Editor’s Note: Marshall J. Breger is a Professor of Law at the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University of America. He was a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and his liaison to the US Jewish community. Richard Caplan is a Professor of International Relations at Oxford University and the author of International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford University Press). Larry D. Johnson is a former UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and is currently a Professorial Lecturer at the Vienna Diplomatic Academy.
The authors were participants in a conference on “Gaza: The Day After” in Amman, Jordan, 25-27 March 2024 organized by The Democracy Council and bring authoritative expertise to this topic.
By Richard Ponzio, Senior Fellow and Director of the Global Governance, Justice & Security Program
With the war in Gaza raging on, President Biden recently announced a three-part plan for Gaza that would entail a ‘surge’ of humanitarian aid, the release of all hostages held by Hamas, a permanent cessation of hostilities, and ‘major reconstruction’ of Gaza. The plan was subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council. Although billed as comprehensive, the plan – like so many others – is silent on the fundamental question: who will administer Gaza the day after?
Think tanks and pundits have proposed various kinds of international involvement after the war but the details are sparse. Some suggest a US-led effort together with Arab states. Some urge EU participation. Others have floated the idea of resuscitating the UN trusteeship system designed for former colonial territories. Israel expects the international community (largely Gulf states) to pick up the tab for reconstruction. Few talk about making use of the one model that has been effective in administering war-torn states before: a United Nations transitional authority (UNTA).
The United Nations has considerable experience administering conflict-affected territories, thereby carrying out many of the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government while building the capacity of these territories to govern themselves. UNTAs have been established in the past:
- In Cambodia, following years of civil war and foreign intervention, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established in 1992 to supervise or control all aspects of government, including foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information, pending the holding of free and fair elections which UNTAC conducted.
- In Eastern Slavonia, a territory in Croatia occupied by rebel Croatian Serb forces following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established in 1996 with full executive authority to administer the territory and oversee its reintegration into Croatia.
- In Kosovo, an Albanian-majority province of Serbia, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established in 1999 with full authority to administer the territory following the NATO-induced withdrawal of all Serbian and Yugoslav authorities from the territory and pending a determination about the future status of the contested territory.
- In East Timor, the Indonesian-occupied former colony of Portugal, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in 1999 with full authority to administer the territory following a scorched-earth campaign by Indonesian-backed forces in the wake of East Timor’s independence referendum.
A UNTA for Gaza has distinct advantages over other options. A UNTA would be established and overseen by the UN Security Council, as opposed to the UN trusteeship option that some have suggested, which would operate under General Assembly authority. As a Security Council-based option, any Israeli government would likely view it with less hostility than any other UN entity given that the US would be able to exercise its veto to protect Israel’s legitimate interests, if necessary. The Palestinian Authority – the governmental body that exercises partial control over the Palestinian territories – would also likely view a UNTA with less hostility knowing that it would be an interim arrangement leading to a two-state solution that realizes Palestinian rights and security while maintaining Israel’s rights and security.
Of course, a UNTA would face formidable challenges in administering Gaza. The establishment and maintenance of security – inside and outside the borders of Gaza – would be of paramount concern for a UNTA. A military security component with a separate Security Council mandate would be required – perhaps led by NATO, as in Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina before that. Policing, too, would need a robust international police force, as is currently envisioned for gang-ridden Haiti. The humanitarian challenges that Gaza faces are also enormous. Gaza’s health sector has been decimated; famine looms for a population of 2.23 million. With massive donor support, the UN system could deliver rapid and comprehensive humanitarian assistance to Gaza, as it has done in response to numerous natural and man-made disasters before. Reconstruction needs are urgent too: more than 1 million people have been displaced, their housing either damaged or destroyed; the lack of functioning sewage treatment facilities risks widespread water contamination, leading to serious public health issues, environmental degradation, and the spread of waterborne diseases.
How would a UNTA function? The UN Secretary-General would appoint a Transitional Administrator (TA), with the approval of the Security Council, who would have overall authority for the civilian administration of the territory; the multinational security force would operate alongside it. The UNTA would be responsible for the coordination of all humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance; the provision of basic civil and social services; the maintenance of law and order, including the administration of justice; the development of local civil institutions; and the gradual transfer of administrative responsibilities to these institutions. The TA would have executive authority but would establish structures and practices that allow for varying degrees of local participation in decision-making, leading to a progressive transfer of authority from consultation to co-governance and ultimately to incorporation into the administrative structure of the State of Palestine. The TA would be answerable to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
The UNTA would be limited to Gaza but it would not be divorced from the other occupied Palestinian territories. The stabilization and rebuilding of Gaza would be undertaken with an eye towards the revitalization and unification of all Palestinian political institutions and systems, including the holding of free and fair municipal, parliamentary, and national elections, enabling the State of Palestine to then negotiate a final settlement directly with the State of Israel, including but not limited to the status of Jerusalem and the borders in the West Bank. This would represent the completion of the political process – the Oslo Process – to which both Israelis and Palestinians had committed themselves more than two decades ago. Anything short of this ambition will be a prescription for the repetition of the cycles of violence.
There is universal recognition that the status quo ante for Gaza is unacceptable and unsustainable. A UN transitional authority may not be a panacea but it may be the least bad option. It deserves serious consideration.
