could be applied to space warfare, including theater missile defense interceptors, are coming on line.  It does not, however, take more than a few interceptors that blow satellites to smithereens to mess up low earth orbit for all space-faring nations.  China demonstrated this folly in 2007; adherence to a space Code of Conduct would effectively end this particular practice. 

Banning all military capabilities that can be directed against satellites isn't feasible.  Banning "dedicated" ASAT capabilities isn't consequential.  No agreement can foreclose wars of aggression or lesser forms of deliberate mischief making in space.  But a Code of Conduct can clarify wrongdoing and facilitate corrective responses, while setting norms that reduce the likelihood of devastating accidents and grave miscalculations. 

Beijing and Moscow are ramping up their space warfare capabilities as they call for a treaty that they know won't be negotiated.  The Pentagon is not sitting still, either.  The relevant choice before us is whether to set norms for responsible behavior by major space-faring nations, or to maximize flexibility to engage in space warfare.

Some critics in the United States oppose a Code of Conduct because it seems too much like a treaty that could impede U.S. war fighting in space.  For example, Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation has argued in Space News that a Code of Conduct "would jeopardize the U.S. ability to engage in testing of both space weapons and space combat doctrines."  In his view, a Code of Conduct would "raise real questions about American security, while doing little to create a widely accepted set of norms." 

This critique of the Code of Conduct dwells on potential rule breakers, especially China.  If, as critics assert, a Code of Conduct would not be helpful for norm setting, how would its rejection improve the conduct that they find most objectionable in others?    An analogous argument could be made against highway traffic regulations.  There are speeding limits and other rules to promote highway safety, but not everyone abides by them.  Would we be safer by dispensing with traffic regulations? 

To be sure, rule breaking in space can be far more consequential than anarchy on the highways.  As a practical matter, if China and Russia play by their own rules, the United States will, as well.  A Code of Conduct will fall short unless it includes the three most important space-faring nations. 

Another argument used by Dean Cheng against the Code is that it is unnecessary because it is superfluous.  If, indeed, a Code of Conduct would merely reaffirm what is widely acknowledged as responsible behavior, why oppose it?  In actuality, an effective Code of Conduct would both reaffirm some existing norms, such as debris mitigation, while extending them to the realm of space traffic management. 

Yet another argument against the Code is that it does not impose severe penalties or sanctions for misbehavior.  Critics fail to clarify how their desire to impose penalties or sanctions can be advanced by opposing a Code of Conduct.  Without rules, there are no rule breakers. 

Some critics worry that a Code could lull the United States into a false sense of security when China is increasing its military capabilities in space, on land and at sea - especially China's growing sea-denial capabilities against the U.S. Pacific Fleet.  These concerns were also expressed in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union placed satellites in orbit that could sometimes track U.S. surface combatants. 

Back then, Washington and Moscow tested anti-satellite weapons infrequently before shelving them.  During the Cold War, the notion of protecting surface navies by preemptively engaging in antisatellite warfare was widely dismissed as being extremely dangerous, especially because satellites were intertwined with the nuclear deterrents of both superpowers. 

With one Cold War receding in the rear-view mirror, it makes little sense to invite a new one, if it can be avoided.  The United States and China have the ability to interfere with or destroy satellites.  As was the case with the Soviet Union, and is the case now with respect to China, mutual capabilities to engage in space warfare constitute a basis for restraint and deterrence.  This reality will exist with or without a Code of Conduct.  Existing space warfare capabilities make a Code of Conduct all the more essential to affirm responsible behavior and to facilitate appropriate responses if others act irresponsibly.   

Domestic critics of a space Code of Conduct from the Left want an ambitious new treaty.  Critics from the Right want maximum flexibility to develop and use space warfare capabilities.  Neither has made a persuasive case against the Code of Conduct.  Nor have they offered a better alternative.

Photo Credit: NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_2059.html