In international negotiations, while the interests and will of the States engaged in the process guide the outcome, the people in the room matter. Stimson brought together some of the original stakeholders involved in the ATT process, including diplomats and civil society researchers and advocates, a decade after its adoption to provide reflections on the ATT’s past decade and key insights into the treaty’s current impact and future trajectory.
Read all the commentaries and the report on the ATT at 10 webpage.
Looking back at the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), what stands out most to me is its uniqueness. It is a hybrid treaty combining trade regulation with national/international security concerns, driven by humanitarian concerns. It was negotiated at the United Nations and the UN Secretary General is the depositary, but it is not part of the UN system. It was negotiated on the basis of consensus during a time of multilateral gridlock. Although it was negotiated by UN Member States, representatives from civil society and industry played important roles in its negotiation, and it reflects a balance between the interests of stakeholders involved in the exporting, importing, transit, and transshipment of arms. The treaty is aspirational in its object and purpose, but its provisions are grounded in reality.
The story of the ATT to date has been like the voyage of Odysseus – it has been navigating between the Scylla of what is possible and the Charybdis of what is essential, while listening to the Sirens’ call of what is desirable. Work to date in the first ten Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) has focused on navigating between Scylla and Charybdis as the CSPs did the necessary work of building out the infrastructure for the international operation of the Treaty – setting up the CSPs and its subsidiary bodies, establishing the Secretariat, agreeing to financial rules, creating the Voluntary Trust fund, putting in place the mechanism for reporting, and so forth. While not particularly sexy or uplifting, this work was necessary for establishing the Treaty. That work has been completed, and it is now time to take the wax out of our ears and listen to the Sirens as we pivot to having the Treaty operate effectively in practice.
One ongoing challenge facing the Treaty in practice is the need to increase its membership to increase its effectiveness. The Treaty needs to include all the States involved the arms trade, not just the like-minded ones. Outreach efforts to date have largely focused on trying to pick the low-hanging fruit of States that are potentially sympathetic to joining the Treaty. We need to extend our outreach and go after the fruit higher up the tree – the block of countries that participated in the negotiations but have isolated themselves completely from the Treaty. These countries abstain on the annual ATT resolution at the UN, do not attend meetings of the formal ATT process, and show no interest in joining the Treaty. They are located mainly in Asia and the Middle East, and they include some of the countries most active in the arms trade. We cannot afford to just write them off. They were active in the negotiation, and the Treaty reflects their participation. We need to find a way reengage them and sell them on the Treaty.
In addition to outreach to States outside the Treaty, we need to do “inreach” to States that are party to the Treaty but are not fully complying with its provisions. For the Treaty to be effective, State Parties need to more than just join the Treaty – they need to comply with their obligations and actually implement the Treaty’s provisions. There is an internal logic to the Treaty that makes its whole greater than the sum of its parts, and the State Parties that only selectively implement their obligations risk undermining the Treaty as a whole.
The Treaty is structured around national implementation of international obligations. By design, it does not include a verification regime. Instead, State Parties demonstrate how they are complying with their obligations by submitting an initial report detailing their national control system and annual reports on transfers that demonstrate how they are interpreting the Treaty. Failing to submit these reports raises question about how these States are interpreting and applying the Treaty. When these reports are submitted, they need to be made public to maximize their usefulness. Keeping this information private, admittedly as the Treaty permits, undermines the ability of the broader international community to judge compliance with the Treaty and have confidence that the Treaty is achieving its object and purpose.
Another challenge is the failure of some States to pay their financial obligations to the Treaty; these contributions fund the operation of the Treaty and ongoing financial problems risk corroding the Treaty from the inside. If the Treaty is important enough to a State for it to become a State Party, it should be important enough for that State to pay its financial obligations.
Now that the CSPs and its subsidiary bodies (the Working Groups on Effective Treaty Implementation, Transparency and Reporting, and Treaty Universalization and the Diversion Information Exchange Forum) have been running for several years, it is appropriate to consider if their discussions adequately address the concerns that led to the Treaty in the first place. The subsidiary bodies have been effective in generating reports that unpack different aspects of the Treaty to assist States Parties in implementing the Treaty, but they have largely failed to address broader issues related to the impact of the Treaty – how are State Parties complying with the Treaty? What effect has the Treaty had on the international arms trade? Is the Treaty living up to its object and purpose?
These are not simple issues and discussing them will not be easy – but this discussion is needed to create a virtuous cycle that will help reinvigorate the Treaty and aid in outreach efforts to universalize the Treaty. To use another analogy, avoiding these discussions risks turning the Treaty into a self-licking ice cream that keeps working on its object and does not allow the broader international community to taste the benefits of States Parties striving to fully realize its purpose.
William B. Malzahn, Deputy Head of Delegation (2008-2013), Department of State, United States of America
The Arms Trade Treaty & Its Future
By William B. Malzahn
Conventional Arms
In international negotiations, while the interests and will of the States engaged in the process guide the outcome, the people in the room matter. Stimson brought together some of the original stakeholders involved in the ATT process, including diplomats and civil society researchers and advocates, a decade after its adoption to provide reflections on the ATT’s past decade and key insights into the treaty’s current impact and future trajectory.
Read all the commentaries and the report on the ATT at 10 webpage.
Looking back at the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), what stands out most to me is its uniqueness. It is a hybrid treaty combining trade regulation with national/international security concerns, driven by humanitarian concerns. It was negotiated at the United Nations and the UN Secretary General is the depositary, but it is not part of the UN system. It was negotiated on the basis of consensus during a time of multilateral gridlock. Although it was negotiated by UN Member States, representatives from civil society and industry played important roles in its negotiation, and it reflects a balance between the interests of stakeholders involved in the exporting, importing, transit, and transshipment of arms. The treaty is aspirational in its object and purpose, but its provisions are grounded in reality.
The story of the ATT to date has been like the voyage of Odysseus – it has been navigating between the Scylla of what is possible and the Charybdis of what is essential, while listening to the Sirens’ call of what is desirable. Work to date in the first ten Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) has focused on navigating between Scylla and Charybdis as the CSPs did the necessary work of building out the infrastructure for the international operation of the Treaty – setting up the CSPs and its subsidiary bodies, establishing the Secretariat, agreeing to financial rules, creating the Voluntary Trust fund, putting in place the mechanism for reporting, and so forth. While not particularly sexy or uplifting, this work was necessary for establishing the Treaty. That work has been completed, and it is now time to take the wax out of our ears and listen to the Sirens as we pivot to having the Treaty operate effectively in practice.
One ongoing challenge facing the Treaty in practice is the need to increase its membership to increase its effectiveness. The Treaty needs to include all the States involved the arms trade, not just the like-minded ones. Outreach efforts to date have largely focused on trying to pick the low-hanging fruit of States that are potentially sympathetic to joining the Treaty. We need to extend our outreach and go after the fruit higher up the tree – the block of countries that participated in the negotiations but have isolated themselves completely from the Treaty. These countries abstain on the annual ATT resolution at the UN, do not attend meetings of the formal ATT process, and show no interest in joining the Treaty. They are located mainly in Asia and the Middle East, and they include some of the countries most active in the arms trade. We cannot afford to just write them off. They were active in the negotiation, and the Treaty reflects their participation. We need to find a way reengage them and sell them on the Treaty.
In addition to outreach to States outside the Treaty, we need to do “inreach” to States that are party to the Treaty but are not fully complying with its provisions. For the Treaty to be effective, State Parties need to more than just join the Treaty – they need to comply with their obligations and actually implement the Treaty’s provisions. There is an internal logic to the Treaty that makes its whole greater than the sum of its parts, and the State Parties that only selectively implement their obligations risk undermining the Treaty as a whole.
The Treaty is structured around national implementation of international obligations. By design, it does not include a verification regime. Instead, State Parties demonstrate how they are complying with their obligations by submitting an initial report detailing their national control system and annual reports on transfers that demonstrate how they are interpreting the Treaty. Failing to submit these reports raises question about how these States are interpreting and applying the Treaty. When these reports are submitted, they need to be made public to maximize their usefulness. Keeping this information private, admittedly as the Treaty permits, undermines the ability of the broader international community to judge compliance with the Treaty and have confidence that the Treaty is achieving its object and purpose.
Another challenge is the failure of some States to pay their financial obligations to the Treaty; these contributions fund the operation of the Treaty and ongoing financial problems risk corroding the Treaty from the inside. If the Treaty is important enough to a State for it to become a State Party, it should be important enough for that State to pay its financial obligations.
Now that the CSPs and its subsidiary bodies (the Working Groups on Effective Treaty Implementation, Transparency and Reporting, and Treaty Universalization and the Diversion Information Exchange Forum) have been running for several years, it is appropriate to consider if their discussions adequately address the concerns that led to the Treaty in the first place. The subsidiary bodies have been effective in generating reports that unpack different aspects of the Treaty to assist States Parties in implementing the Treaty, but they have largely failed to address broader issues related to the impact of the Treaty – how are State Parties complying with the Treaty? What effect has the Treaty had on the international arms trade? Is the Treaty living up to its object and purpose?
These are not simple issues and discussing them will not be easy – but this discussion is needed to create a virtuous cycle that will help reinvigorate the Treaty and aid in outreach efforts to universalize the Treaty. To use another analogy, avoiding these discussions risks turning the Treaty into a self-licking ice cream that keeps working on its object and does not allow the broader international community to taste the benefits of States Parties striving to fully realize its purpose.
William B. Malzahn, Deputy Head of Delegation (2008-2013), Department of State, United States of America
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