Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Masoud Pezeshkian, a former health minister and parliamentarian who will soon be inaugurated as president of Iran, campaigned on promises to promote transparency in the political system, more social freedom, economic revival, and better relations with the West.
But in the days since Pezeshkian was chosen in a second-round vote that attracted only marginally more turnout than the first, indications are that he will be heavily circumscribed by the real power in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei will have a major say in how the new administration faces three critical dilemmas: the nuclear issue, the regional landscape after the conclusion of the Gaza war, and the Iranian economy.
First, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is on the brink of collapse, following the Trump administration’s withdrawal in 2018 and the failure to revive it under the Biden administration. Iran has limited time to act before facing potential repercussions such as snapback of UN sanctions before October 2025, when the UN resolution that enshrined the 2015 nuclear deal expires. The two European Security Council members that technically remain in the deal – Britain and France – are unlikely to tolerate major Iranian nuclear advances without invoking snapback. The possible return of Donald Trump as U.S. president in January 2025 could increase pressure to restore UN sanctions on Iran.
Second, the Gaza conflict appears to be coming to at least a temporary cessation which will have a broader impact on the Middle East. Several European countries have recognized the state of Palestine as part of their support for a two-state solution, contrasting with Iran’s advocacy for a single-Palestine approach in the region. The challenge for Iran lies not merely in policy adjustments, but in broader ideological shifts that would bring Iran into an international consensus and entail a diminution of support for militant anti-Israel groups.
The third but related challenge – improving the economy — is the most daunting and depends on the other two. Iran is plagued by soaring inflation, staggering unemployment, and a rapidly declining currency, worsened by persistent economic mismanagement and sanctions imposed by the U.S. Pezeshkian acknowledges that there can be no fundamental improvement without sanctions relief, which would likely require Iranian concessions both on the nuclear file and on support for militant regional partners.
Pezeshkian has suggested that he would engage in direct talks with the U.S. on the sanctions issue. The president-elect’s campaign manager even said Iran would be happy to negotiate with Donald
Trump should he return to the White House. “We will negotiate with Trump to lift the sanctions,” Ali Abdolali-Zadeh posted on social media. Trump “is a businessman, and we understand the language of trade well too.”
But Khamenei has opposed direct talks. He will make the key decisions, in conjunction with the Supreme National Security Council which the president chairs but does not control and which includes the heads of Iran’s powerful military branches. The president will then be obliged to implement these decisions.
Already, Pezeshkian has encountered hurdles directly orchestrated by Khamenei. For instance, the leader called Pezeshkian to his office immediately after the poll results were announced, forcing the president-elect to cancel a customary post-election press conference with Iranian and foreign media. Khamenei not only counseled Pezeshkian to “adhere to [Ebrahim] Raisi’s policies,”but followed up by meeting with the late president’s cabinet members to further laud Raisi, a rightwing ideologue who died in a helicopter crash in May.
Saeed Jalili, the hardliner defeated by Pezeshkian in the second round and Khamenei’s representative in the Supreme National Security Council, threatened to override the new president if he tried to alter current policies. Speaking to a group of his supporters, Jalili said he would present his plans and ideas to Pezeshkian and support the new president in implementing them. However, he also emphasized that “should we perceive any missteps on Pezeshkian’s part, we would utilize our full authority to intervene and prevent any such errors.”
These actions suggest that the challenges for Pezeshkian’s presidency have as much or more to do with navigating Khamenei’s influence as in addressing the three critical dilemmas.
Even under the weight of harsh economic sanctions, Iran has shown no inclination to make any significant compromises regarding its nuclear program or regional activities. Instead of capitulating to pressure, Iran has defiantly escalated its uranium enrichment levels, kept up its backing for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias, and tightened ties with Russia and China.
Addressing this shift in Iran’s foreign relations, including its regional strategies, is imperative for achieving sustainable peace in the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Gaza war carries profound implications for the future of the entire region, transcending the immediate humanitarian impact on the Palestinian populace.
The dispute has become a focal point for regional actors, who align themselves based on ideological, religious, or geopolitical considerations. Support for either the Palestinian cause or Israeli security interests can further polarize the region, exacerbating tensions among key players. In terms of Arab public opinion, recent opinion polls indicate that Iran has benefited from this polarization. But as long as the war continues, there is also the risk of a broader regional conflagration involving Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran itself.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s longstanding opposition to a two-state solution, coupled with the Islamic Republic’s provocative rhetoric calling for Israel’s elimination, has positioned Iran at odds with the international community. A de-escalation of the Gaza conflict and progress towards a peaceful resolution could prompt Iran to reassess its regional strategies and potentially pursue diplomatic engagement to safeguard its interests.
Pezeshkian, however, has so far dutifully echoed the official line, harshly criticizing Israel and expressing support for the “Axis of Resistance” of anti-Israel and anti-U.S. groups. While Iran’s support for proxy groups has been a means to exert influence in the region, it has also strained relations with neighboring states and intensified geopolitical rivalries. This undercuts Iran’s – and Pezeshkian’s — chances for success.
Early Signals After Iran’s Election Suggest More Continuity Than Change
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Masoud Pezeshkian, a former health minister and parliamentarian who will soon be inaugurated as president of Iran, campaigned on promises to promote transparency in the political system, more social freedom, economic revival, and better relations with the West.
But in the days since Pezeshkian was chosen in a second-round vote that attracted only marginally more turnout than the first, indications are that he will be heavily circumscribed by the real power in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei will have a major say in how the new administration faces three critical dilemmas: the nuclear issue, the regional landscape after the conclusion of the Gaza war, and the Iranian economy.
First, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is on the brink of collapse, following the Trump administration’s withdrawal in 2018 and the failure to revive it under the Biden administration. Iran has limited time to act before facing potential repercussions such as snapback of UN sanctions before October 2025, when the UN resolution that enshrined the 2015 nuclear deal expires. The two European Security Council members that technically remain in the deal – Britain and France – are unlikely to tolerate major Iranian nuclear advances without invoking snapback. The possible return of Donald Trump as U.S. president in January 2025 could increase pressure to restore UN sanctions on Iran.
Second, the Gaza conflict appears to be coming to at least a temporary cessation which will have a broader impact on the Middle East. Several European countries have recognized the state of Palestine as part of their support for a two-state solution, contrasting with Iran’s advocacy for a single-Palestine approach in the region. The challenge for Iran lies not merely in policy adjustments, but in broader ideological shifts that would bring Iran into an international consensus and entail a diminution of support for militant anti-Israel groups.
The third but related challenge – improving the economy — is the most daunting and depends on the other two. Iran is plagued by soaring inflation, staggering unemployment, and a rapidly declining currency, worsened by persistent economic mismanagement and sanctions imposed by the U.S. Pezeshkian acknowledges that there can be no fundamental improvement without sanctions relief, which would likely require Iranian concessions both on the nuclear file and on support for militant regional partners.
Pezeshkian has suggested that he would engage in direct talks with the U.S. on the sanctions issue. The president-elect’s campaign manager even said Iran would be happy to negotiate with Donald
Trump should he return to the White House. “We will negotiate with Trump to lift the sanctions,” Ali Abdolali-Zadeh posted on social media. Trump “is a businessman, and we understand the language of trade well too.”
But Khamenei has opposed direct talks. He will make the key decisions, in conjunction with the Supreme National Security Council which the president chairs but does not control and which includes the heads of Iran’s powerful military branches. The president will then be obliged to implement these decisions.
Already, Pezeshkian has encountered hurdles directly orchestrated by Khamenei. For instance, the leader called Pezeshkian to his office immediately after the poll results were announced, forcing the president-elect to cancel a customary post-election press conference with Iranian and foreign media. Khamenei not only counseled Pezeshkian to “adhere to [Ebrahim] Raisi’s policies,”but followed up by meeting with the late president’s cabinet members to further laud Raisi, a rightwing ideologue who died in a helicopter crash in May.
Saeed Jalili, the hardliner defeated by Pezeshkian in the second round and Khamenei’s representative in the Supreme National Security Council, threatened to override the new president if he tried to alter current policies. Speaking to a group of his supporters, Jalili said he would present his plans and ideas to Pezeshkian and support the new president in implementing them. However, he also emphasized that “should we perceive any missteps on Pezeshkian’s part, we would utilize our full authority to intervene and prevent any such errors.”
These actions suggest that the challenges for Pezeshkian’s presidency have as much or more to do with navigating Khamenei’s influence as in addressing the three critical dilemmas.
Even under the weight of harsh economic sanctions, Iran has shown no inclination to make any significant compromises regarding its nuclear program or regional activities. Instead of capitulating to pressure, Iran has defiantly escalated its uranium enrichment levels, kept up its backing for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias, and tightened ties with Russia and China.
Addressing this shift in Iran’s foreign relations, including its regional strategies, is imperative for achieving sustainable peace in the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Gaza war carries profound implications for the future of the entire region, transcending the immediate humanitarian impact on the Palestinian populace.
The dispute has become a focal point for regional actors, who align themselves based on ideological, religious, or geopolitical considerations. Support for either the Palestinian cause or Israeli security interests can further polarize the region, exacerbating tensions among key players. In terms of Arab public opinion, recent opinion polls indicate that Iran has benefited from this polarization. But as long as the war continues, there is also the risk of a broader regional conflagration involving Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran itself.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s longstanding opposition to a two-state solution, coupled with the Islamic Republic’s provocative rhetoric calling for Israel’s elimination, has positioned Iran at odds with the international community. A de-escalation of the Gaza conflict and progress towards a peaceful resolution could prompt Iran to reassess its regional strategies and potentially pursue diplomatic engagement to safeguard its interests.
Pezeshkian, however, has so far dutifully echoed the official line, harshly criticizing Israel and expressing support for the “Axis of Resistance” of anti-Israel and anti-U.S. groups. While Iran’s support for proxy groups has been a means to exert influence in the region, it has also strained relations with neighboring states and intensified geopolitical rivalries. This undercuts Iran’s – and Pezeshkian’s — chances for success.
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