The tortoise will win this race, and could quicken its pace. But the hare continues to run fast, because nuclear weapons are a sign of strength amid domestic weaknesses and because it can't keep up with the growth of India's conventional military programs.

At present, there is rough nuclear parity between India and Pakistan, with Pakistan having a larger arsenal and India having more advanced air- and sea-based capabilities. Both countries are expanding their capacity to produce bomb-making material, adding cruise missiles to their arsenals and planning to send nuclear weapons to sea. Pakistan's arsenal now exceeds 100 warheads. India is not too far behind.

India, like China, has adopted a relaxed approach to nuclear deterrence. In both countries, national security is equated with strong economies and domestic cohesion. Indian and Chinese leaders value nuclear weapons as expressions of national will and power, rather than as military instruments.

As befitting the home of Mahatma Gandhi, Indian political leaders have great ambivalence about nuclear weapons. They seek the moral high ground while attending to national security imperatives. No other country has waited 24 years between testing its first and second nuclear devices.

In Pakistan, the situation is starkly different. Economic growth is hobbled, foreign reserves are dwindling and the country is plagued by bloodletting. Decisions about nuclear requirements are made by a few generals who view these weapons as a military necessity as well as a political instrument. In Pakistan, political leaders take their guidance from generals. In India, the requests of military leaders often land on deaf ears.

Pakistan's nuclear requirements were set high initially, and grew higher still after the George W. Bush administration agreed to cooperate with India to build nuclear power plants. This civil-nuclear agreement has languished, while Pakistan's military-nuclear programs have ramped up.

After testing nuclear weapons in 1998, Indian and Pakistani authorities embraced a doctrine of minimal, credible deterrence. Now the word "minimal" applies less and less, as their stockpiles have doubled over the past decade. There is little chance that Pakistan and India will end fissile material production for bombs anytime soon.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons can be used to warn India not to advance on Pakistani territory. Its military doctrine has recently embraced short-range, tactical nuclear weapons to counter India's conventional military advantages. At the high end of the targeting spectrum, Pakistan's military appears intent to deny India victory in warfare and to destroy it as a functioning society in the event of a complete breakdown in deterrence.

Slowing this trajectory will be difficult. Nuclear weapons are widely perceived in Pakistan as the nation's crown jewels. Most Pakistanis begrudge governmental corruption and incompetence, but not money spent on The Bomb, which has been imbued with great powers, including the power to keep India at bay and to lift Pakistan onto the world's stage.

Finding stability in this competition will be difficult, in part because China weighs heavily in Indian calculations and because civil-military relations in Pakistan are so unbalanced. Fifteen years and two major crises have passed since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998 - and they still haven't engaged in serious, sustained nuclear risk-reduction talks.

What might change Pakistan's calculation that more nuclear weapons equates to more security? One way is for New Delhi to take dramatic steps to improve relations and to "take away the enemy image," similar to what Mikhail Gorbachev accomplished when he was leader of the Soviet Union in his dealings with the United States.

There is, however, little appetite within India for bold steps to reinforce the obvious need of the Pakistani Army to focus on internal security threats. Another potential game changer is severe perturbations in Pakistan's economy. Economic upheavals would, however, create even more domestic instability without changing the Pakistan military's dependency on The Bomb.

The safest route to reduce nuclear dangers on the subcontinent is through concerted efforts to improve relations between Pakistan and India. The surest way to do so is by greatly increasing cross-border trade. Leaders in both countries have endorsed this course of action, but underlings are moving slowly ahead of national elections. Even modest progress can be stopped short by another mass-casualty attack on Indian soil designed to disrupt improved ties.

A nuclear arsenal built on very weak economic foundations is inherently unstable, which is reason enough for India to pursue sustained and accelerated trade and investment opportunities with Pakistan. These methods, which have dampened tensions between China and Taiwan, could also serve a similar purpose on the subcontinent.

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This op-ed was first published in the International Herald Tribune. 

Photo credit:Antônio Milena via Wikimedia Commons

Until recently, the only non-natives to visit the unspoiled Arctic were explorers, Cold War troops and scientific adventurers. Now the Arctic is absorbing a wave of energy company explorers eager to deploy new undersea drilling technologies to tap into vast oil and natural gas deposits thought to be among the largest on the planet.

At the same time, warming temperatures over the past decade have accelerated the melting of sea ice, unlocking the fabled Northwest Passage and other Arctic sea routes for the first time in modern history. This game-changing development has the potential to transform the global shipping industry by slashing distances and costs for ocean-borne cargo moving from Europe to Asia.

Lost amidst these sea changes has been the emergence of another potential source of new economic activity in the region - commercial fishing.

Beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zones extending off the northern coastlines of the five Arctic nations (Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, and the U.S.) lies a "donut hole"-- a massive, ungoverned maritime no-man's land that sits at the heart of the Arctic north, beyond international boundaries. It has been covered by ice for centuries.

Now that warming trends are reducing sea ice coverage to unprecedented levels, the region is theoretically accessible by boat in warmer months. In September 2007, for instance, a record 40 percent of central Arctic Ocean waters in the donut hole stayed ice-free.

The region's newfound accessibility raises the prospect of commercial fishing in these waters, with potentially dangerous implications for the region's delicate ecological balance if the practice is unregulated.

The local fish populations' potential inability to withstand commercial exploitation has raised red flags from the international scientific community. The concern is not unwarranted. During the late 20^th century a similar region of ungoverned international maritime space became ice-free in the Bering Sea, leading to such a rapid depletion of local pollack populations that a 1994 treaty was signed to impose more sustainable management policies to prevent the fish stocks' collapse. 

In U.S. Arctic territorial waters off the Alaskan coast, research has revealed most fish stocks in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas are not large enough to sustain commercial exploitation. For local marine species numerous enough to support commercial fishing exploitation (snow crab, Arctic cod, saffron cod), American scientists have said more data must be collected to implement an ecosystem-based approach to sustainable fisheries management and set appropriate catch limits for these species.

However, highlighting the sensitivity of the region's maritime ecosystems, it is likely that fishing Arctic cod and saffron cod will remain banned in U.S. Arctic waters because both species serve a key role in the local food chain, constituting a vital food supply for larger marine predators and birds.

While the U.S. has the enforcement capacity to help ensure these quotas are observed in its territorial waters, the same regulatory infrastructure does not exist in the Arctic's international waters beyond the reach of exclusive economic zones. Further complicating the future of commercial fishing in the High Arctic is confusion over which nation controls what areas.

Perhaps the only thing that seems certain is that these waters will stay increasingly ice-free in the years and decades to come. The U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center says the 2013 maximum extent for sea ice coverage ranks as the sixth lowest in satellite records. The 10 lowest maximums in ice coverage in the satellite record occurred in the last 10 years (2004-2013). According to several recent studies, climate model projections indicate that this trend will continue, potentially leading to an ice-free Arctic Ocean in summers in about the year 2035.

In response, the global scientific community is urging caution and patience in the region's newly accessible fishing grounds. Upwards of 2,000 scientists from more than 65 countries recently authored an open letter highlighting the urgent need for an international pact to protect the High Arctic from unsustainable rates of exploitation, to help avoid a repeat of the Bering Sea debacle.

In a position consistent with U.S. policy in Alaskan territorial waters, scientists have essentially suggested a moratorium on new, large-scale commercial fishing until further biological data can be collected on newly accessible fish stocks to gauge their health and potential to withstand both commercial harvesting and rising ocean temperatures. At the same time, the rights of local fisherman in Arctic would be protected under such a moratorium to ensure continuation of their traditional economic livelihoods and guarantee access to an important dietary staple for the region's indigenous populations.

Taking the time to let science determine how much fish can be taken from the Arctic without endangering future catches is the only sensible course. Letting fishing fleets destroy fish populations today is shortsighted and could destroy the potential of the Arctic to provide sustainable fish harvests deep into the 21^st century.

At the political level, Iraq is today a flawed but functioning multiparty hybrid presidential/parliamentary system. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is the dominant actor, and has worked relentlessly - some would say ruthlessly - to consolidate his power to advance his vision of the reconstruction of Iraq and to ensure the continued power of the Shia majority community. He has minimally accepted the checks and balances implicit in the current system, but few believe the constitution is the guide for the rough and tumble of Iraqi politics these days. Maliki's style of co-opting select Sunnis but discrediting and undermining any significant Sunni political bloc has set back prospects for any lasting reconciliation between Sunni and Shia in the country.

The relations between Maliki's Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government led by President Massoud Barzani are also fraught because of a number of issues. These include disputed territories on the Arab-Kurdish frontlines, the Kurds' assertiveness in oil exploration and production deals, and the development of a quasi-independent Kurdish foreign policy, vis a vis Turkey in particular. In recent budget deliberations, Prime Minister Maliki reduced the Kurdish share of income based on oil production, apparently revising the complicated formula by which the KRG submits its oil revenue to the national government and receives payments allocated on a population ratio basis in return. This early March maneuver was an assertion of primacy by Maliki over the Kurds, but could have long-term consequences if it sharpens Kurdish thinking about the desirability of breaking free from Iraq at some point.

Iraq's oil wealth provides robust resources for national development in the KRG and the rest of Iraq.  As a result, reconstruction of the country's infrastructure, rebuilding of research and academic institutions and investment in new economic enterprises can proceed with less dependence on foreign aid than in most post-conflict states. But slow decision-making, poor contracting procedures and endemic corruption have seriously constrained the progress that could have been made by now. The last report of the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, released in March 2013, detailed the many shortcomings of American reconstruction efforts (valued at over $60 billion in U.S. funds and billions more in Iraqi funds). The report found a lack of early buy-in from Iraqis, a lack of attention to capacity building for Iraqis to sustain the effort, and very weak Iraqi oversight of financial transactions that enable corruption.  The bottom line is an American legacy that has created resentment and only modest enduring achievements, and an Iraq that needs more time to develop more transparent and efficient economic policies.

U.S.-Iraq relations are a pale shadow of what they were even five years ago, and part of that shift is by design. The removal of American forces from Iraq was planned and mutually agreed, and had the salutary effect of reducing at least one of the sources of violence and instability in the country. Shia insurgents were able to lay down their arms once the occupation ended; Sunni areas still harbor groups of extremists whose grievances are now directed at Baghdad, not foreign forces. But the policy activities outlined in the Strategic Framework Agreement of 2008 are only partly in play. The U.S. government was not able to sustain the intense level of cooperation envisioned (in areas such as energy, education, health, environment, information technology, etc.) and Iraq's political structures were not up to the task of frequent ministerial exchanges. More effort will be needed to make real the commitment to a robust civilian relationship.  While some believe US policy has developed a pro-Maliki tilt (at the expense of the Sunnis and the KRG), there are new and enduring frictions in the bilateral relationship with respect to Iraq's ties to Iran and Syria, as Secretary Kerry pointed out in his recent visit. 

As for Iraq's reintegration in the neighborhood, it too is a work in progress. Iraq's response to the crisis in Syria has only reinforced the mistrust that major Gulf Arabs have had about a Shia-led government in Baghdad since 2003. Maliki has viewed the Syrian crisis through a sectarian lens. He has kept solidarity with the Assad regime, even though the Syrian government helped feed  the violence in Iraq from  2004  and even though Sunnis and Kurds see their interests aligned with the Syrian opposition. Iraq's return to the Arab League is a formality. More productive relations with its Arab neighbors will take time and may take a more careful modulation of Iraq's relations with Tehran.

Despite the long list of challenges, there are quiet signs of normalcy in many parts of the country. New universities are being established, Iraqis are travelling to rebuild their professional credentials, and joint ventures with Turkey and Iran are creating economic opportunities and improving the quality of life.  It is true that many fewer Iraqis live in ethnically or religiously mixed communities, but some cross-communal bridge-building is happening the north, and in the disputed areas.  Even the environmental degradation of Iraq's natural habitat is being reversed by Iraqi scientists. The ongoing restoration of the marshes in southern Iraq is a fitting metaphor for Iraq's near future; lingering sadness at the destruction caused by the old regime, but quiet hope for the slow return of a once proud and beautiful part of the country's patrimony.   

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Photo credit: US Army Corps of Engineers Digital Visual Library via Wikimedia Commons

"We thank the MacArthur Foundation for one of the largest gifts in Stimson's 24-year history and greatly appreciate its vote of confidence in our work," Bloomfield said. "While the award focuses on our work on the environment and security, it's really a recognition of Stimson's many contributions and the important work of all our scholars."    

"This award will sustain Stimson into the future and strengthen our capacity to develop fresh ideas that have a real impact on peace and security," Laipson said. "We will be able to attract more great talent and do more to advance innovative solutions that are based on pragmatic ideas rather than partisan ideology."

Laipson also announced that to celebrate the MacArthur Foundation award, Stimson will host a new discussion series beginning in several weeks to bring together experts who will illuminate the diverse connections between environmental challenges and a wide range of security issues.

Because the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development are mischaracterized as non-security agencies under sequester - despite their central role in U.S. foreign policy - the sequester will cut U.S. international affairs funding by 5 percent this year.

Five percent is a significant chunk of money - almost $3 billion - but the State Department and USAID have said the cut will not force them to furlough their employees. While obviously a good thing, such a policy emphasizes that the bulk of the State Department's and USAID's funding does not go to their most important resource: their people.
 
We conducted a study last year that found direct U.S. employee personnel costs made up only 31 percent of the State Department's operating budget. USAID non-program funded personnel costs were only 37 percent of its operating budget. Operating budgets pay for the day-to-day running of the agencies.
 
Together, both agencies' personnel costs are only 8 percent of the total U.S. international affairs spending. The sequester will not force furloughs because people are such a small part of the spending on international affairs.
 
Our study, titled "Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity," argued that this spending on personnel costs flipped the relationship of what was important in conducting international affairs; that even though they are a small part of the budget, the people who conduct U.S. diplomacy and development are the most important foreign policy asset.
 
While our study acknowledged the growth in personnel at both the State Department and USAID over the last few years, it found that that growth did not achieve the real needs identified years ago - needs that have only been complicated by a constantly changing world. And so the report argued that the United States needs to continue to grow foreign policy personnel numbers even as the budget crisis rages.
 
Today sequester is not only preventing this growth but reversing it. Although the State Department and USAID will not furlough employees, the sequester will force them to slow hiring and leave positions empty, over time eroding the size of America's existing diplomatic and development workforce.
 
Sequester will also affect training, a key recommendation of the study. Just having more people is not enough. The U.S. needs to give foreign policy personnel not just basic training but advanced training that makes them more effective across all areas of foreign policy. As with the number of people, such training is something the State Department has always needed more of. Sequester both emphasizes how few resources are dedicated to this problem and exacerbates it by cutting what resources are available.
 
It is also troubling that the public has heard so little from the State Department about the dire effects of the sequester. State Department officials are often afraid - unlike their counterparts in the Pentagon - to note that their job will be harder when they receive less money. Diplomats fear bringing attention to their politically weak agency and inspiring greater cuts.
 
To his credit, Secretary of State John Kerry has come out strongly for adequate funding for the State Department and USAID. Instead of shying away from budget questions, he used a recent appearance at the University of Virginia to make a strong argument for why this funding is needed to protect American national security and achieve national interests by ensuring that the United States has the right men and women in adequate numbers to implement foreign policy.
 
Instead of waiting for the next time U.S. foreign policy comes up short and then investigating what went wrong, Congress and the Obama administration should have a frank conversation about the funding that America needs and how best to spend that funding to develop and implement a smart and effective foreign policy. We believe our report starts that conversation by emphasizing the people who do that.
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Former Ambassador Boyatt is chairman of the "Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity" project, former Ambassador Neumann is president of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and Russell Rumbaugh is a senior associate at the Stimson Center. 

This piece was first published in The Hill.

Photo credit: World Bank Photo Collection via Flickr

Jordan's recent elections ushered into power various tribal coalitions and independent businessmen, groups considered loyal to King Abdullah II and likely to resist substantive reform. While the level of youth participation--and active boycott--is unknown, skepticism towards state-led reform abounds among many young Jordanians. Instead, concerns about their own economic livelihood remain a top focus.

The country's myriad economic challenges underscore these concerns. Similar to other Middle East states, Jordan's official youth unemployment rate hovers around 30 percent, more than double the national rate of 12 percent. However, unofficial estimates place both numbers much higher. In addition, Jordan's weak economy and tribal patronage system have encouraged an acutely bloated public sector, even by regional standards. The IMF estimates the public sector accounts for 35 percent of total employment in Jordan--on par with Egypt, a country nearly 14 times its population size. Jordan's unemployment rate also continues to rise as fewer young Jordanians are able to find jobs in the Gulf. Its aid-dependent budget and ongoing energy crisis create regular annual deficits. Continue...

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This article was first published by the Diplomatic Courier.

Photo credit: Isamb via Flickr

Yet while prospective water supply clashes increasingly exercise policy imaginations on both sides of the border, water quality rather than water scarcity now poses by far the greater risk to the lives and welfare of Indians and Pakistanis living on the Indus. Agriculture, industry, mining, and other activities increasingly load surface and groundwater resources with synthetic chemicals, fertilizers, pesticides, toxic metals, and microbial pathogens that endanger human health and imperil vital ecosystems. According to the United Nations Environmental Programme, some 55 cubic kilometers (km³) of wastewater are dumped into the Indus every year. By way of comparison, the average annual flow of the entire river amounts to 187 km³.

Agriculture accounts for most water pollution in both the Indian and Pakistani portions of the Indus. Ever since the Green Revolution swept across South Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, fertilizers and pesticides have been widely used to enhance crop production. Although they can augment harvests, these chemical compounds also contaminate agricultural runoff, which pollutes adjacent waterways, seeps into groundwater stocks, and taints drinking water supplies for consumers and communities downstream. As India and Pakistan expand their agricultural output to feed growing populations in coming years, more agricultural effluents will drain into Indus water systems. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, as India boosts its crop production by some 50 percent by 2030, annual nitrogen loads in the country's wastewater will soar fivefold and phosphorous loading will more than triple over year 2000 levels.

Industrial pollution is similarly widespread. On the Indian side of the basin, a 2011 UN report named Haryana and Punjab as particular "hot-spot states" for water pollution stemming from power-generation, manufacturing, and other heavy industries. Available data on Pakistan suggest that 99 percent of industrial sewage is discharged into streams and canals untreated. Industrial water use also upsets the Indus Basin's environmental health. In both India and Pakistan, energy producers withdraw large volumes of water to cool power plants; this water is often returned to the basin's waterways at high temperatures, disturbing riverine ecosystems and disrupting freshwater fisheries.

Municipal wastewater constitutes the third principal source of pollution in the Indus. Often characterized by alarming levels of bacterial contamination, raw municipal sewage is a primary driver of waterborne illnesses - such as diarrhea, typhoid, intestinal worms, and hepatitis - in downstream populations. Little of the basin's municipal effluents are properly treated. In Indian cities of 50,000 to 1 million people, wastewater facilities can handle less than one-third of the sewage generated daily. In Pakistan, more than 90 percent of municipal wastewater goes untreated. With urban populations projected to swell 62 percent in India and 83 percent in Pakistan by 2030, cities' poorly maintained water delivery systems will face further strain, while overburdened wastewater facilities will be pushed far past their capacity.

The consequences of pervasive water pollution for Indian and Pakistani societies are dire. In India, a national water and sanitation survey conducted by the Ministry of Urban Development judged not a single city "healthy," while nearly half were deemed on the brink of public health emergency. In Pakistan, a five-year nationwide study found water quality fell below recommended standards for human consumption in 76-96 percent of the samples tested across the country. All told, water pollution and inadequate sanitation costs Pakistan USD$5.7 billion annually in health damages, productivity losses, and work and school absences, a sum equivalent to 3.9 percent of GDP. Similarly, inadequate sanitation costs India USD$53.8 billion annually, representing 6.4 percent of GDP. More troubling than the economic impacts is the human toll. Water-borne diseases account for 20 to 40 percent of all hospital patients and one-third of all deaths in Pakistan, including an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Pakistani children who perish from diarrhea and other water-related illnesses each year. In India, unsafe water and inadequate sanitation cause 10 percent of all deaths, including more than 30 percent of deaths among children under five. Diarrhea alone killed 395,000 Indian children in 2006.¹  

Water quality in the Indus Basin represents a shared challenge for the riparians. Though Pakistan lies largely downstream from India, the Indus forms the border between the two countries for more than 100 miles - via its tributaries, the Ravi and the Sutlej - such that pollution from each country impacts the other. So too, shared surface water sources partially overlap hydrologically with shared groundwater aquifers in the Indus system, such that pollution in one water supply may potentially contaminate the other. Indeed, the myriad pressures on water quality in the basin ultimately interact with strains on water quantities. Decreasing water quality can lower effectively available water supplies, as some sources become too degraded for certain uses. Extreme industrial pollution, for example, can render water supplies unsuitable for drinking, irrigation, and even for other industrial uses. Likewise, as withdrawals from the Indus increase, diminishing water quantities boost the concentration of any pollutants present, further eroding water quality.

Despite the importance to water users of water quality as well as quantity, water relations between India and Pakistan have largely focused on regulating the river flows that reach the two countries. The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty physically divides the river between the two nations, allotting use of the three eastern tributaries to India and the three western tributaries to Pakistan. The agreement addresses water quality in a single hortatory passage pledging the parties' intent to prevent undue pollution "as far as practicable," foregoing any more specific or more binding stipulations. Yet both countries could benefit from greater collaboration in tackling their common water quality problems. Water managers across the basin face similar risks from agricultural wastewater, municipal sewage, and industrial effluents. Enhanced monitoring and data exchange would substantially increase their ability to apprehend the nature and extent of these challenges. By the same token, sharing policy lessons and technical advances in water treatment, re-use, and recycling, would combat the spread of pollution by spreading innovations and best practices. Greater cooperation can help India and Pakistan ensure that all their citizens enjoy safe and sustainable water supplies from the Indus.   

¹ Water and Sanitation Program, The Economic Impacts of Inadequate Sanitation in India (New Delhi: Water and Sanitation Program, 2011); Water and Sanitation Program, The Economic Impacts of Inadequate Sanitation in Pakistan (Islamabad: Water and Sanitation Program, 2012).

Photo: A public tap in Lahore, Pakistan, courtesy of Flickr user Saad Sarfraz Sheikh.

The $85 billion-plus annual global trade in conventional weapons is relatively unregulated today. For decades, states have tried to close the dangerous loopholes that have allowed arms to flow to human rights abusers and terrorists, perpetuate conflicts, and undermine long- term prospects for growth and development. The Arms Trade Treaty, while clearly not a panacea, would try to establish rules of the game and develop a framework for national export control systems. It would not impact an individual citizen's right to bear arms but, rather, control the flow of dangerous weapons across national boundaries.

The ATT is intended to develop common international standards for the global trade in conventional arms in order to curb the irresponsible and illegal trade and prevent diversion of legal arms sales into the illicit market. Establishing a global arms trade framework would potentially help reduce human suffering that often results from the illegal and irresponsible trade in conventional arms. The impact of an ATT would not be seen immediately, as it would take time for states to develop and enhance national export control systems and begin to incorporate the new norms created under an ATT for when arms sales are ill-advised or prohibited. But in the long run, it would make governments behave in more thoughtfully and deliberately in both their sale and purchase of conventional weaponry.

Starting this week, states will have less than two weeks to finalize a treaty text. The short time means that not every issue in the treaty will be reopened and states will have to decide what issues are most important to "fix" in the existing draft text. The most contentious issues include: the scope of the treaty, particularly the inclusion of ammunition; the types of prohibited arms transfers; and the level of transparency of state exports and imports of conventional arms.

The United State is responsible for 77 percent of the global arms trade and has the "gold standard" when it comes to national export controls and regulations. An ATT would be less meaningful without the United States on board. But U.S. support for an ATT has been lukewarm at best. Although the United States had voted against the ATT process during the George W. Bush administration, the Obama administration has voted in favor of the UN Treaty negotiations and has supported the development of the ATT within certain constraints.  Many UN member states blame the United States for the failure of an agreement in July 2012, but the United States has stated that it is committed to a strong ATT that is implementable and can be signed and ratified by the Congress.

The United States, which produces more than 7 billion rounds of ammunition a year, has also resisted efforts to include ammunition in the ATT, much to the disappointment of some of its closest allies. The U.S. position is based on the belief that including ammunition is impractical and would make no real difference to halting the human suffering caused by the irresponsible trade in arms. However, the United States claims it is open to ideas on specific means by which such a consumable commodity could be effectively and practically accounted for and that would result in a degree of real control consistent with the goals of the treaty.

An ATT would likely not stop Russian arms sales to Syria tomorrow or five years from now. But an ATT would provide another tool to pressure Russia to stop arming Syrian President Bashar Assad's bloody regime. An ATT would make it more difficult for Russia to justify Syrian arms sales, or any state to sell arms when it is clear that the arms would be used for repression and human rights abuses. Finally, an ATT could provide a comprehensive transparency regime to identify potentially troubling arms sales and to keep pressure on those countries operating outside treaty standards.

John Kerry, when a senator, championed a U.S. Code of Conduct on Arms Transfer, which called on the United States to negotiate an international regime to "promote global transparency with respect to arms transfers, including participation by countries in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." The proposed code of conduct would also "limit, restrict, or prohibit arms transfers to countries that do not observe certain fundamental values of human liberty, peace, and international stability."  These are the very values at the core of an ATT. The next two weeks will provide Secretary of State Kerry with a fleeting opportunity to turn this rhetoric into reality. As the Obama administration works to respond to the growing epidemic of armed violence in our own country, it is time for Washington to think beyond borders and address the growing scourge of weapons proliferation around the globe.

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Photo credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe 

By 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces from today's roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.

Such a crisp figure clearly symbolizes the firmness of U.S. commitments to allies like Japan and South Korea as well as to potential adversaries like China and North Korea. Still, questions persist about whether the details live up to their billing. Unpacking this statistic is one way to measure the pivot's progress, yet it also makes the message a bit more complicated. Indeed, the Pentagon may emphasize this ratio for its signaling power rather than as a precise statement of fact.

Unlike strategy, ships are countable - even if imperfectly. One limitation, inherent in this exercise, is that simple counts treat carriers the same as frigates, submarines the same as destroyers, and so forth, despite ships' very different capabilities and symbolic values. There also are methodology challenges. Ships could be "in the Pacific" based on their present physical location, the geographic combatant commander under whose operational control they fall, or their home port. Meanwhile ships routinely are commissioned and retired, changing the balance within fleets and across the Navy.

Still snapshots of the fleet are readily doable, and home ports provide an accessible, stable, and reasonable metric.

One part of Panetta's remark is the division of specific ships. A majority of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines are supposed to be in the Pacific, and that is already true. Only five of America's 10 aircraft carriers have a Pacific home port, but fielding the USS Gerald Ford in 2015 could make six possible. Meanwhile, Littoral Combat Ships are a special case because only three of 20 have been commissioned to date, yet each of those three has San Diego as its permanent station.

This part of the plan was nearly done as soon as Panetta announced it, and adding the Ford could achieve it.The other part is shifting naval forces so that 60 percent are in the Pacific. Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter explained last July at least one way that the Pentagon will make that happen:

As Secretary Panetta said, we intend to have 60 percent - historic high - of our naval assets based in the Pacific by 2020, a substantial historical shift. We will have a net increase of one aircraft carrier, four destroyers, three Zumwalt destroyers, ten Littoral Combat Ships, and two submarines in the Pacific in the coming years.

By addressing a "net increase," Carter seems to be referring to new generations being procured. This almost certainly is the case with Ford carriers and Zumwalt destroyers, which are not yet fielded, and Littoral Combat Ships, of which only three of 20 have been commissioned so far. The same likely goes for Virginia submarines, of which six are presently under construction, and even the four Arleigh Burke destroyers presently in the yard.

Here's where unpacking the Pacific fraction gets really complicated. Each new ship will increase the numerator but possibly also the denominator. Ships that join the fleet without another retiring will have a smaller impact than outright shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Determining whether the additions favor the Pacific sufficiently to cross the 60 percent threshold would require knowing the construction schedules and homeporting decisions for everything in the acquisition pipeline through 2020, as well as the retirement details for everything leaving service at the same time.

Of course, these factors are largely in the Pentagon's control, even if the budgets have become less certain.* It may well be on pace to reach 60 percent. Fifty-six percent of carriers, cruisers, destroyers, LCS', and submarines - the classes Panetta and Carter named - already are in the Pacific (94 out of 169). Panetta seemed to leave open the possibility of including other classes as well. If amphibious ships, mine clearers, and frigates also are tallied, the ratio stays at 56 percent but the count grows to 239, providing a wider range of hulls that could contribute to the shift. Observers like retired Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt have noted that relatively few ships have to move in order to cross this threshold.

Treating very distinct ships as equivalent is necessary to build this fraction. Doing so provides the Pentagon with a real benefit, but it comes at a cost.

Tying the rebalance to a ratio of naval presence neglects the capability implications of these changes. Adding an aircraft carrier, two submarines, and seven destroyers in the Pacific is powerful irrespective of the ratio. Counting them in the same way as a frigate or Littoral Combat Ship masks some huge differences in how they can be used.

On the other hand, a significant part of rebalancing to Asia is about reassuring allies and indicating to China that this region will remain a priority even as the defense budget declines. As a rhetorical device the 60/40 balance is a clear symbol, serving the goals of deterrence and reassurance well enough that imprecision on the margins may be an affordable liability. Honing that signal may be on the Pentagon's mind more than the math, budgetary or force structure, associated with this shift.

*Budget uncertainty exists on a number of fronts, but sequester is likely the most prominent. In 2013 the cut will be applied across the board, including within the shipbuilding and operations account. That will create some turbulence, but it will be temporary because, from 2014 onward, the Navy will be able to choose how to accommodate the sequester reduction. If that savings comes from shipbuilding or operations requirements associated with the pivot to Asia, that will be the Navy's choice rather than a necessary impact of sequester.

Methodology Notes

Source: Navy Online Fact Files, as of March 6, 2013

Fielded fleets included in the Navy fact files but excluded from this analysis are Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles; Large Scale Vehicle Cutthroat; the USS Constitution; Fast Sea Frame Sea Fighter; Landing Craft - Air Cushioned; Landing Craft, Mechanized and Utility; Patrol Coastal Ships; Mark V Special Operations Craft; Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats, Submarine Tenders; and Yard Patrol Craft.

Four Mine Countermeasures Ships are home ported in Bahrain. They are counted as "not Pacific."

Photo Credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/specmode/3884164512/in/set-72157620593987858/

The government of Laos took many observers by surprise when it abruptly announced its decision in November 2012 to go ahead with the highly controversial Xayaburi dam project on the Mekong mainstream in northern Laos. The Lao government had agreed the previous year to suspend for an indefinite period the construction by the Thai developer of the 32 meter high dam to allow further study of its impact on the river.

The project has been strongly opposed by the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia, along with a wide range of regional civil society activists and international organizations. Project opponents are concerned about the serious negative local and transboundary impacts of mainstream dams on the environment, human security and regional relations. 

In late January my colleague Zach Dubel and I took a scenic eight-hour, 100-mile (150 km) boat trip upriver from Luang Prabang to Pak Beng, a small town near the next planned Lao mainstream dam.  

China's construction of a massive cascade of seven or eight large- to mega-sized dams in China's Yunnan Province and plans for up to 12 dams on the Lao, Lao-Thai and Cambodian stretches of the Mekong will change the river from wild and free-flowing into a series of slow moving lakes reaching far upstream.   The anticipation of such dramatic changes has created a "see it before it's gone" situation.

Because of the 30-foot or more seasonal difference in the height of the river in northern Laos between the wettest and driest months, the iconic long shovel-like bows of these traditional Lao craft  (see photo) with their steel hulls and wooden superstructures are ideally suited for beaching, regardless of water level.  

The construction of some mainstream dams (starting with Xayaburi) seems inevitable because of the strong desire of the Lao government to develop the country's large hydroelectric power potential for export earnings, the influence of foreign developers who offer relatively "cost-free" build-own-operate and transfer projects, significant demand from Thailand's state-owned electric generating authority, and ample investment capital.

In the worst-case scenario, the Lao government will decide not to invoke the Mekong River Commission's procedures for a six-month period for notification, prior consultation and agreement, or it will allow the six-month process but ignore the findings and recommendations of the accompanying Mekong River Commission's expert prior consultation review report.   

Cambodia will also view Laos' decision as sharply reducing the environmental and socioeconomic value of its stretches of the Mekong, in particular the rich fisheries of the Tonle Sap.  This worst-case scenario has the potential to create domestic instability and fissures in regional relations, and undermine the Mekong River Commission's goal of cooperative, science-based decision-making. 

Current plans for mainstream dams involve a half-dozen different foreign developers, including Thai (3 companies), Chinese (3 companies), Vietnamese and Malaysian. The resultant dam construction will be uncoordinated and chaotic.  Because neither Laos nor Cambodia has the human or institutional capacity to carry out the necessary planning, coordination and oversight capacity, the result will likely be even more damage to the river's natural hydrology and ecology than is necessary.

The most optimistic scenario would involve significantly fewer than the nine planned or proposed mainstream dams in Laos. Any dams Laos decided to build would be confined to northern Laos, above the capital of Vientiane. The six Lao and Lao-Thai dams planned for southern Laos and two for Cambodia, all of which would be more damaging to wild fisheries by several orders of magnitude, would be dropped or deferred indefinitely.  

Mekong Standard

The best realistic outcome would involve a commitment by all four Lower Mekong Basin countries to share the risks and benefits of additional mainstream hydropower development within the framework of a stronger and more effective Mekong River Commission, along with an agreed Mekong Standard for a maximum acceptable level of risk.   It would involve the agreement of all Mekong River Commission countries on a maximum limit on adverse transboundary impacts on fisheries, livelihoods, water quality and silt flows. 

Linking the Mekong Standard to proposals for strengthening of the six-month period for notification, prior consultation and agreement process would underscore continuity with a 1995 agreement, which already provides that the impact of infrastructure projects should not cause changes that exceed certain minimum and maximum seasonal flows in and out of the Tonle Sap.  Enhanced standards would not guarantee the best decisions, but a reasonable understanding of the transboundary distribution of costs and benefits is essential to the continued viability of the river's core ecosystems and the Mekong Delta. 

This best-case scenario would not be "sustainable" in the classic environmental sense, but would feature defensible tradeoffs based on risks that would be calculated on a full-scope analysis of the costs and benefits.

Photo Credit: Rich Cronin